Politics is not the business of specialists. There is no science of [politics]
~Castoriadis1
Yavor Tarkinski, Orobo Journal || One of the main arguments against direct democracy is that people en mass lack the knowledge, expertise, and skills to run their whole society collectively. On the basis of this anti-democratic fallacy the supporters of the current oligarchic model of representation agree on the conduct of elections but refuse any form of more direct involvement of the populace with political decision-making. According to this logic the most that ordinary people can be entrusted with is to choose the best among society to rule them. But if democratic tools are even mentioned – like public assemblies or sortition – then the supporters of oligarchy argue that the mass of people lacks what is needed to run their life in common.
This anti-democratic slander is nurtured by the dominant system as the latter, despite parading as “representative democracy” is in fact inherently oligarchic, of a particularly aristocratic type. Modern-day support for more technocratic involvement with politics stems from a concept that originates in ancient Greece – namely, Aristokratíā or Aristocracy. It is a model of government based on inequality, where the áristoi (or the best) get the authority to rule over the populace. One of its notable supporters in the ancient Greek world was Plato, who advocated for the reigns of society be undertaken by the “best,” meaning philosophers who are both wise and virtuous. The technocrats of today argue basically for the same thing – that governments be run by people with a whole bunch of diplomas and titles that certify their cognitive superiority over the rest of us.
This line of argumentation is, of course, completely fallacious as politics concerns the everyday life of ordinary people, rather than a specific scientific field. It has to do with people collectively determining the rules under which they want to live together – how power and resources are being distributed, what rights there are for individuals and communities, etc. These are all issues that are of practical and moral nature, with no single correct response. It is up to the political choice of the people who consist society to decide how they want to live their life in common, rather than allow one or a group of experts dictate the correct way.
This brings us to a crucial distinction between what the ancient Greeks called technē (technical skill) and praxis (action in the everyday human realm). The former has to do with the mastery of craftsmanship and technic processes, such as the production of complex machineries or the conduct of surgery, while the latter indicated public deliberation on passing judgement and making decisions according to collectively upheld values. This distinction is underlined by Aristotle in the following manner:
All art [technē] is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). Making and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting… action and making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself, action [praxis] cannot; for good action itself is its end.2
The distinction between the two is evident from the way crises are managed by technocrats. Take for example the European financial crisis that began on 2009. Governments across the EU framed it as an issue that requires exclusive economic and financial skills, and thus, a task to be vested to technocrats. But the problem is that this crisis is not an exercise in some textbook. It has real-life implications for all layers of society, and each decision taken bears the burden of inflicting suffering and pain on the most vulnerable sections of the populace. No economic model can deliver justice to those who are about to get hit the hardest, since its not an issue of economic, but rather of political character. It has to do with democratic deliberation between all those effected in coming to a solution that will be attentive to their everyday experiences.
While vital for human progress, expert knowledge cannot supplant grassroots political deliberation. Experts can and should provide explanation for different social and natural phenomena and calculate what the outcome of a given policy may be, but it is up to the social whole collectively to decide whether this or that policy is in accordance with its values, whether it is just or unjust, regardless of the expected outcome.
Politics also has to do with the experience of decisions taken and policies enacted, which in itself is a process of production of political knowledge. Rather than a narrow expertise in a given field, it has to do with an overall comprehension of ways of living, which does not derive from textbooks or the scientific method but by daily experiences that are unique for each and every member of society. In this line of thought philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis suggests that:
The politician, according to these premises, would have to be the Incarnation of Absolute and Total Knowledge. No technical specialization, however advanced, entitles its possessor to master areas other than his own.3
In short, there can never be an expert of everything that can be entrusted with the rule of society. But even if in some sci-fi alternative universe such a thing was even possible, it could still not be also the bearer of everyday experiences of each and every individual that consists the collective whole. Castoriadis insists that:
Competence is, almost by definition, restricted in its scope. Outside of his/her particular sector, or of the particular process which s/he knows, the technician is no better equipped to take a responsible decision than anyone else. Even within his/her own field, his/her viewpoint is often limited. He/she will often know little of the other sectors and may tend to minimize their importance although these sectors have a definite bearing on his own.4
The legitimacy of direct democracy stems exactly from the realization of this simple truth. It is a just form of social organization because it disseminates power not in accordance to knowledge, but in accordance to the extent policies affect our shared lives. As policies will determine our collective goals and values, it is only logical that all members of society get to participate in their crafting. The foundational basis of direct democracy then is the equality of political voices, rather than the inequality of expertise. Mikhail Bakunin warns of the dangers embedded in the latter approach:
there is no universal man, no man capable of grasping in all that wealth of detail, without which the application of science to life is impossible, all the sciences, all the branches of social life. And if such universality could ever be realised in a single man, and if he wished to take advantage thereof to impose his authority upon us, it would be necessary to drive this man out of society, because his authority would inevitably reduce all the others to slavery and imbecility. I do not think that society ought to maltreat men of genius as it has done hitherto: but niether do I think it should indulge them too far, still less accord them any privileges or exclusive rights whatsoever; and that for three reasons: first, because it would often mistake a charlatan for a man of genius; second, because, through such a system of privileges, it might transform into a charlatan even a real man of genius, demoralise him, and degrade him; and, finally, because it would establish a master over itself.5
The common toiler is the living embodiment of the plurality of the social whole. They consist of the range of needs, perspectives, and ways of living life that the political system must abide to. It is through this plurality, and the deliberation that arises from it, that values, significations, and norms emerge that regulate social relations as seen fit by those who consist society, rather than elites whose privileges have detached them from the many.
For philosopher Jacques Rancière there is no natural or divine principle (ἀρχή) on which society must be grounded when it comes to politics since the very ground for the power or ruling is that there is no ground at all.6 He suggests that:
it is possible to establish a list of governments based on the respective titles to govern. But a single government will be missing fr om the list, precisely political government.7
This absence of titles is indicative of the pluralist essence of politics. The constant exchange of experiences and the deliberation between different worldviews is what constitutes a political community, as opposed to a blood-tied clan or an all-controlling uniform totalitarianism. And it is the project of direct democracy, with its decentralization of power and mass participation in decision-making, that best suits and nurtures this social pluralism.
If today our societies are feeling detached and plagued by alienation, and if risky decisions and endeavors are constantly being made that empower and enrich the few while endangering the many, it is exactly because the current oligarchic model constantly stifles the innate social pluralism. Because of the dominant top-down structure, it is only the narrow interest of the elites that gets to be enforced through the guise of national unity or the “invisible hand” of the capitalist market. As political theorist Hélène Landemore suggests:
The flaws in our current democratic models come from their being excessively, rather than insufficiently, elitist and epistocratic. It is because electoral democracies only empower a fraction of their population that they fail to deliver good policies and, in turn, breed both authoritarian and populist backlashes.8
The viability of the project of direct democracy, however, is not confined within the fields of political theory or speculation of the ancient past. Throughout history there have been numerous examples of people-power in practice. While minorotarian, their examples radiate stark inspiration to all those that dare to imagine a more just world. Nowadays the two most notable examples in the direction of a direct-democratic society are the revolutionary experiments of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, and the democratic confederalist communities of Rojava. In both cases, while expert knowledge plays an important role in developing different fields of social life, the final decision is always left to be made collectively by the grassroots.9 These societies have come to the realization, and have given it an institutional expression as well, that politics is not a matter of expertice held by few technocrats, but a capacity that emerges when people en masse engage directly with managing the public affairs that shape their life in common.
Ultimately the issue boils down to the following, if humanity is to avoid social and environmental collapse it is up to its constituents to give way to the innate social plurality through the political architecture best suited for this – the project of direct democracy. It is not a matter on speculating whether people can directly and collectively in social-wide decision-making, we already know they can do it and there is a plethora of examples for that. The question is how to make the majority believe in its direct-democratic capacity – this is the greatest issue before us.
Footnotes
1 Cornelius Castoriadis, Postscript on Insignificance: Dialogues with Castoriadis (New York: Continuum, 2011), 11.
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, book VI, chap. 6, Internet Classics Archive, MIT, accessed November 18, 2025, https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.6.vi.html
3 Cornelius Castoriadis, “On the Content of Socialism: Part Two (From the Critique of Bureaucracy to the Idea of the Proletariat’s Autonomy),” 1957, in Socialisme ou Barbarie, reprinted on the Marxists Internet Archive, accessed November 18, 2025, https://www.marxists.org/archive/castoriadis/1957/socialism-2.htm
4 Cornelius Castoriadis, “Workers’ Councils and the Economics of a Self-Managed Society,” 1972, Marxists Internet Archive, accessed November 18, 2025, https://www.marxists.org/archive/castoriadis/1972/workers-councils.htm
5 Mikhail Bakunin, “What Is Authority?” (1871), in Bakunin’s Writings, Marxists Internet Archive, accessed November 18, 2025, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/various/authrty.htm
6 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2010), 50.
7 Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (London: Verso, 2006), 45.
8Hélène Landemore, “Defending ‘Open’ Democracy,” Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Pennsylvania, accessed November 18, 2025, https://amc.sas.upenn.edu/h%C3%A9l%C3%A8ne-landemore-open-democracy
9 Bance, Pierre. “Autonomy Institutions in Chiapas and Rojava: What Lessons?” Peace in Kurdistan Campaign, January 19, 2022. Accessed November 19, 2025. https://www.peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/autonomy-institutions-in-chiapas-and-rojava-what-lessons/
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