Dingane Xaba, Unicorn Riot || Over 16 years have passed since Mohamed Bouazizi – a Tunisian street vendor – self-immolated in protest against longtime dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This pivotal moment served as the beginning the “Arab Spring” – a series of global political revolutions that began in the north African country of Tunisia, subsequently spreading across the wider Middle East and the world.
Syria would become the epicenter of this global movement in 2011, when millions of Syrian demonstrators hit the streets to protest against the Assad family dictatorship. The dictatorship’s brutal crackdown led to the subsequent Syrian civil war. Current estimates place the ensuing death toll at over half a million, while at least six million Syrians are believed to have been displaced.
The Assad political dynasty was suddenly toppled in late 2024 by an Islamist-led Syrian rebel coalition heavily backed by neighboring Turkey. The transitional Syrian government, now ruled by former al-Qaeda operative Ahmed al-Sharaa, has since gone on a wide-ranging international charm offensive in order to court further financial and military benefits from both the east and the west. Thus far, those efforts have resulted in the lifting of western economic sanctions against Syria, while American, Turkish and Russian strategic military bases in the country continued to occupy the landscape. Israel also has moved beyond the 1967 ceasefire line to occupy more of Quneitra province.
Syria’s transitional government has made it a priority to unite all of Syria under one central authority from the capital city of Damascus. This includes all territory currently controlled by the semi-autonomous region officially known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, but more commonly referred to as Rojava.
2026 Syrian Government Offensive; Islamic State Group Prison Breaks
In March 2025, the Syrian transitional government and Rojava reached a comprehensive deal to integrate all of the latter’s civil and military institutions with the transitional Syrian government by the end of that year. Despite this agreement in principle, details over how exactly this it was to be implemented were scarce, as the full version of the March 2025 agreement was never fully publicized. Thus, tense negotiations continued on as both sides continued to disagree over their own separate interpretations of the agreement, and other unresolved issues.
These tensions eventually boiled over into open conflict beginning on August 2025, as Rojava-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and government troops started to engage in limited but fierce clashes, particularly around the strategically situated cities of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo.
After the integration deadline passed on December 31, 2025, the transitional government initiated a full-scale invasion of Rojava, starting with the Kurdish-dominated neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyah in Aleppo city. The bulk of Syrian Army troops involved in this latest invasion effort mostly consisted of units from the Syrian National Army (SNA) – a former rebel group that has now integrated into the newly reconstituted Syrian Arab Army.
Since its inception in 2016, the SNA had been used as a proxy force by Turkey to invade and occupy large parts of Rojava. The group has since racked up a long list of reported war crimes, ranging from forced mass displacement to extrajudicial executions of civilians and genocide.
The Syrian Army push into Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyah met heavy resistance by Rojava’s local internal police units, known as “Asayish” – a Kurdish word meaning security. These internal security units reportedly received no assistance from Rojava’s main military force in the SDF. Thus, a relatively small force of hundreds of local Kurds were left to confront a much larger and better equipped army of at least 20,000 government troops.
Though resistance was fierce, the massively outnumbered Asayish held out for a time but being surrounded and cut off from any form of resupply would force them to ultimately surrender their positions and pull out of Aleppo. A short-lived ceasefire was agreed to after this initial withdrawal before fighting quickly resumed yet again. This resulted in further SDF withdrawals across the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.
However, the Syrian government’s army did not stop their invasion there, immediately crossing over the river and capturing the key strategic cities of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor with little-to-no Kurdish resistance. Government troops had received assistance from a number of local Arab tribesmen in those areas, some of whom had earlier been a part of the SDF but switched sides during the offensive. It was these former SDF militias that were able to secure both Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa ahead of the Syrian Army. From there, government forces continued to push northwards until they reached the outskirts of Kobani, Qamishli and Hasaka – all traditional Kurdish strongholds.
Source: Institute for the Study of War.
The SDF also withdrew from the the al-Hol and Shaddadi prisoner of war camps which were at that time estimated to contain at least 24,000 Islamic State group members and their families — at least 20,000 of these prisoners were reportedly women and children, of various nationalities. Immediately following the SDF withdrawal, mass prison breaks occurred which led to the release of most of the prison camps’ detainees. The Syrian government claims that the vast majority of the escapees were recaptured, a claim that has yet to be independently verified.
On the heels of the mass prison breaks, the U.S. announced that some 5,700 remaining “high value” detainees had been transferred to Iraq to face trials there. Though it is currently unknown exactly how many detainees remain in Syrian prisons, by February 2026 both al-Hol and Shadaddi prisons – the two largest prisons in the country – were reported to have been mostly deserted.
Source: Rojava Information Center.
Renewed Kobani Siege
After capturing nearly 80% of SDF-held territory in less than two weeks without significant Turkish military assistance, or SDF resistance, on January 30, Rojava and the Syrian transitional government agreed to yet another ceasefire agreement.
Days later, as frontline troops from both sides reportedly pulled back from the reconstituted border, members of Syria’s internal security forces were seen entering Hasaka and Qamishli under escort by their Kurdish Asayish counterparts. Kobani was notably left out of this deal for reasons that still remain unclear as the city continues to be besieged on all sides by the Turkish military to the north, and Sharaa’s forces in every other direction.
For over a month to date, Kobani’s residents have reported having no access to water, electricity or internet making survival within the small enclave increasingly difficult. Straddling the Turkish border, Kobani has long been a major center of Kurdish resistance to Turkish, Syrian and hardline Islamic imperialism. It was said resistance at this city that effectively changed the course of the war against the Islamic State group in 2015.
To gain further insight into the siege, Unicorn Riot spoke to Suaad Omar, a Syrian Kurd living in Europe who maintains sporadic contact with loved ones in Kobani. Omar said the internet is shut down and there is no electricity or water.
“[Kobani] hasn’t had water for many days, they tried to manage that by collecting rainwater and melting snow to drink. There are generators but there is no oil to start them, people are trying to send them money, but the money doesn’t come because of the Internet shutdown.”Suaad Omar
When asked why the government is specifically targeting Kobani she explained, “Kobani, for Kurds [is] a symbol of resistance […] they’ve always tried to put more pressure on Kobani. We cannot forget the story of how Kobani defeated ISIS. They, along with Jabhat al-Nusra, are now in the Syrian army and they want revenge.”
The Syrian government officially denies maintaining a siege of Kobani, adding that some humanitarian flows have been coming into the city this past month. While some aid has been able to reach Kobani, it is often through a limited number of checkpoints controlled by the Syrian government and Turkey. Humanitarian organizations on the ground have repeatedly warned that this is not enough and that aid, electricity and water flows into Kobani continue to be obstructed by Syrian and Turkish authorities.
Ongoing Disputes
The 14-point ceasefire agreement announced on January 30 committed to the integration process without detailing the specifics of exactly how both sides intend to implement it. As was the case for previous agreements, the full version of the latest deal has yet to be released to the public, as negotiations over unresolved issues rage on.
The agreement did disclose some specific details not previously expressed, however. This includes the transitional government’s commitment towards the full integration of “all military and security elements of the ‘SDF.’”
While both sides appear to now agree that the SDF should be integrated as “individuals,” reportedly comprising of up three to four separate brigades within the army, there are still ongoing disputes over senior leadership positions.
There are also still serious doubts over the plan to integrate thousands of female soldiers who currently serve in the SDF. Rojava currently operates as a democratic confederation that includes basic political rights and representation for all the region’s diverse ethnic population. It maintains an explicitly left-wing, feminist and ecological political platform, which stands in stark contrast to the far-right Islamic-centered politics long espoused by Sharaa and his benefactors.
Though some sources have claimed that the Syrian government has agreed to integrate the SDF’s women fighters, they, nor the SDF, have yet to publicly acknowledge this. When asked about the likelihood of such a scenario the Commander in Chief of the SDF’s Women’s Protection Units, (YPJ) Rohilat Afrin, was careful to say that it is a goal they are still working towards, with the caveat that the “new government is in serious chaos…”
“The new government is in serious chaos, both in terms of its institutions and its ability to govern the entire country. The future remains uncertain. If – as the population wishes for and as we wish for – Syria truly becomes a democratic Syria, politically, socially, legally; if all the effort given and achievements gained in [Rojava] through the past 12 years are recognized, then of course YPJ can become a part of [the Syrian army]. In fact, YPJ can serve as a model for Syrian women, setting an example of women’s autonomy and self-defense. […] It is imperative to comprehend that the scope of this matter is wide. Our objectives, positions and approach will be formulated on this foundation I have explained. Not following the current way of thinking exhibited by HTS – that everything must be centralized.”Rohilat Afrin
The YPJ have historically been a prime target for armed Islamic fundamentalist groups due to their explicit feminism and existence as one the world’s most recognizable all-female militias. More recent reports of this targeting appeared online after a man allegedly affiliated with the Syrian Army posted a video online holding a piece of hair that he claimed belonged to a dead YPJ fighter. The video drew international outrage and sparked a viral social media trend depicting Kurdish women braiding each other’s hair in an act of solidarity with the women of Rojava.
The rights of Syria’s ethnic minorities are yet another major unresolved issue. One unprecedented concession publicized in the Jan. 30 announcement by the transitional government was the right to teach Kurdish languages in public schools. If this is the case moving forward, it would mark the first time in Syria’s history that a non-Arabic language has been officially recognized in a country that has long been home to a diverse array of languages. Though many critics were quick point out that this does not include other minority languages including, but not limited to; Syriac, Turkmen, Armenian and Circassian.
Current Situation and Possible Outcomes
Having lost the majority of its political leverage and economic lifeline in the strategic oil fields of northeastern Syria, Rojava now finds itself in a much more difficult position to negotiate the terms of its integration into the Syrian state.
The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates at least 1,000 combatants, and around 170,000 people are believed to have been internally displaced from Rojava. Immediately following the Syrian government’s offensive, international states particularly in the west publicly distanced themselves away from Rojava, preferring their new partners in Damascus instead.
After the Islamic State was defeated at Kobani, the U.S. was forced to ally with the Syrian Kurds — explicitly rejecting Turkish demands not to do so. But now that the group has largely been defeated, the Americans have publicly admitted that the SDF has little use to them anymore.
“The original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired, as Damascus is now both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities, including control of Daesh [Islamic State group] detention facilities and camps.”Tom Barrack, a top U.S. diplomat and longtime friend of President Trump and Jeffrey Epstein
Unconfirmed reports have since come out revealing that as of this month, the U.S. is “in the process of withdrawing all of its roughly 1,000 troops from Syria.” Some analysts and journalists have thus made the assessment that Rojava’s leadership made a grave mistake by betting on continued support from the Americans. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi himself acknowledged that “there was wrong evaluations made” in this regard.
“There were shortcomings and mistakes. If there were no mistakes, perhaps the outcome would not have been as it was. With regards to political calculations, the politics of the U.S and the west […] there was wrong evaluations made.”Mazloum Abdi
Despite this candid admission, Abdi was clear that now is not the time for critical debates as the Kurdish enclave struggles to deal with the growing existential threat at its doorstep. He also aimed to reassure Rojava’s residents that all Kurdish areas in Syria would “maintain their autonomy,” a notable statement that would suggest that any such deal may only apply to the few Kurdish-dominated areas that currently remain under SDF control.
It remains to be seen exactly how much “autonomy,” if any, the neighboring Turkish state is willing to concede to the Syrian Kurds. Turkey is currently one of Syria’s biggest financial and military suppliers and has consistently opposed the existence of Rojava on its southern border.
Much depends on whether parallel, indirect peace negotiations between the Turkish state and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) — which is allied with the SDF — proceed. A successful peace process could see Kurdish fighters lay down their arms and enter into democratic politics in both Turkey and Syria.
It may also see the release of longtime imprisoned Kurdish revolutionary and PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan. In exchange, it is believed that Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and allies are seeking Kurdish votes in parliament to bypass established presidential term limits, possibly allowing him to become the longest serving president in Turkish history.
Last week, after a three-hour long meeting with Kurdish delegates at Imrali prison in Turkey, Ocalan issued a statement from prison declaring that “the first phase has ended with the dissolution of the organization and the end of the armed struggle” and that the Kurdish movement “will now turn to the integration aspect, which is the central issue of the second phase.”
When asked generally how Syrian Kurds feel about his potential release, Suaad Omar responded, “Ocalan is more than 70 years old so he should be released on health conditions.” and that while “he is a symbolic leader for Kurds in Syria,” she said, “he is not more than that” and that his aims are “far from Syrian Kurds’ aims.”
Ultimately, if the peace process in both Turkey and Syria fail, it very well may lead to another Turkish-led invasion, this time to extinguish the Rojava experiment for good. As such, military activity and fortification building has been observed along Rojava’s reconstituted front line as both sides appear to be preparing for the possibility of another armed conflict. A general mobilization has also been issued, especially appealing to Kurdish diaspora communities and international supporters around the world to once again come to the defense of Rojava.
Cover image: Syrian Arab News Agency
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Unicorn Riot original reporting on Syria:
Youth Press Conference Bombed in Turkey – Deprogram Ep. 12 (July 23, 2015)
International Volunteers of the Rojava Revolution – DOCUMENTARY FILM – (2019)
Questions Remain After Syria – Rojava Integration Deal (July 22, 2025)
Syrian Rebels Topple Assad Dynasty; Establish Transitional Government (Jan. 3, 2025)
Syrians Facing Expulsions at Home and Abroad (May 16, 2024)
Shahba, Syria: Survival as Resistance (July 24, 2023)
Looking Beyond the Rubble: Aiding the Kurds After the Syria, Türkiye Earthquake (April 25, 2023)
Revolution in Every Country Comic Series: Episode 1 – Syria: Erasing an Inconvenient Revolution (June 5, 2022)
Origins of the PKK and the ‘Rojava’ Revolution: Part II (September 18, 2021)
Origins of the PKK and the ‘Rojava’ Revolution: PT. I (August 3, 2021)
Building Autonomy Through Ecology in Rojava (February 28, 2018)
Kurdish Fighters Defend Afrin From Turkish Military Invasion in Northern Syria (January 25, 2018)
Kobane Rebuilds as ISIL Control Diminishes in Syria (December 27, 2017)
As Course of War Turns, Turkey Challenges Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (Rojava) (October 30, 2017)
Solecast #20 Rojava Special w/ Janet Biehl (January 9, 2016)
Pipeline Politics in the Syrian Civil War (September 20, 2015)
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