Left-wing Identity Politics and Authoritarian Attitudes: A Correlational Study of Social Media Users

Angelo Fasce and Diego Avendaño || Identity politics based on an interpretation of society as a system of power and privilege are increasingly influential within left-wing parties and movements. We used two cross-sectional samples composed of Spanish-speaking social media users (total N = 1684) to assess the relationship between psychological variables typically associated with left-wing identity politics and authoritarian attitudes. In Study 1, we tested perceived grievance, identity-based ideology, and prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged, which positively predicted left-wing authoritarianism, with large effect sizes. In Study 2, we replicated our results on identity-based ideology and observed that social justice attitudes also positively predicted left-wing authoritarianism. These results aid understanding of political attitudes among social media users and help to close the gap in relation to the wider literature on right-wing authoritarianism.

Keywords: left-wing authoritarianism, identity politics, grievance, prejudice, social justice.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2023.2246914n

Prominent scholars argue that the struggle between left-wing and right-wing forms of identity politics is increasing affective polarization and the erosion of the fundamental values of liberal democracies, with social media playing a key role in this process.ⁱ Even though social media facilitates interpersonal communication and access to information, it also constitutes a breeding ground for disinformation campaigns and facilitate the emergence of political bubbles among its users.ⁱⁱ In a recent review, Lorenz-Spreen et al.ⁱⁱⁱ suggest that information overload, personalized virtual environments, and distorted social cues create an information environment with potential to subvert the exchange of ideas among social groups. Social media users can associate with like-minded pairs in ideologically uniform online communities and these self-selected environments can give rise to the perception of broad support for negative intergroup attitudes. As a result, phenomena such as online shaming have become well-documented strategies for the promotion of ideological and political ideas, also in the left wing.^iv

In this programme of research, we focus our attention on how authoritarian attitudes among social media users may constitute a political manifestation of psychological constructs concomitant to contemporary left-wing identity politics. This domain of study has been scarcely subjected to scientific scrutiny. Prior studies have measured the relationship between various forms of prejudice and authoritarian attitudes among social media users in relation to conservative or far-right discourses—for example, prejudice against ethnic minorities and the LGBT+ community.^v However, no study to date has comprehensively used psychometric scales to measure the relationship between authoritarianism and psychological constructs typically associated with left-wing identity politics.

Left-wing identity politics

The term “identity politics” is widely used by political analysts and social scientists to describe diverse phenomena related to the politicization of social identity, wherein the distinctive traits of groups are identified as the crucial factor for socio-political conceptions and movements.^vi Kauffman^vii defined this political trend as “the belief that identity itself—its elaboration, expression, or affirmation—is and should be a fundamental focus of political work, [including] sexuality, interpersonal relations, lifestyle and culture”, thus constituting a cognitive framework in which individual situation and worldview are dissolved into a plethora of politicized intersectional group identities, organized within a hierarchy of unidirectional oppression. As a result, group differences and the recognition of oppressive relations between them play a pivotal role in identity politics.^viii Hereinafter, we describe, based on a thorough literature review, some of the most remarkable constructs of the nomological network of left-wing identity politics.

Identity-based ideology

Identity-based ideologies underlying left-wing identity politics often reflect a closely interrelated set of interpretations of Western society, rooted in experiences of injustice shared by certain groups, which are usually referred to as “cultural studies”—such as critical race theory, and postcolonial, gender, and fat studies.^ix In the empirical studies reported here, we selected three salient instances which share many commonalities, namely radical feminism, cultural feminism, and critical race theory.

Radical feminism has been deemed the dominant and most influential within left-wing movements.^x This form of feminism sees women as a culturally and politically marginalized class, asserting that Western society is primarily defined as a patriarchy based on male supremacy, and that women’s exploitation constitutes the most fundamental form of oppression.^xi Following the maxim “the personal is political”,^xii radical feminists track patriarchal power relations within both the public and private spheres—for instance, in romantic love, job market, education, prostitution, movies, housework, and child care.^xiii As it seeks to abolish patriarchy and gender roles, radical feminism is closely connected to an interpretation of intergroup relations as constructed by power and politics.

Cultural feminism evolved as a depoliticized branch of radical feminism.^xiv The central focus of cultural feminists is not so much on male control as on oppressive and negative “masculine values”, such as emotional inexpressiveness and hierarchical relations. These feminists seek to promote a cultural landscape dominated by “women’s values”, such as caring for others, emotionality, beauty, and cooperation. Cultural feminists tend to reject the notion that feminine traits reflect patriarchy, thus preferring an essentialist interpretation of gender differences in which women’s “essence” is characterized as superior to men’s.^xv Accordingly, this form of feminism departs from an assumption that women share a feminine system of values, regardless of ethnicity, class, or age.

Critical race theory acknowledges race as the fundamental category used by privileged power groups to oppress marginalized minorities, thus holding that racism pervades all the dimensions of Western societies.^xvi Critical race theory is explicitly opposed to meritocratic conceptions of equal opportunities based on colour-blind competition between individuals, as doing so would mask the self-interest of privileged groups and perpetuate inequality rooted within established political institutions, social systems, knowledge, and traditions.^xvii As a typical form of left-wing identity-based ideology, critical race theory highlights subjective experiences of oppression and aims at re-constructing the whole system of power relations through a subversive backlash against oppressive “whiteness”.^xviii

Perceived grievance

Proponents of left-wing identity politics often postulate non-explicit forms of generalized structural oppression within Western societies—a perspective that has motivated a growing corpus of research on the expansiveness of liberal people’s concepts of harm.^xix The interpretation of the public sphere as deeply immoral, unfair, and uncertain constitutes a well-documented root factor that motivates subjects to engage in authoritarian forms of justice-seeking to redress the perceived injustices suffered by their group.^xx For instance, Sullivan et al.^xxi found that men and women tend to engage in competitive victimhood when dealing with accusations of discrimination—a situation potentially aggravated by identity politics, in which the signalling of structural discrimination may boost individual’s dispositions.^xxii

Prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged

Even though prejudice has been traditionally interpreted as a right-wing phenomenon, prejudice based on the assumption that people with a different social identity also have different ideological beliefs can apply to a broader range of social categories, so people on the political left and right are both prejudiced towards groups stereotypically associated with different ideologies.^xxiii According to the identity-based ideologies addressed in this study, prejudice would be targeted towards groups perceived as privileged and oppressive, such as Whites and males.

Social justice

This political ideal encompasses the value or belief that social inequalities should be minimized in order to accomplish empowerment of disadvantaged groups and an equal allocation of resources^xxiv—for example, Constantine et al.^xxv define the concept as “fairness and equity in resources, rights and treatment for marginalized individuals and groups of people who do not share equal power in society because of their immigration, racial, ethnic, age, socioeconomic, religious heritage, physical ability, or sexual orientation status groups”. Conceptions of social justice extend across the entire ideological landscape of left-wing movements, given its central role in, among others, social democracy, anarchism, Marxism, and environmentalism. Promoters of left-wing identity politics often uphold a conception of social justice in which one of the main objectives relies on the promotion of worldviews expressing minority identities, as doing such would allow disadvantaged people to fight back structural marginalization.^xxvi

Identity politics and left-wing authoritarianism

Since the seminal work of Altemeyer^xxvii, authoritarianism had been conceptualized as an eminently right-wing construct reflecting an aggressive form of social conventionalism, based on the imposition of moral and social imperatives.^xxviii Nevertheless, the study of left-wing authoritarianism is gaining momentum.^xxix Costello et al.^xxx have advanced a domain-specific model of left-wing authoritarianism, which proposes that the construct is composed of three dimensions: 1) Anti-hierarchical aggression: A disposition to violently overthrow and punish the established figures of authority or power; 2) Top-Down Censorship: A motivation to exert group authority to regulate right-wing ideology and behaviours; 3) Anti-conventionalism: A desire for ingroup ideological uniformity and a sense of moral superiority, whereby is developed an overprotective politically correct puritanism.

We hypothesize that psychological constructs related to left-wing identity politics, as increasingly influential political movements, predict the endorsement of authoritarian attitudes—which could be tracked in violent protests and incidents of repression against free speech,^xxxi also in Spanish-speaking countries.^xxxii These phenomena have been regarded, in both the English and Spanish-speaking contexts, as a reactionary drift within the left wing,^xxxiii reflected in lessened support for civil liberties and rights among left-wing social media users.^xxxiv

Hypothesis and precedents

In the following, we will report and discuss two quantitative studies conducted to test the predictive power of the previously described constructs for authoritarian attitudes. These predictions are summarized in the following hypothesis:

Psychological constructs typically related to left-wing identity politics (identity-based ideology, perceived grievance, prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged, and social justice) positively predict left-wing authoritarianism.

To assess the originality and significance of this hypothesis in relation to the existing empirical literature on this topic, on 27 November 2022, we conducted multiple searches using the main databases of academic publications in behavioural sciences (i.e., Web of Science, Scopus, PsycINFO, and Google Scholar) using English and Spanish search strings. We only found two precedents: two survey-based studies in which social justice commitment and feminist ideology were positively associated with left-wing authoritarianism.^xxxv

Study 1

In the first study, we used a sample of social media users to test the predictive power for left-wing authoritarianism of three components of the nomological network of left-wing identity politics: identity-based ideology, perceived grievance, and prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged. We also conducted exploratory analyses on liberal feminism as a left-wing ideology detached from the forms of politicization of social identity that are typical of identity politics. This type of feminism is regarded as greatly influenced by classical liberal thought and can be summarized as a belief that men and women should be equal before law, having the same civil rights and equality of opportunity—nevertheless, liberal feminists usually consider that group differences and private life should be placed outside the scope of gender politics.^xxxvi Liberal feminism was used to test the specificity of the relationship between identity-based ideology and left-wing authoritarianism.

Sample

We recruited a sample of 1315 Spanish-speaking participants from a wide range of politically charged groups through social media. No rewards were offered in exchange and all participants gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. To obtain an adequate level of political heterogeneity, throughout the data gathering process we selected the new groups in which to share the questionnaire based on the descriptive statistics of the Political Self-Identification variable (assessed through a 10-point Likert scale; 1 = far-left, 10 = far-right), to focus on areas of the political spectrum that were underrepresented—as a result, participants’ Political Self-Identification exhibited proper variability and normal distribution (skewness = -0.07, kurtosis = -0.85). Nine hundred and twenty-four participants (70%) stem from Spain and 391 (30%) from Latin American countries; 691 (53%) were women and 624 (47%) were men, with an average age of 29 years (SD: 11); 260 (20%) had pre-university education and 1055 (80%) had university education; lastly, 886 (67%) self-identified as non-religious (atheist or agnostic) and 429 (33%) as religious (practicing or non-practicing).

Measures

Left-wing authoritarianism. To assess Left-Wing Authoritarianism, we used a 39-item scale.^xxxvii It presents a tripartite structure: Anti-hierarchical aggression (e.g., “political violence can be constructive when it serves the cause of social justice”), top-down censorship (e.g., “when we spend all of our time protecting the right to ‘free speech’ we’re protecting the rights of sexists, racists, and homophobes at the cost of marginalized people”), and anti-conventionalism (e.g., “conservatives are morally inferior to liberals”). The Spanish version of the scale used in these studies has been validated by Avendaño et al.^xxxviii and its factor solution is consistent with the structure of the English scale.

Identity-based ideology. To measure left-wing instances of identity-based ideology, we used three scales. Firstly, a 5-item measure on Radical Feminism (e.g., “marriage is a perfect example of men’s physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women” and “men use abortion laws and reproductive technology to control women’s lives”). Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) revealed excellent fit indices for a one-factor solution: [χ² (5) = 14.95, p < 0.05], TLI = 0.99, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.039 (0.017 – 0.062), SRMR = 0.01. Secondly, a 6-item scale on Cultural Feminism (e.g., “putting women in positions of political power would bring about new systems of government that promote peace” and “bringing more women into male-dominated professions would make the professions less cutthroat and competitive”). Again, CFA resulted in excellent fit indices for a one-factor solution: [χ² (9) = 26.20, p < 0.01], TLI = 0.99, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.038 (0.022 – 0.056), SRMR = 0.02. Both scales on feminism were retrieved from the short form of the feminist perspectives scale.^xxxix Thirdly, we adapted several items from a previous scale developed by Campbell^xl to construct a 7-item scale to measure Critical Race Theory based on an in-depth literature review on the topic (e.g., “equal opportunity laws, including racial neutrality and meritocracy camouflages the self-interest of powerful entities of society” and “powerful groups generally demonize minority races and ethnic groups to feel better about exploiting them”). CFA supported a one-factor solution for this scale: [χ² (14) = 130.96, p < 0.001], TLI = 0.97, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.080 (0.068 – 0.092), SRMR = 0.03.

Perceived grievance. We included a scale on Sexism Awareness (8-item; e.g., “women are disadvantaged compared to men” and “femininity is less valued in this society”). CFA showed satisfactory fit indices: [χ² (20) = 188.65, p < 0.001], TLI = 0.97, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.080 (0.070 – 0.091), SRMR = 0. We also added a scale on White Privilege Awareness (13-item; e.g., “White cultural characteristics are more valued than those of people of color” and “most White high-level executives are promoted based on their race”). CFA also showed satisfactory fit indices: [χ² (65) = 1162.99, p < 0.001], TLI = 0.92, CFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.113 (0.108 – 0.119), SRMR = 0.04. These two scales were retrieved from the privilege and oppression inventory developed by Hays et al.^xli

Prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged. Prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged, understood as negative gender and ethnicity stereotypes, was measured through two scales. On one hand, to measure Prejudice Towards Whites, we used the 7-item ingroup-directed stigmatization and discriminatory expectations subscale developed by Johnson and Lecci^xlii(e.g., “I believe that most Whites would harm Blacks if they could get away with it” and “I believe that most Whites would love to return to a time in which Blacks had no civil rights”). CFA revealed satisfactory fit indices for a one-factor solution: [χ² (14) = 273.50, p < 0.001], TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.119 (0.107 – 0.131), SRMR = 0.03. On the other hand, to measure Prejudice Towards Men, we administered the 10-item hostility towards men subscale of the ambivalence towards men inventory developed by Glick and Fiske^xliii (e.g., “most men sexually harass women, even if only in subtle ways, once they are in a position of power over them” and “when men act to ‘help’ women, they are often trying to prove they are better than women”). CFA also revealed satisfactory fit indices for a one-factor solution: χ² (34) = 496.16, p < 0.001], TLI = 0.91, CFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.100 (0.092 – 0.108), SRMR = 0.05.

Liberal feminism. To conduct exploratory analyses, we included a 5-item scale on Liberal Feminism (e.g., “whether one chooses a traditional or alternative family form should be a matter of personal choice” and “men need to be liberated from oppressive sex role stereotypes as much as women do”), validated by Henley et al.^xliv CFA revealed satisfactory fit indices for a one-factor solution: [χ² (4) = 49.85, p < 0.001], TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.093 (0.071 – 0.117), SRMR = 0.03.

The descriptive statistics, distributions, and internal consistencies of the variables used in Study 1 are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics, distribution, and internal consistency of the scales used in both studies.

Study 1
Political self-identification	1-10	5.69 (2.48)	-0.07	-0.85	–
Left-wing authoritarianism	1-5	1.94 (0.66)	1.32	1.67	0.94
Radical feminism	1-5	1.55 (0.86)	1.98	3.46	0.90
Cultural feminism	1-5	1.92 (0.86)	1.08	0.72	0.83
Critical race theory	1-5	2.09 (1.06)	0.84	-0.29	0.91
Sexism Awareness	1-6	2.60 (1.36)	0.93	-0.08	0.93
White privilege awareness	1-5	2.30 (1.11)	0.77	-0.49	0.95
Prejudice towards men	1-6	1.98 (1.02)	1.33	1.53	0.91
Prejudice towards whites	1-5	1.02 (0.52)	1.74	2.85	0.91
Liberal feminism	1-5	3.52 (1.00)	-0.90	0.15	0.73
Study 2
Political self-identification	1-10	4.88 (2.33)	0.10	-0.77	–
Left-wing authoritarianism	1-5	2.06 (0.68)	1.01	0.64	0.95
Radical feminism	1-5	1.87 (1.02)	1.22	0.50	0.90
Cultural feminism	1-5	2.15 (0.94)	0.85	0.10	0.85
Critical race theory	1-5	2.51 (1.01)	0.32	-0.84	0.86
Social Justice	1-5	3.76 (0.88)	-0.76	0.56	0.91
Liberal feminism	1-5	3.89 (0.76)	-1.68	3.98	0.61

Results

Correlations between Left-Wing Authoritarianism and the predicted variables

Table 2 displays the correlation matrix between all the variables included in Study 2. Given our sample size (N = 1315), our data would be sufficient to reliably detect effects of r = 0.08, with 80% power (α = 0.05, two-tailed). The variables were all positively and strongly intercorrelated in our sample of social media users. In addition, Left-Wing Authoritarianism exhibited significant strong correlations with Radical Feminism (r = 0.71), Cultural Feminism (r = 0.66), Critical Race Theory (r = 0.75), Sexism Awareness (r = 0.70), White Privilege Awareness (r = 0.71), Prejudice Towards Men (r = 0.62), and Prejudice Towards Whites (r = 0.64).

Table 2: Correlation matrix between the variables included in Study 1.

1. Left-Wing Authoritarianism	–	-0.51**	0.71**	0.66**	0.75**	0.35**	0.70**	0.71**	0.62**	0.64**
2. Political Self-Identification		–	-0.42**	-0.30**	-0.38**	-0.27**	-0.40**	-0.40**	-0.28**	-0.30**
3. Radical Feminism			–	0.72**	0.73**	0.27**	0.80**	0.72**	0.72**	0.67**
4. Cultural Feminism				–	0.69**	0.39**	0.74**	0.67**	0.67**	0.55**
5. Critical Race Theory					–	0.38**	0.77**	0.85**	0.67**	0.70**
6. Liberal Feminism						–	0.43**	0.38**	0.32**	0.20**
7. Sexism Awareness							–	0.81**	0.73**	0.62**
8. White Privilege Awareness								–	0.68**	0.70**
9. Prejudice Towards Men									–	0.64**
10. Prejudice Towards Whites										–

Note: All significant results are corrected by Bonferroni method at p < .05. * = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.001.

Regression and mediation analyses with Left-Wing Authoritarianism as the dependent variable

To test our hypothesis, we conducted a series of regression analyses taking Left-Wing Authoritarianism as the dependent variable—displayed in Table 3. Given our sample size (N = 1315), the regression model would be sensitive to effects of R² = 0.01, with 80% power (α = 0.05).

Table: Multiple linear regressions with Left-Wing Authoritarianism as dependent variable in Study 1.

F	90.94	298.64	280.77	257.07	216.85
p	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001
VIF	< 1.3	< 2.8	< 3	< 1.8	< 4.8
Tolerance	> 0.83	> 0.36	> 0.34	> 0.56	> 0.21

Note: Sex was coded as 1 = women, 2 = men; Education as 1 = pre-university, 2 = university; Religious Identity as 1 = non-religious, 2 = religious; and Political Self-Identification as 1 = far-left, 10 = far-right. R² displays the adjusted value. All regression coefficients are standardized β. * = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.001.

In the first analysis, we assessed the predictive power of the sociodemographic variables and Political Self-Identification to be used as control covariates, so that, in subsequent analyses, we were able to calculate the increase in the correlation coefficient between the observed and predicted values (ΔR) and the amount of variance specifically accounted for by the predictor variables assessed in each model (ΔR²). In the second analysis, we tested the predictive power of the ideological variables, resulting in Radical Feminism, Cultural Feminism, Critical Race Theory being confirmed as positive predictors of Left-Wing Authoritarianism (ΔR = 0.31, ΔR² = 0.42). In contrast, Liberal Feminism added no predictive power above the other ideological variables. In the third analysis, we introduced perceived grievance, with Sexism Awareness and White Privilege Awareness also being positive predictors of authoritarian attitudes (ΔR = 0.27, ΔR² = 0.34). In the fourth analyses, variables manifesting prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged (i.e., Prejudice Towards Men and Prejudice Towards Whites) also accounted for a significant and substantial amount of variance (ΔR = 0.25, ΔR² = 0.32). Lastly, we introduced all the predicted variables in the fifth regression analysis. This last analysis resulted in ΔR = 0.32 and ΔR² = 0.43. The obtained results support our hypothesis, as the constructs related to left-wing identity politics assessed in Study 1 constitute positive predictors of authoritarian attitudes.

The last regression revealed that the identity-based ideologies measured are the dominant predictors in our sample of social media users, which suggests potential mediational effects in the associations of left-wing authoritarianism with perceived grievance and prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged. The proposed design for the mediation analyses do not suggest a univocal causal pathway between identity politics and authoritarianism. Instead, based on the data obtained in the regression analysis (Table 3, fifth model), we propose that identity politics facilitates the endorsement of certain authoritarian attitudes and behaviours, with identity-based ideology, as the dominant predictor, playing a mediational role. Furthermore, this model is more parsimonious and elegant from an explanatory point of view—it is easier to explain political action based on ideological conceptions than the other way around.

We tested these effects using the SPSS PROCESS macro (v3.4) to conduct targeted mediation analyses, estimating the indirect effect via bootstrapping (95% confidence intervals; number of bootstrap samples: 5000). As can be seen from Figure 1, identity-based ideologies (Radical Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Critical Race Theory) act as significant mediators in the association of Sexism Awareness with Left-wing Authoritarianism (indirect effect: 0.62). They also significantly mediate the association of Prejudice Towards Men and Left-Wing Authoritarianism (indirect effect: 0.57). Similarly, these identity-based ideologies act as significant mediators in the associations of Left-Wing Authoritarianism with White Privilege Awareness (indirect effect: 0.59) and Prejudice Towards Whites (indirect effect: 0.51).

Indirect effect: 0.62 (CI: 0.55, 0.70)	Indirect effect: 0.59 (CI: 0.53, 0.66)
Indirect effect: 0.57 (CI: 0.51, 0.63)	Indirect effect: 0.51 (CI: 0.45, 0.56)

Figure 1. Graphical representation of mediation analyses in Study 1. SA = Sexism Awareness, WPA = White Privilege Awareness, PTM = Prejudice Towards Men, PTW = Prejudice Towards Whites, RF = Radical Feminism, CF = Cultural Feminism, CRT = Critical Race Theory, LWA = Left-Wing Authoritarianism. Values represent standardized beta coefficients. Direct effect between parentheses. * = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.001.

Study 2

In this second study, we used another sample of social media users to test the predictive power of social justice, as the remaining dimension of the nomological network of left-wing identity politics described in previous sections. This study was also aimed at replicating our previous results on ideological variables (radical feminism, cultural feminism, critical race theory, and liberal feminism).

Sample

We recruited a sample of 369 Spanish-speaking participants through Twitter and Facebook groups on feminism, social justice, and left-wing politics. To increase variability, we also recruited subjects from groups on science dissemination and conservatism. No rewards were offered in exchange and all participants gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study. Following the same procedure as in Study 1, we selected the new groups in which to share the questionnaire based on the descriptive statistics of a 10-point Likert scale on Political Self-Identification (1 = far-left, 10 = far-right), to focus on areas of the political spectrum that were underrepresented and, consequently, achieve an appropriate level of political heterogeneity (skewness = 0.10, kurtosis = -0.77). Two hundred and eighty-six participants (77%) stem from Spain and 83 (23%) from Latin American countries; 100 (27%) were women and 269 (73%) were men, with an average age of 36 years (SD: 12); 90 (24%) had pre-university education and 279 (76%) had university education; lastly, 291 (79%) self-identified as non-religious (atheist or agnostic) and 78 (21%) as religious (practicing or non-practicing).

Measures

Left-wing authoritarianism. We administered the scale on Left-Wing Authoritarianism used in Study 1.

Identity-based ideology. To measure identity-based ideology, we administered the same three scales used in Study 1: Radical Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Critical Race Theory.

Liberal feminism. To replicate our previous exploratory analyses, we also included the same measure on Liberal Feminism.

Social justice. We used the 11-item social justice attitudes scale (e.g., “I believe that it is important to make sure that all individuals and groups have a chance to speak and be heard, especially those from traditionally ignored or marginalized groups” and “I believe that it is important to try to change larger social conditions that cause individual suffering and impede well-being”).^xlv The Social Justice scale was presented with a preceding instruction of thinking about situations of interaction between men and women, and Whites and Blacks. CFA showed satisfactory fit indices for the one-factor solution: [χ² (43) = 233.97, p < 0.001], TLI = 0.89, CFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.110 (0.096 – 0.124), SRMR = 0.05.

The descriptive statistics, distributions, and internal consistencies of the variables used in Study 2 are also displayed in Table 1.

Results

Correlations between Left-Wing Authoritarianism and the predicted variables

Given our sample size (N = 369), our data would be sufficient to reliably detect effects of r = 0.15, with 80% power (α = 0.05, two-tailed). Correlation analysis using our second sample of social media users replicated the strong and positive intercorrelations between identity-based ideologies, which extends to Social Justice. In addition, Left-Wing Authoritarianism also showed significant strong correlations with Radical Feminism (r = 0.77), Cultural Feminism (r = 0.71), Critical Race Theory (r = 0.75) and Social Justice (r = 0.61). These results are displayed in Table 4.

Table 4 Correlation matrix between the variables included in Study 2.

1. Left-Wing Authoritarianism	–	-0.63**	0.77**	0.71**	0.75**	0.61**	0.17**
2. Political Self-Identification		–	-0.60**	-0.47**	-0.56**	-0.48**	-0.20**
3. Radical Feminism			–	0.76**	0.77**	0.60**	0.19**
4. Cultural Feminism				–	0.73**	0.59**	0.24**
5. Critical Race Theory					–	0.65**	0.27**
6. Social Justice						–	0.47**
7. Liberal Feminism							–

Note: All significant results are corrected by Bonferroni method at p < .05. * = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.001.

Regression and mediation analyses with Left-Wing Authoritarianism as the dependent variable

As we did in Study 1, we conducted a series of regression analyses with Left-Wing Authoritarianism as the dependent variable to assess the predictive power of the independent variables in our sample of social media users. Given our sample size (N = 369), the regression models would be sensitive to effects of R² = 0.05, with 80% power (α = 0.05). These results are displayed in Table 5.

Table 5 Multiple linear regressions with Left-Wing Authoritarianism as dependent variable in Study 2.

F	62.13	100.45	77.85	94.59
P	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001
VIF	< 1.2	< 3.7	< 1.4	< 3.8
Tolerance	> 0.89	> 0.27	> 0.72	> 0.27

In the first analysis, all the sociodemographic variables were introduced to calculate the increase in the correlation coefficient between the predicted and observed values (ΔR) and the amount of variance explained by the predictor variables in each subsequent analysis (ΔR²). In the second analysis, we introduced the ideological variables. The results obtained in Study 1 were replicated, as Radical Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Critical Race Theory positively predicted Left-Wing Authoritarianism (ΔR = 0.17, ΔR² = 0.26). Again, Liberal Feminism showed no significant predictive power above the other ideological variables. In the third analysis, Social Justice was also confirmed as a predictor of Left-Wing Authoritarianism (ΔR = 0.07, ΔR² = 0.11). These results offer further confirmation for our hypothesis and suggest that the positive and direct association between authoritarian attitudes and the left wing is partial—i.e., applicable to certain ideological trends, such as identity politics, but not to others.

We introduced all the predicted variables in a last regression analysis, resulting in ΔR = 0.17 and ΔR² = 0.27, and Liberal Feminism negatively predicting Left-Wing Authoritarianism after controlling for identity-based ideology and Social Justice. Following the procedure described in Study 1, we carried out a mediation analysis, estimating the indirect effect via bootstrapping (95% confidence intervals; number of bootstrap samples: 5000) to test the mediational role of the three instances of identity-based ideology on the relationship between Social Justice and Left-Wing Authoritarianism. These results are displayed in Figure 2 and confirm that identity-based ideologies also act as significant mediators in this association (indirect effect: 0.49).

Indirect effect: 0.49 (CI: 0.41, 0.59)

Figure 2. Graphical representation of mediation analysis in Study 2. SJ = Social Justice, RF = Radical Feminism, CF = Cultural Feminism, CRT = Critical Race Theory, LWA = Left-Wing Authoritarianism. Values represent standardized beta coefficients. Direct effect between parentheses. * = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.001.

Discussion

The results found in our two samples of social media users support our hypothesis and suggest that left-wing identity politics reflect a network of psychological associations composed of perceived grievance, identity-based ideology, prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged, and social justice-seeking, which could be manifested in authoritarian political agendas. Correlation and regression analyses supported this interpretation, with perceived grievance, identity-based ideology, prejudice towards groups perceived as privileged, and social justice attitudes being strongly intercorrelated, and positively predicting authoritarian attitudes. It should be noted that the scales used to measure participants’ perceptions of grievance, ideological background, prejudices, and attitudes towards social justice are quite independent from each other in logical and semantic terms—for example, there is no need to subscribe to radical or cultural feminism to perceive sexism or hold gender prejudice, and something similar could be said on critical race theory, perception of racism, and race prejudice. A strength of the reported results is that the multiple regressions control for liberal-conservative political orientation. This way, the effects of the identity politics variables show to what extent they predict left-wing authoritarianism over and above the effects of conventional liberalism. This is important since conventional liberalism predicts left-wing authoritarianism substantially (just as conventional conservatism predicts right-wing authoritarianism), due to their inevitably shared ideological content. The importance of doing this has been emphasized in recent years though it was neglected in most prior research.^xlvi

Moreover, in both studies, we used liberal feminism as an exploratory variable to test the distinctiveness of the associations between authoritarian attitudes and identity politics. We interpret this situation as analogous to the nomological network of right-wing authoritarianism, which is predicted by social conservatism but sometimes not by economic conservatism—an effect often attributed to the philosophical foundations of liberal values.^xlvii Liberal values tend to limit intergroup hostility through the promotion of a cultural system based on an open marketplace of ideas and lifestyles, which act as a cognitive basis for mutual understanding.^xlviii In contrast, authoritarians are prone to be attracted to intransigent doctrines by means of emphasized conventionalism, identifying themselves with groups that provide normative beliefs and behavioural prescriptions.^xlix In this regard, right-wing authoritarians tend to engage with abstract deontologies and selective intolerance elicited by religious orthodoxy and nationalism.^l Identity politics may be playing a similar role among left-wing social media users with authoritarian dispositions, as gender and ethnic partisanship might also constitute a form of illiberal civil solidarity.^li

To finish this section, we would like to remark on some limitations of the reported results. The nature of our two samples (social media users recruited from politically charged online groups) set constraints on the generalizability of the reported results. Previous research has shown that information shared in social media tends to be more extravagant and partisan than that of the open web,^lii so appealing minority positions spread more efficiently than moderate views.^liii More research is needed to know if social media use and political engagement also explain the observed large effect sizes for the associations between left-wing identity politics and authoritarianism. In this regard, replications using representative samples of the general population of one or more countries would be more than welcome. Furthermore, around 70% of these samples stem from Spain, a Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic country (WEIRD).^liv Hence, the extrapolation of these results to non-WEIRD populations should also be addressed with caution. Even though the number of participants allowed us to carry out intergroup comparisons, the samples were composed by a higher number of university educated and non-religious participants—and males in Study 2. These asymmetries should be taken into consideration in the future to assess if they affected our results. Lastly, the correlational approach of both studies does not allow us to draw causal inferences between the tested variables, although it does suggest promising research lines to confirm causal relations. Although the reported mediation analyses cannot confirm causal relationships between the tested variables due to the correlational nature of our data, they can guide future experimental research due to its compatibility with a causal interpretation (i.e., association does not imply causation, but causation implies association in cross-sectional samples with proper size and variability).

Concluding remarks

We successfully tested the predictive power for authoritarian attitudes of variables typically associated with left-wing identity politics. In addition, we obtained exploratory results suggesting that liberal feminism does not constitute a direct positive predictor of authoritarian attitudes. In our view, the reported results call for social scientists and policymakers to evaluate ways to redesign digital environments in ways that promote more heterogeneous interactions, mutual understanding, and open exchanges among users.^lv As the first studies of their kind, the reported results open novel research lines to aid understanding of the contemporary Western socio-political landscape, as the scientific analysis of authoritarian left-wing movements completes the wider literature on the upsurge of right-wing authoritarianism.

Open Science

All data and materials used in this article are publicly available in https://osf.io/s3n8c/.

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