The Oldest Trick in the Book

Panic-Driven Scapegoating in History and Recurring Patterns of Persecution

Ben M. Debney

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"The Oldest Trick in the Book revives the type of radical class orientation that has given so much of classical sociology its analytic power and enduring relevance. Bait and switch scapegoating by elites is indeed a very old trick; but why do we fall for it anew, with each slightly refurbished iteration? Ben Debney's well-researched, historically rich, and analytically-muscular book answers that question in useful and original ways."

—Christian Parenti, *Associate Professor of Economics at John Jay College, City University of New York (CUNY)*

"In his daringly sweeping treatise on scapegoating throughout history, Ben Debney reveals the social function of demonisation to be an audacious smoke and mirrors trick: obscuring the real evil of ruling elites while distortedly reflecting it. The Oldest Trick in the Book is a lively and thoughtful offering."

—Scott Poynting, *Adjunct Professor, Charles Sturt University and Queensland University of Technology, Australia*

"*The Oldest Trick in the Book* takes us on a remarkable journey. Ben Debney perceptively explores the long use and abuse of power and ideology, from the Roman Empire to Red Scares, Witch Hunts to Islamophobia. The power of the One Percent, he shows us, depends on convincing the rest of us to accept the demonization of the Enemy: unruly women, treacherous communists, Islamic terrorists. It is to Debney's great credit that he reveals scapegoating's long history as pillars of rule, and strategies of cultural and material violence directed at the oppressed and exploited. The Oldest Trick in the Book is a necessary contribution to unmasking modernity's binary code and pointing the way towards a more just and sustainable future."

—Jason W. Moore, *Professor of Sociology, Binghamton University. Author, Capitalism in the Web of Life*

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A banker, a worker and a refugee are seated at a table with 20 cookies on a plate in the middle. The banker takes 19 and says to the worker, "watch out for that refugee, he wants your cookie."
—Old union joke

Beware of the words 'internal security,' for they are the eternal cry of the oppressor.
—Voltaire

This work is dedicated to the voices silenced during the episodes treated herein. I thought about them a lot.

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Introduction: Scapegoating Doth Never Prosper

> The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary.
>
> —H. L. Mencken[1]

> The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.
>
> —Antonio Gramsci[2]

This study examines the relationship historically between scapegoating and moral panics. Using a variety of interdisciplinary tools, it explores the nature and meaning of that relationship, theorising a model of panic-driven scapegoating—the proverbial 'Oldest Trick in the Book'—from the results. Through this model, this study looks to establish a counter-frame though which to transcend the logic that gives rise to it, deriving a general justification from the understanding that the failure to adequately conceptualise the Oldest Trick in the Book has tended to result in the ideological sleights of hand associated with scapegoating

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[1]Mencken, H. L., *Notes on Democracy*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921, 22.

[2]Gramsci, Antonio, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.

discourse continuing to fly under the radar. In so doing, it seems to have both dominated our collective destiny, and defined the parameters of our collective condition—often in quite significant and profound ways.

Scapegoating is widely understood as a metaphor for blame-shifting, the concept originating in the Bible as an alleged means of purging sin through ritual sacrifice (Leviticus 16:10). As the name suggests, moral panics are understood sociologically as episodes, historical and contemporary, where fears of 'existential threats', those said to endanger the existence of society, become a societal preoccupation. Such fears tend to frustrate meaningful, constructive dialogue, giving rise to reactionary policies and acts that characteristically (and rather ironically) tend to approximate the alleged evil being rallied against. Greater understanding of this paradox forms a primary driver for research in the abovementioned area. For reasons forming the primary focus of this study, the 'existential threats' fuelling moral panics are increasingly associated with propaganda and political hoaxes functioning to serve political agendas radically oppositional to those stated.

In theorising a model of panic-driven scapegoating and looking to clarify the nature of political reaction from the results, this study examines three historical episodes where fear of an existential threat played a conspicuous role: the European Witch Hunts (approx. 1350–1750), the Red Scares and Cold War (approx. 1919–1989), and the War on Terror (2001–2013). It contends that these episodes involved the manufacture of moral panics and can be characterised by Witch Panic, Communist Panic and Terrorist Panic, respectively, insofar as they involved an eponymous bogeyman who provided grist to the mill of ideologically driven hysteria.

Furthermore, in better resembling the parameters of the existential threat than those associated with it, it contends that these episodes reflect a paradox in that those responsible, the architects of such panics, in other words, tend to embody much or all of the evils they claim to oppose, as noted, by creating problems to which they can then style themselves the solution. Projecting their own malfeasance onto a convenient target in this way is, this study argues, a characteristic feature of scapegoating campaigns. On this basis, this study proposes to assess the extent to which the historical episodes chosen for examination, and the pretexts invoked to rationalise the panic that characterises them, reflect a common pattern of crisis leveraging and scapegoating, from which the contours of a general model can be drawn.

In looking to establish scapegoating as a feature of moral panics connecting otherwise apparently unrelated periods of history, this study draws on interdisciplinary studies in sociology and social psychology for its theoretical framework. Deviance studies in sociology, and especially research into 'deviance amplification', or 'the production of deviance', forms the basis for research into moral panics. These concepts derive from the understanding that deviance is a subjective concept, the prevalence of any one interpretation socially depending on the main on who has the power to control the meaning of words rather than of qualities of any person or group so labelled. Similarly, research into such mechanisms of individual and group subjectivity as playing the victim, blaming the victim, abandoning responsibility, the use of sanitising language and refusing to distinguish between being criticised and attacked form the basis for research in social psychology into moral disengagement.

Research in social psychology into stereotype priming rounds out the theoretical basis by looking at how the mechanism of 'convergence' in deviance production, or linking of different sources of moral panic, draws power from the cultural legacy of previous panics while feeding back into and reinforcing the culture that sustains moral panic, not least in the form of the binary, Self vs. Other logic on which they turn. This study will argue that such binary logic constitutes the concrete form of the proverbial big red 'panic button' that many in positions of power and privilege tend to press when they feel their power and privileges in jeopardy, the means by which the scapegoat is identified and targeted. We examine this in detail in Chapters 1–4.

Methodologically, this research project seeks initially to establish the examples of scapegoating from history chosen for analysis as moral panics. To do so adequately, it starts by examining the context for mass mobilisation through construction of a moral panic in the prior framing of crises by instigators of panics in terms favourable to themselves (this is telling in and of itself; no one ever provokes moral panics as a form of self-criticism). It examines the facts of each case study as they compare against multiple definitions of moral panics and characteristics associated with them by multiple theorists, before comparing the characteristics of each case study thus established as moral panics against characteristic features of moral disengagement. With a contextual ideological framework, target and legitimising pretext for scapegoating thus established, it looks at how the scapegoating campaign proceeds in practical terms. Given the existence of double standards and apparent ulterior motives

indicates another purpose for moral panics as methods of crisis leveraging, it rounds out each case study by looking at who benefits the most from panic-driven scapegoating and why. At the end of the three case studies, it reviews each as they compare to the analytical criteria and then cross-compare them at each stage of the analytical criteria with a view to assessing the relative merits of each.

In so doing, this study works from the understanding that blame-shifting exists because society has a normative moral code based around reciprocal respect for the equal rights and freedoms of others. This code is taken as the primary way of securing our own ('treat others as you would want to be treated', etc), even if observed by many only in the breach. If all humans were sociopaths, we would need to dodge accountability in violating the rights and freedoms of others, as there would be no such concepts to violate. Thankfully many of us are not, and so there are. This study justifies itself in the grounds that it is only because a normative moral code does exist, separating social from anti-social behaviour, that an ideological workaround becomes necessary when looking to service our self-interest at the expense of others, and that this takes the form of the proverbial Oldest Trick in the Book. The conflict between the normative moral code of society and our desire to take advantage of, exploit and otherwise trespass against the rights and freedoms of others for our own personal gain, as the predatory mentality of the sociopath seems to consider normal, presents significant logistical issues for those perpetrating such behaviour.

These cannot and must not be acknowledged, if not to the society whose codes we are violating, then very definitely not to those being taken advantage of. Even the most unintelligent of sociopaths can appreciate the issues at hand: our victims might not cooperate, they might resist, or even more perilously, they might try to hold us to account for the consequences of our actions. We might, catastrophically enough, be obliged to reflect on our basic operating assumptions about ourselves and the way we choose to treat the people around us. Thus, scapegoating is necessary.

History Is Written by the Victors

In consideration of the fact that scapegoating as a matter of definition can never be acknowledged as such by its perpetrators or their enablers, then, this study develops from the observation that it remains something

of an enigma. As Elizabethan writer John Harrington wrote of treason, it 'doth never prosper'. The reason was straightforward: if treason prospers, 'none dare call it treason'. This study contends the same applies to scapegoating: when successful, it too never prospers, as successful scapegoating is incorporated into and normalised as part of the dominant ideological paradigm. If treason is a crime, then so too must be scapegoating—even if successful and written into history as something that doth never prosper. If this follows, then this fact begs the question then as to why scapegoating is not criminalised at the conceptual level, while treason is.

This study argues that this is because of who scapegoating benefits. While elites benefit from the criminalisation of treason—such tending to involve charges of betrayal of institutional power structures, as in the case of the charges levelled against Nelson Mandela in 1956—they do no benefit in the same way from criminalisation of scapegoating. On the contrary, the fact that one must have vested interests or special privileges necessitating scapegoating tends to suggest they are its primary beneficiaries. On this count, elites have nothing to gain and much to lose from any criminalisation of scapegoating. They do not enact laws upon which to prosecute themselves for blaming the victims of policies designed to benefit themselves from the harmful and destructive social consequences of such policies. Furthermore, given Churchill's truism that history is written by the Victors, successful scapegoating is normalised as the dominant ideological paradigm, as the socio-political status quo. The history of the doctrine of *Terra Nullius* (literally 'empty land') in Australia presents as a particularly marked example of Victor history in which the victims of settler colonialism and continent-wide land theft were blamed for existing, and literally written out of existence by a legal code imposed by violence. That this Victor history requires further significant challenges yet to mitigate its ongoing destructive legacy only serves to reinforce this fact.

As the ongoing social conflict arising from the legacy of indigenous dispossession by European settler colonialism clearly demonstrates, criminalising scapegoating would require members of the same Victors whose power and privileges so often seem to require scapegoats to be responsible for prosecuting scapegoaters—all the more so the production of deviance depends on power to control the meaning of deviance in popular discourse and persecute those labelled thus. As Australian nationalists continue to turn a blind eye to the crimes against humanity that paved the

way for the Australian settler-colonial state, so too must others do much the same were their own power and privileges continue to depend on a general attitude of militant ignorance.

We find then that, as an abstract concept, scapegoating is an uncontested fact—as ubiquitous as the Bible from which it derives. As a fact of political life, scapegoating is not even against the law. Through the mechanism by which some of the greatest crimes against humanity throughout history have been perpetrated—the European Witch Hunts and the Holocaust being not the least of which—the Oldest Trick in the Book somehow remains the domain of our enemies, the great Other who is atavistic, brutal, sadistic, autocratic, lacking in our superior moral virtues and consumed with jealousy of our enlightened sensibilities. Or so the story goes. Where the tendency of scapegoating never to prosper is concerned, then, the question remains as to what parts of history the Victors leave out.

Contents

Abbreviations

BCE	Before Common Era
CE	Common Era
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Committee on Public Information
ERP	European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUAC	House Committee on Un-American Activities
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
KJV	King James Version
NAC	National Americanization Committee
NACLI	North American Civic League for Immigrants
NAM	National Association of Manufacturers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NKVD	*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del* (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organisation of American States
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PNAC	Project for the New American Century
RAF	Red Army Faction
RAND	Research and Development (Corporation)

CHAPTER 1

Theorising Panic-Driven Scapegoating

In private I observed that once in every generation, without fail, there is an episode of hysteria about the barbarians.

—J.M. Coetzee[1]

The means of defence against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.

—James Madison[2]

Never let a good crisis go to waste.

—Rahm Emanuel[3]

This chapter theorises a model of panic-driven scapegoating—the proverbial Oldest Trick in the Book. For the purposes of this exercise, we define scapegoating as a specifically ideological act in which some are blamed for the consequences of the policies or conduct of others with

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[1] Coetzee, John M., *Waiting for the Barbarians*, Random House, 2015, 9.

[2] Madison, James, *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1865; Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, 'Madison Debates: June 29,' The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, via http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_629.asp, accessed 13 June 2018.

[3] Seib, Gerald F., 'In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama,' *Wall Street Journal*, 21 November 2008, via https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271; Widmaier, Wesley W., *Economic Ideas in Political Time*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, Chapter 8 'Constructing the Global Financial Crisis: From Accommodation to Iteration,' 179–202.

positions of power and privilege to protect. Panic-driven scapegoating is defined as that which occurs in the midst of moral panics, defined for the purposes of this study as periods when society is overcome by fear of external threat. Such external threats understood to be so dire as to imperil its existence—though ultimately illusory (such are to be distinguished from existential threats for which evidence abounds and for which moral panics often tend to enable, like the climate crisis[4]).

One early example of this phenomenon was the Diocletian Persecution (CE 303), the result of the eponymous Pagan Emperor casting early Christians as enemies of society and subjecting many to torture and death. Analogous contemporary examples, where the only major difference seems to be the group cast as existential threats, are not hard to find.[5] As an exercise in historical persecution, the Diocletian Persecution is useful for illustrating the way insecurities wrought by crisis are 'projected' onto scapegoats represented as 'existential threats'—dangers alleged to imperil the existence of society as such. In the Diocletian Persecution, the crisis for the Roman ruling class arising from the challenge of emerging Christianity became a threat to Roman society through a propagandistic conflation on their part of their own class privileges and interests and the common interest of the mass of the population—an alleged threat to society then being used as an excuse to defend elite power and privileges. Construction of the Christian as a scapegoat in this manner then was the catalyst for the degeneration of Roman society into mob hysteria fuelled by what we understand today to be moral panics, or the hijacking of dispassionate, rational thinking by scare politics designed simply for the purpose of crisis management.

At the core of the Diocletian Persecution, as a representative example of the kind of panic-driven scapegoating constituting the core focus of this study, was an 'Othering' logic based on exclusionary, 'us and them'

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[4] Klein, Naomi, 'Let Them Drown: The Violence of Othering in a Warming World,' *London Review of Books*, Vol. 38, No. 11, 2 June 2016, 11–14; Debney, Ben, 'Historical Nature Versus Nature in General: *Capitalism in the Web of Life*,' *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 28, no. 2, 2017: 126–131; Debney, Ben, 'Refugees vs. Climate Change: Worthy vs. Unworthy Victims,' *Counterpunch* 24, no. 2, 2016; Versluis, Arthur. *The New Inquisitions: Heretic-Hunting and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Totalitarianism*. Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapter 9 'Norman Cohn and the Pursuit of Heretics,' 85–93, 125.

[5] Davies, P. S., 'The Origin and Purpose of the Persecution of AD 303,' *The Journal of Theological Studies* 40, no. 1 (1989): 66–94; Morgan, George, and Scott Poynting, *Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West*, London: Routledge, 2016.

binary logic, crucial to the purpose insofar as it facilitated the targeting inherent to the process of demonisation.[6] Analogous to the deviance production driving moral panics, the 'Othering' of early Christians during this period presents as a precedent for many comparable episodes that followed. With 'Othering' and deviance production as its key linking point, this study contends that the kind of construction of false crises to mask real ones and persecution of scapegoats in the name of crisis management typified by the Diocletian Persecution represents a tangible scapegoating praxis with a historical continuity—one characterised by a Faustian bargain, were attitudes and behaviour ordinary considered anathema to social values are permitted in the name of temporary expediency, cast as necessary evils to neutralise and overcome the alleged threat. Otherwise unacceptable to normative moral codes when carried out by official enemies, and generally portrayed as regrettable expediencies taken on by selfless leaders whose hands were tied in appropriating more power to themselves, these crimes are typically enacted under the pretext of restoring security and order. At the same moment, the ideological narratives underwriting them typically become permanent features of the political landscape.

A simple comparison of the Diocletian Persecution and the 'War on Terror,' with its Othering logic of 'if you think for yourself, the terrorists win,' suggests a historical tendency periodically to degenerate into mass panic and paranoia in reaction to an alleged threat—a tendency that, in this instance, spans roughly 1700 years.[7] It is significant in both cases

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[6] de Buitrago, Sybille Reinke, ed., *Portraying the Other in International Relations: Cases of Othering, Their Dynamics and the Potential for Transformation*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012; Klein, Naomi, 'Let Them Drown: The Violence of Othering in a Warming World,' *London Review of Books*, Vol. 38, No. 11, 2 June 2016; Saïd, Edward, *Orientalism*, Penguin, 2016; Van Houtum, H., and T. Van Naerssen, 'Bordering, Ordering and Othering,' *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 93, no. 2, 2002: 125–136; Jensen, S. Q., 'Othering, Identity Formation and Agency,' *Qualitative Studies* 2, no. 2, 2011: 63–78; Canales, M. K., 'Othering: Toward an Understanding of Difference,' *Advances in Nursing Science* 22, no. 4, 2000: 16–31; Dervin, F., 'Cultural Identity, Representation and Othering,' *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Intercultural Communication* 2, 2012: 181–194; Dervin, F., 'Discourses of Othering,' *The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction* 2015: 1–9; Moosavinia, S. R., N. Niazi, and A. Ghaforian, 'Edward Said's Orientalism and the Study of the Self and the Other in Orwell's Burmese Days,' *Studies in Literature and Language* 2, no. 1, 2011: 103.

[7] See Case Study III.

that the alleged threat turned out to be illusory long after the dust had settled—and more to the point. Long after it had done its job in mobilising society against the scapegoats de jure. This presents as a further problem insofar as particular scapegoating discourses might eventually be exposed and discredited, though not the underlying dynamics driving new variations on a theme with an ancient vintage. As a feature of history, this process of panic-driven scapegoating goes no little way towards accounting for the fact that the 1700 years between the Diocletian Persecution and the 'War on Terror' consists of a seemingly endless litany of wars, pogroms, massacres, genocides, indefinite detentions without trial in concentration camps and gulags, draconian political measures from repressive bills to police states and show trials, as well as any number of other forms of harassment, persecution and scapegoating of vulnerable sections of the population. In one form or another, all seemed to involve one or another demonised Other, rendered as scapegoat through deviance production, whose alleged evil justified the violence and injustice being metred out (it bears mentioning at this point that one of the major problems in beginning this study of historical patterns of scapegoating was not so much lack of data as a considerable surfeit).

In developing the theoretical foundation for a model encompassing these kinds of features on a firm empirical foundation, this chapter traces moral panic research from its founding in the 1970s by Stanley Cohen, through to further notable development by others like Stuart Hall et al., with the ultimate goal of building on Cohen's recommendation that future research examines moral panics as patterned phenomena recurring throughout history. By comparing specific examples of moral panics historically, this study looks to establish the scapegoating model—not by comparing two examples, which constitute a parallel, but at least three, which establishes a pattern and the likelihood of more.

Modelling Panic-Driven Scapegoating

Before we can introduce moral panics, our model of panic-driven scapegoating needs to address the question of demand, which in this case is produced by crisis. The audience for the campaign of scapegoating must be mobilised in defence of those whose interests are threatened by the crisis, so in the demonologies driving moral panic the interests of society

at large are identified with the interests of elites, who are by definition the only stratum of society with class privileges whose defence necessitates scapegoats to begin with (scapegoats are unnecessary to defend nothing).

The first phase establishes the parameters of the crisis in terms that freely conflate 'class privilege' and 'the moral good,' while simultaneously invoking a binary, Self. vs Other logic with a view to provoking moral panic; the audience for the scapegoating narrative must be compelled to choose under conditions of high drama whether to align themselves with elites, or resist the ideological compulsion associated with binary thinking and risk association with the alleged threat. Therefore:

I. *Mobilisation phase: self-interestedly framing the parameters of crisis.* A crisis emerges. Framed in terms favourable to elites, it is associated with an 'existential threat' said to preclude rational discussion and debate. 'Act now or be damned.'

The next phase directs the incipient moral panic generated through the construction of a crisis narrative favourable to elites towards a suitable, or at least convenient, target. Therefore:

II. *Targeting phase: constructing targets for scapegoating through 'production of deviance' (see below).* A cause for existential threat is found in a folk demon, which is constructed with the aid of 'deviance amplification' (see below); half-truths are exaggerated for to create an imaginary hobgoblin with which to menace the public.

Applied to each of the case studies throughout this research project, this second criteria establishes the basis for Cohen's historically patterned moral panics. As the basis for theorising a model of panic-driven scapegoating, however, this is only half the job. The other half requires establishing that this historical patterning of moral panics has a scapegoating function—questions we are largely yet to account for given the fact that, as we have seen, scapegoating doth never prosper. In this respect, though, we are fortunate. If scapegoating can be said to involve such things as victim-blaming, playing the victim, absolving oneself of responsibility, employing sanitising language and refusing to distinguish between being criticised and being attacked, then social psychology accommodates the issue in classing these and related behaviours as

'moral disengagement.' Insofar as these behaviours encompass the subjective mechanisms of blame-shifting, they provide the necessary link between moral panics and scapegoating.

The next step in our model of panic-driven scapegoating, then, is to examine the relationship between the mobilisation through moral panic of audiences for scapegoating demonologies or conspiracy theories, the construction of suitable targets and the construction of suitable pretexts for actions to be carried out in the name of responding to the alleged existential threat. As exercises in scapegoating, this model contends that such ideological pretexts involve victim-blaming and a hard-wired victim complex as a matter of definition. Therefore:

III. *Legitimation phase: constructing a pretext through moral disengagement for the persecution of scapegoats.* 'Deviance amplification' produces moral panic; elites exploit that panic to establish a pretext for a response to the crisis that serves their own interests and victim-blames. Calls for calm or restraint are associated with the threat.

Once the machinery of panic-driven scapegoating is set in motion, then, comes the execution phase, where the previous three stages are set in motion together. Therefore:

IV. *Persecution phase: crisis leveraging through scapegoating.* Elites cast themselves as solutions to crises framed in their own interests, using panic as leverage to carry on with activities they had planned to do anyway and persecute scapegoats as part of their self-legitimising morality play.

The last criterion addresses the question, 'Cui bono?' or who benefits from the particular example of panic-driven scapegoating, how and why. Therefore:

V. *Restoration phase: the beneficiaries of moral panic collect.* Scapegoating enables a fix that neutralises the initial crisis without addressing root causes; the panic narrative legitimises the vested interests of those responsible in upholding the moral ideal with which they are conflated.

Analytical criteria (I) derives from the discussion around parallels and patterns of scapegoating and persecution, (II) from theories of deviance production and moral panic, (III) from theories of moral disengagement, (IV) from general history and (V) from studies of political economy: thus, the political economy of scapegoating. These criteria are the basis for the evidencing of the model through three case studies in subsequent chapters, which proceed as follows:

- *Witch Panic*. This first chapter begins as famine and the Black Death laid waste to a third of the European population. It explores how feudal elites framed these crises in their own interest, looking at the production of a deviant, the Witch, onto whom blame could be shifted for the politicised crisis. It looks at how feudal elites rationalised this blame-shifting through the construction of a self-rationalising victim complex, exploring how these preparatory stages played out in the European Witch Hunts, and the consequences for those targeted. It ends by examining the interests served by the European Witch Hunts and how elites leveraged the campaign of scapegoating to their own advantage.
- *Communist Panic*. This second chapter begins the escalation of class conflict in the United States towards the end of the nineteenth century and how industrial elites framed these crises in their own interest. It treats the construction of the Communist as the deviant upon whom blame could be shifted for the politicised crisis, exploring how industrial elites rationalised this blame-shifting through the construction ideologically of a self-rationalising victim complex. It looks at how these preparatory stages played out in the First Red Scare, the Second Red Scare and the Cold War, and the consequences for those targeted, before examining the interests served by the Red Scares and the Cold War, and how elites leveraged both the campaign of scapegoating to their own advantage.
- *Terrorist Panic*. This third and final chapter begins with geopolitical tensions borne out by several waves of violence extending between the 1970s and 2001, and how transnational elites and their neoconservative subsidiaries framed these crises in their own interests. It examines the construction of 'terrorists' as the deviant upon whom blame could be shifted for crisis framed in the interests of transnational corporate elites and their electoral subsidiaries, explores how both rationalised this blame-shifting through the construction

ideologically of a self-rationalising victim complex. It looks at how these preparatory stages played out in what this study calls the First and Second Terror Scares, and the consequences for those targeted, before reviewing the interests served by these Terror Scares, and how elites leveraged the campaign of scapegoating to their own advantage.

In theorising the above outlines in more detail, this chapter reviews, along with the research areas already cited, attempts by various writers and thinkers to come to terms with the conditions and processes that permit scapegoating never to prosper. It applies the analytical criteria to several of these in the name of preliminary testing and illustrating the model.

Modelling Panic-Driven Scapegoating I: Deviance Production

In 1972, a sociology student named Stanley Cohen published *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, a foundational work in the newly eponymous field.[8] Defining moral panics as 'a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests,' Cohen examined overblown media reactions to a series of 'disturbances' at English seaside towns in the late 1960s—episodes that, despite the attention they received, were in reality little more than minor scuffles between groups of youths affiliated with contending subcultures ('Mods' and 'Rockers'). Cohen queried the volume of media attention,

[8] Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, London: Routledge, 2002; Goode, Erich, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*, London: Blackwell, 2009; Ben-Yehuda, Nachman. *The Politics and Morality of Deviance: Moral Panics, Drug Abuse, Deviant Science, and Reversed Stigmatization*, SUNY Press, 1990; Altheide, David L., *Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis*, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002; Bonn, Scott, *Mass Deception: Moral Panic and the U.S. War on Iraq*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010; Critcher, C., *Moral Panics and The Media*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003; Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law & Order*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; Morgan, George, and Scott Poynting, eds., *Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West*, London: Ashgate; Thompson, Kenneth, *Moral Panics*, London: Routledge, 1998; Critcher, Chas, *Moral Panics and the Media*, Open University Press, 2003; Hier, Sean, *Moral Panic and the Politics of Anxiety*, Routledge, 2011; Krinsky, Charles, *Ashgate Research Companion to Moral Panics*, Ashgate, 2013; Petley, Julian, *Moral Panics in the Contemporary World*, Bloomsbury, 2013; Béland,

taking issue with the fact that, although the disturbances produced no last-ing damage to life or limb, and no more property damage than the over-turning of a few garbage bins and the smashing of a window, they were presented to the public as the thin end of the wedge of social breakdown, precipitating a massive overreaction from the police. Insofar as the media reaction was disproportionate to any demonstrable threat, Cohen argued, it constituted a scare campaign—one instigated for ideological purposes vastly at odds with the stated complaints.[9]

The process of generating a scare Cohen described as 'deviance ampli-fication,' or 'deviance production'—the creation of a bogeymen to dangle in front of the public, either by cherry-picking facts to create a distorted picture of a particular problem, and/or applying double stand-ards to problematise aspects of a targeted group while ignoring the same thing in others. In more extreme cases, the production of deviant bogey-men was achieved simply by lying. These bogeymen Cohen called 'folk demons,' and the architects of moral panics who quite literally traded in belief systems for their own benefit, 'moral entrepreneurs.'[10] The moral panic produced though this process of wilful stoking of public fears by moral entrepreneurs about some threat to public order and safety, he argued, constituted a kind of 'morality play' by the most powerful mem-bers of the community who, perceiving a threat to social order domi-nated by themselves, were anxious to reassert their power and ideological legitimacy by juxtaposing themselves negatively against deviants of their own making—in this case, youths associated with the Mods and Rockers. 'In the gallery of types that society erects to show its members which role should be avoided, and which should be emulated,' Cohen wrote,

Daniel, 'The Political Construction of Collective Insecurity: From Moral Panic to Blame Avoidance and Organised Irresponsibility,' Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 2005; Hawdon, James, 'The Role of Presidential Rhetoric in the Creation of a Moral Panic: Reagan, Bush and the War on Drugs,' *Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 22: 419–445; Victor, Jeffrey S. 'Moral Panics and the Social construction of Deviant Behaviour: A Theory and Application to the Case of Ritual Child Abuse,' *Sociological Perspectives* 41, no. 3, 1998: 541–565. For material on deviance see Becker, Howard, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, New York: Free Press, 1963.

[9] Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, ibid., 1–20.

[10] Cohen, ibid., 3.

'these groups have occupied a constant position as folk devils: visible reminders of what we should not be.'[11]

It was here that Cohen revealed the most significant aspects of 'deviance amplification' as it related to the engineering of moral panics. Durkheim had previously identified the subjective basis of the concept of deviance, noting that the nature of 'deviance' depended on who had the power to define the meaning of the word and impose that definition on popular discourse, rather than on the characteristics of anyone thus labelled.[12] Where he had understood this to be generally a good thing, a way of asserting the 'collective conscience' of a society, however, sociologist Howard Becker adopted a more critical attitude, noting that 'visible reminders of what we should not be' could also be forms of social control—especially if 'society' and 'vested interests of elites' were used interchangeably, as in a propaganda narrative. Where Durkheim seemed to suggest people imposed themselves on others as a selfless service to society, Becker's approach suggested they did so more typically as a service to themselves. 'Deviance is created by society,' Becker wrote.

> I do not mean this in the way that it is ordinarily understood, in which the causes of deviance are located in the social situation of the deviant or in 'social factors' which prompt his action. I mean, rather, that social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance and by applying those rules to particular persons and labelling them as outsiders.[13]

It was the specific act of labelling, involving stereotyping, demonising and stigmatizing as it did, that made deviance production a destructive act. Where the power to impose definitions on public discourse derived from corporate mass media hegemony, Cohen argued, labelling became the basis for scare campaigns built around imaginary hobgoblins or 'folk demons,' whose purported machinations moral entrepreneurs of moral panic used to menace the public, emotionally hijacking them into a state

[11] Cohen, ibid., 2.

[12] Little, Craig B., 'The Social Construction of Deviance,' *Deviance & Control: Theory, Research, and Social Policy*. FE Peacock Pub, 1989, 381; *Cohen*, ibid., 5.

[13] 'From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is on to whom the label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label,' in Cohen, ibid.

of paranoid preoccupation with every conceivable threat except the one with the power to engineer consent.[14] Triggering of primitive 'fight or flight' responses could then be harnessed for ideological ends—a fact expressed in Jenny Holzer's classic observation that 'deviants are sacrificed to increase group solidarity,' and reflected in articles of popular culture like *The Wicker Man* (1973), *Wag the Dog* (1997) and the *South Park* episode 'Britney's New Look.'[15] In this sense, Cohen understood moral panics as acute phases of the reductive process Saïd describes of labelling people different from oneself as subordinates defined as the 'Other.' 'Social control leads to deviance,' Cohen summarised, 'not the other way around.'[16]

Deviance production was then, by definition, an elite-controlled process, given the prior and fundamental requirement of control over the

[14] 'Among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandise on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them. The representatives of these interests have important agendas and principles that they want to advance, and they are well positioned to shape and constrain media policy. This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors' and working journalists' internalization of priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institutions' policy.' Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, Random House, 2010, xi; See also Carey, Alex, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, Sydney: UNSW Press, 1995; Ewen, Stuart, *PR!: A Social History of Spin*, Basic Books, 2008.

[15] 'Hetus! Alte omnebus! Virtu e poquebus! Rectus! Hoc honebus!' The Miley Cyrus prediction seems to have been eerily prescient. An extensive literature on collective narcissism treats this area in much more detail. See: de Zavala, A. G., A. Cichocka, R. Eidelson, and N. Jayawickreme, 'Collective Narcissism and Its Social Consequences,' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97, no. 6, 2009: 1074; de Zavala, A. G., Collective Narcissism and Intergroup Hostility: The Dark Side of 'Ingroup Love,' *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 5, no. 6, 2011: 309–320; de Zavala, A. G., A. Cichocka, and M. Bilewicz, 'The Paradox of In-Group Love: Differentiating Collective Narcissism Advances Understanding of the Relationship Between In-Group and Out-Group Attitudes,' *Journal of Personality* 81, no. 1, 2013: 16–28; collectivenarcissism.com.

[16] This is reaffirmed by the observation credited to *Nietzsche that* 'all things are subject to interpretation, and whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.' Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, op. cit., 8. Edward Saïd, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 2003; Khalid, Maryam, 'Gender, Orientalism and Representations of the "Other" in the War on Terror,' *Global Change, Peace & Security* 23, no. 1, 2011: 15–29; de Buitrago, Sybille Reinke, ed., *Portraying the Other in International Relations: Cases of Othering, Their Dynamics and the Potential for Transformation*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012.

channels of mass communication.[17] While some might criticise such arguments as conspiratorial thinking, conspiracy theory is in fact unnecessary to comprehend concerted action by dominant social classes and their intellectual servants and enablers reading from the shared script of common class interests; the 'morality play' associated with deviance production can be understood as an intuitive process guided by a desire to protect one's power and class privileges on the one hand, and the solidarity of privileged groups articulated through institutions designed for that purpose on the other.

The existence of the 'morality play' arguably also reflects research acknowledge the social basis of constructing meaning, and the ways that this social construction of reality can be institutionalised—with all that follows in terms of politicisation and ideological influences on the shared representations that form the basis for group communication.[18] In the cases of deviance production, Mead, Berger and Luckman note, the ultimate purpose of institutionalising socially constructed realities is ideological legitimation of the status quo—legitimation achieved not so much through reason and evidence-based logic, but the power to impose subjective interpretations of deviance on public discourse deriving from hegemonic corporate media, as discussed above. The power to construct and institutionalise shared representations of the Other is tantamount to the power to engineer consent negatively by associating challenges to the status quo with threats to society. The power to create and impose a

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[17] The research cited above pertaining to the role of the corporate mass media and corporate propaganda in the manufacture of consent lends further support to this interpretation. *See* Chomsky & Herman, *Manufacturing Consent*, op. cit.; Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, op. cit. For more on the relationship between corporate power, the manufacture of consent and moral panics see Rohlo, A., and S. Wright, 'Moral Panic and Social Theory: Beyond the Heuristic,' *Current Sociology* 58, no. 3, 2010: 403–419; Young, Jock, 'Moral Panics and the Transgressive Other,' *Crime, Media, Culture* 7, no. 3, 2011: 245–258; Oplinger, Jon, Richard Talbot, and Yasin Aktay, 'Elite Power and the Manufacture of a Moral Panic: The Case of the Dirty War in Argentina,' *Moral Panics in the Contemporary World*, A&C Black, 2013, 263; Shafir, Gershon, and Cynthia E. Schairer, 'The War on Terror as Political Moral Panic,' Shafir, Gershon, Everard Meade, and William J. Aceves, eds., *Lessons and Legacies of the War on Terror: From Moral Panic to Permanent War*, Routledge, 2013, 9.

[18] Mead, J., P. Berger, and T. Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality*, Penguin, 1991; Schutz, A., *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, Northwestern University Press, 1967.

shared 'symbolic universe' in the process of constructing a panic-driven 'morality play' is therefore the power to construct

> a general theory of the cosmos and a general theory of man… The symbolic universe also orders history. It locates all collective events in a cohesive unity that includes past, present and future.[19]

In this sense then, deviance production might be conceived then a wedge for the institutionalisation of shared representations of the Other; the defence of power and privilege by long tried and proven methods also require the reconfiguration of the basis of ideological legitimacy for the political status quo in the process of recasting those who benefit from scapegoating processes as cause and cure of the same problems.

Larner supports these conclusions as they relate to the broader question of the relationship between the 'morality play' and the defence of ruling class interests in a significant study on the European Witch Hunts. 'Witch hunting was a ruling class activity,' she writes, 'because any large-scale pursuit and rounding up of categories of person requires official organisation and administration.'

> This does not actually conflict with the proposition that local pressures might have caused witch-hunting on particular areas nor preclude an examination of why certain areas produced suspects when others did not. It does imply, though, that local pressures would need to be felt by the local ruling class. Peasants left to themselves will identify individuals as witches and will resort to a variety of anti-witchcraft measures in self-defence; they cannot pursue these measures to the punishment, banishment, or official execution of even one witch, let alone a multiplicity of witches, without the administrative machinery and encouragement of their rulers.[20]

Peasants cannot impose their own subjective definitions of deviance on public discourse either, much less construct and institutionalise shared representations of reality benefiting elites insofar as they conflate the needs of society and the demands of class privilege and power. Cohen

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[19] Mead, Berger, & Luckman, ibid., 92–104.

[20] Larner, Christina, *Enemies of God: The Witch-Hunt in Scotland*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1981.

describes this elite-controlled process in terms of the stages of disaster relief operations, as a synonym for crisis management. A moral panic, he argues, begins with an 'inventory' stage involving the locating, targeting and labelling of deviants, before proceeding the formulating and initiating of action plans through a 'reaction' phase, from which point the popular ire aroused as a result of these two stages crystallizes into further deviance production and institutional repression as a feedback loop.[21] In lieu of addressing the grievances of contending parties, this process rehabilitates the ideological basis of the *status quo* and the authority of those who represent it.

In Cohen's example, the fact that the re-establishment of control is built on the suppression of the actual causes of the disturbances on the beach and the polarisation of public opinion serves predictably to alienate local youth even more, inspire them to escalate rather than reign in the disturbances, and ensure their continuance. The process of deviance production driving moral panic over juvenile delinquency derives not from the wayward nature of the youths attached to the Mods and Rockers subcultures so much as the reaction of elites and their opinion-making courtiers to the changing circumstances of the times—not least of which being the emergence of youth culture from which the young gained independent identity and increased assertiveness, coupled with high unemployment, breeding alienation from society. Older members of the community, overwhelmed by the pace of change, were unwilling or unable (or both) to address root causes, such as the dissolving of social bonds as a culture of selfish individualism replaced social solidarity—deeper underlying problems and fears could no more be expressed than they could be acknowledged.

Reflecting establishment values, the mainstream media ignored the testimony of many young people feeling alienated from a society that had left them behind, demonising them instead as hoodlums and thugs intentionally trying to disrupt peaceful towns for their own selfish and malevolent ends. The sensationalist reports they produced might have failed to address root causes of the disturbances, or to establish anything in the way of understanding, but they did expedite the production of deviance, selling a lot of newspapers in the process.

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[21] Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, op. cit., 16–17.

Modelling Panic-Driven Scapegoating II: Moral Panic as a Social Relation

Similar motivations to those Cohen had documented fuelled another scare several years hence, again in the United Kingdom but this time over 'muggings.' This mugging scare became the basis for Hall et al.'s *Policing the Crisis* (1978), a second major work in the field of moral panics. Following in Cohen's footsteps, Hall et al. explored deviance amplification of street crime—which is to say, in mispresenting a standard phenomenon as new, one allegedly meriting budget increases for emergency 'law and order' initiatives to deal with an allegedly new threat that had long existed in fact. Hall et al. focused in particular on the conflation of 'mugging' as an event in this instance with 'mugging' as a social relation, one demonising the 'mugger' as the Other upon whom blame for the social relations giving rise to the mugging event could be shifted. This wilful confusion of object and relation, they argued, became the basis for the binary logic on which deviance production and amplification as the engines of moral panic turned—a critical insight for all students of scapegoating to come.

'In 1973,' Hall et al. wrote, 'sentences of ten and twenty years were handed down in court to three boys of mixed ethnic background after a serious incident in Handsworth, Birmingham, in which a man on the way home from the pub was "mugged" on a piece of waste ground, robbed and badly injured.' These sentences seemed 'unnecessarily vicious, but also—in terms of the causes that produced this incident— pointless, dealing with effects, not causes.' 'If you enter the "mugging" problem with the Handsworth case,' they added, it is impossible to fall into the trap of thinking that 'mugging' is simply a term for what some poor boys do to some poor victims in the poor areas of our large cities.

> 'Handsworth' was, clearly, also an exemplary sentence—a sentence intended to have a social as well as a punitive impact; it was, also, the fears and anxieties which the sentence aimed at allaying. It was the massive press coverage, the reactions of local people, experts and commentators, the prophecies of doom which accompanied it, the mobilization of the police against certain sector of the population in the 'mugging' areas. All this was the Handsworth mugging. Once you perceive 'mugging' not as a fact but as a relation—the relation between crime and the reaction to crime—the conventional wisdoms about 'mugging' fell apart in your hands.[22]

[22] Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law & Order*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 2.

In looking outside of conventional binaries, Hall et al. found, to 'the social forces and the contradictions accumulating within it (rather than simply the danger to ordinary folks) or in terms of the wider historical context in which it occurs (i.e. in terms of a historical juncture, not just a date on a calendar)' changed the 'whole terrain' of the problem.

> The pattern of the crime, but also the nature of the social relation, has a pre-history; conditions of existence, strikingly absent from all the publicity concentrated on the single incident. Both have a location in institutional processes and structures, apparently far away from the 'scene of the crime.'[23]

Far away from the 'scene of the crime,' Hall et al. found, was a 'crisis of hegemony'—the rolling back of the welfare state and other changes associated with the rise of neoliberal corporate capitalism that, in fracturing the social fabric, exposed the class fractures within the political apparatus that, already well entrenched, were driving ever deeper—as they had in the case of the youth subcultures Cohen studied.[24] In the case of mugging panic, the form of crisis management implemented by the architects of the panic was not one that dealt with root causes of problems, but sought rather an 'authoritarian consensus' built around a reactionary 'law and order' policy agenda that sought to rationalise, by blowing the situation out of proportion, the victimisation of poor black and immigrant communities through harsher sentencing, while asserting the permanent victim status of privileged whites as the binary opposite of the criminalised, deviant Other. The implementation of strategies to grapple with mugging prior to it becoming an object of moral panic created a 'self-fulfilling prophecy,' rendering moral entrepreneurs of the scare narrative cause and cure of the same problem.[25] Permanently deferring responsibility for the social causes of mugging ensured they continued to produce mugging permanently; the victim-playing, victim-blaming and casting of guilt by association enabled by scare narratives around mugging ensured its permanent utility as a defence against anarchy, chaos, criticism and accountability.

[23] Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis*, ibid.
[24] Hall et al., ibid., 220.
[25] Hall et al., ibid., 41.

In coming to terms with these self-fulfilling prophecies cum mugging panic, Hall et al. developed the concept of a 'signification spiral' characterising the steps through which deviance production and moral panic were observed to pass:

a. The intensification of a particular issue;
b. The identification of a subversive minority;
c. 'Convergence' or the linking by labelling of the specific issue to other problems;
d. The notion of 'thresholds' which, once crossed, can lead to further escalation of the problem's 'menace' to society;
e. The element of explaining and prophesying, which often involves making analogous references to the United States—the paradigm example;
f. The call for firm steps.[26]

These characteristics complement and enhance the conditions Cohen lists as the three basic elements needed for the construction of a successful moral panic: a suitable enemy ('a soft target, easily denounced, with little power'), a suitable victim ('someone with whom you can identify') and a consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities but are or could be integral parts of society 'unless something is done.'[27] Here the idea that the belief or action being denounced were not insulated, reflected the criterion from Hall et al. of thresholds; the innovation on the part of Hall et al. came in their observation of the way specific issues were linked by labelling to other problems, an insight reflecting the apparent desire of those responsible for manufacturing scares to get as much bang for their buck as they could. For their part, Goode and Ben-Yehuda define moral panics with the following characteristics: (a) Heightened concern; (b) Increased hostility; (c) Widespread consensus; (d) Disproportionate appraisal; and (e) General volatility.[28] In addition to re-emphasising the criterion of consensus, the criteria Goode and Ben-Yehuda cite not only concur with both Cohen and Hall et al. that moral panics involve the production of suitable deviants, but

[26] Hall et al., ibid., 220.

[27] Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, op. cit., xi.

[28] Goode and Ben-Yehuda, ibid., pp. 34–43.

also emphasise that it produces volatile outcomes. From the perspective of why moral panics are significant to the question of modelling scapegoating processes, this criterion is many respects key.

Combined, these criteria suggest a period of unusual political *volatility* following the *intensification of a particular issue*, involving anything from prolonged legal persecution (such as through the indefinite detention without charge of refugees) and race riots up to wars and genocide occurs when a widespread *consensus* develops in society that a *suitable enemy* (*identified as a subversive minority* from the standpoint of the *status quo* and the interests supporting it) threatens a *suitable victim* (again defined as such from the standpoint of the *status quo*, since the 'victim' is already known to those who become enveloped in panic; the enemies are strangers). This consensus is based on a *disproportionate appraisal* that produces *increased hostility* towards the group perceived as a threat resulting from *heightened concern* that would not otherwise exist. Such disproportion, increased hostility and volatility then *converges* with other suitable enemies through *linking by labelling of the specific issue to other perceived or claimed problems* and *explaining and prophesying*. At the same time, Cohen acknowledges that

> In concentrating on the ways in which moral panics are transmitted through the mass media and reflected in the responses of the social control system, I have not dealt adequately—as future research should do—with the patterning of such reactions in the wider society.'[29]

This comment forms the basis for the present study, which looks to theorise patterns of moral panicking principally by examining the social relations that characterise each and attempting to ascertain their degree of commonality. To establish that patterning of moral panics occurs, we must first establish multiple historical events as moral panics according to a set of common criteria—those we have just established, and other relational features we explore further in successive chapters. Establishing that two episodes meet the above criteria only demonstrates a historical parallel and precedent, not a pattern and continuing phenomenon. To demonstrate that what we are dealing with is a historical pattern of scapegoating that continues to reappear while frustrating attempts to examine it for the specific reason that scapegoating doth never prosper,

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[29] Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, op. cit., 76.

we must establish a minimum of three events as moral panics according to the above criteria. This is not to suggest that apples are oranges or that oranges are bananas, but that due to specific traits are grouped together because of their relevance to higher categories of organisation. At the risk of labouring the point, we don't lump them together because they exist as separate entities, but nor do we put them at opposite ends of the supermarket.

CHAPTER 2

Patterning Moral Panics

> In concentrating on the ways in which moral panics are transmitted through the mass media and reflected in the responses of the social control system, I have not dealt adequately—as future research should do—with the patterning of such reactions in the wider society.
> —Stanley Cohen

In developing a methodology for modelling panic-driven scapegoating as a persistent historical phenomenon (i.e. by demonstrating historical patterning of moral panics), we are aided greatly at the outset by two central canons in the western literary tradition—*The Crucible*, by US playwright Arthur Miller (1953), and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1948), by English novelist George Orwell.[1] As central canons of Western literature, *The Crucible* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are both remarkable in that, in one form or another, they treat the tendency of scapegoating never to prosper, helping as a commentary on two different historical parallels to establish the pattern and construct the theoretical scapegoating model.

In *The Crucible*, Miller uses the Salem Witch Trials of seventeenth-century Massachusetts as a setting for a critique-by-metaphor of the hysteria over communism that arose in the United States in the latter stages of the 1940s. He draws an implicit parallel between the two, leaving his audience to read between the lines.

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[1] Miller, Arthur, *The Crucible: Revised Edition*, London: Penguin, 1996; Orwell, George, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, London: Penguin, 2004.

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell, writing in 1948, critiques Soviet totalitarianism by depicting a future dystopia geared around the ideology of Ingsoc, a rough portmanteau of English Socialism, within which ruling classes of three different empires use the other two as grist to the propaganda mill for their own citizenry—a fact that renders them dependent on the continued existence of a perpetual state of warfare to maintain their respective holds on power.

Patterning Moral Panics I: *The Crucible*

The social dynamics in *The Crucible* immediately invite comparison to the panicked tenor of the McCarthy period, as was patently intended. The campaign of theocratic terror unleashed on Salem is predicated on the conspiracy theory of an exterior threat imperils the safety of the community—one that features the claim that those who question or challenge their judgment are implicitly giving aid to the forces of evil. Judge Danforth adopts this counter-witchcraft narrative as his own, insisting opportunistically that conditions are so urgent to belie indulgences like critical thought (the citizens of Salem are thus 'either with this court or they are against it'[2]). Fortunately for Hawthorne, but tragically for Salem, Abigail has created fertile soil for his demagoguery; he hardly needs to set a community already polarised against itself, only steer it where he sees fit. Since the enabling narrative for the Salem Witch Trials does arise out of the notion that those who are not for the trials are against them, Abigail has a perfect pretext for attacking Goody Proctor, wife of protagonist John Proctor (with whom she is still infatuated following a brief affair). She invokes the mythology of the witchcraft menace (1) to play the victim of the poppet Mary Warren leaves in the Proctors' house, (2) to blame Goody Proctor, who is in fact the actual victim of the witch-hunt, for the punishments that would otherwise be metered out to her for dancing in the forest, and her own irresponsibility in not accepting John Proctor's rejection after their love affair and (3) to avoid accountability for stirring up the townspeople against witches in pursuit of the above.

In these developments, the criteria of Hall et al. can be found in *the intensification of a particular issue* (witchcraft), *the identification of a*

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[2] Miller, *The Crucible*, ibid.

subversive minority (witches), *'convergence' or the linking by labelling of the specific issue to other problems* (interpersonal squabbles between Salemites), *the notion of 'thresholds'* (Satan's ever more decisive influence over the souls of the residents of Salem), *the element of explaining and prophesying* (the perils of Satan gaining a decisive influence over the souls of the residents of Salem) and *the call for firm steps* (the establishment of the Witch Trials to expunge Satan's influence from Salem). We find Cohen's criteria in *a suitable enemy*, 'a soft target, easily denounced, with little power' (more socially vulnerable members of the community like Goody Proctor and Giles Corey), *a suitable victim*, 'someone with whom you can identify' (the young innocent girls) and *a consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities* (the influence of Satan within a community of Puritanical Christians). We find the criteria of Goode and Ben-Yehuda in *heightened concern* (Salem is not ordinarily concerned about the influence of witches), *increased hostility* (Salem is not ordinary up in arms about the influence of witches), *widespread consensus* (the Witch Trials enjoy popular support), *disproportionate appraisal* (there is no actual threat of witchcraft) and *general volatility* (many injustices are metered out in the name of fighting witchcraft).

We find McCarthy using the same kind of self-serving, binary logic to attack his political enemies, most notably those in liberal Hollywood.[3] The processes involved are virtually identical. Despite the doctrine of Socialism in One Country and Stalin's disavowal of world revolution, McCarthy blows the existence of communism out of all proportion, amplifying it into a conspiracy theory of dark designs against the United States—one he can use to smear his liberal enemies as threats to peace and security on the grounds that questioning the belief system he prefers gives comfort to the enemy ('Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity,' etc.).[4] McCarthy's communist conspiracy theory gives him exactly the pretext he needs to initiate a purge he intended to carry out anyway, while shifting blame for that purge and its consequences to the allegedly malevolent designs of a demonised enemy. He does so in the name of

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[3] See Case Study II for a more detailed discussion.

[4] Griffith, Robert, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph McCarthy and the Senate*, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1987; Feldman, Jay, *Manufacturing Hysteria: A History of Scapegoating, Surveillance, and Secrecy in Modern America*, Pantheon, 2011.

defending norms of individual freedom and human rights for good measure, even perhaps as a departing shot to those who defied him.

In this, the criteria of Hall et al. appears in *the intensification of a particular issue* (communism), *the identification of a subversive minority* ('communists'), *'convergence' or the linking by labelling of the specific issue to other problems* (liberals, who in being soft on communism enable it), *the notion of 'thresholds'* (the likelihood for communist subversion to succeed), *the element of explaining and prophesying* (the loss of freedom and the American way of life) and *the call for firm steps* (a crackdown on 'communists'). Cohen's criteria appear in *a suitable enemy*, 'a soft target, easily denounced, with little power' (dissidents as individuals lack the resources of power structures), *a suitable victim*, 'someone with whom you can identify' (good, loyal patriots) and *a consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities* (communists exercise influence disproportionate to their numbers). The criteria of Goode and Ben-Yehuda appear in *heightened concern* (Americans have not always been preoccupied with communist influence), *increased hostility* (Americans are not always up in arms about communist influence), *widespread consensus* (anticommunism enjoys popular support, e.g. in the Truman Doctrine), *disproportionate appraisal* (no threat to US democracy from communism is demonstrated), and *general volatility* (many injustices are metered out in the name of anti-communism).[5]

Patterning Moral Panics II: *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

If *The Crucible* is one useful literary medium for modelling moral panics as the second stage of the model of panic-driven scapegoating, the core focus of this chapter, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is another. Its critique of political authoritarianism in the Soviet Union—the very same used to justify political authoritarianism in the United States in the name of anti-communism—has in the decades since its publication become the basis for critique of authoritarian and indeed totalitarian political tendencies far more broadly.[6]

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[5] See Case Study II for a more detailed discussion.

[6] A small fraction of the available literature appears in examples such as Howe, Irving, ed., *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century*, New York: Harper Row, 1983; Goodman, David, 'Countdown to 1984: Big Brother May Be Right on Schedule,' *The Futurist* 12, no. 6, 1978: 345–355; Tyner, James A., 'Self and Space, Resistance and Discipline: A Foucauldian Reading of George Orwell's *1984*,' *Social & Cultural Geography* 5, no. 1, 2004: 129–149;

Deviance production is a prominent feature of the Orwellian nightmare and one that, in many respects, permits it to prevail. The daily Two Minutes Hate is a mandatory exercise for party members who are subjected to a barrage of highly charged political propaganda based on overblown fears of the Other—the xenophobic demonisation of enemy states accompanying the state of perpetual war, and the dissident figure of Emmanuel Goldstein (modelled on Leon Trotsky).

> But what was strange was that, although Goldstein was hated and despised by everybody, although every day, and a thousand times a day, on platforms, on the telescreen, in newspapers, in book, his theories were refuted, smashed, ridiculed, held up to the general gaze for the pitiful rubbish that they were—in spite of all this, his influence never seemed to grow less.[7]

This could just as easily describe the Salem Witch Trials, or the anti-communist panic Miller sought to critique, the hold the existential threat from without growing at the same pace as the rate of denunciations. If Goldstein is the demonised enemy, he appears more and more monstrous and threatening the more society is galvanised against him—a paradox we can account for with no difficulty in recognising that the terror is producing the deviant, not the other way around. Scare propaganda renders the totalitarian state of *1984* cause and cure of the same existential threat, reinventing the oppressor totalitarian police state as protector of the people from external attack, internal subversion, and ultimately themselves.

Orwell gives some indication of how complete this process has become by the time the story begins by describing Smith's job within the Ministry of Truth—his brief being to help rewrite history every time military allegiances change to disguise the nature of the war as a perpetual one, implicitly predicated on the deviance production of the

Yeo, Michael, 'Propaganda and Surveillance in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: Two Sides of the Same Coin,' *Global Media Journal* 3, no. 2, 2010: 49; Herman, Edward S., *Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda, Including the Doublespeak Dictionary*, Black Rose Books Ltd., 1992; Kerr, Douglas, 'Orwell's BBC Broadcasts: Colonial Discourse and the Rhetoric of Propaganda,' *Textual Practice* 16, no. 3 (2002): 473–490; Bennett, John, 'Orwell's *1984*: Was Orwell Right?' *Journal of Historical Review* 6, no. 1 (1986): 9–15; Plank, Robert, *George Orwell's Guide Through Hell: A Psychological Study of 1984*, Vol. 41, Wildside Press LLC, 1994, etc.

[7] Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, op. cit., CITE.

Two Minutes Hate and its function in directing inadmissible social tensions onto a scapegoat, creating demand for the benevolent paternalism of Big Brother in the process. This process in fact seems to be a feature common to each of the empires within the tri-polar world of Eurasia, Eastasia and Oceania—all of whom practice, in one form or another, deviance production, insofar as each make out the other two to be worse than themselves. In reality they are all equally bad.

Within the iconoclastic Orwellian nightmare, the criteria of Hall et al. appear in *the intensification of a particular issue* (Eastasia and Oceania), *the identification of a subversive minority* (Emmanuel Goldstein and his agents), *'convergence'* (Goldstein giving aid to enemy powers), *the notion of 'thresholds'* (if Goldstein gains enough influence to overthrow the state, if Eurasia is defeated militarily), *the element of explaining and prophesying* (what will happen if Goldstein or the enemy powers are victorious) and *the call for firm steps* (rooting out Goldstein's influence, military victory). Cohen's criteria appear in *a suitable enemy*, (dangerous dissidents), *a suitable victim* ('doubleplus goodthinkers') and *a consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities* (everyone participates in the Two Minutes Hate). The criteria of Goode and Ben-Yehuda appear in *heightened concern* (party members are not universally preoccupied with Emmanuel Goldstein the other 1438 minutes of the day), *increased hostility* (party members are not universally up in arms about Emmanuel Goldstein the other 1438 minutes of the day), *widespread consensus* (everyone participates in the Two Minutes Hate), *disproportionate appraisal* (the totalitarian state is well entrenched) and *general volatility* (many injustices are metered out in the name of defending Big Brother from military enemies and *crimethink*).

If the periods of history that formed the backdrop for both *The Crucible* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are comparable with defining features of moral panics, we have grounds then for expecting that extending that modelling to the historical case studies might achieve similar results. We can build on the insights gained through comparison of moral panic characteristics with the works of Miller and Orwell with a survey of attempts to account for the tendency of scapegoating never to prosper—in so doing laying the ground for a comparison of historical patterning of moral panics and the dynamics of blame-shifting, which we explore in Chapter 3.

Patterning Moral Panics III: The Rise of Propaganda

The 'morality play' that characterises moral panics on the deviance production on which they turn both require means of transmission—in this case, political propaganda. The history of propaganda writ large was suitably prefaced by US journalist and satirist H.L. Menken, who noted in 1921 that 'the whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary.'[8] Mencken's observation is primarily of value insofar as it invites reflection on the role of lies in defending a status quo dominated by elites from challenges to power and privilege; a brief overview of the long history of political propaganda as a source of such offers potential for additional insight into the tendency of history to repeat itself as a result—as propaganda is deployed by ideological servants of dominant elites to institutionalise socially constructed collective representations of reality through self-serving morality plays based on deviance production, in other words.

The word *propaganda* originates in the Catholic Church with Pope Gregory XV, who founded the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (1622) or Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. That this took place a mere eight years after the Roman Inquisition outlawed the heliocentric theory of the cosmos as heresy, and ten years before it found the Italian astronomer Galileo Galilei to be in violation of this ban, tells us something of the milieu in which it was established.[9] While what is retroactively referred to these days as 'propaganda' always existed in one form or another, in this particular context it referred to what the Catholic Church perceived to be its duty 'to lead the wretched and errant sheep back to the folds of Christ, so that they might recognize that they are of the flock and pasture of our Lord.'

> In this way, and with the aid of divine grace, these unhappy sheep will abandon their heretical wanderings in evil pastures, and their drinking of deadly, pestilential waters; instead, they will turn to the pasture of true

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[8] Mencken, H. L., *Notes on Democracy*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921, 22.

[9] Guilday, Peter, 'The Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide (1622–1922),' *The Catholic Historical Review* 6, no. 4 (1921): 478–494; Mattelart, Armand, *The Invention of Communication*, University of Minnesota, 1996: 179–180; Koestler, Arthur, *The Sleepwalkers*, London: Hutchinson, 2017, Penguin.

Faith, where they may gather wholesome teachings and be led to the source of the water of life.[10]

Since the Inquisition in general and the trial of Galileo in particular indicate the milieu in which the *Propaganda fide* was born—the latter for entertaining the heretical and false notion that the Earth revolves around the Sun—the operating assumptions of this milieu indicate the broad trajectory of this office. The Papal bull that brought it into being, the *Inscrutabili Divinae*, does so specifically. 'Propagation of the faith' was at least as concerned with preserving the power of the Catholic hierarchy as it was preserving truth. It did so the sense of the quote attributed to *Nietzsche that* 'all things are subject to interpretation, and whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth,' deriving from the power of the Catholic Church to impose its viewpoint as the hegemon through the coercion and terror of the Inquisition. Being based on the orthodoxy vs. heterodoxy binary upon which the Faith was built, the theocratic hegemon could only see the world in black and white through the kind of 'panoptic gaze' that regarded differing points of view as challenges to its power to interpret truth and impose that interpretation on everyone within its sphere of influence.[11]

It was thanks to this gaze and the power to impose the interpretation of truth associated with it for the purposes of propagation of the faith through propaganda that the Catholic hierarchy could speak of leading 'wretched and errant sheep' away from errant points of view to political correctness in the name of alleged Christian principles like, 'judge not, lest ye be judged.'[12] Here the cognitive dissonance between rhetoric and conduct is impossible to miss—one that remains a characteristic feature of propaganda writ large. In more modern times this kind of cognitive dissonance has migrated into war propaganda and corporate propaganda, particularly as the doctrine of total war arose, along with all that involved

[10] Prendergast, Maria Teresa, and Thomas A. Prendergas, 'The Invention of Propaganda: A Critical Commentary on and Translation of *Inscrutabili Divinae Providentiae Arcano*,' in Auerbach, Jonathan, and Russ Castronovo, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, Oxford University Press, 2014, 2.

[11] Simon, Bart, 'The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection and the New Surveillance,' *Surveillance & Society* 3, no. 1, 2002.

[12] Matthew 7:1-3, Luke 6:37.

in terms of mobilisation of a whole society behind the war effort of its ruling class.[13] As Finch has shown, the two steadily became intertwined as war propaganda and then the public relations industry became necessary to sell the idea of war to the general population, usually by terrifying them with atrocity tales perpetrated by the enemy.[14]

Putting particular emphasis on the role played by war propaganda in the mobilisation of entire populations during World War One, war propagandists sought to create a 'subtle climate of sacrifice' necessary to the achievement of war aims. A major part of this project involved efforts to increase the susceptibility of the audience to absorb the messages thus imparted. To this end, Finch shows, propagandists and public relations experts threw their lot in behind efforts to increase literacy and promote mass education such that this would actually increase their receptivity to attempts to manipulate them and engage in the 'manufacture of consent.' As Edward Bernays, the 'Father of Public Relations' was at some pains to point out, 'The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society'—the opposite, apparently, of the preoccupations of the paranoid conspiracy theorist.

> Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are moulded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organised. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society … In almost every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons—a trifling fraction of our hundred and twenty million—who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.[15]

[13]Lynette Finch, *Dark Angel: Propaganda in Modern Warfare*, Beaconsfield, VIC, 2006.

[14]Finch, *Dark Angel*, ibid.

[15]Bernays, Edward L., *Propaganda*, Ig Publishing, 1928; Bernays, Edward L., 'Manipulating Public Opinion: The Why and the How,' *American Journal of Sociology* 1928: 958–971.

In the name of shedding light on those who pull the wires that control the public mind, Alex Carey, an academic at the University of New South Wales, published the seminal academic study of corporate propaganda in the United States and Australia, *Taking the Risk out of Democracy*, in 1995.[16] In this groundbreaking work, Carey ruminated at some length on the disastrous economic and political consequences associated with the rise of corporate power, not least because of the destructively totalitarian trends contained therein, and the role of corporate propaganda in producing scapegoats upon whom to shift blame.[17] 'The twentieth century,' he wrote,

> Has been characterised by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy … Ironically, even while corporate propaganda overwhelms democracy … it remains, as ever, an axiom of conventional wisdom that the use of propaganda as a means of social and ideological control is distinctive of totalitarian regimes. Yet the most minimal exercise of common sense would suggest a different view: that propaganda is likely to play at least as important a part in democratic societies, where the existing distribution of power and privilege is vulnerable to quite limited changes in popular opinion, as in authoritarian societies, where it is not.[18]

As Carey noted, the colonisation of democratic forms by corporate power with the aid of widespread propagandising began in the years following 1886, when legal notes attached to the case of *Santa Clara County vs. Southern Pacific Railroad* became the basis for the principle of corporate personhood, thanks to an appeal to the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, originally been drawn up at the end of the Civil War to guarantee the civil rights of African Americans (the circumstances surrounding the supposed basis for the establishment of corporate personhood remain highly contentious).[19]

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[16] Carey, Alex, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, Sydney: UNSW Press, 1995, 37.

[17] Carey, ibid.

[18] Carey, ibid., 18–21.

[19] Hartmann, Thom, *Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the Theft of Human Rights*, Rodale: New York, St. Martin's Press, 2002.

The totalitarian thrust of corporate power had tended to become increasingly more conspicuous throughout the course of the twentieth century as it became increasingly more acute, as the political institutions of representatives democracy came to be more and more dominated by propertied elites who took advantage of changes to the law in their favour to begin the work of constructing 'private, unaccountable tyrannies' (Chomsky) and the world's first privatised empire.[20] Monopoly as a matter of definition involves imbalances of power given the power that attends economic privilege per se, a fact that holds true for privilege in any form. As the process of accumulating disproportionate amounts of power had inadvertently generated resistance from what remained of the democratic sphere, the economically privileged had required recurring episodes of moral panic as ideological cover under which to neutralise resistance, reassert their dominance as a class and reconstruct their ideological legitimacy.

In the process of elaborating on what he argued was essentially a process of social engineering carried out under cover of moral panic, using some outside threat as a pretext and rationale, Carey described a three-stage process of blame-shifting:

(1) A threat (real or imagined) from outside the United States achieves a *dramatic impact on popular consciousness*; (2) this effect occurs at a time when liberal reforms and popular hostility to the large corporations and the power they exercise are perceived by conservative interests as a profound threat from inside the U.S. social and political system. Finally, (3) the two perceived threats merge, to the discredit of the internal reforms and of any political party, persons or policies associated with them. [*emphasis added*][21]

One is hard-pressed to think of similar commentary that so eerily and luridly presaged future events; we do well to recall that this was published six years *prior* to 9/11. The previous examples Carey referred to were nineteenth-century nativism and xenophobia, and twentieth-century anti-communist panic, which saw in every attempt to resist economic

[20]Chomsky, Noam, 'The Corporate Takeover of US Democracy,' Chomsky.info, 24 January 2010, via https://chomsky.info/20100124; Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 2000.

[21]Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, ibid., 37.

injustice the evil hand of the Kremlin and its designs for global conquest. Nativism and anti-radicalism combined in the aftermath of World War One to produce the First Red Scare (1919–1920), the fruits of which were a series of unconstitutional raids carried out by Attorney General Mitchell A. Palmer in the name of upholding democracy. Illegal deportations and draconian legislation in the Espionage (1917) and Sedition Acts (1918) rounded out the assaults on individual freedoms, the former sitting in place for a century before being used to prosecute US whistle-blower Chelsea Manning.[22]

In these examples, immigrants and Reds had played the part of the threat from outside the United States, that which achieved 'a dramatic impact on popular consciousness.' Both had appeared at moments when conservative interests perceived a profound threat to large corporations and the power they exercised from liberal reforms, as Carey noted. In the former case, opposition during the Progressive Era to 'robber barons' presaging the passing of antitrust legislation, and the breaking up of monopolies like Standard Oil, was a worrying trend for American nationalists, as was growing opposition to homegrown imperialism, union organising and other challenges to elite prerogatives. The popularity of poets like Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon, writing in the tradition of Whitman and Hardy, gave voice to anti-war feeling born of antipathy towards wartime jingoism, the self-interested militarism of war contractors, the ignoble purposes of war and many of its other horrors.[23] Such feelings would eventually reach their apex in General Smedley Butler's famous anti-war treatise *War is a Racket*.[24] Similarly, and as we

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[22] Pilkington, Ed, 'Manning Conviction under Espionage Act Worries Civil Liberties Campaigners,' *The Guardian*, 1 August 2013, via https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/bradley-manning-espionage-act-civil-liberties.

[23] Wilson, Jean Moorcroft, *Siegfried Sassoon: The Journey from the Trenches: A Biography (1918–1967)*, London: Routledge, 2003.

[24] 'I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927

will see in the second case study, the involvement of foreign-born workers in union organising in the Massachusetts textile mills were associated with foreign subversion; none could have legitimate grievances with the factory system during the early stages of industrial capitalism otherwise. In both cases, opposition to war and union organising as challenges to elite values and priorities come to be equated with the willing destruction of 'American values,' corporate propaganda merging such challenges with Cohen's 'folk demons' to their mutual discredit.[25]

Further innovations in the propaganda discourse Carey discusses arrived not long thereafter in the Red Scare of 1919–1920, the first of two moral panics over communism in the United States during the twentieth century (the Cold War innovated on this theme once more with moral panic as the driving force of foreign policy). The Second Red Scare appeared in the aftermath of the Second World War, and again bore a comparison to Carey's three stages. In this instance, the threat from outside the United States was alleged to be the Soviet Union, with whom the United States had successfully allied over much of the previous decade. With Hitler out of the way, the United States turned its sights on Stalin, said to have expansionist designs on the western hemisphere despite the thrashing the Soviet Union took on the Eastern front during the war, Stalin's abandonment of worker internationalism in the doctrine of 'Socialism in One Country.' Popular distaste for war in the immediate aftermath of WWII and regard for the Russian ally only added to the cognitive dissonance.

That opposition to militarism and war and a social democratic outlook translated into a desire to institute a Bolshevik-dominated America as far as the aforementioned vested interests were concerned should not seem so surprising given the parallels already established above. With the addition of this third example, parallel examples became a pattern. With a pattern of three established, the main question Carey's study appeared to raise then was the timing and circumstances of the next instalment—the answer to which arrived six years later. It was clear then that, in addition to containing eerie turns of phrase chilling for their presaging of

I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.'

[25] Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, op. cit.

future events, the three-stage process Carey outlined in *Taking the Risk out of Democracy* revealed the function of elite-driven scare campaigns as a means of stirring moral panic, the ideological cover of choice for scapegoating and persecution of political threats.

Patterning Moral Panics IV: Imaginary Hobgoblins and the Paranoid Style

Hitler's deputy Hermann Göering acknowledged as much during a 1946 interview with Gustave Gilbert, a German-speaking US intelligence officer, while awaiting trial for crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg Prison. 'Naturally the common people don't want war,' Göering observed,

> But after all, it's the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it's always a simple matter to drag the people along whether it's a democracy, a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism, and exposing the country to greater danger.[26]

Being second in command of the Third Reich, he would have been one to know; the menacing of the public with an endless series of hobgoblins Göering described was textbook deviance production ('tell them they're being attacked and denounce the pacifists for exposing the country to danger').[27] Also worth noting is the similarities between the tripolar world order Göering refers to in the course of his

[26] Gilbert, Gustave Mark, *Nuremberg Diary*, Da Capo Press, 1995; Knightley, Phillip, 'The Role of the Media in Justifying and Promoting War,' in Fox, Jo, and David Welch, eds., *Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age: Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012*, 378.

[27] It bears dwelling on the conditions under which these comments were made, neither giving Göering room to manoeuvre nor boding well for his longevity. If Göering did not made a direct *mea culpa*, the abovementioned comments might be considered the next best thing—even more so if saying so gave him an opportunity to take down his enemies with him. Being close to death, he had plenty of motivation to make his last public statements truthful ones. Mosley, Leonard. *The Reich Marshal: A Biography of Hermann Goering*, Doubleday Books, 1974.

comments at Nuremberg, and the tripolar Eurasia/Eastasia/Oceania world of Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*; all mortal enemies and yet also dependent on one another as folk demons for the purposes of internal propaganda. In addition to being straightforward by the standards of moral panic, Göering's commentary is perhaps more to the point also quite familiar to Western political traditions. During the Constitutional Convention (1778), US Founding Father and author of the Constitution, James Madison, declared that 'the means of defence against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home,' pointing out further that 'among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war whenever a revolt was apprehended.'[28]

Few have taken issue with Madison in the two and a half centuries since. On the contrary, a recent image circulating on the internet provides an eminently suitable way of introducing the torrent of commentary in agreement by way of a political joke: a man in a suit declares, 'Gentlemen! The Cold War is over, the Soviet Union has Collapsed. We need to invent a new enemy if we're going to keep the arms market afloat!' In the next row the suited man and two others look indifferently at a communist hammer and sickle against a classic red background; in the third and bottom row, the hammer and handle of the sickle have been rubbed out with a black marker, leaving a yellow crescent—referencing Islam. The faces of the men are now wide open with excited surprise, heralding a solution.

Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN), speaking to the filmmakers behind *The Newburgh Sting*, an HBO documentary about FBI entrapment of terrorism suspects, makes similar observations:

> You know I remember years ago we used to go after people we said were communists, then we went after gang members, during the whole war on drugs, and that literally lead to the incarceration of a whole generation of African American men. So now, okay, Muslims are the new 'thing' … when you channel a vast array of law enforcement resources towards

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[28] Cf. Norman Mailer: 'Wars are a convenient way for the government to export a generation that is proving disruptive at home.' Madison, *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, op. cit. The latter quote is generally updated into modern English as 'if Tyranny and Oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting a foreign enemy.'

a particular community, no doubt you're going to get some bad actors because there are bad actors in every community.[29]

Ellison is the first Muslim elected to Congress, and on that count likely has a better appreciation of ideologically driven persecution than many. In developing his 'imaginary hobgoblin' commentary, Mencken wrote on what Austrian psychologist Wilhelm Reich would later, in evaluating the nascent national socialist movement, call the 'mass individual.'[30] Ideas, Mencken noted, 'leave them unscathed; they are responsive only to emotions, and their emotions are all elemental — the emotions, indeed, of tabby-cats rather than of men.'

> Fear remains the chiefest of them. The demagogues, i.e., the professors of mob psychology, who flourish in democratic states are well aware of the fact, and make it the cornerstone of their exact and puissant science. Politics under democracy consists almost wholly of the discovery, chase and scotching of bugaboos. The statesman becomes, in the last analysis, a mere witch-hunter, a glorified smeller and snooper, eternally chanting "Fe, Fi, Fo, Fum!" It has been so in the United States since the earliest days. The whole history of the country has been a history of melodramatic pursuits of horrendous monsters, most of them imaginary: the red-coats, the Hessians, the monocrats, again the red-coats, the Bank, the Catholics, Simon Legree, the Slave Power, Jeff Davis, Mormonism, Wall Street, the rum demon, John Bull, the hell hounds of plutocracy, the trusts, General Weyler, Pancho Villa, German spies, hyphenates, the Kaiser, Bolshevism. The list might be lengthened indefinitely; a complete chronicle of the Republic could be written in terms of it, and without omitting a single important episode, it was long ago observed that the plain people, under democracy, never vote for anything, but always against something. The fact

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[29] *The Newburgh Sting*, dirs. Heilbroner, David, and Kate Davis, Home Box Office, 2009. For more on entrapment see Aaronson, Trevor, *The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI's Manufactured War on Terrorism*, Ig Publishing, 2014.

[30] Reich, Wilhelm, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, London: Macmillan, 1970. For more on authoritarian psychology see Fromm, Erich, *The Fear of Freedom*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1942; Adorno, T. W., E. Frenkel-Brunswik, and D. J. Levinson, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Wiley, 1964; Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973; Eco, Umberto, 'Ur-Fascism,' *New York Review of Books*, 22 June 1995, via http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/06/22/ur-fascism, accessed 18 May 2017; Brinton, Maurice, 'The Irrational in Politics,' in Goodway, David, ed., *For Workers Power: The Selected Writings of Maurice Brinton*, Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2004, 257–292.

explains, in large measure, the tendency of democratic states to pass over statesmen of genuine imagination and sound ability in favour of colourless mediocrities.[31]

By mid-century Menken's observations had enjoyed development at the hands of political scientist Richard Hofstadter, who penned what has since become a classic essay on the 'Paranoid Style.' This again can be construed as another way of describing deviance production. Outlining 'a style of mind, not always right wing in its affiliations, that has a long and varied history,' Hofstadter explained his reasoning in terms of the idea that 'no other word adequately evokes the qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy that I have in mind.'[32]

As 'a way of seeing the world and of expressing oneself,' he argued, the Paranoid Style made the feeling of persecution a key facet, systematising grandiose theories of conspiracy just as the 'clinical paranoiac' exhibited a 'chronic mental disorder characterized by systematic delusions of persecution and of one's own greatness.'[33] While the clinical paranoiac and the demagogue both tended to be 'overheated, over-suspicious, overaggressive, grandiose and apocalyptic in expression,' however, the clinical paranoiac, Hofstadter argued, felt 'the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he feels himself to be living as directed specifically against him.' In the Paranoid Style, its spokesman 'finds it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not him alone, but millions of others.' This was a significant difference, in that

> Insofar as he does not usually see himself singled out as the individual victim of a personal conspiracy, he is somewhat more rational and much more disinterested. His sense that his political passions are unselfish and

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[31] Mencken, *Notes on Democracy*, op. cit.; Rodgers, Marion Elizabeth, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast*, Oxford University Press, 2005; Reich, Wilhelm, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, London: Macmillan, 1970; For 'a complete chronicle of the Republic written in terms of melodramatic pursuits of horrendous monsters, most of them imaginary, and without omitting a single important episode,' see Davis, David Brion, ed., *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present*, Cornell University Press, 1971.

[32] Hofstadter, Richard, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, Vintage, 2012, 3.

[33] Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, ibid.

patriotic, in fact, goes far to intensify his feeling of righteousness and his moral indignation.[34]

To illustrate the abstractions on which the Paranoid Style feeds, Hofstadter cites four primary documents—a speech in June 1951 by Republican senator Joseph McCarthy, an 1895 manifesto from the Populist Party, a Texas newspaper article from 1855 and a sermon preached in Massachusetts in 1798. The 1951 McCarthy speech speaks of 'a [communist] conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men,' in defence of his country, the 1895 manifesto of 'the secret cabals of the international gold ring,' in defence of the country, the Texas article of 1855 a plot by 'the Monarchs of Europe and the Pope of Rome,' in defence of Protestantism and the country, and the 1798 sermon 'secret and systematic means' pursued 'by wicked and artful men to undermine the foundations of this religion,' in defence of Christianity. All told, as Hofstadter points out, the spectres of evil against which these examples rally are as varied as Illuminism, Masons, Catholics, gold traders and communists, while the 'goods' are ideological abstractions with which individuals can ally as a form of self-avoidance—the 'nation' and religion dominant themes.[35] In some ways this is not altogether surprising, Hofstadter argues, since the exponents of the Paranoid Style tend less to see conspiracies turning up 'here and there' in history than they see 'vast' or 'gigantic' conspiracies as the 'motive force' in history.[36]

The paranoid then, Hofstadter argues, only understands history in impoverished terms of the willed actions of individuals, not as something co-produced by collections of masses of people within themselves and in relation to one another; this enemy is a projection of the self; 'both the ideal and the unacceptable parts of the self are attributed to him.' In projecting his own unconscious self onto some demonised stereotype or bogeyman, the paranoid demagogue exhibits a fundamental paradox

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[34] Hofstadter, ibid., 4. See also Cichocka, A., de Zavala, A. G., Marchlewska, M., & Olechowski, M., 'Grandiose delusions: Collective narcissism, secure in-group identification, and belief in conspiracies,' in Bilewicz, M., Cichocka, A. & Soral, V., ed., *The Psychology of Conspiracy*, London: Routledge, 2015, 60–79, and Golec de Zavala, A., & Lantos, D., 'Collective narcissism and its social consequences: The Bad and the Ugly,' *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 29, no. 3, 2020: 273–278. The Prejudice Lab at *collective-narcissism.com* promotes further research into collective narcissism and conspiracy theories.

[35] Hofstadter, ibid., 7–9.

[36] Hofstadter, ibid., 29.

insofar as he imitates the enemy; Hofstadter quotes historian David Brion Davis, who in commentating on pre-Civil War nativism, observed that 'as the nativist searched for participation in a noble cause, for unity in a group sanctioned by tradition and authority, he professed a belief in democracy and equal rights.'

> Yet in his very zeal for freedom he curiously assumed many of the characteristics of the maligned enemy. By condemning the subversive's fanatical allegiance to an ideology, he affirmed a similarly uncritical acceptance of a different ideology; by attacking the subversive's intolerance of dissent, he worked to eliminate dissent and diversity of opinion; by censuring the subversive for alleged licentiousness, he engaged in sensual fantasies; by criticizing the subversive's loyalty to an organization, he sought to prove his unconditional loyalty to the established order … Though the nativists generally agreed that the worst evil of subversives was their subordination of means to ends, they themselves recommended the most radical means to purge the nation of troublesome groups and to enforce unquestioned loyalty to the state.[37]

Projecting onto the enemy gave the paranoid the opportunity to 'freely express unacceptable aspects of their own minds,' serving as 'strong sadomasochistic outlets.'[38] If imitating the enemy involves ends-justify-the-means morality (as opposed to making means consistent with ends), then Davis's commentary suggests that the paradox of the Paranoid Style—and also therefore of deviance production and moral panicking—involves the propensity of those employing it to become what they claimed to oppose. The paranoid attributed the traits they embodied to an available target to shift responsibility away from themselves for addressing the shame they experienced subconsciously, at which point the hated trait could be named and denounced, and they could carry on with the shameful behaviour they had decided on prior to looking for a scapegoat upon whom to pin blame for the consequences.

As the central problem of the Paranoid Style, Hofstadter notes, was that belief in 'an all-encompassing conspiracy on the part of Jesuits or Freemasons, international capitalists, international Jews or Communists,' he pointed out, 'are familiar phenomena in many countries throughout modern history.'[39] Furthermore, in not being 'confined to modern times,' they were familiar to many times and places throughout history,

[37] Hofstadter, ibid., 33–34.

[38] Hofstadter, ibid., 34.

[39] Hofstadter, ibid., 6, 38.

an argument confirmed by Madison above and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter, who noted that even the Roman Empire was familiar with the Paranoid Style. 'There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack,' he wrote.

> If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome's allies; and if Rome had no allies, then allies would be invented. When it was utterly impossible to contrive such an interest—why, then it was the national honour that had been insulted. The fight was always invested with an aura of legality. Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbours, always fighting for a breathing-space. The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly Rome's duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs.[40]

In this sense, the Paranoid Style as the characteristic mentality of the 'moral entrepreneur' of moral panics might be understood not just as a feature of American politics, but of politics in general and international relations in particular; it was also evident in the Diocletian Persecution, as we have seen. A practical example from international relations can be found in the form of what novelist Robert Harris, in an op-ed for the *New York Times*, described as a 'daring terrorist attack' by pirates on the Roman port of Ostia in 68 BCE. The pirates, Harris recalled, set Ostia on fire, destroyed the consular fleet and kidnapped two prominent senators along with their bodyguards and staff, sparking a panic that 'the Latin husbandman, the traveller on the Appian highway, the genteel bathing visitor at the terrestrial paradise of Baiae were no longer secure of their property or their life for a single moment.'[41] Those responsible were 'the disaffected of the earth,' perpetrators who, according to Mommsen, represented 'the ruined men of all nations … a piratical state with a peculiar esprit de corps'—'loosely organized' outlaws, in other words, whose capacity for spreading fear was well disproportionate to their actual capabilities, depending rather on their ability to shock

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[40] Schumpeter, Joseph A., *Imperialism and Social Classes: Two Essays*, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1955.

[41] Harris, Robert, 'What a Terrorist Incident in Ancient Rome Can Teach Us: Pirates of the Mediterranean,' *The New York Times*, 30 September 2006, via http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/opinion/30harris.html, accessed 22 April 2017.

Romans out of the prevailing belief in their own immunity from the very same violence that had wrought their empire.[42]

As events transpired, the Rome responded with a naval campaign that crushed the existential threat of Mediterranean piracy in under three months—though not before 38-year-old Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, remembered by history as Pompey the Great, exploited popular fears of the manifestly overblown threat to demand sweeping powers, including supreme naval command and what Plutarch recalled as 'an absolute authority and uncontrolled power over everyone.' Coming as it did into direct conflict with the constitution of Ancient Rome, the law presented to the Senate by a lieutenant of Pompey's, the *Lex Gabinia*, caused a riot when it was debated, but was passed illegally after a 'tumultuous mass meeting' in the centre of Rome that, in cowing Pompey's opponents into submission, provides some sense of its general tenor. Fearful hatefulness was becoming a habit; 'by the time of Pompey,' Press notes, 'the word "pirate" had developed into one of the most powerful and evocative of slanders that authors could use to damn the morality of their subject.'[43] 'Even allowing for Pompey's genius as a military strategist,' Harris observes,'the suspicion arises that if the pirates could be defeated so swiftly, they could hardly have been such a grievous threat in the first place.'

> But it was too late to raise such questions. By the oldest trick in the political book—the whipping up of a panic, in which any dissenting voice could be dismissed as "soft" or even "traitorous"—powers had been ceded by the people that would never be returned. Pompey stayed in the Middle East for six years, establishing puppet regimes throughout the region, and turning himself into the richest man in the empire.[44]

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[42] Harris, 'Pirates of the Mediterranean,' ibid.

[43] 'This moral colouring has inevitably affected the literary tradition for 67 BC, most notably in building up Roman paranoia about an organised pirate armada issuing forth from the rocky bays and ambuscades of the region known as Cilicia.' Press, Daniel Patrick, *Bellum Piraticum: Pompey, Piracy, and the Lex Gabinia of 67 BC*, MPhil dissertation, The University of Queensland, 2012, via http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:281782, accessed 23 April 2017.

[44] Harris, 'Pirates of the Mediterranean,' op. cit.; Puchala, Donald J. 'Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach,' *Contemporary Security Policy* 26, no. 1 (2005): 1–24.

On this point, Policante notes that 'it is precisely by taking upon itself the burden of fighting those who were represented as "common enemies of all human communities" that Rome claimed an Imperial role throughout the ancient world … Only by depicting Imperial violence not as war, but as the persecution of outlaw groups (*persecutio piratarum*), could the Roman Emperor be presented as a global peace-enforcer (*pacator orbis*).' In a similar manner today, he adds, imperialist war has been spin-doctored out of existence 'in favour of global police actions against terrorist networks, criminal mafias, rogue states and pirate outlaws.'[45] On the domestic front, the same mentality produces 'Teflon politics.'[46]

Other sources provide hints of the Paranoid Style in history, not least of which being the biblical. Exodus 22:18 (KJV) states unequivocally 'Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live.' Likewise, in Leviticus 20:27 (KJV), 'A man also or woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death: they shall stone them with stones: their blood shall be upon them.'[47] A recent work of scholarship recalls a series of witch-hunts used to resolve a bitter power struggle under the Han Dynasty in China between 90 and 87 BCE.[48]

In support of all of the above, Hofstadter quotes historian Norman Cohn, who describes a 'persistent psychological complex' evident within millenarian sects from the eleventh to the seventeenth centuries characterised by

> The megalomaniac view of oneself as the Elect, wholly good, abominably persecuted yet assured of ultimate triumph; the attribution of gigantic and demonic powers to the adversary; the refusal to accept the ineluctable

[45] Policante, Amedeo, *The Pirate Myth: Genealogies of an Imperial Concept*, Routledge, 2015, 'Ch. 7 Terrorists and Pirates: Global police and *humanitas afflicta*,' 184–185.

[46] Hood, Christopher, *The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government*, Princeton University Press, 2010.

[47] These comments come with the obvious caveat that The Bible was written by persons unknown hundreds of years after the events it describes had died, and that the King James Version was produced in the early seventeenth century, at the height of the European Witch Hunts, under the direction of the eponymous monarch, a notorious witch-hunter. If the KJV is a true reflection of Christianity, then let the comparison to the Paranoid Style stand. If the comparison is felt to be unjust, then let us acknowledge the KJV as the word of man, and an example of the Paranoid Style prevailing in the seventeenth century—or at least in part. Paranoid fears of the influence of Satan generally has a much older pedigree.

[48] Cai, Liang. *Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire*, SUNY Press, 2014, 143–151.

limitations and imperfections of human existence, such as transience, dissention, conflict, fallibility, whether intellectual or moral; the obsession with inerrable prophecies … systematized misrepresentations, always gross and often grotesque … ruthlessness directed towards an end which by its very nature cannot be realized — towards a final and total solution such as cannot be attained at any actual time or in any concrete situation, but only in the timeless and autistic realm of phantasy.[49]

It is fascinating that Hofstadter saw fit to quote Cohn in this respect given the considerable extent to which doing so draws together otherwise disparate threads in the humanities, though he does neglects to mention similar observations made in Cohn's later work. Not least of these are Cohn's exploration of the roots of witch panic in what he describes in the quite brilliant *Europe's Inner Demons* as an 'Ancient Fantasy'—what we might all a trope or archetype in the Jungian sense. The essence of this 'Ancient Fantasy,' Cohn argued, was that 'there existed, somewhere in the midst of the great society, another society, small and clandestine, which not only threatened the existence of the great society but was also addicted to practices which were felt to be wholly abominable, in the literal sense of anti-human.'

> The fantasy changed, became more complex, down through the centuries. It played an important part in some major persecutions; and the way in which it did also varied. Sometimes it was used merely to legitimate persecutions that would have occurred anyway; sometimes it served to widen persecutions that would otherwise have remained far more limited. In the case of the great [European] witch-hunt it generated a massive persecution, which would have been inconceivable without it. In pursuing its history, one is led far beyond the confines of the history of ideas and deep into the sociology and social psychology of persecution.[50]

It was this concern with the bloody consequences of episodes such as the European Witch Hunts that has been the driving force for research into 'deviance production' in sociology, as we have seen, and 'moral disengagement' in social psychology, which we will shortly review.

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[49]Cohn, Norman, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, Fairlawn, NJ; Essential Books, 1957, quoted in Hofstadter, ibid., 38.

[50]Cohn, Norman, *Europe's Inner Demons*, London: Pimlico, 2005, ix.

This concern is reflected in Hofstadter's conclusion that 'movements employing the Paranoid Style are not constant but come in successive episodic waves,' suggesting that 'the paranoid disposition is mobilized into action chiefly by social conflicts that involve ultimate schemes of values and that bring fundamental fears and hatreds, rather than negotiable interests, into political action.'[51]

If this is the case, then the sociology of moral panics and the social psychology of blame-shifting can provide greater insight into the Paranoid Style and the Ancient Fantasy as its chief features. It is the latter to which we now turn in the name of exploring patterns of moral panic as the primary feature of successful scapegoating campaigns—successful because we are prevented from becoming conscious of the fact that scapegoating doth never prosper, for if it does none dare call it scapegoating.

[51] Hofstadter, op. cit., 39.

Features of Scapegoating

Every war is carefully justified as a defensive war by the government involved, and by all the political parties, in their official utterances.
—Joseph Schumpeter

Every war when it comes, or before it comes, is represented not as a war but as an act of self-defence against a homicidal maniac.
—George Orwell

Although the practice of Empire is continually bathed in blood, the concept of Empire is always dedicated to peace—a perpetual and universal peace outside of history.
—Hardt and Negri, *Empire*

In the project of establishing historical patterning of panic-driven scapegoating as a fact, it is not enough to simply point to different episodes of history and argue that they compare because of the kinds of features we find in literary texts such as *The Crucible* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, as discussed above. Ultimately it is not even enough to point to the Paranoid Style and the Ancient Fantasy as the chief features of historical patterns, even if it appears that they are. That historical periods bear comparison to one another is not controversial; to the extent that the abovementioned literary texts can be considered canonical artefacts of western culture, we might even consider them established truths.

Establishing historical patterns of moral panics necessitates explaining why they appear as patterns in the first place; the chapter that follows is based on the premise that moral panics recur throughout history because they represent suitable ideological cover for scapegoating and persecution. To evidence that line of argument, we must examine the mechanics of scapegoating in more detail.

Features of Scapegoating I: Moral Disengagement

Research in social psychology into the group traits classed as 'moral disengagement' focuses on the mechanisms we use to reconstruct unethical, immoral, harmful, dangerous and even criminal actions as morally just and right, with a view to neutralising the self-censure of our conscience.[1] This approach recognises that we rarely reject the idea of morality out of hand, but merely apply it selectively. With this subjective sleight of hand, we maintain our self-concept as moral actors while abandoning principled action where it does not convenience us. Conceptually speaking, moral disengagement arises from what Bandura calls the 'social cognitive theory of morality,' the field of social psychology concerned with awareness of the moral self and development of moral agency through nurturing of self-regulatory mechanisms.[2]

Broadly, moral disengagement mechanisms include: displacement or diffusing of responsibility ('I was just following orders, it's normal,' etc.); misrepresenting injurious consequences as beneficial to the victim ('they like it, it's good for them'); demonising and dehumanising the victim

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[1] Albert, Bandura, 'Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,' in W. Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 161–191; Bandura, Albert, 'Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,' *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 3, 1999: 193–209; McAlister, Alfred L., 'Moral Disengagement: Measurement and Modification,' *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 1, 2001: 87–99; Bandura, Albert, 'Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,' *Journal of Moral Education* 31, no. 2, 2002: 101–119; Bandura, Albert, 'Reflections on Moral Disengagement,' in G. V. Caprara, ed., *Bandura: A Leader in Psychology*, Milano, Italy: Franco Angeli, 1997; Bandura, Albert, 'Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, 1996: 364–374; Moore, Celia, 'Moral Disengagement in Processes of Organizational Corruption,' *Journal of Business Ethics* 80, no. 1, 2008: 129–139.

[2] Bandura, Albert, 'Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action,' *Handbook of Moral Behaviour and Development* 1, 1991: 45–103.

('they are bad/evil, therefore the rules we have for regular people don't apply') and/or; articulating a self-defence in absolute terms ('those who aren't for me are against me,' willing conflation of criticism and attacks on person and rights).[3] Moral disengagement defined more broadly can include, but is not limited to: 'moral' justification (e.g. playing the victim); euphemistic labelling (e.g. collateral damage is inevitable in such situations); advantageous comparison (e.g. what I did was nothing compared to what others did); attribution of blame—exonerates the self by placing fault with the target of the harmful behaviour (e.g. terrorists deserve to be tortured because they have brought such outcomes upon themselves).[4]

From the above characteristics, this study focuses on playing the victim, blaming the victim, dehumanising the other, using sanitising language and articulating self-defence in morally absolute terms as the primary means of blame-shifting and scapegoating under conditions of moral panics. Insofar as it constitutes a form of dehumanising or demonising the other as a means of 'Othering,' this study contends, deviance production *as such* constitutes a form of moral disengagement. In creating a demonised Other for the purposes of menacing the public, elite-controlled channels of mass communication make political openings for the resolution of the crisis in the favour of elites in ways encompassing all that follows in terms of moral disengagement—playing the victim, blaming the victim, polarising public opinion with the spectre of a demonised Other. In the end, this means associating anyone who refuses to play along with the play-acting that conflates the class privileges of elites with the moral good with the alleged existential threat.

Insofar as this is the case, moral disengagement is a characteristic facet of moral panics. If the Paranoid Style is the car in which Cohn's Ancient Fantasy of conspiratorial threats to the status quo travel, moral panic is the volatile fuel that powers the machinery of moral disengagement under the hood, as the whole lot travels down the road of panic-driven scapegoating.

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[3] Bandura, 'Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,' ibid.; Bandura, 'Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,' ibid.

[4] Detert, James, Linda Klebe Trevino, and Vicki Sweitzer, 'Moral Disengagement in Ethical Decision Making: A Study of Antecedents and Outcomes,' *Journal of Applied Psychology* 93, no. 2, 2008: 374–391.

Features of Scapegoating II: The False Dilemma

It merits noting at the outset that not all forms of moral disengagement appear in every example of deviance production. As its engine, however, moral disengagement is, in one form or another, always apparent. Deviance production depends, as noted, on a wilful conflation of object and relation, such that the dysfunctional, unjust and irrational social relations that produce crises can be swept under the rug in the name of personifying ('reifying') them in the deviant stereotype or 'folk demon' used to generate moral panic. This is generally only possible on the basis of the 'false dilemma' fallacy ('displacement of responsibility' and 'articulating a defence in morally absolute terms'), which, in becoming the basis for the propaganda tactic of 'guilt by association,' identifies the wilful confusion of dissent, criticism, questioning, challenge or mere failure to worship with the requisite level of awe with attacks on one's person and rights (often a curious pretence in the context of attempts to stereotype and demonise others). To torture the metaphor above, if moral disengagement is the engine of panic-driven scapegoating, the False Dilemma is the carburettor.

The black-and-white logic of the False Dilemma is reflected in the assumption that those who are not 'for us' can only ever be motivated by ill-will, not because we are wrong—a tell-tale sign of the mentality drunk on the Paranoid Style. By associating goodwill with obedience, the False Dilemma also enables playing of the victim and victim-blaming as core features of moral disengagement. This indicates further that the production of deviance enables blame-shifting and scapegoating.

Though not typically stated so overtly, history provides a number of verifiable examples of the false dilemma, otherwise known as the 'with us or against us' fallacy (Fig. 3.1):

1. President George W. Bush announced to the world on 20 September 2001, the terrorists 'hate our freedoms,' and 'every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.'[5]

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[5] 'Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation,' *Washington Post*, 20 September 2001, via http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html, accessed 28 April 2017. See Case Study III for more discussion.

Fig. 3.1 America First Society (*Source* Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*)

2. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton announced in 2008 that, 'Every nation has to either be with us, or against us. Those who harbor terrorists, or who finance them, are going to pay a price.'[6]

3. America First membership cards issued in Colorado during World War I stated that 'the object of this Society is to oppose to the enemies of liberty and justice everywhere a solid front of one hundred million Americans, united in loyalty to one Language, one Country, one Flag.' Their motto was: 'He who is not for America is against America.'[7]

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[6] Marquardt, Alexander, 'Clinton to Congress: You're Either with Us or Against Us,' *CNN Political Ticker*, via http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/05/01/clinton-to-congress-you%E2%80%99re-either-with-us-or-against-us/, accessed 29 April 2017.

[7] Van Nuys, Frank, *Americanizing the West: Immigrants and Citizenship, 1890–1930*, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002, 106.

4. Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini is reported to have regularly claimed that 'there is today a clear line of demarcation between good and evil, and who is not with us is against us … there is no possibility of equivocation'[8]

5. The witch hunters' handbook, *The Malleus Maleficarum*, declares in the first line of the first chapter that the primary evidence of the existence of witches that anyone who doubts the word of a religious official is a heretic ('if you think for yourself, the Prince of Darkness wins').[9]

6. In the King James Bible, Matthew 12:30 says 'He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad,'; Luke 9:50 tells us that 'And Jesus said unto him, forbid him not: for he that is not against us is for us'; while Mark 9:40 declares that 'For he that is not against us is on our part.'[10]

First in the list, from Bush, was notable in inspiring a new cultural challenge to the logic of the False Dilemma. In *Episode III: Revenge of the Sith* (2005), Obi-Wan Kenobi tells Anakin Skywalker shortly prior to completing his transformation into Darth Vader that 'only a Sith deals in absolutes'—widely received as 'transparent attacks [sic] on President George W. Bush and the erosion of civil liberties associated with his War on Terror.'[11] A significant break with the repressive climate wrought

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[8] Quartermaine, Luisa, *Mussolini's Last Republic: Propaganda and Politics in The Italian Social Republic (RSI) 1943–45*, Intellect Books, 2000, 96.

[9] Christopher S., Mackay, and Heinrich Institoris, The Hammer of Witches, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 1.

[10] Via https://www.biblegateway.com, accessed 2017. My earlier comments regarding the status of the King James Bible as an example of the Paranoid Style and various features of moral panics probably also apply here. See Footnote 19.

[11] 'Liberty dies with thunderous applause.' Lucas, George, dir., *Star Wars: Episode III: Revenge of the Sith*, San Francisco: Lucasfilm, 2005; 'No Time for Sorrows: Star Wars (1977),' in Chapman, James, and Nicholas J. Cull, *Projecting Tomorrow: Science Fiction and Popular Cinema*, IB Tauris, 2013, 161–180; Croft, Stuart, *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 215; Halbfinger, David M., 'Latest "Star Wars" Movie Is Quickly Politicized,' *New York Times*, 19 May 2005, via www.nytimes.com/2005/05/19/movies/latest-star-wars-movie-is-quickly-politicized.html, accessed 29 April 2017; Sanchez, Dan, 'The Road to Galactic Serfdom: War, Tyranny, and Terror in the First Two Star Wars Trilogies,' *Antiwar.com*, 15 December 2015, via http://original.antiwar.com/dan_sanchez/2015/12/14/the-road-to-galactic-serfdom, accessed 29 April 2017.

by four years of terror panic, the (at the time) controversial dialogue of *Episode III* highlighted the crucial role of the 'false dilemma' for the construction of scapegoats—much less to say enabling the illegal invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan ('hiding our oil under their sand'.[12]). In so doing, it also exposed the function of terror panic in suppressing dissent.

In a similar manner, the 'false dilemma' appears within National Socialist ideology as the basic operating assumption that failure to worship the Führer with the requisite awe could be identified with a personal corruption by an international Jewish conspiracy ('Articulating a self-defence in morally absolute terms'), giving Nazis a pretext to play the victim and victim-blame ('displacement or diffusing of responsibility') and cast victims as 'sub-humans' ('demonising and dehumanising the victim'); at Nuremberg, prominent Nazis claimed to be 'just following orders' (the 'Nuremberg Defence'[13]) ('displacement or diffusing of responsibility'). In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* contradicting the benevolent paternalism of Big Brother on grounds of principle was impossible, interpreted in every way as giving aid to the demonised Goldstein and the enemy powers ('Articulating a self-defence in morally absolute terms'). In this respect, the Two Minutes Hate was a daily test of loyalty. The use of guilt by association to tar dissenters was only possible if the Party played the victim of independent thought and blamed them for existing ('displacement or diffusing of responsibility). Big Brother's benevolent paternalism carried pretences of care and concern while being oppressive (misrepresenting injurious consequences as beneficial to the victim); dissidents were labelled 'thought criminals' (demonising and dehumanising the victim).

The Crucible is possibly unique in that the false dilemma is spelt out in black and white—in this case, by Danforth, who insists, 'But you must understand, sir, that a person is either with this court or he must be counted against it, there be no road between'[14] ('Articulating a self-defence in morally absolute terms'). Where, in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*,

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[12] Ratigan, Dylan, 'How Did Our Oil Get Under Their Sand?' *Huffington Post*, 24 December 2011, via http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dylan-ratigan/how-did-our-oil-get-under_b_1028395.html, accessed 28 April 2017; Hage, Ghassan, *Is Racism an Environmental Threat?* London: Polity, 2017.

[13] Osiel, Mark J., *Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of war*, Routledge, 2017.

[14] Miller, *The Crucible*, op. cit., Act III.

the Two Minutes Hate is the test of loyalty, obedience to the Witch Trials performs the same role; again, the use of guilt by association to imply harm dissent, and so to tar dissidents like John Proctor, is made possible by the ideological construction of the witch stereotype, which the witch-hunters also use as an excuse for playing the victim and victim-blaming ('displacement or diffusing of responsibility'). The Salem Witch Trials were perpetrated out of concern for the immortal souls of their victims, making sure they were free of Satan's influence and independent thought (misrepresenting injurious consequences as beneficial to the victim), and those who fell afoul of Danforth's court were labelled 'witches' (demonising and dehumanising the victim).

One way or the other, all ultimately play the victim of a threat that remains unproven, adopting all the authoritarian modalities they attribute to the enemy. All strive to avoid accountability for their antipathy towards freedom of conscience and their willingness to persecute dissenters. Reacting to the alleged existential threat by disengaging morally, all that follows derives directly from the Paranoid Style elevated to a script of common interests. Carey's three-stage process for the reconstruction of ideological orthodoxy under cover of recurring episodes of what is in essence moral panic, referred to above, recalls the Paranoid Style, while also indicating something of its application in practice. The incisiveness of his commentary is further borne out when we recall the fate of the anti-globalisation movement prior to 9/11; the virtual evaporation of challenges to neoliberal globalisation amidst terrorist panic evidences Madison's comment about the standing maxim amongst Romans 'to excite a war whenever a revolt was apprehended.'[15]

> Movements employing the Paranoid Style are not constant but come in successive episodic waves … the paranoid disposition is mobilized into action chiefly by [bringing] … fundamental fears and hatreds, rather than negotiable interests, into political action.
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> —Richard Hofstadter[16]

[15]Thomas, Janet, *The Battle in Seattle: The Story Behind and Beyond the WTO Demonstrations*, Fulcrum Publications, 2000; Danaher, Kevin, and Roger Burbach, eds., *Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule*, Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2000; Rosenberg, Paul, 'From the "Battle in Seattle" to Donald Trump: Remember When the Anti-Globalists Were Left-Wing Radicals?' Salon, via http://www.salon.com/2016/12/11/from-the-battle-in-seattle-to-donald-trump-remember-when-the-anti-globalists-were-left-wing-radicals/, accessed 20 May 2017.

[16]Hofstadter, op. cit., 39.

When President Ronald Reagan first declared a "national war on drugs" in 1982, fewer than 2% of those polled identified drugs as the nation's most important problem.

—Katherine Beckett, *Making Crime Pay*[17]

FEATURES OF SCAPEGOATING III: CULTURAL PRIMING

Two things are true about scapegoating discourses tied to scare propaganda. Firstly, they are a lot more effective if they fall on receptive ears. Secondary, those on whose ears they fall are a lot more receptive if they fail to perceive that what they are hearing is scare propaganda, which carries clear connotations of being lied to and manipulated. A moral panic depends on an appropriately attuned audience, such that panic-driven scapegoating propaganda is not understood as a product of ideologically fuelled crisis management conducted on behalf of the interest of moneyed elites, but rather as 'disinterested information,' or 'news,' or 'normal' (cf. 'normal is to the delusions of groups what mental illness is to those of individuals').

Failure to perceive scapegoating discourse as such appears in no small part to be the effect of 'stereotype priming.' Research in this area of social psychology examines the process of acculturation to stereotypes, and so, insofar as deviance production gives rise to stereotypes, to scare narratives. As behavioural responses are represented mentally, fear can be implanted through automatic mental processes responsible for categorising features of the social environment; such form a kind of 'back door' for indoctrination as propaganda mimics unbiased information. 'Frequent and consistent repetition' is critical in giving moral panic time to be absorbed and take root as the basis for 'preconscious activation of mental representations,'[18] At this point we return full circle to the links between the production of deviance through 'morality play,' and the institutionalisation of shared representations of the Other, discussed above.

[17] Beckett, Katherine, *Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics*, Oxford University Press, 1999, Chapter 2, 'Setting the Public Agenda,' 25.

[18] Bargh et al., 'Automati*city* of Social Behaviour,' op. cit., 231. See also Ferguson, Melissa J., Travis J. Carter, and Ran R. Hassin, 'On the Automati*city* of Nationalist Ideology: The Case of the USA,' in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, Oxford University Press, 2009, 53–83.

Automatic behaviour associated with moral panicking, also an unconscious process insofar far as scapegoating doth never prosper, can be triggered by environmental stimuli associated with a stereotype—in other words, through contact with those to whom the 'deviant' label is affixed.[19] Molden takes it as 'virtually axiomatic … that the mere exposure to socially relevant stimuli can facilitate, or prime, a host of impressions, judgments, goals, and actions, often outside of people's intention or awareness.'[20] Similarly, Bargh et al. observe that 'social behaviour is often triggered automatically on the mere presence of relevant situational features; this behaviour is unmediated by conscious perceptual or judgmental processes.'[21] Collective societal knee-jerking, then, results much less from spontaneous responses to actual threats than it does from long-term acculturation to the Paranoid Style of those of us failing to perceive our own indoctrination. As long as an audience is allowed to absorb deviance production without interventions of fact to mitigate their emotional reactions, a panicked response 'should come eventually to be activated automatically on the mere occurrence of that event'—the newly minted right-thinker conditioned in the manner and style of a Pavlovian dog.[22] Others conclude similarly;

> That automatic processes may be involved in stereotyping is disturbing because such processes reveal the potential to perpetuate prejudice and discrimination independently of more controlled and intentional forms of stereotyping. For example, because people may be either unaware of the

[19] Scheufele, Dietram A., and David Tewksbury, 'Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models,' *Journal of Communication* 57, no. 1, 2007: 9–20; Molden, Daniel C., ed., *Understanding Priming Effects in Social Psychology*, Guilford Publications, 2014; Bargh, John A., Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows, 'Automati*city* of Social Behaviour: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action,' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 2, 1996: 230; Blair, Irene V., and Mahzarin R. Banaji, 'Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming,' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70, no. 6, 1996: 1142.

[20] Molden, 'Understanding Priming Effects in Social Psychology: What Is "Social Priming" and How Does It Occur?' in *Understanding Priming Effects in Social Psychology*, op. cit., 3.

[21] Bargh et al., 'Automati*city* of Social Behaviour,' op. cit., 231. See also Ferguson, Melissa J., Travis J. Carter, and Ran R. Hassin, 'On the Automati*city* of Nationalist Ideology: The Case of the USA,' in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, Oxford University Press, 2009, 53–83.

[22] Bargh et al., ibid.

automatic influences on their behaviour or believe that they have adequately adjusted for those influences, they may misattribute their (stereotypic) response to more obvious or seemingly justifiable causes, such as *attributes of the target*. [emphasis added][23]

This observation is telling in the implication of the production of deviance, which as we have seen depends on the ability of moral entrepreneurs, the architects of moral panics, to label targets for scapegoating on the basis of their own interpretations of the meaning of 'deviance,' as if the stereotypes thus created are innate characteristics of those so labelled—'attributes of the target,' in other words. Because the target of scapegoating triggers the automatic, primed response, the triggering is understood to be a spontaneous response indicative of the existential threat, when it is in fact an effect of indoctrination.

By way of illustration, a significant amount of research into priming focuses on the effect of racial stereotyping in news reports on sentencing in criminal cases—much the same theme to that Hall et al. treat in their analysis of media-driven panics over mugging.[24] Priming, in this context, is understood as 'the process by which recently activated information about a group (e.g., stereotypes) is used in making subsequent judgments of group-related stimuli.'[25] 'Dozens of studies, conducted with surveys, lab experiments, or observational methods,' in other

[23] Blair, and Banaji, 'Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming,' op. cit., 1159.

[24] See above. Dixon, Travis L., and Cristina L. Azocar, 'Priming Crime and Activating Blackness: Understanding the Psychological Impact of the Overrepresentation of Blacks as Lawbreakers on Television News,' *Journal of Communication* 57, no. 2, 2007: 229–253; Verhaeghen, Paul, Shelley N. Aikman, and Ana E. Van Gulick, 'Prime and Prejudice: Co-Occurrence in the Culture as a Source of Automatic Stereotype Priming,' *British Journal of Social Psychology* 50, no. 3, 2011: 501–518; Dixon, Travis L., and Keith B. Maddox, 'Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal,' *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 35, no. 8, 2005: 1555–1570; Graham, Sandra, and Brian S. Lowery, 'Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders.' *Law and Human Behaviour* 28, no. 5, 2004: 483; Mendelberg, Tali, 'Racial Priming Revived,' *Perspectives on Politics* 6, no. 1, 2008: 109–123; Hutchings, Vincent L., and Ashley E. Jardina, 'Experiments on Racial Priming in Political Campaigns,' *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, 2009: 397–402.

[25] Dixon, Travis L., and Keith B. Maddox, 'Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judgments,' ibid., 1556.

words, 'have found that white Americans' political preferences are shaped by predispositions that characterize African Americans as lazy, welfare-dependent, violent, or demanding special favours'—that, in other words, 'race cues often racialize white public opinion,' and 'racial messages do shape the political response of white citizens.'[26] When the political response of white citizens becomes crime policy, the primary source of information reported by the corporate press, which as a result of priming becomes the basis of government initiatives in that regard, turns out to be the government. 'There is no evidence that political elites' initial involvement in the wars on crime and drugs was a response to popular sentiments,' writes Katherine Beckett.

> Public concern about crime was quite low when candidate Barry Goldwater decided to run on a law and order platform in the 1964 presidential election. Similarly, when President Ronald Reagan first declared a "national war on drugs" in 1982 and when he called for a renewal of this campaign in 1986, fewer than 2% of those polled identified drugs as the nation's most important problem. Nor is the most recent reincarnation of the crime issue a response to popular concern, although the public's attention has certainly shifted in that direction. Only 7% of those polled identified crime as the nation's most important problem in June 1993, just before the legislative debate over anticrime legislation began. Six months later, in response to the high levels of publicity these legislative activities received, that percentage had increased to 30%. By August 1994, a record high of 52% of those polled were most concerned about crime. Gallup Poll analysts concluded that this result was "no doubt a reflection of the emphasis given to that issue by President Clinton since he announced his crime bill in last January's State-of-the-Union Address, and of the extensive media coverage now that the crime bill is being considered by Congress.[27]

Beckett concludes noting the irony of official data indicating a decline in most types of crime during this period. Facts of the situation notwith-standing, racist cues provided by the political class become the basis for a

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[26]Mendelberg, Tali, 'Racial Priming Revived,' ibid., 109.

[27]Beckett, *Making Crime Pay*, op. cit., 25; Wozniak, Kevin, H., 'Public Opinion and the Politics of Criminal Justice Policy Making: Reasons for Optimism, Pessimism, and Uncertainty,' *Criminology & Public Policy* 2016; Feeley, M., and Jonathan Simon, 'Folk Devils and Moral Panics: An Appreciation From North America,' in Downes, David, Paul Rock, Christine Chinkin, and Conor Gearty, eds., *Crime, Social Control and Human Rights: From Moral Panics to States of Denial, Essays in Honour of Stanley Cohen*, Routledge, 2013, 45.

series of exercises in deviance production, the scare campaign over black criminal Willie Horton by George Bush Snr during the 1988 presidential debates not the least of which, and culminating in a moral panic over the 'knockout game' in 2013.[28] If such cues are provided by a Paranoid Style in the process of engaging in deviance production, then it follows, on the basis of what Bargh et al. call 'the principle of ideomotor action' that 'the mere act of thinking about a behaviour increased the tendency to engage in that behaviour.'[29] If we reflect on the paradox associated with deviance production for moral entrepreneurs to become cause and cure of the same problem, this becomes more true insofar as producing the problem elevates the threat, increasing the tendency to think about it.

Stereotype priming becomes in effect the crude stuff of deviance production, transmitting the cultural baggage of the Ancient Fantasy and Paranoid Style much as victims of abuse tend to replicate such abuse in their own treatment of others. The importance of 'convergence' for moral entrepreneurs here is to link one existential threat to another, and in so doing to be able to draw on the emotional power of prior moral panics and other social fears if the habit of thinking in binary terms has already been ingrained in their audience from other contexts. A classic setting for the activation of environmental representations of this kind, both in the long and short term, is provided for by the binary dualism of God vs. the Devil at the heart of Christian demonology ('if you think for yourself, the Devil wins').[30] The functionality of this binary in particular is illustrated in a dramatic fashion by the leadup to the Salem Witch

[28] King, Mike, 'The "Knockout Game": Moral Panic and the Politics of White Victimhood,' *Race & Class* 56, no. 4, 2015: 85–94; Tepperman, Alexander, 'Prison Weights for No Man: Interpreting a Modern Moral Panic,' *Critical Issues in Justice and Politics* 7, no. 1, 2014: 1–16; Anderson, David, *Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the Willie Horton Story Changed American Justice*, New York: Crown, 1995; Mendelberg, Tali, 'Executing Hortons: Racial Crime in the 1988 Presidential Campaign,' *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61, 1997: 134–57; Mendelberg, Tali, *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*, Princeton University Press, 2001; Debney, Ben, 'The Scare Cycle: Moral Panics and National Elections,' *Arena Journal* 47/48, 2017: 76.

[29] Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behaviour,' op. cit., 231.

[30] See for example Boureau, Alain, *Satan the Heretic: The Birth of Demonology in the Medieval West*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006; Pagels, Elaine, *The Origin of Satan: How Christians Demonized Jews, Pagans, and Heretics*, London: Vintage, 2011.

Trials, where the long acculturation of the community of Puritans to fear of diabolic influence provided fertile soil for associating unwanted class tensions with religious deviance. Boyer and Nissenbaum argue that it was not 'surprising to discover a high correlation between Salem Village factionalism and the way the Village divided in 1692 over the witchcraft outbreak.'

> … Just as the average member of the anti-Parris faction paid about 40 percent more in Village taxes than his counterpart in the pro-Parris faction, so the average 1695–96 tax of the villagers who publicly opposed the trials was 67 percent higher than that of those who pushed the trials forward … As early as 1689, [prominent New England Puritan minister] Cotton Mather had urged his readers to shun a frame of discontent" if they wished to avoid becoming witches: "When persons through discontent at their poverty, or their misery, shall always be murmuring and repining at the providence of God, the devils do then invite them an agreement … [and] downright witchcraft is the upshot of it."[31]

The irony of a religious dissenter scaremongering about witches seems to have been lost on many amongst the pro-Parris faction. Mather's sermon, entitled 'The Nature and Reality of Witchcraft,' published shortly thereafter as *A Discourse on Witchcraft*, circulated widely throughout the New England colonies over the next two years. This begs the question regarding the extent to which people are attuned to scapegoating discourses through prior acculturation in *their own persecution*. The next question concerns the extent to which that experience produces archetypal fascism as an emotional pathogen, making persons infected through exposure, even in victimisation, predisposed to binary thinking, and by extension deviance production and scapegoating discourse. In the case of the Salem Witch Trials, this question is of patent interest given the history of persecution suffered by the nonconformist community itself, apparently via the exact same dynamics of deviance production, moral disengagement and stereotype priming that it later took up as its own.[32]

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[31] Boyer, Paul, and Stephen Nissenbaum, *Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1974, 208.

[32] See Case Study I: Witch Panic.

Modelling Patterns of Scapegoating

> Absent the Jew, we should have then to invent him … It is essential to have a tangible enemy, not merely an abstract one.—Adolf Hitler

A conspiratorial mentality of elite control tends to envision a cabal of nineteenth-century capitalists in top hats, working feverishly in back rooms teeming with cigar smoke to deceive and defraud the public. In addition to being belied by the fact that contemporary capitalists often seem quite content to defraud the public out in the open, less concerned with hiding away out of sight than clawing their way to the top of the Fortune 500, this conspiratorial picture also suffers from the pitfall of approximating everything it purports to oppose. If the first error of conspiratorial thinking is to indulge speculation minus any supporting evidence, then to indulge speculation minus supporting evidence in the name of opposing conspiratorialism is patently self-defeating.

At the same time, modelling historical patterns of panic-driven scapegoating is potentially meaningful insofar as it bases arguments in evidence, recognising that elites need not actually conspire to act in concert when they read intuitively from a script of common class interests. We might add to this that elites need not even do the job themselves; the truism that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' reflects the manufacture of consent, discussed above. The following chapter proceeds on this basis to model historical patterns of panic-driven scapegoating.

Modelling Patterns of Scapegoating I: Elites, the Grassroots and Interest Groups

Despite the preponderance of cultural, historical, sociological and psychological material pointing towards moral panics as elite-driven scapegoating, not all agree. For their part, Goode and Ben-Yehuda outline three theories of moral panic: (1) the Elite-Engineered Model, (2) the Grassroots Model and (3) the Interest Group Model.[1] While none are wrong *as such*, they represent different facets of a common process, but are presented separately due to lax arguments.

The first of these theories, Goode and Ben-Yehuda argue, is the Elite-Engineered Model, based around the argument that the ruling class or elite 'causes, creates, engineers or "orchestrates" moral panics,' or in other words that 'the richest and most powerful members of the society consciously undertake campaigns to generate and sustain concern, fear and panic on the part of the public over an issue that is not generally regarded as terribly harmful to society as a whole.' With the aid of the mass media, who are complicit in the process of creating a '"red herring," a diversionary and false enemy' whose function is to 'divert attention away from the real problems in the society, whose solution would threaten or undermine the interests of the elite.'[2]

As far as they are concerned, this is a 'politically instructive atrocity tale' for 'leftist ideologists' such as Hall et al., whose 472-page, 5-author *magnum opus* critiquing of the production of deviance in the media-constructed moral panic over juvenile crime is demolished in the space of less than 250 words—about the word length of this paragraph and a quarter again.

> The idea that the ruling elite would come up with and be able to execute a scheme that involves their class selecting and endorsing the threat of mugging as a target for media attention and the masses' interest in order to divert attention away from society's 'true' problems, the solution of which would threaten elite interests, is fanciful—in our view, strictly comic book fare.[3]

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[1] Goode, Erich, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*; Wiley, 2010, Chapter 3: 'Three Theories of the Moral Panic.'

[2] Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, ibid. 62–64.

[3] Goode and Ben-Yehuda, ibid. 66.

Oligarchs in top hats sitting around in smoky back rooms selecting scapegoats from fancy binders is a fanciful view, but also a misrepresentation. Evidence from Cohen, Larner, Beckett, Herman & Chomsky and Hall et al. cited above points to the elite origins of deviance production as a characteristic feature of the 'manufacture of consent.'[4] This is simply just not the same thing as a conspiracy theory; to suggest otherwise is to invoke a strawman. In any event, Goode and Ben-Yehuda inexplicably disprove their own case in a subsequent chapter entitled, 'The Media Ignite and Embody the Moral Panic.'[5] Their analysis own indicates that the media *do* produce deviance as a means of diverting blame from problems elites wish not to acknowledge as consequences of a society devoted to upholding the privileges to which they have become accustomed.[6] They demonstrate that this reflects the tendency of the mass media to reflect the values and priorities of the billionaires who own and control it.[7]

This leaves Goode and Ben-Yehuda in an awkward position regarding their modelling of moral panics—as does a highly underrated 1990 survey of moral panic demonology by sociologist Jon Oplinger, *The Politics of Demonology,* which in arguing that the demonology of the European Witch Hunts (1350–1750) was also evident within the Red Scares (1919–20; 1946–54), the Stalinist Purges (1936–38), and the Nazi Holocaust (1933–45), further illustrates the elite origins of deviance production. Lending critical academic weight to the elite origins of moral panics, Oplinger concludes that 'the potential for the mass production of deviance is greatest in societies characterized by great concentrations of power.'[8] A hegemonic organisation during the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church certainly represented great concentrations of power. 'In a society that had a little place for women outside of the family or the convent,' Oplinger writes of the Witch Hunts, 'the presence of a

[4] Debney, Ben, 'The Scare Cycle: Moral Panics and National Elections,' *Arena* 47/48, 2017, 76; Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, op. cit.; Chomsky and Herman, *Manufacturing Consent*, op. cit.; Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, op. cit.

[5] Goode and Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics*, op. cit., 89.

[6] Goode and Ben-Yehuda, ibid., 89–92.

[7] Goode and Ben-Yehuda, ibid., 97.

[8] Oplinger, Jon, *The Politics of Demonology: The European Witch Craze and the Mass Production of Deviance*, Susquehanna University Press, 1990.

substantial percentage of women who were not directly under masculine control must have been hard to digest.'[9]

Along with Miller, he draws parallels on the basis of panic-driven demonologies with the House Un-American Activities Committee, arguing that, in this 'inquisitorial theatre,' the many hearings of HUAC functioned, 'by design, to label and degrade.'[10] Again a great concentration of power in a national government—even more in the Stalinist police states, where peasants refusing to submit to forced collectivisation were demonised as 'kulaks,' 'wreckers,' and 'enemies of the revolution.'[11] Bolshevik elites understood dissent as the work of 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'opportunists'—especially after the 1934 assassination of Sergei Kirov, Stalin's pretext for wholesale terror.[12] Applying deviance amplification to the Jews of Europe as a 'biological fifth column' representing 'the ultimate internal conspiracy that destroyed a society at its most fundamental level,' Hitler as a dictator and great concentrator of power admitted frankly that in the absence of the Jew 'we should have then to invent him … It is essential to have a tangible enemy, not merely an abstract one.'[13]

Complementing Oplinger, recent moral panic research argues that 'political moral panics' reflect elite agendas in being 'catalysed by political and moral entrepreneurs who seek to attain goals that are out of

[9] Oplinger, *The Politics of Demonology*, ibid., 52.

[10] 'The pretence that HUAC was an investigatory body was largely a fiction. The information uncovered by the committee in open session had already been made known to committee members in executive sessions that were, in fact, rehearsals. In HUAC's long career, little, if anything, was revealed by the committee that not previously known by the FBI. HUAC hearings were entirely degradation ceremonies that served to establish a moral boundary.' Oplinger, *The Politics of Demonology*, ibid., 164.

[11] Oplinger, ibid.

[12] Oplinger, ibid., 183–185. See also Conquest, Robert, *Stalin and the Kirov Murder*, Oxford University Press, 1989; Knight, Amy W. *Who Killed Kirov? The Kremlin's Greatest Mystery*, Hill and Wang, 1999; Lenoe, Matt, 'Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?' *The Journal of Modern History* 74, no. 2, 2002: 352–380.

[13] 'In no case has revolution succeeded without the presence of a lightning rod that could conduct and channel the odium of the general masses … I came to the conclusion that a campaign against the Jew would be as popular as it would be successful. There are few Germans who have not suffered losses through them in some way or another … Once the hatred and the battle against the Jews have been really stirred up, their resistance will necessarily crumble in the shortest possible time. They are totally defenceless, and no one will stand up to protect them.' Oplinger, ibid., 207.

reach of politics as usual.' In particular, Shafir and Schairer cite 'the breakdown of the separation of powers,' which they consider tantamount to 'counterrevolution':

> Whereas "reactionary political actors propose to lead a retreat back into a world both lost and regretted" and conservatives articulate a traditional, defensive, and pragmatic but deferential outlook, counter-revolutionary actors are innovators who nurture a fresh ideology to undergird a novel revolutionary conservative regime. While reactionaries and conservatives also seek a retreat from liberty and reason, only counterrevolutionaries do so with revolutionary zeal. In his work on "restoration," another post-revolutionary response, historian Robert Kann specified that it "must come about within the life-span of a political generation…[14]

Novel counterrevolution as a reflection of the elite origins of panic-driven scapegoating is also the focus of Joosse, who, citing Donald Trump as a conspicuous example, argues that moral entrepreneurs display charismatic qualities not only in tilting against folk demons, but also against traditional leaders and power structures (the GOP, in Trump's case). Through counterrevolution, Joosse argues, charismatic moral entrepreneurs can appear to buck tradition without doing irreparable damage to privilege insofar as they attack elites at the liberal end of

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[14]Shafir, Gershon, and Cynthia E. Schairer, 'The War on Terror as Political Moral Panic,' in *Lessons and Legacies of the War on Terror: From Moral Panic to Permanent War*, 2013, 12–15. 'We also would like to point out that the characterization of certain revolutions as counterrevolutionary is a sociological and not a partisan undertaking. Many left-leaning revolutions in history went through two stages, moderate followed by radical. The radical phase, which rejects the earlier moderate phase, will *eo ipso* contain a counterrevolutionary dimension. To disassociate themselves from their moderate revolutionary precursors, radical revolutionaries frequently resort to amplification typical of moral panics in that they proclaim their goal to be nothing less than the defence of the revolution itself. To accomplish their goals, radical revolutionaries have been willing to use the kinds of extreme methods that have given rise to the expression "the revolution devours its own children." Radical phases of revolutions, such as the Jacobin Terror, Great Stalinist Terror, and the Cultural Revolution, all rolled back freedoms, violated rights, and repossessed land and other resources attained in the earlier phases of the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions respectively. In doing so, they channelled moral panics in the pursuit at once of radical and counterrevolutionary goals. The focus of this chapter, however, is a more typical ideologically-driven counterrevolution that amplified fears to reverse rights acquired within living memory'.

the spectrum in the service of their own reactionary one.[15] 'First,' he continues, 'charismatic leaders can outflank traditional leaders on their own moral territory, taking the principle of 'one-upmanship' to an extraordinary (and therewith charismatic) extremes.'

> This outflanking move denatures the moral field by repositioning traditional leaders awkwardly as defenders of the folk devils they would have previously decried. Second, at times charismatic leaders can creatively work to subvert traditional moralities (and concomitantly, traditional moral actors), overturning established value tables in ways that 'bedevil' traditional moral leaders, refashioning them as folk devils for wholly new dialectics of moral panic.[16]

In this sense, charismatic moral entrepreneurs like Donald Trump are anything but comic book fare.[17] If the Elite-Engineered model distorts potential charismatic features of moral panics, then the remaining two, the Grassroots and Interest Group Models, must also. While accounting for charismatic and counterrevolutionary features, along with the fact that deviance production demands control over the channels of mass communication, a meaningful reappraisal might incorporate grassroots and interest groups, accounting for moral disengagement, to show in whose interests deviance is produced, and stereotype priming, to show how architects of and participants in moral panics can read from a common cultural script (to which cultures can be conditioned for receptivity to paranoid scaremongering) without needing to conspire.

In their discussion of moral panics over mugging in the United Kingdom, Hall et al. argue for this integrated model, noting that the manufactured panic over rising violent crime amongst poor black youths acted for the predominantly white working class to whom the moral panic was directed

[15] Joosse, Paul, 'Expanding Moral Panic Theory to Include the Agency of Charismatic Entrepreneurs,' *The British Journal of Criminology*, 2017.

[16] Joosse, ibid.

[17] de Freytas-Tamurajan, Kimiko, 'George Orwell's "1984" Is Suddenly a Best-Seller,' *The New York Times,* 25 January 2017, via https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/books/1984-george-orwell-donald-trump.html, accessed 27 April 2017.

as a perverse legitimation of inexpressible fear and anguish. What is taking place is only secondarily an expression of prejudice. It is first and foremost a therapeutic psychodrama in which the emotional release of the protagonists takes precedence over what is actually being said. It is an expression of their pain and powerlessness confronted by the decay and dereliction, not only of their familiar environment, but of their own lives too—an expression for which our society provides no outlet … something more complex and deep-rooted than what the metropolitan liberal evasively and easily dismisses as prejudice.[18]

In this notion of the moral panic as 'therapeutic psychodrama' we find a thematic counterpart for the Paranoid Style. Goode and Ben-Yehuda's Elite Engineered Model, Grassroots Model and Interest Group model are all represented—'elite engineering' in the hegemonic origins of panic-driven scapegoating, 'grassroots' effects through popular participation, and 'interests' who reap the benefits. The combination of these roles suggests that political moral panics as charismatic counterrevolution is a co-produced affair, deviance produced according to the common script of class privilege and cultural priming tending to encourage subordinates to identify with and defend the interests of their masters, typically to the detriment of their own.

Modelling Patterns of Scapegoating II: The Gleiwitz Incident

To this point, this chapter has theorised a model of panic-driven scapegoating, explored research into moral panic, looked at historical patterning of moral panics, looked at theoretical treatments of historical patterning of panics, explored the scapegoating facets of moral panics, and modelled participants in panic-driven scapegoating. As a prelude to the case studies to follow, this chapter rounds up the theoretical part of this study by looking at how these theoretical aspects apply to a practical example—an attack by an SS unit on their own border posts as a propaganda exercise, one designed to give Hitler an excuse to invade Poland in fulfilment of his long-held desire for 'living-space,' or *lebensraum*.

The details of the Gleiwitz Incident, as it became known, was recorded in a deposition to the Nuremberg Trials on 20 November

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[18] Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis*, op cit., 158.

1945, by Alfred Naujocks, the former SS officer who lead the attack and somehow survived to tell the tale:

> I, Alfred Helmut Naujocks, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows … I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944 … I surrendered to the Allies on 19 October 1944… On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich said: 'Actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for the foreign press, as well as for German propaganda purposes.' I was directed to go to Gleiwitz with five or six SD men and wait there until I received a code word from Heydrich indicating that the attack should take place. My instructions were to seize the radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German, who would be put at my disposal, to broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state that the time had come for the conflict between the Germans and the Poles and that the Poles should get together and strike down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich also told me at this time that he expected an attack on Poland by Germany in a few days.[19]

After noting that he requested permission to return to Berlin after waiting a fortnight in Gleiwitz for orders that never arrived, Naujocks recalled that, shortly before 31 August 1939, he visited Heinrich Muller, head of the Gestapo, who discussed 'plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops.' Muller, Naujacks recalled, stated that he had '12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had been killed while attacking.' Following their attack, Muller had added, journalists and other useful onlookers were to be taken to the site to see the 'evidence.'

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[19] Naujocks, Alfred Helmut, 'Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 4, Twenty-Fourth Day Thursday, 20 December 1945: Morning Session,' *Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/12-20-45.asp, 241–243, accessed 8 March 2016. The relevant affidavit from Alfred Helmut Naujocks begins on 241.

4 MODELLING PATTERNS OF SCAPEGOATING   67

The attack as planned in this manner took place the evening prior to the German invasion of Poland. 'At noon on the 31st of August,' Naujocks wrote in his deposition,

> I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o'clock that evening. Heydrich said, 'In order to carry out this attack, report to Muller for "Canned Goods."' I did this and gave Muller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes … We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots, and left.[20]

The next day, on 1 September 1939, Hitler announced to the Reichstag:

> I can no longer find any willingness on the part of the Polish Government to conduct serious negotiations with us. These proposals for mediation have failed because in the meanwhile there, first of all, came as an answer the sudden Polish general mobilization, followed by more Polish atrocities. These were again repeated last night. Recently in one night there were as many as twenty-one frontier incidents: last night there were fourteen, of which three were quite serious. I have, therefore, resolved to speak to Poland in the same language that Poland for months past has used toward us.[21]

The invasion of Poland began the next day—and, as Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 in response, World War II. Applied to this example as a practical demonstration of panic-driven

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[20] Naujocks, 'Nuremberg Trial Proceedings,' ibid.; Shirer, William L., *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, Random House, 1991, 628–631.

[21] 'This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our own territory. Since 5:45 a. m. we have been returning the fire… I will continue this struggle, no matter against whom, until the safety of the Reich and its rights are secured.' Hitler, Adolf, 'Address by Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of the Reich, Before the Reichstag, September 1, 1939,' *Lillian Goldman Law Library: The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, Yale Law School, via http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/gp2.asp, accessed 7 April 2016.

scapegoating, the analytical criteria nominated at the beginning of the chapter appear as follows:

I.   Mobilisation phase: self-interestedly framing the parameters of crisis. A political crisis emerges—in this case, the alleged killing of ethnic Germans. Framed in terms favourable to elites by invoking a Self vs. Other binary—in this instance, by conflating the political interests of the ruling National Socialists and their industrialist backers with the interests of Germany as a whole—the crisis becomes the basis for an 'existential threat' broadly consistent with Cohn's 'Ancient Fantasy.' As ethnic Germans in Poland are allegedly subject to massacred, the crisis is said to preclude rational discussion. 'Act now or be damned.'

II.   Targeting phase: constructing targets for scapegoating through the production of deviance. A cause for the alleged crisis of ethnic German massacring is found in folk demons—the Polish *Untermensch*, or subhumans—fear of whom is fuelled by deviance production. While much of deviance production involves amplifying or blowing out of proportion half-truths, in the case of the Gleiwitz Incident, deviance is produced through a lie cut from whole cloth. Those with control over the meaning of words, the totalitarian Nazi state, demonise those thus labelled, meeting Cohen's criteria appear in *a suitable enemy*, (a foreign country, the Poles, the ethnic Other), *a suitable victim* (fellow countrymen, Germans, the ethnic Self), and *a consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities* (increasingly frequent atrocities portend a general Polish mobilisation).

Hall et al.'s criteria appear in *the intensification of a particular issue* ('Polish atrocities'), *the identification of a subversive minority* ('Polish provocateurs'), *'convergence'* (Polish atrocities feeding into a general Polish mobilisation), *the notion of 'thresholds'* (border violations, the patience of the National Socialist government), *the element of explaining and prophesying* (what will happen if Poland is permitted to speak to Germany in the language of violence), and *the call for firm steps* ('speak to Germany in the same language they have been speaking to us'). Goode and Ben-Yehuda's criteria appear in *heightened concern* (Poland is not generally a threat to German state security), *increased hostility* (Germany is not generally up in arms about alleged

Polish threats to its national security), *widespread consensus* (it was accepted as a legitimate justification for invading Poland by the Germans who participated in it), *disproportionate appraisal* (any evidence for Polish atrocities was not forthcoming because it did not exist), and *general volatility* (it ignited the Second World War).[22]

III. Legitimation phase: constructing a pretext through moral disengagement for the persecution of scapegoats. The production of belief surrounding alleged atrocities against ethnic Germans in Poland and border incidents potentially signalling invasion threw Germans into a state of terror; they felt they had more justification in invading Poland themselves to pre-empt what they understood to be inevitable carnage. The moral entrepreneurs in the Nazi high command exploited the moral panic to create a victim complex-as-pretext for things they intended to do anyway. Defending the rights of those targeted in such cases becomes impossible without being associated with the threat; no one dares ask for proof or question the validity of 'proofs' offered.

IV. Persecution phase: crisis leveraging through scapegoating. The Nazis used the power to control the meaning of words inherent to their control of the German press to exploit the crisis framed in their own interests and leverage the panic generated by menacing the public with hobgoblins, They carried on with their long-held plans to invade the East, blamed their victims for being in the way. Reassert their basic ideological legitimacy, the Nazis further entrenched their power in the name of defending national security—dragging the country and then the world into war in the process.

V. Restoration phase: the beneficiaries of moral panic collect. Crisis leveraging by casting themselves as solutions to a problem they had created through deviance production, and scapegoating the

[22] Rossino, Alexander B., *Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity*, University of Kansas Press, 195–197; Smith, Woodruff D., 'Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum,' *German Studies Review* 3 no.1, 1980: 51–68; Lumans, Valdis. 'The Ethnic German Minority of Slovakia and the Third Reich, 1938–45,' *Central European History* 15, no. 3, 1982: 266–296; Klein, Gerhard, dir., *Der Fall Gleiwitz* (*The Gleiwitz Case*), Deutsche Film (DEFA), 1961.

victims of the invasion of Poland by naming their own actions and projecting them onto those they were attacking, gave the Nazis a way to neutralise class tensions in Germany without addressing underlying causes like hyperinflation and the world accumulation crisis associated with the Great Depression—problems for which their enemies on the left blamed capitalist social relations. Moral panic over Polish atrocities whitewashed the fix, while suppressing the class interests being serviced by imperialist war and exporting an oft-troublesome German working class to fight and die for the class privileges of Hitler's industrialist backers.

Here we can see the analytical criteria associated with the model of panic-driven scapegoating theorised in this chapter applied to the Gleiwitz Incident. Insofar as the model can be demonstrated to fit the facts pertaining to the episode, this chapter argues that this demonstrates the validity of the model as it will be applied to witch, communist and terrorist panics. Elite engineers are represented by the Nazi political elite, their backers amongst the industrial elites as the Interest Group, those who benefitted from the scare, and by the grassroots—those who absorbed the propaganda and were mobilised accordingly.[23]

At the same time, the Gleiwitz incident was unique in several respects, so a few qualifying remarks are necessary. In the first place, the purported deviant threat, rather than being amplified (in the sense of something being overblown, or built on the foundation of a half-truth such as a double standard), was built on a complete lie. In the second place, the consequences in global war and the Holocaust were and remain historically unparalleled. Our traditional understanding of the production of deviance as the characteristic feature of moral panics tends not to account for such extreme falsehoods, certainly not when considering the scale of their consequences. This gap in our understanding hints at the neglect of numerous other relevant historical examples of the Paranoid Style and deviance production excluded on the grounds of nothing more concrete than confirmation bias, typically expressed as the prejudice that pointing out conspiracy theories and embracing them are the same thing.

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[23] For documentary evidence reflecting the impact of the Nazi scare over Polish atrocities on German soldiers, see Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland*, ibid., 195–197.

CASE STUDIES

Witch panic, communist panic and terrorist panic are the three case studies to which these criteria will be applied in subsequent chapters. These have been chosen for specific reasons. In the first place, they are some of the largest and most studied examples and have the most sources available to draw from. This study does not aim of necessity to introduce new material into these case studies, but rather to use information already existing for the purposes of identifying patterns of moral panic. In the second, these case studies assess the continuity of moral panics and scapegoating within and without of modernity, and the extent to which the existence of scare mongering within modernity represents a kind of premodern hangover. In the third place, in looking at these case studies as elements within a historical and geopolitical continuity, this study aims to highlight historical stages within what we might term the social reproduction of empire. Given the physical constraints of this study, this can only be touched on in a token manner, but in doing so aims to highlight a possible route of further research.

The limitations of space in this study and time permissible in general preclude treatment of many other relevant examples. In this respect the Holocaust (1933–45) is the most regrettable omission; the attempt by the National Socialist movement at world domination in the name of combating a purported Jewish conspiracy to the same ends merits a volume all on its own. Similarly, the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), the Great Purge (1936–38), the Reign of Terror (1793–94), the Inquisition (12thC—present), the Crusades (11th–15thC) and the colonial era in general stand out. The reader will likely think of others. Nixon's War on Drugs is another regrettable omission given the overt parallels with the War on Terror.[24]

[24] 'At the time, I was writing a book about the politics of drug prohibition. I started to ask Ehrlichman a series of earnest, wonky questions that he impatiently waved away. "You want to know what this was really all about?" he asked with the bluntness of a man who, after public disgrace and a stretch in federal prison, had little left to protect. "The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I'm saying? We knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did." Baum, Dan, 'Legalize It All:

Rather than trying to cover every instance of scapegoating, this study aims to treat case studies that demonstrate how individual scare campaigns and moral panics fit into the overall pattern of scapegoating and persecution—a pattern that can be extended to include scare campaigns and moral panics as they will no doubt reappear in the future.[25] The overall pattern of scapegoating more than the particular details of each case study is what is most significant here; while each case study makes no claim to being exhaustive, they do attempt to present critical data relating to the analytical criteria as described above. The challenge of this study is in that respect to account for the pattern produced by moral panics, and in so doing to kick the chair out from underneath the conditions of hateful negativity that make them possible in the first place.

How to Win the War on Drugs,' *Harper's Magazine*, April 2016, via https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all, accessed 10 September 2017; Miller, Abraham H., and Nicholas A. Damask. "The Dual Myths of 'Narco terrorism": How Myths Drive Policy,' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8, no. 1, 1996: 114–131.

[25] Klein, Naomi, 'The Worst of Donald Trump's Toxic Agenda Is Lying in Wait—A Major U.S. Crisis Will Unleash It,' The Intercept, 10 June 2017, via https://theintercept.com/2017/06/10/the-worst-of-donald-trumps-toxic-agenda-is-lying-in-wait-a-major-u-s-crisis-will-unleash-it, accessed 10 September 2017; Lizza, Ryan, 'How President Trump Could Seize More Power After a Terrorist Attack,' *The New Yorker*, 7 February, 2017, via http://www.newyorker.com/news/ryan-lizza/how-president-trump-could-seize-more-power-after-a-terrorist-attack, accessed 23 February 2017; Debney, Ben, *The Booger Peril: A History of Things to Come*, Melbourne, 2016.

Case Study I: Witch Panic

The many facts about the power and works of the Devil in regard to producing effects through sorcery are omitted for the sake of brevity.

—*Malleus Maleficarum* (1487)

[The Pope] canonizeth the rich for saints and banneth the poor for witches.

—Reginald Scot (1584)

So far, at length, did the madness of the furious populace and of the courts go in this thirst for blood and booty that there was scarcely anybody who was not smirched by some suspicion of this crime.

—Johann Linden, *Gesta Trevirorum* (1620)

This first case study examines witch panic, the first of the three case studies exploring historical patterns of moral panic and their relationship to scapegoating. It outlines the construction of witch panic as such according to the analytical criteria nominated in the theoretical chapter of this study, looking at the self-interested framing of the crisis from which it derived by those responsible for the panic itself, before examining the use of moral panic constructed around witch mythology as the basis for crisis leveraging and scapegoating. The case study then looking at the underlying economic and social dynamics driving the construction of witch panic and whose interests it ultimately served. It concludes by summarising the material presented in the case study against the analytical criteria

in preparation for comparison against the second and third case studies in the conclusion to the thesis itself.

Witch panic was the driving force and characteristic feature of the European Witch Hunts, a period of religious persecution spanning roughly the period between 1450 and 1750. The European Witch Hunts claimed somewhere between 60 and 100,000 victims—70 to 90% of whom were women.[1] During this time, Europe was consumed by fears of a social menace in the form of witches, so-called 'Brides of Satan,' who in meeting Satan at illicit meetings known as the *sabbat* had been tempted into evil, and lured thereby into performing evil works on the basis of a sexual pact they made with an entity who became, to all intents and purposes, their spiritual pimp. According to the 'moral entrepreneurs' or architects of witch panic, the witches' sexual pact with the Devil was not only the consequence of a characteristic and defining lack of restraint in female sexuality, but the root cause of calamities from bad weather, crop failure, famine and pestilence to miscarriages and sexual impotence; the mythology that developed out of these core beliefs is indicative of deviance production associated with moral panic, numerous mechanisms of moral disengagement and the construction of stereotypes consistent with priming for automatic reactions.

Some idea of the extent to which the development of cultural stereotypes became common coin during the era of the Witch Hunts can be gathered from their appearance in Shakespeare's *The Tragedy of Macbeth* (1611). In *Macbeth*, these stereotypes appear in the form of the 'weird sisters,' characters whose dishevelled and conspiratorial manner is typical of the stereotyped folk demon. As Brides of Satan, Shakespeare's witches hail Macbeth as the future king when they encounter him early on, tempting him into sin with the prospect of absolute power such that he might begin a campaign of wholesale betrayal and destruction of anyone who stands between him and the throne of Scotland. Such conduct is, according to this stereotype, their sole purpose for existing on Earth, which is to use all their malevolence and cunning to inflict as much damage and destruction as possible in the Devil's service. Their tempting of Macbeth with malicious prophecy exemplifies the evil works the Brides of Satan were said to perform, as their fundamental reason for being and their primary form of service to their diabolical master.

[1] Brauner, Sigrid, *Fearless Wives and Frightened Shrews: The Construction of the Witch in Early Modern Germany*, University of Massachusetts Press, 1995, 5.

As the scene in which they make their first appearance tends to suggest, Shakespeare's 'weird sisters' or witches are petty, spiteful creatures whose energy is taken up in bringing harm to others. In their first appearance, they discuss the fallout from an encounter the first has had with someone from whom she was seeking charity.

> A sailor's wife had chestnuts in her lap,
> And munched, and munched, and munched. "Give me,"
>   quoth I.
> "Aroint thee, witch!" the rump-fed runnion cries.
> Her husband's to Aleppo gone, master o' th' Tiger;
> But in a sieve I'll thither sail,
> And like a rat without a tail,
> I'll do, I'll do, and I'll do.[2]

In other words, she will chase and catch up to the husband on his way to Syria from Scotland in a kitchen utensil, and upon finding him curse his ship; even though her powers do not extend to capsizing the vessel outright, 'it shall,' she insists, 'be tempest-tossed.'[3] Their grandiosity is palpable. The laws of physics tell us that this is therapeutic play-acting, a vehicle for social rebellion insofar the witch stereotype provided a ready-made role for social outcasts to spite their persecutors. The notion that socially marginalised women adopted social roles the objects of their scorn were threatened by as an act of rebellion against the morés of the social order they represented is at least as plausible an explanation for witch beliefs as the idea that anyone really thought they might be able to sail to Syria from Scotland in a kitchen sieve.[4] Many elements of underground culture today also adopt Satanic and devil-based imagery, the US metal band Slayer and the *Thrasher* magazine 'skate goat' being not the least of which, reflecting similar attitudes.

Nevertheless, Macbeth's witches are presented as credible enough for Macbeth to take seriously in virtually inciting him to murder. Macbeth doesn't reject the Weird Sisters' prediction that he will become King because he would have to betray and kill Duncan, and that the dynamic

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[2] Shakespeare, *The Tragedy of Macbeth*, Dover, 1993, Act 1, Scene 3.

[3] Frye, Roland Mushat, 'Launching the Tragedy of *Macbeth*: Temptation, Deliberation, and Consent in Act I,' *Huntington Library Quarterly* 50, no. 3, 1987: 249–261.

[4] Thomas, Keith, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, New York: Scribner, 1971, 628.

he would set in motion would likely come back to him in the form of his own ultimate destruction. He takes the idea on board and runs with it, a fact that would seem to demonstrate the currency of the idea of witches for Shakespeare's intended audience, the ancient hag or crone draped in rags, conspicuous by her shady, conspiratorial manner and malevolent disposition.

It was this stereotype and the belief that it reflected a real threat to European society that enabled the European Witch Hunts to go on for as long as they did. Plays such as *Macbeth* and their use of witchcraft stereotypes were part of that process, serving to normalise the witch stereotype, and to prime audiences with the prejudices that allowed the moral panic over witchcraft to become fuel to the fire of trials and persecutions. In this sense, Shakespeare's work can be understood to contain a propaganda function—not something typically associated with his canon, but one that is nevertheless apparent. This chapter examines the fruits of such propaganda in witch panic in the broader context of medieval political economy, as a presaging of moral panics throughout the modern world.

> That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.
>
> —Matthew 5:45

MOBILISATION PHASE: SELF-INTERESTEDLY FRAMING THE PARAMETERS OF CRISIS

This first section of the first case study examines the initial mobilising stage of witch panic in the context of the general crisis of fourteenth-century Europe, that which resulted from the political fallout from the Black Death (1346–53) and the social and environmental conditions that produced it. In examining how this crisis was framed by elites to mobilise the masses around a scapegoating campaign, this first section argues that, moral entrepreneurs from amongst the feudal elite (inclusive of the religious establishment) reacted to the crisis of faith and apostasy that the Black Death generated, and the shift in power relations between buyers and sellers of labour due to the loss of labour power, by politicising the crisis in their own favour. It argues that they did so by identifying their own class interests with the moral good—by identifying

the Good with the Self, in other words—and polarising European society between themselves and the Other, identified with the Evil and the alleged existential threat, by invoking a binary, Self vs. Other logic. As the Catholic Church was hegemon, this binary was inevitably defined in terms of the eternal battle between God and Satan.

This section argues then that this became the basis for deviance production and witch panic as the Catholic theocracy equated servicing their own interests as members of the ruling elite with servicing the common interests of all Catholics in rallying against the scourge of Satan, including those of the Catholic peasants they were attacking. By framing existential crisis in binary terms drawing on the Ancient Fantasy archetype, it argues that they set the stage for the demonisation of rebellious peasants, women living outside of the control of the Church patriarchy especially, and for the construction of the existential threat they were said to pose.[5] By thus framing those they perceived as a threat to their class interests as a source of existential crisis, this section contends, they set the stage for blaming of the victim, and the scapegoating and persecution that followed.

Flood, Famine, Pestilence and Death

The crisis behind moral panic over witchcraft was all too real, growing out of a perfect storm of successive catastrophes ultimately resulting in the deaths of a third to a half of the population of Europe. Between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, Medieval Europe had enjoyed an era of prosperity. This came to a thudding halt however in the spring and summer of 1314, when a climate event known the Little Ice Age, one marking the end of the Medieval Warm Period—itself dating to the ninth century—brought with it prodigious flooding. Prodigious flooding gave rise to widespread crop failure and made the ripening of grain or to the curing of hay for livestock feed next to impossible, resulting in the Great Famine (1315–22). Famine was compounded by the nature of subsistence agriculture under feudalism to leave a small margin for error between satisfaction of human needs and starvation, and a general habit of dependency in the towns of Europe on the countryside.

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[5] Roper, Lyndal, *Witch Craze*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004, 121.

A reluctance to buttress themselves against famine by storing grain and other foodstuffs left both all acutely vulnerable to starvation in the event of crop failure; tempted, fate duly responded with 'the dread spectres of *Caristia, Fames, Pestilentia* and *Mortalitas.*'[6]

The latter comment comes from the chronicles of Johannes de Trokelowe, a Benedictine Monk of St Albans Abbey, who described the disastrous conditions in some detail. De Trokelowe recorded that the summer rains 'were so heavy that grain could not ripen … It could hardly be gathered and used to bake bread down to the said feast day unless it was first put in vessels to dry.' What bread could be baked 'did not have its usual nourishing power and strength because the grain was not nourished by the warmth of summer sunshine.' When 'even the rich were constantly hungry,' such that the King could not even find enough grain to feed his court, there could have been no doubt about the fate of the poor, who Trokelowe described as 'crushed with hunger, lying stiff and dead in the wards and streets.' He lamented finally that

> Four pennies worth of coarse bread was not enough to feed a common man for one day. The usual kinds of meat, suitable for eating, were too scarce; horse meat was precious; plump dogs were stolen. And, according to many reports, men and women in many places secretly ate their own children.[7]

The fairy tale of Hansel and Gretel, which tells of a pair of children are abandoned in the forest to face a cannibalistic witch by a cruel stepmother trying to save herself and her new husband from famine, is suggestive of the pressures of the period. Malnutrition became protracted as planting stocks of grain were consumed, as well as the draft animals that might have helped peasants to re-establish grain production. The inflationary effect of subsistence crises on prices generally also exacerbated the problem.[8] In time, protracted malnutrition weakened immune systems.

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[6] Lucas, Henry S., 'The Great European Famine of 1315, 1316, and 1317,' *Speculum* 5, no. 4, 1930: 343–377.

[7] Lucas, ibid., 345–346; Trokelowe, Johannes de, *Annales*, Riley, H. T., ed., Rolls Series, London, 1866, 92–95.

[8] 'Hunger was the mark of inflationary crisis—its dreadful symbol, so to speak.' Further down he adds, 'Bread provided the staple of the early modern diet. The pious wish, "give us this day our daily bread," was fully justified.' Behringer, Wolfgang, *Witches and Witch-Hunts: A Global History*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, 75–76.

Weakened immune systems, coupled with unsanitary living conditions as poverty and made lack of heating water for regular bathing and cleaning purposes unusually difficult, provided fertile soil for the Black Death (1346–53), a deadly pandemic wrought by bacteria known as *Yersinia pestis* that produced bubonic plague in humans. *Yersinia pestis* was carried by fleas who would attempt to feed from the blood of their rodent hosts, and then regurgitate the now infected blood back into their bloodstreams as the bacteria in their passageways prevented them from swallowing. Rodents who resisted the disease created what was essentially a reservoir of infected blood that spread the bacteria to fleas, who attacked humans when rodents not resistant to the plague died off. Humans then transmitted it through the air.[9] *Yersinia pestis* was thought to have been carried Asia along trade routes through the Black Sea, and into Europe, where it ravaged the continent, killing between one third and half the population without distinction of class or religious enthusiasm in less than a decade—an estimated 100 million people in all.[10]

Catastrophes of this scale can hardly be represented by numbers, but the evidence to hand tends to suggest it bore some resemblance to Armageddon; the details are significant in bearing on the political fallout in the aftermath. In the introduction to *The Decameron*, his novel about a group of people who try to survive the Black Death by abandoning civilisation for the countryside, the Italian writer Giovanni Boccaccio, for example, left a vivid account of the deplorable conditions the Black Death wrought in his hometown of Florence in 1348. 'In men and women alike,' Boccaccio wrote, it first betrayed itself by the emergence of certain tumours in the groin or the armpits, some of which grew as large as a common apple, others as an egg, some more, some less, which the common folk called *gavoccioli*,' which 'soon began to propagate and spread itself in all directions indifferently.' Since it was unclear 'whether it was that the disorder was of a nature to defy such treatment, or that

[9] Christakos, George, Ricardo A. Olea, Marc L. Serre, Hwa-Lung Yu, and Lin-Lin Wang, *Interdisciplinary Public Health Reasoning and Epidemic Modelling: The Case of Black Death*, New York: Springer, 2005, 110–114.

[10] Postan, Michael, *Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy,* Cambridge University Press, 2008; Cantor, Norman F., *In the Wake of the Plague, The Black Death and the World It Made*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001, 9–10; Aberth, John, *From the Brink of the Apocalypse: Confronting Famine, War, Plague and Death in the Later Middle Ages*, London: Routledge, 2013.

the physicians were at fault,' he added, treatments were ineffective, setting 'entirely at naught both the art of the physician and the virtue of physic' as well as the efforts of a 'multitude both of men and of women … practiced without having received the slightest tincture of medical science.'[11]

Other details bear out the virulency of the pandemic; Boccaccio describes the rags of a plague victim being 'strewn about' on the street, which then piqued the interest of a pair of hogs who sniffed at them and 'took the rags between their teeth and tossed them to and fro about their chaps.' The effect was instantaneous; 'almost immediately,' he writes, 'they gave a few turns, and fell down dead, as if by poison, upon the rags which in an evil hour they had disturbed.' Without the required treatment being available, however, the *gavocciolo* remained 'an infallible token of approaching death,' almost all contracting them reportedly succumbing within three days.[12] In this respect,

> The condition of the lower, and, perhaps, in great measure of the middle ranks, of the people shewed even worse and more deplorable; for, deluded by hope or constrained by poverty, they stayed in their quarters, in their houses where they sickened by thousands a day, and, being without service or help of any kind, were, so to speak, irredeemably devoted to the death which overtook them. Many died daily or nightly in the public streets; of many others, who died at home, the departure was hardly observed by their neighbours, until the stench of their putrefying bodies carried the tidings; and what with their corpses and the corpses of others who died on every hand the whole place was a sepulchre.[13]

As far as this perfect picture of hell was concerned, the Catholic Church religious as authorities and ideological hegemons stood accountable in the aftermath of the pandemic for explaining the part it played in God's Plan. The Black Death had, after all, touched believers and sinners alike, taking lives without distinction of faith or effort. This fact presented significant problems for the Catholic hegemons in raising serious questions

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[11] Boccaccio, Giovanni, *The Decameron of Giovanni Boccaccio*, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/23700, introduction, accessed 25 February 2016.

[12] Boccaccio, *The Decameron of Giovanni Boccaccio*, ibid.

[13] Boccaccio, ibid.

about the merits of faith.[14] The God of Love and Mercy had, after all, neglected to save millions of his devoted followers from the horrors of pandemic. The 'Epicurean Paradox' submitted by the eponymous ancient Greek philosopher had long been in circulation by the time of the Black Death; the points it raises remain as relevant now as they must have been for many fourteenth-century Europeans not too dead to recall it:

> Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
> Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
> Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
> Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?[15]

For defenders of the Faith, whose very Earthly power and authority depended on it continuing to exist, the inclination to interpret the disasters of the fourteenth century as certain proof of the non-existence of divine purpose was indeed an existential threat. In reaction, the moral entrepreneurs of what would soon become witch panic launched their Mobilisation phase by alleging a diabolical conspiracy against Christendom in the form of 'sin, hatred of the visible Church, empty faith, and lack of loyalty,' which, it was said, had provoked divine wrath in the form of famine and pandemic as a *pro sceleribus castigare*—i.e. 'to punish crimes.'[16] Implicit in this demonology—besides the revival of the concept of a divine purpose in the face of otherwise random events in nature—was an unstated Self vs. Other binary logic that placed contending parties in absolute categories relative to their attitude towards the Catholic hierarchy, its moral entrepreneurs have taken it on themselves to define the meaning of criminality in accord with their own political interests, to give it the weight of the eternal battle between God and Satan, and to gift themselves a way to demonising anyone who dared cross them. On no more solid basis than personal preference, then, the identification through conspiracy theory of the moral good with the interests of the Catholic hegemon established an alternative framework for its moral entrepreneurs to reposition themselves as the offended party and

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[14] Russell, Jeffrey Burton, *Witchcraft in the Middle Ages*, Cornell University Press, 1972, Chapter 7 'Witchcraft and Rebellion in Medieval Society, 1300–1360,' 167–170.

[15] Epicurus, Eugene O'Connor, trans., *The Essential Epicurus*, Prometheus Books, 1993.

[16] Jordan, William Chester, *The Great Famine: Northern Europe in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Princeton University Press, 1997, 22.

stake a claim to political legitimacy for further action in pursuit of their own interests—ground otherwise occupied by those questioning the meaning of faith in the aftermath of the Black Death.

'For God is deaf nowadays and will not hear us, /And for our guilt he grinds good men to dust,' wrote a London cleric to that end the late fourteenth century.[17] In this respect, the Catholic hegemon could even point to a Biblical precedent in Noah's Ark, built in anticipation of a similar form of Divine Wrath (though wrath was only a sin when it served the wrong ends). The official conspiracy theory was allegedly confirmed by willing misinterpretations of Biblical passages like Matthew 5:45, which states that, 'That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.' Passages said to evidence the 'Divine Plague' (*plaga divina*), a contextual innovation on the broader concept of Divine Wrath.[18] The notion that God might look down on his creation without judgement and send rain and sunlight on all, despite our sins, had to be twisted beyond recognition to become a justification for the kind of collective punishment associated in more modern times with totalitarian societies.

From the point of view of the Church on the other hand, any potential for atheistic doubt to take room and gain momentum would threaten the power the Catholic hierarchy, which, already on shaky ground in part thanks to the papal Schism that created endemic disunity and undermined its moral authority throughout the fourteenth century, hardly needed any more reasons after the arrival of famine and pandemic on top of that to feel uncertain about its future. The breakdown of feudal economic and social relations of power resulting from labour shortages associated with the Black Death, also weakened the traditional hegemony of Europe's largest landowner.[19] For sinners who refused to submit to

[17] Cantor, Norman, *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, Simon and Schuster, 2001, 6.

[18] Byrne, Joseph Patrick, *Daily Life During the Black Death*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006, 216; Lerner, Robert E., 'The Black Death and Western European Eschatological Mentalities,' *The American Historical Review* 86, no. 3, 1981: 534.

[19] 'The Witch Hunt was in reality a defence of the eroding social position and symbolic prestige of the ecclesiastical elite.' Oplinger, *The Politics of Demonology*, op. cit., 102; Richard A. Barney, and Helene Scheck, 'Introduction: Early and Modern Biospheres, Politics, and the Rhetorics of Plague,' *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 10, no. 2, 2010: 7; Moore, Barrington, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Beacon Press, 1993.

Church authority, all served to rationalise theocratic terror at the hands of what Jordan calls 'God's Ordinance.'[20] Such a terror would be facilitated with the construction of a deviant for persecution during the Targeting Phase (II) and the establishment of a pretext for scapegoating during the Legitimation Phase (III), as we shall see.

As a concluding side note, the fact that the 'Divine Plague' conspiracy theory was intended as the basis for class war and theocratic terror is evidenced in the fact that, where even departures from orthodoxy upheld the Divine Plague conspiracy theory, they were still outlawed. Such was the fate of the Flagellants, Christian zealots who saw in the Black Death evidence of the Tribulation prior to the prophet's return and the Last Judgment.[21] Those who didn't, like the Lollards, rebels led by John Wycliffe, were simply targeted by the Inquisition (1478). The impetus to theocratic terror is likewise evidenced in the way Jews became targets of pogroms following similar conspiracy theories alleging they were poisoning wells to spread the Plague amongst Christians.[22] In addition to being one of the more significant driving factors behind the growth of anti-Semitism in Germany via the association of European Jews and black magic, this well-poisoning mythology would also prove to be one of the more significant factors behind the development of the witch stereotype, pointing to a common lineage between the witch-hunts and the Holocaust.[23]

> Witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable.
> —Kramer and Spengler, *Malleus Malleficarum*

[20] Jordan, *The Great Famine*, op. cit.

[21] Lerner, 'The Black Death and Western European Eschatological Mentalities,' op. cit., 533–552; Kieckhefer, Richard, 'Radical Tendencies in the Flagellant Movement of the Mid-Fourteenth Century,' *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4, no. 2, 1974: 157–176; Cohn, Norman, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, Random House, 2011.

[22] Stokes, Laura, *Demons of Urban Reform: Early European Witch Trials and Criminal Justice, 1430–1530*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 58–61, 88; Foa, Anna, *The Jews of Europe After the Black Death*, University of California Press, 2000, 14; Cohn, Samuel K., 'The Black Death and the Burning of Jews,' *Past & Present* 196, no. 1, 2007: 3–36; Porter, Catherine M., 'The Black Death and Persecution of the Jews,' *Saber and Scroll* 3, no. 1, 2015: 6.

[23] Voigtländer, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth, *Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany*, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011; Hsia, R. Po-chia, *The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany*, Yale University Press, 1988; Trachtenberg, Joshua, *The Devil and the Jews*, Yale University Press, 1943.

Targeting Phase: Constructing Targets for Scapegoating Through the Production of Deviance

This second section of the first case study examines the targeting stage of witch panic in the context of the mobilisation of society in defence of feudal elite interests using the witchcraft conspiracy theory constructed atop a Self vs. Other binary. It focuses on how, having politicised the crisis wrought by famine and pandemic by conflating their vested class interests with the moral Good, feudal elites leveraged binary logic to construct the witch stereotype as a took with which to demonise future victims as a prelude to persecution. To that end, this section investigates the use of deviance production as the primary driver of witch panic, exploring the adaptation of previous persecutions of heretics associated with the Inquisition and the Crusades to the folk demon of the Witch, the 'heretic plus magic.' It explores the use of the politicised crisis framework in that way to attack rebellious peasants and to put down various other challenges to the feudal power structure, taking particular care to acknowledge the threats to feudal class power arising from of the shift in class power created by the decimation of the feudal labour force by famine and pandemic.

In looking at how feudal elites made scapegoats out of perceived threats to their power, this section addresses elite control over the pulpit and the printing press, and the role of both in perpetrating deviance production and scare-mongering. In linking the witchcraft conspiracy theory with priming material supplied by the Ancient Fantasy, it examines the converging of threats with the specific goal of developing a broader historical form of what we now call the Paranoid Style, further expediting the political goals of scare-mongering moral entrepreneurs.

Heresy Plus Magic

Heretics, despite having been tempted by Satan into heterodoxy and independent, critical thought, remained incapable of inducing torrential rain and pestilence. This was the unique innovation of the witch, the heretic with access to magic. Targets for deviance production were found in the aged peasant woman, the impoverished crone muttering curses under her breath against those who refused her alms, the aged practitioner of folk medicine with a wealth of experience in herbal remedies, and the learned midwife able to assist with labour and induce abortions. The latter in fact was a particular

bone of contention for feudal elites desirous of replacing the decimated workforce and shifting the balance of class power back in their own favour. Underscoring such preoccupations, Roper argues that the characteristics associated with the witch stereotype were those caused by the onset of menopause: 'facial hair, bent posture resulting from thinning bones, wrinkled skin.' Such were 'intrinsically related to the ending of fertility rather than to the visible onset of old age.'[24] No longer of value for purposes of social reproduction, aging peasant women could be put to other uses.[25]

The Catholic Church had been persecuting heretics at least since the beginning of the Crusades in 1096 ('Deus Vult'); the adaptation of the heretic stereotype by incorporating magic to account for famine and plague was a textbook example of convergence with prior scapegoating campaigns to build on their cultural legacy—all the more so as the witch trials to come borrowed the Inquisitorial method. Magic, however, had long been a staple of Christianity, involving the consumption of the body and blood of their Saviour, Holy Water, and the supernatural abilities of their patron saint to walk on water and rise from the dead. Double standards in this respect reflect the amplification of deviance and the hysteria associated with the moral panic demonology and the Self vs. Other binary framing it. Further reflecting these double standards, the prevalence of magical beliefs was even a notable facet of terror surrounding unbelief, the articulation of which in one example at least bearing more than passing resemblance to Divine Ordinance:

> "We worship saints for fear," wrote William Tynsdale in the early sixteenth century, 'lest they be displeased and angry with us, and plague us or hurt us; who is not afraid of St. Laurence? Who dare deny St. Anthony a fleece of wool for fear of his terrible fire, or lest he send the pox amongst our sheep.'[26]

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[24]Ehrenreich, Barbara, and Deirdre English, *Witches, Midwives, & Nurses: A History of Women Healer*, The Feminist Press at CUNY, 2010; Roper, *Witch Craze*, op. cit., Chapter 7 'The Crone,' 160–178.

[25]Tithi, Bhattacharya, ed., Social *Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*, Pluto Press, 2017; Bhattacharya, Tithi, 'How Not to Skip Class: Social Reproduction of Labour and the Global Working Class,' *Viewpoint Magazine* 5, 2015, 31.

[26]Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, Chapter 2 'The Magic of the Medieval Church,' ibid., 28–29.

'Divine ordinance' demonologies failed to account for how this was supposed to differ in principle from sorcery; *Dives and Pauper* (1402) declared that 'it was not wrong to try to charm snakes or birds by reciting holy words, provided the operation was done with reverence.'[27] For anyone confused about the patent double standards, the Council of Malines ruled in 1607 that 'it is superstitious to expect any cause from anything, when such an effect cannot be produced by natural causes, by divine institution, or by ordination or approval of the Church.'[28] The rules were, in other words, conspicuously flexible—a fact that eventually drove Reginald Scot to remark of the Pope that, 'He canoniseth the rich for saints and banneth the poor for witches'—lamentable, he felt, for the poor since 'theologians further enhanced popular belief in the existence of the Church's magical powers by stressing the mystical powers available to the faithful as a means of preservation against the assault of evil spirits.'[29] The fact was that the religious hegemon was at the same time prime instigator of myths about evil spirits, chief promoter of magical thinking *and* inquisitor of magical beliefs where they failed to serve its purposes and/or could serve as ideological fodder for deviance production in the name of generating scapegoats for its political difficulties. In so doing, the Catholic hierarchy was managing to render itself cause and cure of the same problem with a notable comprehensiveness—a textbook sign of deviance production and equally sure precedent for events to follow.

The Council of Basel

The focal point in the development of the witch stereotype was a reform movement centred around the Council of Basel during the 1430s, a century after the Great Famine. The Council of Basel sought to reign in Papal excesses by establishing an ecumenical council more responsive to the base, a move that precipitated a power struggle with Rome lasting most of the decade. While wrestling with the Pope, the Council of Basel also pursued other areas of its reform agenda, not least of which being combatting the popularity amongst the European peasantry of magical rites, tokens and superstitions—in essence, magical thinking not

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[27] Dives and Pauper, f. 59, cited in Thomas, ibid.

[28] Thomas, ibid., 55.

[29] Quoted in Thomas, ibid., 55–56.

consistent with the perceived interests of the Catholic hierarchy. Socially widespread and ingrained as the popular culture of the day, these were emblematic of the kind of heterodoxy that the Inquisition had lately been brought into existence to stamp out as 'heresy.'[30] Of particular interest was the fact that the Council of Basel included no less than nine jurists from the trial of Joan of Arc, who had been convicted of sorcery at a show trial after having been captured by the English during the Hundred Years' War and burnt at the stake. News of this event reached the Council through the jurists who had facilitated the process; it intermingled there both with the concern of reformers to stamp out the popular culture of magic competing with the Catholic hierarchy for the loyalty of the mass of the population on the one hand, and the Inquisitorial fear of heterodoxy on the other.

With those responsible for selling out the future national patron saint of France to the English during the Hundred Years' War leading the way, then, the Council of Basel lead the way in combining heresy and magic, their previous experience with show trials providing grist to the mill of persecution.[31] As it emerged out of the work of the Council of Basel, the witch stereotype embodied identifiable characteristics. Essentially, these were:

1. That witches existed,
2. That their existence was the result of a sexual pact with the Devil,
3. That their main organisational form was the witches' meeting or Black Sabbat,
4. That they had the ability to fly through the air to attend such meetings, and
5. That they were willingly and ably devoted to carrying out evil works ('*maleficia*').

[30] Stokes, *Demons of Urban Reform*, op. cit.; Stokes, Laura, 'Toward the Witch Craze,' in Bennett, Judith M., and Ruth Mazo Karras, *The Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender in Medieval Europe*, Oxford University Press, 2013; Stokes, Laura, 'Prelude: Early Witch-Hunting in Germany and Switzerland,' *Magic, Ritual, and Witchcraft* 4, no. 1, 2009: 54–61.

[31] Bailey, Michael, and Edward Peters, 'A Sabbat of Demonologists: Basel, 1431–1440,' *Historian* 65, no. 6, 2003: 1375–1396.

Most or all of the above claims can be found in many of the major trea-
tises of witchcraft published in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They
represent the primary forms of deviance production and moral panic,
understood as the Targeting phase of panic-driven scapegoating perpe-
trated in reaction to the imaginary hobgoblin of witchcraft.

(1) *That witches existed*. The elite character of witch panic demonol-
ogy is reflected in the way religious elites preached the peril of witches
from the pulpit, fanning popular fears, priming their audiences to see
witches where in fact were only people who approximated the stereotype
in being female and old, and giving witch trials grassroots momentum.[32]
In the case of Scotland, where the use of torture made for notably brutal
witch-hunts, Larner concludes that

> The actual pattern of witch-hunting … reinforces this assumption of rul-
> ing class control in that witch-hunting crises were *nearly always preceded by
> official expressions of anxiety about witchcraft and were marked by the simul-
> taneous increase in the supply of suspects from a variety of localities, not all of
> which were likely to have experienced internal pressures at the same time in
> the same way* [emphasis added].[33]

Expressions about anxiety and supply of suspects established a use for
trials; the propensity of medieval courts to put the burden of proof on
defendants completed the circle of blame. This particular judicial quirk
accompanied the introduction of the Inquisitorial method to secu-
lar courts in the thirteenth century.[34] In addition to the application of
Inquisitorial method, the thirteenth-century judiciary acquired the right
to torture the accused in many parts of Europe, Scotland and Germany
being notably brutal examples, and the right to adjudicate over cases
involving witchcraft; most local courts operated without much over-
sight from national or coordinating legal bodies to limit authoritar-
ian excesses.[35] All contributed to ideal conditions for the production of

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[32]Levack, Brian P., *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe*, Longman, 1995, 163–164.

[33]Larner, *Enemies of God*, op. cit., 2; Levack, *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe*,
ibid.

[34]Levack, ibid., Chapter 3.

[35]Trevor-Roper, Hugh, *The European Witch-Craze of the 16th and 17th Centuries*,
London: Penguin Books, 1969, 43; Levack, *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe*, op.
cit., 69.

witch deviance based on the reversal of onus fallacy and moral disengagement through conflation of nonconformity and doubt with hostility and aggression.

One of the primary quirks of the adoption of Inquisitorial methods by secular courts throughout Europe was that they could prosecute witch-heretics using ecclesiastical methods for the ends of organised religion; thus, for a time, witch trials involved aspects of a judicial system which, in transition from procedural or accusatorial to Inquisitorial, utilised an aspect of the old system, the trial by ordeal. The result was the grotesque practice of throwing the accused into bodies of water, and declaring them innocent if they drowned, floating understood to signify supernatural aid.[36] The only possible purpose of a process so militantly defiant of the primal impulse to live as this could be the spreading of terror.

(2) *That witches made a sexual pact with Satan*. The Sexual Pact between Satan and his heretic-bride is a direct descendent of Cohn's 'Ancient Fantasy' tropes, the development of the mythology surrounding the Bride of Satan innovating on a continuing theme by replacing family members as participants in the incestuous orgy with the Prince of Darkness. A major innovation in the heretic stereotype, the transformation of the incestuous orgy trope into a diabolical one was also a major innovation in long-held beliefs about witchcraft; even Roman Law had recognised a distinction between healing magic, and *maleficia*, or black magic, and so it remained up until the fifteenth century. The advent of the diabolical pact, however, destroyed the distinction and established an ideological foundation for persecution and state terror by connecting magic and healing with Satanism, thereby establishing a rationale for covetous jealousy and paranoia and a basis for conspiracy theories.[37]

The *Errores Gazarorium* (1450) or *Errors of the Cathars* is one of the earliest texts describing the witch stereotype. *Errors of the Cathars* references the Occitanic targets of the Albigensian Crusade (1209–1229), from which derives the infamous command, 'kill them all, God will know his own'—the policy of the occupying forces towards the citizens of Béziers, in the south of France, adopted after its Catholic citizens refused

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[36]Trevor-Roper, ibid., 68.

[37]Larner, Christina, 'James VI and I and Witchcraft,' in Smith, A. G. R. ed., *The Reign of James VI and I*, London: Palgrave, 1973, 74.

to give up their heterodox neighbours to the besieging Crusader army.[38] In the *Errores Gazarorium*, the Sexual Pact trope features prominently. 'First, when a person of either sex is seduced by the persuasion of the enemy of the human race,' alleged the anonymous author,

> the seducer, precipitating the seduced person into the abyss of the evil ones, makes him first swear to whatever is required of him and is given a container for the journey to the synagogue, filled with the ointment pertaining to this, and he teaches him how to anoint the staff as well as anything else he needs.[39]

Commentary on anointed staffs features repeatedly as thinly veiled pornography. The use of the term for a Jewish house of worship as the meeting place for the Devil and his human minions draws not only on the heretic stereotype but also that of the treacherous Jew to invoke priming and convergence mechanisms at the same time, reflecting versatility in the production of deviance.[40] Conspiracy theory primed by the Ancient Fantasy archetype takes form as the *Errores* elaborates on the Sexual Pact narrative, converging with anti-Semitism along the way. 'When the devil has heard and accepted the oath of fidelity from the seduced person,' states the *Errores Gazarorium*, '… first he swears that he will be faithful to the master who presides over the whole society.' The new adherent then promises in turn to meet with the society of witches, to not reveal its secrets, to 'kill all of those children he is able to injure or kill and will take them to the synagogue, and by this is to be understood children under three years old,' to

[38] 'When they discovered, from the admissions of some of them, that there were Catholics mingled with the heretics they said to the abbot "Sir, what shall we do, for we cannot distinguish between the faithful and the heretics." The abbot, like the others, was afraid that many, in fear of death, would pretend to be Catholics, and after their departure, would return to their heresy, and is said to have replied, "Caedite eos. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius - Kill them all for the Lord knoweth them that are His" (2 Tim. ii. 19) and so countless number in that town were slain.' Oldenbourg, Zoé, *Massacre at Montségur: A History of the Albigensian Crusade*, Hachette UK, 2015.

[39] *Errores Gazariorum* (1437), in Kors, Alan Charles, and Edward Peters, *Witchcraft in Europe, 400–1700: A Documentary History*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, 160–162.

[40] Homayun Sidky, *Witchcraft, Lycanthropy, Drugs and Disease: An Anthropological Study of the European Witch-Hunts*, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2010, 54.

go to the synagogue whenever he is called, to 'impede sexual intercourse in every marriage that he is able to, using *sortilegia* and *maleficia*,' and to 'avenge all injuries to the sect.'[41]

> After having sworn and promised these things, the poor seduced person adores the presiding devil by giving homage to him, and as a sign of homage he kisses the devil, appearing in human or in another form, as noted above, on the buttocks or anus, giving to him as tribute one of his own limbs after death. After which all the members of that pestiferous sect celebrate the admittance of the new heretic, eating whatever is around them, especially murdered children, roasted or boiled. When this most wicked feast is completed, after they have danced as much as they desired, the presiding devil then cries, while extinguishing the light, *"mestlet, mestlet!"* After they hear his voice, immediately they join together carnally, one man with one woman, or one man with one man, and sometimes father with daughter, son with mother, brother with sister … scarcely observing the natural order.[42]

The phrasing of this text is remarkably similar to the examples of the 'Ancient Fantasy' cited by Cohn, almost plagiarised. When the witches are spent, they set about manufacturing the ointment spoken of above; this is, 'made of a mystery of diabolic malignancy made out of the fat of small children who have been cooked .. ' Also, 'powders for killing human beings' are made 'from the internal parts of the children mixed with parts of poisonous animals, and all of this is scattered through the air by a member of that society on a cloudy day.' This claims the *Errores*, 'is the reason why in some villages of a region there is a great mortality, and in other areas there is much bad weather.'[43] The 'Pestilential Alliance' was alive and well, now a sexual one, the result of the sexual disposition of the female gender. 'Witchcraft,' explained Heinrich Kramer in the witch-hunter's manual *Malleus Maleficarum*, 'comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable.'[44] Jean Bodin concurred with this assessment, noting

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[41] *Errores Gazariorum*, in Kors and Peters, *Witchcraft in Europe*, op. cit., 160.

[42] *Errores Gazariorum*, in Kors and Peters, ibid.

[43] *Errores Gazariorum*, in Kors, Alan Charles, and Edward Peters, eds., *Witchcraft in Europe, 400–1700: A Documentary History*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, 161.

[44] Mackay, Christopher S., and Heinrich Institoris, *The Hammer of Witches: A Complete Translation of the Malleus Maleficarum*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 170.

with disapproval that 'women love carnal pleasures.'[45] The insatiable love of both for thinly veiled snuff pornography was, on the contrary, God's work; the patent double standards here are unmistakable examples of deviance production.

(3) *That the witches' main organisational form was the Sabbat.* Johannes Nider was a figure in the Council of Basel and its 'sabbat of demonologists'; he made the most of the opportunity to exert his influence by reading excerpts from drafts of his major work, the *Formicarius* (1437), to assemblies of Council participants.[46] Nider drew most of his material on the *sabbat* from Peter of Greyerz, an Inquisitor active around Bern prior to the convocation of the Council of Basel who claimed to have interrogated a male witch who confessed to participating in a meeting with Satan. 'The aforesaid inquisitor told me,' claimed Nider's witness, invoking the Ancient Fantasy, 'that in the duchy of Lausanne he had seen some witches cooking and eating their own children.'

> The way that they would find out about this practice was, as he said, that the witches would come to a fixed meeting place, and would see the demon in the assumed likeness of a man. Their disciples had to promise to abjure Christianity, never to reverence the Eucharist and to stamp on the cross if they could do so without notice.[47]

'It was moreover, widely known,' Nider continued, 'the said judge Peter told me, that in the territory of Bern witches had devoured thirteen babies within a short period of time, with the result that public justice finally flared up sufficiently harshly against such murderers.'

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[45] Bodin, *On the Demon-Mania of Witches*, quoted in Levack, *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe*, op. cit., 137.

[46] Kors and Peters, op. cit., 155–159; Bailey, Michael D., *Battling Demons: Witchcraft, Heresy, and Reform in the Late Middle Ages*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.

[47] Ginzburg, Carlo, *Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches' Sabbath*, University of Chicago Press, 2004; Levack, Brian P., ed., *The Witchcraft Sourcebook*, London; Routledge, 2015, 52–55; Bailey, *Battling Demons*, ibid., 41; Kieckhefer, Richard, 'Avenging the Blood of Children: Anxiety Over Child Victims and the Origins of the European Witch Trials,' in Ferreio, Alberto et al., *The Devil, Heresy and Witchcraft in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Jeffrey B. Russell*, Leiden: Brill, 1998; Wakeweld, Walter L., and Austin P. Evans, eds., *Heresies of the High Middle Ages*, Columbia University Press, 1969, 78–79.

When Peter had questioned one of the captured witches how they ate the babies, she said: "This is how. With unbaptized babies, even baptized ones if they are not protected by the sign of the cross and prayers, we kill them in our ceremonies, either in their cradles or by the sides of their parents, who afterwards are thought to have suffocated or to have died in some other way. We then quietly steal them from their graves and cook them in a cauldron until their bones can be separated from the boiled meat and the broth. From the more solid material we make an unguent suitable for our purposes and rites and transmutations. From the more liquid fluid, we fill up a flask or a bottle made out of skins, and he who drinks from this, with the addition of a few ceremonies, immediately becomes an accomplice and a master of our sect."[48]

In the development of the witch stereotype, the *Formicarius* establishes the *sabbat* as a location within the broader mythology for moral entrepreneurs to combine magic and heresy in the trope of the Sexual Pact between Brides of Satan and their diabolical pimp.

(4) *That Witches had the ability to fly through the air to attend meetings.* The immediate problem with the *sabbat* as the forum for the Diabolical Pact was that it implied implausibly long distances for witches to have to travel to attend.[49] Public transport did not exist in the fifteenth century, nor for that matter the necessary mode of production through which to organise it. The first bicycle was not invented until 1718, John Stevens did not build the first internal combustion engine until 1798, the first prototype of a steam locomotive did not even appear until 1784, and senior peasant women did not typically ride horses.[50] Indeed, the most significant technological advancement running parallel to the birth of witch panic was Johannes Gutenberg's invention of printing with movable type (1447)—the great ironies of which was it expedited the spread of the first editions of the *Malleus Malleficarum* (1487), speeding deviance production and moral panic well before it contributed to learning.

In any event, belief in night flights without evidence was vital then to the witch stereotype and supporting mythology; without it, the *sabbat* was impossible. Without the *sabbat*, there was no sexual pact between Satan and his witch-brides, no production of deviance, and no scapegoat

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[48]Levack, ed., *The Witchcraft Sourcebook*, ibid., 51.

[49]Ginzburg, *Ecstasies*, op. cit., 84.

[50]Klooster, John W., *Icons of Invention: The Makers of the Modern World from Gutenberg to Gates,* ABC-CLIO, 2009, 2.

for the random nature of the cosmos. An account of a 1324 witch trial, then, tells of Alice Kyteler, accused of killing her husband, alleging that

> In rifleing the closet of the ladie, they found a wafer of sacramental bread, having the devels name stamped thereon in steed of Jesus Christ, and a pipe of ointment, wherewith she greased a staffe, upon which she ambled and galloped through thick and thin, when and in what matter she liked.[51]

In prefacing an explanation of the meaning of the ointment, we might pause to take note of the fact that tales of this kind anticipated the work of Nicholas Jacquier, a Dominican and Inquisitor from France, and attendee of the Council of Basel. In the decade following the Council's demise, Jacquier had used the updated propaganda skills he acquired at Basel to pen a number of tracts, the *De calcatione daemonum* (1452) and the *Flagellum haereticorum fascinariorum* (*Scourge of Heretical Witches*, 1458).[52] In carving out a career as demonologist and moral entrepreneur of witch panic, Jacquier's strategy focused on attacking the *Episcopi*, a piece of tenth-century Canon law declaring witch belief impossible on the grounds that the power attributed to the devil could only come from God—that, in other words, good, devout Christians should take responsibility for the consequences of their own actions rather than projecting them onto convenient scapegoats.

To the Canon *Episcopi*, however, Jacquier claimed that witchcraft, involving the new element of magic, was an innovation in the crime of heresy, and as such rendered older statues of Canon law obsolete.[53] As evidence, he cited a 'favoured exemplum' for other defenders of the night flight trope—namely, the 'deuterocanonical' tale in Daniel 14 of

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[51] Wright, Thomas, ed., *A Contemporary Narrative of the Proceedings Against Dame Alice Kyteler, Prosecuted for Sorcery in 1324*, by Richard de Ledrede, Bishop of Ossory. Vol. 24. Camden Society, 1843, 46.

[52] Champion, Matthew, 'Crushing the Canon: Nicolas Jacquier's Response to the *Canon Episcopi* in the *Flagellum haereticorum fascinariorum*,' *Magic, Ritual, and Witchcraft* 6, no. 2, 2011: 183–211; Champion, Matthew, 'Scourging the Temple of God: Towards an Understanding of Nicolas Jacquier's *Flagellum Haereticorum Fascinariorum* (1458),' *Parergon* 28, no. 1, 2011: 1–24; Levine, Amy-Jill, 'Commentary on "Bel and the Dragon,"' in Coogan, Michael David, Marc Zvi Brettler, Carol Ann Newsom, and Pheme Perkins, eds., *The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version: With the Apocrypha: An Ecumenical Study Bible*, Oxford University Press, USA, 2010.

[53] Bailey, 'Sabbat of Demonologists,' op. cit., 1393.

Habakkuk's 'very bodily transportation' to Babylon.[54] At the time, the lack of citational evidence for this certain miracle in turn was no obstacle to its use; indeed, early proponents of night flight like Hans Fründ had already declared that 'witches, sitting on chairs, flew at night to the caves of rich citizens,' where they 'celebrated and drank wine from barrels.'[55] As we shall see momentarily, however, the Diabolical Pact was to become crucial in closing this mountain-sized plothole in the witchcraft conspiracy theory.

Closing the Plothole: Flying Ointment

A keen supporter of Jacquier was Nicholas Remy, a French jurist and contemporary of Jean Bodin. An Inquisitor and judicial mass murderer who claimed to have sent 800 witches to their deaths throughout the course of his career, Remy was the author of the *Daemonolatreiae libri tres* (1595), a demonological text that, in incorporating material from the trials of 900 people put to death for witchcraft over the span of 15 years in the province of Lorraine, came to replace the *Malleus Maleficarum* as the main source of information for witch hunters.[56] Remy's role appears to have been to overcome the logistical problem of attendance at the *sabbat* by combining Jacquier's arguments against the Canon *Episcopi* with the Diabolical Pact. 'On the other side' of the Canon law, Remy declared to that end, 'there is no lack of well-reputed authors, for example, Ulrich Molitor and Jean Bodin, who, both by argument and examples, maintain the literal truth of this matter.' As evidence, he alleged that

> … they have heard the evidence of those who have smeared and rubbed themselves with the same ointment that witches use and have in a moment been carried with them to the Sabbat; though it cost them many days' journey to return from it when, as Apuleius says, the song was done and the blind force of conjured Powers was expended. They have heard also of those who have gone on foot to the Sabbat with their children, whom they meant to initiate at the solemn assembly, and were afterwards carried home through the air by the Demon.[57]

[54] Champion, 'Crushing the Canon,' op. cit., 209–210; Daniel 14:32–37.

[55] Ostorero, Martine, 'The Concept of the Witches' Sabbath in the Alpine Region (1430–1440): Text And Context,' *Witchcraft Mythologies and Persecutions* 3, 2008, 15.

[56] For the *Malleus*, see below: Champion, 'Crushing the Canon,' op. cit.

[57] Levack, *Witchcraft Sourcebook*, op. cit., 83.

In making such grand assertions, Remy neglected to account for whom amongst the peasantry could regularly afford 'many days' time off from subsistence agriculture. He did better however in incorporating the concept of 'flying ointment' into his conspiracy theory, adapting the allegation of Nider that witches boiled down the flesh and bones of babies they butchered as per the Diabolical Feast trope into an ointment to new contingencies. While Nider had been suspicious of night flight, Remy held no such compunctions, adapting the poisonous ointment into a flying one also and bridging Jacquier and the Diabolical Pact in the process. The fruits of Remy's work can be seen, for example, in the *Saducismus Triumphatus* (1681) by Joseph Glanvil, a seventeenth-century English writer and philosopher, which documented confessions from witch trials held in Somerset in 1664 in the following terms:

> Before they are carried to their meetings, they anoint their Foreheads and Hand-wrists with an Oyl the Spirit brings them (which smells raw) and then they are carried in a very short time, using these words as they pass, Thout, tout a tout, tout, throughout and about. And when they go off from their Meetings, they say, "Rentum, Tormentum … all are carried to their several homes in a short space." Alice Duke gave the same testimony, noting besides that the oil was greenish in colour. Ann Bishop, the Officer of the Somerset covens, confessed that her "Forehead being first anointed with a Feather dipt in Oyl, she hath been suddenly carried to the place of their meeting … . After all was ended, the Man in black vanished. The rest were of a sudden conveighed to their homes."[58]

Where 'flying ointment' was concerned, the night flight motif did contain a half-truth. Before the stave or broomstick was alleged to have become the transportation of choice in the standard witch stereotype, witches were said to fly on beasts and any number of other objects. One tale even told of a 'terrible black dog' that she 'boldly mounted as upon a well-tamed horse; and in payment for her passage, when she dismounted she was in her turn mounted and defiled by the dog; but first (as it seemed to her) it changed itself into a not uncomely young man.'[59] Sexual imagery of this kind, as it turns out, was not coincidental.

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[58] Harner, Michael J., 'The Role of Hallucinogenic Plants in European Witchcraft,' in Harner, Michael J., ed, *Hallucinogens and Shamanism*, Oxford University Press, 1973, 130.

[59] Levack, ed., *The Witchcraft Sourcebook*, op. cit., 85–86.

The best explanation that does perpetuate the witch stereotype or the misogyny fuelling it pertains to the illicit drug-taking habits of those accused of witchcraft.[60] For reasons of their own, which may well be similar to the reasons why many use illicit drugs today, peasant women of the Middle Ages possessed of herbal knowledge liked to anoint broomsticks with powders made from herbs of the *Datura* genus and others closely resembling them, including deadly nightshade (*Atropa belladonna*), henbane (*Hyoseyanos niger*), mandrake (*Mandragora officinum*), Jimson weed (*Datura stamonium*) and tobacco (*Nicotiana tabcum*). In small quantities, all had hallucinogenic properties.[61] Harner cites a long list of references indicating that each of these plants contains varying qualities of tropane alkaloids atropine, hyoscyamine and scopolamine, 'all of which have hallucinogenic effects.'[62] Staves or broomstick handles being thus anointed, the accused would rub their armpits or genitals with them, or use them as a dildo—absorption through the skin being a method to avoid nausea that came with oral ingestion, and, as the Dominican Inquisitor Jordanes de Bergamo was clearly well aware and acknowledged in his *Quaestio de striges* (1470), 'the most sensitive zones of the body are, precisely, the vulva in the woman and the armpits.'[63]

If 'flying on broomsticks' had ambiguous meaning, those disposed to literal interpretations may not have perceived it and may not have wanted to. While some accused of *maleficia* might have claimed to have been on a journey, just as today if someone admits to going 'tripping,' one does

[60] Holzman, Robert S., 'The Legacy of Atropos, The Fate Who Cut the Thread of Life,' *The Journal of the American Society of Anesthesiologists* 89, no. 1, 1998; Rothman, Theodore, 'De Laguna's Commentaries on Hallucinogenic Drugs and Witchcraft in Dioscorides' *Materia Medica*,' *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 46, no. 6, 1972: 562; Lee, M. R., 'Solanaceae III: Henbane, Hags and Hawley Harvey Crippen,' *Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh* 36, no. 4, 2006: 366–373.

[61] Harner, 'The Role of Hallucinogenic Plants in European Witchcraft,' op. cit., 125–150.

[62] Harner, ibid., 128.

[63] 'The *bella donna* may have been a magical or beautiful lady (or spirit) of the forest, and the term may have been used euphemistically as a substitute for witch, suggesting an association with potions and herbalism.' Holzman, 'The Legacy of Atropos,' op. cit., 241–249; Connor, Steven, *The Book of Skin*, Cornell University Press, 2004, 195.

not interpret that literally.[64] Just with modern drug usage, if some were immoderate with their usage, then this was only bound to exacerbate their negative effects, as drug use by the mentally ill generally tends to do. In no sense, however, did the use of a broomstick handle for the purposes of applying hallucinogenic drugs to the vaginal glands indicate that users had allowed themselves to be seduced by the Devil. The narrative of the sexual pact gained currency within a misogynistic culture by purposefully misrepresenting the physically intimate nature of the illicit drug culture with appeals to misogynistic attitudes towards female sexuality (e.g. 'Witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable,' 'women love carnal pleasures,' etc.). Misogyny used in this manner victimised drug users for the benefit of those who argued for the existence of night flight, while facilitating the perpetrators' portrayal of themselves as targets of diabolical malfeasance.

Anecdotes from a witch trial at Metz were related by Andres de Laguna, a sixteenth-century physician and humanist. He described the prosecution of 'two wretched old people,' amongst whose effects were found as 'a pot full of a certain green ointment … composed of extremely cold and soporific herbs such as hemlock, nightshade, henbane and mandrake.'[65] From this, de Laguna concluded, amongst other things, that 'those women who carried out those infamous practices confessed with one voice that they had on many occasions copulated with the devil,' but that 'when they were asked whether they had experienced special pleasure in such connectedness, they invariably replied that they had felt no pleasure

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[64] 'De Laguna was not the sole commentator about the relationship of mind-altering drugs and witchcraft in the 16th century. In *De Praestigiis Daemonum*, which Freud called one of the 10 most significant books of all time, Johann Weyer (1515–1588 CE) concluded henbane was a principal ingredient of witches' brew, along with deadly nightshade and mandrake. According to Weyer, there were other ointments, but the essential ingredients remained the same in all. The preparations, when applied to the upper thighs or genitals, were said to induce the sensation of rising into the air of flying. Witches were thought to anoint a chair or broomstick with the devil's ointment, and after self-application, would fly through the air to meet for devil worship at the sabbat. Francis Bacon (1561–1626 CE) observed that '… the witches themselves are imaginative, and believe oftentimes they do that, which they do not … transforming themselves into other bodies … not by incantations or ceremonies, but by ointments, and anointing themselves all over.' Holzman, 'The Legacy Of Atropos,' ibid.

[65] Rothman, 'De Laguna's Commentaries,' op. cit., 565–566.

at all because of the unbearable coldness of the Devil's private parts.'[66] In the atmosphere of hysteria created by witch panic coupled with the derangement created by hallucinogenic drug use, the completely explicable coldness of the anointed stave or broom handle—the result of applying a water-based hallucinogenic potion to a wooden stick in a cold climate or in the cool hours of night and setting it against a human body operating at 37 °C—became the inexplicable, diabolical coldness of the Devil's phallus, and thus proof of the reality of night flight. The gross falsehood of flying ointment serves then as definitional example of deviance production and amplification.

(5) *That they were willingly and ably devoted to carrying out* maleficia, *or evil deeds.* The commitment of the Brides of Satan to carrying out their lord and masters' work on the basis of the Sexual Pact as a key ideological tenet and basic operating assumption of witchcraft mythology was written into the other various elements and tied them all together. For those who sought to save that hierarchy from the perils of apostasy born of doubt in the greatness of God's Plan, that doubt being the thin end of the wedge, it was necessary not only to demonstrate in brutal fashion the power that the Church exercised, but also from a less overtly coercive perspective that intervention in the private lives of women was justified.

As in the case of asserting the existence of witches per se, this was not a matter of actually providing evidence to that effect, but of finding and deploying an appropriate strategy to circumvent just criticism based on a view of the universe that respected basic laws of cause and effect. In the case of witch panic, this strategy took the form of 'divide and conquer,' the payment of a 'public and psychological wage' to the male gender irrespective of class to foster authoritarian identification with a *status quo* that, while stratified and hierarchical, offered token privileges to the male half of the subject classes as an inducement not to resist the persecution of the female half. Through this mechanism, and as the gendered character of the stereotype became set in stone, witch panic could be more effectively disseminated through dog-whistling appeals to male privilege on the basis of the myth of the natural inferiority of women.

The example to which Andres de Laguna referred was notable in that respect in light of the fact that, despite a husband and wife being arrested as witches, it was only the wife who was burnt at the stake, the husband

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[66]Rothman, ibid., 566.

spared as an example of the prosecutor's mercy and the solidarity of the male gender against the potential excesses of dangerous female sexuality.[67] As this example suggests, the *sabbat*, the Sexual Pact, the Diabolical Orgy, the Diabolical Feast and night flight as tropes of the witchcraft conspiracy theory, born of the production of deviance, function to tempt the male half of the European peasantry into complicity with scapegoating. In de Laguna's example, the temptation is enough to induce a husband to betray his wife. In this way, and with the aid of its witchcraft conspiracy theorists at the Council of Basil, then, the Catholic hierarchy offered temptations in exactly the same way as that attributed to the Devil in his seduction of the allegedly weaker gender for the purposes of establishing a sexual pact and perpetrating *maleficia*. The commentary of Nicholas Rémy is instructive in this respect:

> Satan assails mankind not only through their secret and domestic affections and (if I may so express it) by burrowing into their very hearts, but also openly and in declared warfare, as it is called. For he openly addresses them by word of mouth, and appears in visible person to converse with them…. But this he does the more easily when he finds a man weakened by the hardships and cares of life; for then he suggests to the man that he is grieved at his misfortunes and is willing to come to help him. But not even so can he aid and assist any man unless that man has broken his baptismal pledge and agreed to transfer his allegiance to him and acknowledge him as his Master. But if he cannot gain his object in this way by mere persuasions, then Satan employs those allurements and temptations which I have already mentioned: he fabricates some fair and delectable body and offers it for a man's enjoyment … [68]

In associating the alluringness and seductiveness of female sexuality with the temptations of Satan, Rémy echoes the whiney misogyny of 'Incels' and Men's Rights Activists today. One could just as easily describe the scapegoating campaign carried out by the medieval Church in similar terms—all the more so considering they used what we might describe as 'the wages of patriarchy' (tokenistic privileges grated for the purpose of

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[67] Rothman, 'De Laguna's Commentaries on Hallucinogenic Drugs and Witchcraft in *Dioscorides' Materia Medica*,' op. cit., 110.

[68] Levack, *The Witchcraft Sourcebook*, op. cit., 83.

divide-and-conquer) as the carrot to the stick of violence and terror, in similar terms. Where manipulating people and leading them astray was concerned, they were, after all, ones to know.

In witch panic, the moral panic criteria examined in Chapter 1 compare as follows.

Stanley Cohen:

- *A suitable enemy*: 'Witches,' aged peasant women defined as the Other;
- *A suitable victim*: Good Christians lionised as the Self;
- *A consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities*: The Catholic Church asserted hegemonic authority; brides of Satan were trying to destroy Christendom.

Hall et al.:

- *The intensification of a particular issue*: The social influence of brides of Satan, heretics plus magic;
- *The identification of a subversive minority*: 'Women of loose morals are being seduced by Satan to do his bidding';
- *'Convergence'*: The claim that witches are heretics, whom the Inquisition is already persecuting, plus magic;
- *The notion of 'thresholds'*: The claim that witches threaten the sanctity of Christendom;
- *The element of explaining and prophesying*: The fear of what will eventuate if witches are allowed to proceed unhindered; and
- *The call for firm steps*: The establishment of Witch Trials.

Goode and Ben-Yehuda:

- *Heightened concern*: Brides of Satan are not usually a preoccupation;
- *Increased hostility*: Peasant women are not usually suspected or accused of being Brides of Satan trying to bring harm to society;
- *Widespread consensus*: The Church was a hegemonic institution; consensus was enforced;
- *Disproportionate appraisal*: Being sexual does not of necessity mean women would be seduced by Satan, an entity for whom zero empirical evidence exists anyway; and
- *General volatility*: The Witch Hunts resulted in mass murder.

A general fit is apparent between witchcraft conspiracy theory as it drove the European Witch Hunts and multiple criteria of moral panic. It may then be understood as an article of moral panic.

> Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the Lord that will stand.
>
> —Proverbs 19:21

LEGITIMATION PHASE: CONSTRUCTING A PRETEXT THROUGH MORAL DISENGAGEMENT FOR THE PERSECUTION OF SCAPEGOATS

This third stage of the first case study examines the Legitimation stage of witch panic. As crisis framed in the favour of feudal elites laid a foundation for demonising perceived threats to theocratic patriarchy through deviance production, it argues, engineers of witch panic sought to make the witchcraft conspiracy theory the basis for scapegoating through a victim complex based on victim-blaming, playing of the victim, the 'if you think for yourself, the Brides of Satan win' logic of the False Dilemma, and other aspects of moral disengagement. In so doing, this section argues, feudal elites made witch panic the basis for scapegoating by recasting actions already decided on as proportionate responses to provocation rather than inter-class aggression—recasting victims of this aggression as deserving. To that end, it examines how the aforesaid victim complex drew on the Paranoid Style as a feature of history, and of the religious dualism of God vs. Satan informing the Ancient Fantasy, expressed in misogynistic witch-hunting tracts like the *Malleus Maleficarum* and the *Formicarius*. It focuses on how the False Dilemma at its core conflated doubt in the existence of a Divine Plan in the face of famine and pandemic with witchcraft conspiracy, arguing that this became the means of leveraging witch panic by legitimating the persecution of actual victims of power-hungry theocracy to follow.

The Permanent Victim Complex and Righteous Persecution

The beginning of the legitimation phase of witch panic involved the construction of a permanent victim complex as a permanent pretext for permanent class war, a process enabled by the binary framing of crisis and targeting of future victims for scapegoating during the first two stages. This permanent victim complex was characterised by a double standard

between the unrighteous destruction of wellbeing and life attributed to witches, and a righteous destruction of wellbeing perpetrated by witch-hunters in the name of the moral Good, conveniently identified with their own vested interests. For anyone confused by the propensity of Catholic witch-hunters to become everything they claimed to oppose and to produce themselves all the disastrous consequences for life and limb attributed to witchcraft, St. Augustine of Hippo sought to clarify the situation thus:

> There is a persecution of unrighteousness, which the impious inflict on the Church of Christ; and there is righteous persecution, which the Church of Christ inflicts upon the impious. She therefore is blessed, in suffering persecution for righteousness' sake; but they are miserable, suffering persecution for unrighteousness. Moreover, she persecutes in the spirit of love; they in the spirit of wrath; she that she might correct, they that they might overthrow.[69]

Such comments recall the claims by the Eurasian conqueror Timur, the 'Sword of Islam,' that 'l am not a man of blood; and God is my witness that in all my wars I have never been the aggressor, and that my enemies have always been the authors of their own calamity.'[70] Like Augustine, Timur was plagued by the persecution of the unrighteous, even as he prosecuted wars of conquest, indicating that the construction of victim complexes was not limited to proponents of one religion or any one period or place. In both cases, the tawdry rationalisations on offer reflect the double standards and acausality typical of a conspiracy theory framed in terms identifying the moral Good with the self-interest of those articulating it. Using this as their backdrop, both Augustine and Timur determined the legitimacy of their own actions on the basis of qualities associated with their victims. Their actions were, in other words, the fault of their victims. In both cases, the victim complex constructed from this assumption facilitated the shifting of blame; in the development of witch panic, it was a vital ingredient.

[69] Quoted in Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, op. cit., 139.

[70] Gibbon, Edward, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, T. Cadell, 1831, 417; Wright, Henry Clarke, *Defensive War Proved to Be a Denial of Christianity and of the Government of God*, BiblioBazaar, 2008, 117.

The Ancient Fantasy as the Germ of Permanent Victimhood

The permanent victim mentality as a vehicle for scapegoating in the broader context of witch panic begs the question as to its cultural origins. Despite the Council of Basel's decisive contribution to the development of the Bride of Satan stereotype, as with all deviant stereotypes, the foundational elements—the desire of reformers to eradicate belief in magic and replace it with religious orthodoxy with the Inquisitorial campaign against heterodoxy—no more fell out of the sky than did the processes associated with moral panics and scapegoating as such. On the contrary, pre-existing, culturally primed attitudes towards heresy originate in the persecution of Christians under the Pagan Roman Empire, carried out on the basis of deviance mythology whose logic and tropes Christians later adopted themselves after Constantine for the same purposes, this time levelled in the opposite direction.[71]

Cohn, as we have seen, describes these myths in terms of an 'Ancient Fantasy'—to recall, that 'somewhere in the midst of the great society [existed] another society, small and clandestine, which not only threatened the existence of the great society but was also addicted to practices which were felt to be wholly abominable, in the literal sense of anti-human').[72] Illustrating this concept, he quotes a pagan description of early Christians in the following terms:

> I am told that, moved by some foolish urge, they consecrate and worship the head of a donkey, that most abject all animals … Others say that they reverence the genitals of the presiding priest himself, and adore them as if they were their father's … As for the initiation of new members, the details are as disgusting as they are well known. A child, covered in dough as to deceive the unwary, is set before a would-be novice. The novice stabs the child to death with invisible blows; indeed he himself, deceived by the coating dough, thinks his stabs harmless. Then— it's horrible!—they hungrily drink the child's blood, and complete with one another as they divide his limbs.[73]

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[71] Gaddis, Michael, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire*, University of California Press, 2005.

[72] Cohn, Norman, *Europe's Inner Demons*, London: Paladin, 1976, 1.

[73] Cohn, ibid., 1.

The function of this diabolical crime according to this anonymous pagan, interviewed by Minucius Felix, a second-century chronicler, is to bind the Christians together in their guilt; 'the fact that they share the knowledge of the crime bounds them all to silence. Such holy rites are more disgraceful than sacrilege.' Thus does the pagan speaker quoted identify the Christian minority of the second century as a subversive, deviant minority; the cannibalism of infant children converges with the moral oblivion that results from the orgies that ensue once the purported blood lust of the Christians is satisfied and they give themselves over to sexual abandon, the Christians reveal themselves to be true monsters as they cast aside even pretences of morality for the sake of neutralising their collective conscience and effecting moral disengagement.

> It is well known … what happens on at their feasts … On the feast day, they foregather with all their children, sisters, mothers, people of either sex, and all ages. When the company is all aglow from feasting, and impure lust has been set afire by drunkenness, pieces of meat are thrown to a dog fastened to a lamp. The dog springs forward, beyond the length of its chain. The light, which would have been a betraying witness, is overturned and goes out. Now, in the dark, so favourable to shameless behaviour, they twine the bonds of unnameable passion, as chance decides. And so all alike are incestuous, if not always indeed at least by complicity; for everything that is performed by one of them corresponds to the wishes of them all … Precisely the secrecy of this evil religion proves all these things, or practically all, are true.[74]

We find in these examples from Pagan Roman times the diabolical feast and the incestuous orgy, the foundational tropes of the 'Ancient Fantasy' as Cohn describes it; similar tropes appear even earlier in fables concerning the Bacchanalia.[75] In the Roman period, they appear repeatedly. The Roman historian Sallust, writing in the first-century BCE, described the Catiline conspiracy, charged with attempting to overthrow the Roman Republic,

[74] Cohn, ibid.

[75] 'Anxieties grounded in apprehension that parents recall from their own childhood are reinforced by what they have learned about dangers in the world and about their own limitations as parents and protectors. The frailty of children thus becomes a lightning rod for the apprehensions of adults.' Kieckhefer, Richard, 'Avenging the Blood of Children: Anxiety Over Child Victims and the Origins of the European Witch Trials', in Ferreiro, Alberto, ed., *The Devil, Heresy and Witchcraft: Essays in the Honour of Jeffrey B. Russell*, Brill, 1998, 91–118.

in similarly conspiratorial terms. 'Many say,' he wrote, 'that, when Catiline bound his associates by oath to his criminal deed, he mixed the blood of a man with wine and passed it around in a bowl; when all had uttered the curse and drank from the bowl, as is the custom in holy rites, he revealed his plan.'[76] The same tropes appeared again three centuries later in the history of Dio Cassius, who wrote that 'Catiline and his associates had killed a boy, sworn an oath over his entrails and then eaten them together in a sacrificial meal.'[77]

The consequences of these and similar iterations on the evolving theme of a cabal of bloodthirsty evildoers united in moral oblivion were predictable; the root cause of every disaster and catastrophe to befall society was taken for granted to be the work of this existential threat. 'If the Tiber floods or the Nile fails to,' wrote Tertullian, if there is a drought or an earthquake, if there is a drought or an earthquake, the cries go up at once, "Throw the Christians to the lions!"'[78] If the martyrdom of the early Christians under the pagan Roman Empire has never been forgotten within the Christian tradition, the appearance of witch panic tended to suggest that the same could not be said for the logic through which it was effected. On the contrary; in time, it became the basis for comparable behaviour by Christians once their religion was legalised and coopted by the Empire.

Acculturation to the Ancient Fantasy

A crucial fact in understanding the significance of the Ancient Fantasy archetype within witch panic was that, in being coopted by the Roman Empire, Christianity adopted various of its cultural traits in turn; culturally, the Empire lived on through artefacts of subjectivity that reproduced its violence and paranoid covetousness. In one of its first sectarian struggles, for example, the now-institutionalised church set its sights on Montanism, a millenarian, militant wing of primitive Christianity huddled around the remote Kingdom of Phrygia in modern-day Turkey, one that the official version, in its new state privileges, had come to view as a threat. Fatefully emblematic of things to come, this seminal struggle

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[76]Sallust, Catilina, xx, quoted in Cohn, op. cit., 6.

[77]Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons*, op. cit., 6.

[78]Tertullian, *Apolegeticum*, cap. xl, 1–2, quoted in Cohn, ibid., 14.

reflected a profound ideological shift insofar as former victims of persecution now began to engage in moral panic using the same propaganda tropes, as if the memory of persecution had been a perverse form of instruction; as we saw in the introduction, however, this is considered by the contemporary literature as indicative of stereotype priming.

Thus could Philastrius, Bishop of Brescia, write of the Montanists that 'people say that at the Easter festival they mix the blood of a child in their offering, and send pieces of this offering to their erring and pernicious supporters.'[79] Similar reports came from Augustine, who noted that 'People say that they have the most lamentable sacraments.'

> It is said that they take the blood of a one year old, drawing it off through tiny cuts all over his body, and at the same time produce their Eucharist by mixing this blood with meal and making bread out of it. If the boy dies, they treat him as a martyr; but if he lives, they treat him as a great priest.[80]

This and similar efforts to smear opposition and dissident groups, including Paulicians and other Gnostic tendencies, not only turned these tropes into weapons of those formerly their persecutors and now-victims, but also added onto them a religious dimension. In the hands of Christians and incorporated into the dualistic Christian worldview, the cannibalistic feast and the incestuous orgy characteristic of the 'Ancient Fantasy' were no longer held to be indicative of moral perversion or degeneration pure and simple, but instead of an explicitly *theological* interpretation of deviance borne of a Diabolical or Satanic Pact.[81] With this adaptation of traditional deviance tropes to suit the developing needs of the emerging Catholic theocracy, Christians laid the groundwork for the persecution

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[79] Philastrius, *Diversarum hereseon*, xlix, 3, quoted in Cohn, ibid., 16.

[80] Cohn, ibid.

[81] 'In the eyes of Pagan Greeks and Romans, people who indulged in promiscuous orgies and devoured children were enemies of society and of mankind. In the eyes of medieval Christians they were, in addition, enemies of God and servants of Satan; their fearsome deeds were inspired by Satan and his demons, and served their interests. As the centuries passed the powers of darkness loomed larger and larger in these tales, until they came to occupy the very centre of the stage. Erotic debaucheries, infanticide and cannibalism gradually took on a new meaning, as so many manifestations of a religious cult of Satan, so many-expressions of devil-worship.' Cohn, ibid., 17.

of opposing tendencies such as the Donatists, dissident sects such as the Cathars and Waldensians (against whom Crusades were directed) and the suppression of movements for internal reform until the pot lid blew off with the Protestant Reformation.[82]

Theocratic innovations on Cohn's 'Ancient Fantasy' of this kind are visible in numerous texts, of which one, *On the Operation of the Demons*, a Greek dialogue composed by Michael Constantine Psellos, both 'a famous philosopher and a leading Byzantine statesman from Constantinople in or around 1050, who demonstrates the application of the Ancient Fantasy to a religious context as a means of engaging in the production of deviance and establishing an ideological pretext in victim-blaming and victim-playing for attacking dissidents. Psellos's tract referenced the Bogomiles, a minority sect of the Gnostic tendency, one notable for rejecting the authoritarian trappings of the official church in favour of a more non-hierarchical approach developed with a view to recovering the spiritual vitality of early Christianity.[83] The Ancient Fantasy tropes are unmistakable:

> In the evening, when the candles are lit, at the time when we celebrate the redemptive Passion of Our Lord, they bring together, in a house appointed for the purpose, young girls whom they have initiated into their rites. Then they extinguish the candles, so that the light shall not be witness to their abominable deeds, and throw themselves lasciviously on the girls; each one on whomever first falls into his hands, no matter whether she be his sister, his daughter or his mother. For they think they are doing something that greatly pleases the demons by transgressing God's laws, which forbid marriage between blood relatives. When this rite has been completed, each goes home; and after waiting nine months, until the time has come for the unnatural children of such unnatural seed to be born, they come together again at the same place. Then on the third day after the birth, they tear the miserable babies from their mothers' arms. They cut their tender flesh all over with sharp knives and catch the stream of blood in basins. They throw the babies, still breathing and gasping, onto the fire, to be burned to ashes. After which, they mix the ashes with the blood in the basins and so make an abominable drink, with which they

[82] Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, op. cit.

[83] Pagels, Elaine, *The Gnostic Gospels*, Vintage, 1989.

secretly pollute their food and drink, like those who mix poison with hippocras or other sweet drinks. Finally they partake of these foodstuffs; and not they alone but others also, who know nothing of their hidden proceedings.[84]

As well as helping to demonise the enemy and to construct imaginary victims with the aid of patent falsehoods, smears of this kind served an additional purpose within Catholic eschatology by providing evidence of the proximity of the end times. The extreme nature of the acts described point to the advanced stage of struggle between the forces of absolute evil, as represented by these spiritual antecedents of the Brides of Satan, and the forces of absolute good, represented by Psellos and those who shared his orthodox worldview.[85] This dynamic provided a useful tool for spreading panic insofar as it hard-wired a deviant archetype and a permanent victim complex into the collective unconscious as an archetype that could be adapted to the needs of the moment; purported evildoers were not simply immediate threats to Catholics in one form or another, they were potential harbingers of the end of the world, agents in one form or another of the greatest evil stereotype of them all.

This archetype fed directly into the stereotype of the witch as deviant and folk demon; it was produced by combining popular mythology surrounding magic, on which the Church had a dominant influence as we have seen, with the pre-existing cultural stereotype of the heretic. This convergence of existential threats signifies the cultural priming of a stereotype or folk demon by prior acculturation. Previous scare-mongering over religious nonconformity, framed by Inquisitorial defenders of orthodoxy as deviance in the form of 'heresy,' represented fertile soil for the work of the Council of Basel and its 'sabbat of demonologists,' expediting the adaptation of emotive power from one campaign of deviance production to the next. As if to encapsulate this process, one 'fascinating and crucial piece of semantic evidence' revealed that, in parts of the eastern Catholic dioceses of Switzerland, in the Jura Mountains around Lausanne, the word for 'witch' was *vaudois*, or 'Waldensian.'[86]

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[84]Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons*, op. cit., 19.

[85]Cohn, ibid.

[86]Monter, William E., *Witchcraft in France and Switzerland: The Borderlands During the Reformation*, Cornell University Press, 1976, 21.

The Ancient Fantasy Infects Heinrich Kramer

As we have seen, medieval jurists, moral entrepreneurs of witch panic were at considerable pains to force the witchcraft conspiracy theory and associated stereotype on European society as the explanation for God's Plan in the aftermath of the catastrophes of the fourteenth century. Lacking facts to establish witchcraft in hard evidence, their alternate strategy placed the burden of proof on the accused to demonstrate their innocence as per the Inquisitorial method. A classic feature of show trials, this approach necessitated the False Dilemma, or the 'with us or against us' fallacy, by reversing the burden of proof and conflating failure to conform ideologically with support for the prevailing imaginary hobgoblin, derived in turn from the Ancient Fantasy archetype. Through this application of the proverbial Oldest Trick in the Book, demonologists and jurists in witch trials could infer the existence of witches negatively, a method that, while based on logical fallacies and involving overt manipulation, proved exceptionally useful to the construction of an ideologically codified victim complex upon which to rationalise panic-driven crisis leveraging and scapegoating. Anticipating these requirements, French demonologist and moral entrepreneur of witch panic Jean Bodin wrote in *The Demon-Mania of Witches* that he had taken up writing

> partly to respond to those who in printed books try to save witches by every means, so that it seems Satan has inspired them and drawn them to his line in order to publish these fine books. One was Pietro d'Abano, a doctor, who tried to teach that there were no sprits; it turned out later that he was one of the greatest witches in Italy.[87]

Dr. d'Abano, in other words, revealed that he was a witch inspired by Satan in observing that no one had or could have empirically established the existence of witches, and because he refused to reverse the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant in line with Inquisitorial method. The victim complex informing this logic could not be clearer. Bodin, by contrast, was perfectly entitled to demonise d'Abano using an *ad hominem* attack, on the assumption that to experience doubt put him in league with Satan ('articulating a defence in absolutist terms'). As far

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[87] Bodin, Jean, *On the Demon Mania of Witches*, Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 1995, 37.

as Bodin was clearly concerned, d'Abano's attitude could have absolutely nothing to do with the possibility that he might simply be wrong. As if to demonstrate, Bodin insisted, 'One must consider as fools and madmen those people who see the strange actions of witches and spirits, who because they cannot understand the cause, or because it is impossible in nature, do not want to believe any of it.'[88] Placing the burden of proof on those who claimed that witches existed, in other worlds, made victims out of witch hunters like Bodin, while allowing him to accuse his critics of being in league with Satan (and, according to him, proving the existence of witches as well).

A similar mentality appeared in later decades in Papal bulls like the *summis desiderantes* (1484), which blamed evil works ('sorcery') for causing the Great Famine and the Black Plague. Somewhat predictably, the *summis* described departures from official teachings ('heresy') as a reflection of the same kind of permissiveness that produced witches to begin with, the thin end of the proverbial wedge. Such was the cornerstone of the *Malleus Malleficarum*, a viciously misogynistic witch-hunting manual, comparable in general tenor to *Mein Kampf*. Overtly reflecting the capacity of witch panic narratives to create the problems to which their moral entrepreneurs could then style themselves the solutions, the very first line of the very first chapter reads, '… claiming that sorcerers [witches] exist is such a Catholic proposition that to defend the opposite view steadfastly is altogether heretical,' a False Dilemma logic amounting to 'if you think for yourself, the Brides of Satan win.'[89] Author of both the *summis* and the *Malleus*, Inquisitor Heinrich Kramer (*Henricus Institor*) used permissiveness–namely that 'very many persons of both sexes have forgotten their own salvation and deviated from the Catholic faith'—as a pretext for victim-playing and victim-blaming.

Appealing directly to the Ancient Fantasy archetype, Kramer appropriated its 'Diabolical Feast' and 'Incestuous Orgy' tropes to this end, incorporating them into the theory that women of loose morals allowed themselves to be seduced by Satan, precipitating the aforementioned 'Pestilential Alliance' wherein heretics with access to magic embraced a deviant sexuality as Brides of Satan and put their skills to work in

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[88] Bodin, *On the Demon-Mania of Witches*, ibid., 38.

[89] Institoris, *The Hammer of Witches*, op. cit., 91.

deference to their new master.[90] Thus it came to pass, Kramer alleged, that 'witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable.'[91] This purported gender flaw in the sexuality of magical heretics brought about their seduction, Kramer alleged, gave rise to all sorts of heinous misdeeds that he took as license to indulge both his pornographic imagination and his victim complex:

> Committing abuses with incubus and succubus demons, they have no fear of using their incantations, chants and conjugations and other unspeakable superstitions and acts of sorcery, as well as excesses, crimes and misdeeds, in order to bring it about that the offspring of women, the progeny of animals, the produce of the Earth, the grapes of the vines and the fruits of the trees as well as men, women, work animals, cows, sheep and other animals of various kinds, and also the vines, orchards, fields, pastures, wheat, grain, and other crops of the Earth are killed, suffocated and wiped out.[92]

In addition to the emotive use of multiple verbs to describe the same thing, it is worth noting here the unacknowledged shift away from the 'Divine Ordinance' line taken in the direct aftermath of the Black Death to the adoption of the conspiracy theory approach. The latter removed God from the equation entirely and puts the blame squarely on Satan and those too weak to resist his temptations—a move from the back to the front foot. If perpetrating the food crisis wasn't bad enough, Kramer declared, 'They also afflict and torture these men, women, work animals, cows, sheep and animals with terrible pains and torments, both internal and external, and keep the men from fathering children and the women from conceiving by impeding their ability to render the conjugal act to each other.'

> For this purpose, with sacreligious speech they renounce the Faith that they received by receiving Holy Baptism, and they commit and carry out very many other unspeakable acts, excesses and crimes. They do this at the instigation of the Enemy of the Human Race, and the result is that their own souls are endangered, God's majesty is offended, and a scandalous example is set for a very many people.[93]

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[90] Institoris, *The Hammer of Witches*, ibid., 119.

[91] Institoris, *The Hammer of Witches,* ibid., 170.

[92] Institoris, ibid., 71.

[93] Institoris, ibid., 71–72.

With the power to steal Kramer's erection, this 'pestilential alliance,' Augustine's 'baneful alliance of humans and demons,' was fearsome indeed, the early modern equivalent of the Kubrickian Reds conspiring to sap and impurify Colonel Jack D. Ripper's 'precious bodily fluids.'[94] If European society remained woefully ignorant about this vast conspiracy, however, the fault lay with those to whom the moral entrepreneurs of witch panic were directing their efforts for not believing what they were told. Kramer felt obliged in the *Malleus Maleficarum* to explain away the lack of any direct evidence of sorcery in their work, claiming instead that 'the many facts about the power and works of the Devil in regard to producing effects through sorcery are omitted for the sake of brevity.'[95] Since the men of God who were trying to convince the rest of European society that sorcerers existed didn't have to produce evidence to establish the claim as fact because according to them it was preponderant, and producing any would have been tantamount to verbosity, 'it is left to the pious reader to take them as self-evident.' The patent inference of this was that anyone who wanted evidence was not a real Christian, a religious variant on the 'No true Scotsman' fallacy.[96]

The 'conclusions' Kramer sought to draw from the 'facts' surrounding sorcery they had omitted for the sake of brevity and the piously credulous would take as self-evidently true derived from the 'fact' that 'unreasoning rage, insane lust and perverse fantasy are inherent to them'—completely unlike, of course, themselves. The function of this characterisation in fact was to project the defining features of their own persecutory conduct, inadmissible due to its shamefulness in double standards, and in violating Christian norms (e.g. 'judge not, lest you inadvertently judge yourself', etc.). Thus, they were 'enemies of the human race,' 'rational in mind … subtle in wrong-doing, desirous of causing harm, and ever novel in deceit.'

> They change senses, pollute affections, disturb those who are awake, disquiet those who are asleep with dreams, inflict diseases, stir up storms, turn themselves into angels of light, always carry Hell around with them, and in their relations with sorcerers usurp God's worship for themselves. The

[94] Kubrick, Stanley, dir, *Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, Columbia Pictures Corporation, 1964; Mackay and Institoris, ibid., 119.

[95] Mackay and Institoris, ibid., 124.

[96] Mackay and Institoris, ibid.

magical arts are carried out through them. They desire to gain lordship over the good and harass them more to the best of their abilities, are given to the Elect for their training, and always lie in ambush to attack Man's goal. Though they have a thousand methods and arts for causing harm, in that since the start of their own fall they have been trying to tear down the unity of the Church, to wound love, to infect the sweetness of holy works with the bile of envy, and in every way to overturn the human race and throw it into confusion.[97]

Kramer's sorcerers were characteristically weak in lacking God's divine grace, but also so powerful as to threaten the whole of Christendom; the occupation of polar conditions at the same time was another unique aspect of deviance production and victim-blaming not as yet generally addressed by moral panic literature. In any event, and where Kramer was concerned, the matter was resolved with his claim that Satan operated by the 'permission of God,' a phrase that occurs repeatedly in the *Malleus Maleficarum*. Without managing to improve on Jacquier's attempt at a workaround for the Canon *Episcopi*, Kramer's approach here appeared to take the form of bluster, working on the pretence that, while Christian dualism had long understood Jehovah and Satan to be arch-foes, at the same time they were accomplices in the higher purpose of Teaching People a Lesson. In other words, if plague and famine were diabolical evils perpetrated by the Witch folk devil, according to Kramer, as elements of a Divine Plan they also operated via the permission of God. If this theory seemed to put God and Satan on a comparable moral level, apparently what those behind the Canon *Episcopi* were objecting to in the first place, it also seemed to substantiate the Epicurean Paradox insofar as Jehovah was able, but not willing, to prevent evil, and therefore malevolent.

The doublethink behind Kramer's attempt at legitimating panic-driven scapegoating signalled a progressive shift in the way those who fell afoul of the Catholic hierarchy were treated.[98] Gaddis notes that the early preoccupation of the Catholic hierarchy with heresy was driven by a concern less with private beliefs than the regulation of public practice. Heterodoxy and dissent were seen mostly as expressions of recalcitrance

[97] Mackay and Institoris, ibid., 125.

[98] Stokes, *Demons of Urban Reform*, op. cit.

and obstinacy born of false pride and 'lack of charity,' and were to be corrected in a paternalistic manner.[99] As the reflection of the victim schema associated with moral disengagement, the stylistic features of this particular approach are testament to an orthodox culture that had not given itself over completely to moral panic. Early heretics were not generally put to the stake and publicly burned alive to demonstrate what happened to those who dared challenge, question or doubt the Empire of Christ, and while it is certainly true that the *Malleus Maleficarum* was officially denounced and refuted within a few short years, by that stage the damage had been done. It was not for nothing that it went through 30 editions during the next few years, aided by Gutenberg's development of movable type, as noted. By the time the Witch Hunts were in full swing, orthodox culture had deteriorated substantially, the violence metered out to the Waldensians and Cathars during the Crusades portending ominously of what was to come. The victim complex thus established would be used to rationalise witch-hunting for centuries hence.

> The executioner rode a blooded horse, like a noble of the court, and went clad in gold and silver; his wife vied with noble dames in the richness of her array.
>
> —Johann Linden

Persecution Phase: Crisis Leveraging Through Scapegoating

This fourth section of the first case study examines the active leveraging by the religious hegemon of all prior stages of witch panic for the purposes of persecuting a scapegoat—in this instance, the most socially vulnerable parts of the peasantry. The Persecution stage explores some of the more conspicuous instances in which various representatives of the feudal elite cast themselves as cures to crises famed in their own interests—perpetrating the class war to which they were already committed in reaction to the political crisis that emerged in the aftermath of the Black Death. Rather than being itself a form of conspiracy theory, this section argues that the prior stages in the development of a scapegoating campaign driven by witch panic showed that this was driven by reflexive defence of class privilege. It

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[99] Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, op. cit., 134–135.

contends that the theocratic terrorism instituted by the feudal elite were generally destructive of the Christian values in whose defence they were enacted—active destruction of such arguably the purpose of witch panic to begin with. This case study contends that these episodes were typical of panic-driven scapegoating in functioning to neutralise perceived threats to the class-based social order, enabled through a conspiracy theory involving heretical magic made diabolical though licentious consorting with Satan.

The deployment of the witchcraft conspiracy theory fuelled witch panic until it consumed all of Europe, appearing in various watershed trials: those in the Swiss canton of Valais (1428–47), Trier, Germany (1581–93), Pendle Hill, Lancashire (1612), and Scotland (1597). Given limitations of space, the descriptions that follow are brief, but aim to demonstrate the three prior stages at work. Each trial is described as it evolved; the foundational tropes and successive stages of the model of panic-driven scapegoating are noted as they arise.

Valais Witch Trials

Valais is the southernmost canton of Switzerland, a mountainous region dominated by the Matterhorn. Witch panic in Valais arose in the decades following the Black Death, which reduced the total population of Switzerland by a quarter. The social effects of bubonic plague were intensified by religious fissures fracturing the country following the Swiss Reformation, a fact highlighted by anti-Jewish pogroms.[100] The Valais Witch Trails (1428) were notable for reproducing Ancient Fantasy tropes such as the Diabolical Feast, demonstrating that 'witches' were being fed their 'confessions' during torture from a script that dated back to the Diocletian Persecution, in a manner more recently associated with the Stalinist Purges. Newer elements like the *sabbat* also featured, though significantly the Diabolical Pact remained elusive—a reflection of the fact, not that the alleged witches of Valais were neglectful in concluding their arrangements with the Son of Perdition, but that the trials began over a year before the Council of Basel, the veritable '*sabbat* of

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[100]Winkler, Albert, 'The Approach of the Black Death in Switzerland and the Persecution of Jews, 1348–1349,' *Swiss American Historical Society Review* 43(3), 2007: 4–23; Benedictow, Ole Jørgen, *The Black Death, 1346–1353: The Complete History*, Boydell & Brewer, 2004, 118.

demonologists,' was convened.[101] Victims of the European Witch Hunts would have to wait a while to be pimped out to Satan, a fact reflecting the constructed nature of witchcraft conspiracy theory.

The trails appeared in the wake of the Raron Affair (1415–20), a general uprising against an attempt at usurping power in Valais by the Rarons, a family of local nobles—the newly installed Price-Bishop of Sion and Guichard of Raron, his ambitious uncle, key players. The Raron Affair and associated insurrection erupted when Guichard was granted sovereignty over Valais by Emperor Sigismund in reward for military services rendered. Unrest turned to open rebellion when the death of Peter of Raron in 1413 triggered Guichard's accession, antagonising the population of Valais who preferred independence from the central power to encumbrance to the wheeling and dealing of an ambitious theocrat.[102] After some years of not particularly decisive conflict, Guichard found himself besieged at Seta Castle In 1419, whereupon he conceded defeat and acceded to demands from his enemies for voting rights. He was forced into exile in 1420, leaving the power of his dynasty spent and the canton in the hands of independently minded rebels.[103] If Guichard was gone, he was certainly not forgotten, not least by his comrades in the Catholic hierarchy. The Inquisition moved into the area in under a decade. As Martine Ostorero reflects,

> The obsession of a vast conspiracy in Valais doomed some persons of a considerable political power and so-called witches to a common fate. Both were prosecuted by a lay jurisdiction that was obsessed by rebels and disturbers of the established order. This is how everything which threatens public authority gets lumped together.[104]

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[101]Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons*, op. cit., 203; Kieckhefer, Richard, *European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned Culture, 1300–1500*, London: Taylor & Francis, 2012, 11, 20–21; Bertrand, Jules-Bernard, 'Notes sur les procès d'hérésie et de sorcellerie en Valais,' *Annales valaisannes.* [Sér. 1], *Grandes annales* 3, no. 2, 1921: 151–194.

[102]'Rarogne, affaire de,' http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/f/F17017.php, 27 April 2012, accessed 3 April 2016.

[103]Planta, Joseph, *The History of the Helvetic Confederacy.* Vol. 2. J. Stockdale, 1800, 385–389.

[104]Ostorero, 'The Concept of the Witches' Sabbath in the Alpine Region,' op. cit., 24.

Thus 'in the Diocese of Sion,' Monter recalls, 'we know that a severe witch hunting panic began in 1428 under the joint leadership of the Bishop and local authorities, but very few actual trial records survive.'[105] Making up for this shortfall was an account of the Valais Witch Trials prepared by Johannes Fründ, a chronicler in attendance. The chronicles left by Fründ makes for interesting reading insofar as they attempt to portray witch panic, complete with Ancient Fantasy tropes, as a spontaneous uprising of the people, something in the manner of the uprising against the Rarons—as likely a scenario as a spontaneous worker uprising in Stalinist Russia against the petit-bourgeois Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries. 'The uprising of evil, murder and heresy among witches and sorcerers,' alleged Fründ, 'among women as well as men, known by the name *sortilegi* in Latin, and they were found first in two valleys in Wallis [Valais]'—amongst, he neglects to add, the rebels who overthrew the last bishop.

> An abundance of them have confessed to great evil and many murders and heretic beliefs and an abundance of evil things, which they have performed, such things which are in Latin known as *sortilegia*, and of which many are stated in this document; however, a lot of it is not mentioned, so that no one may be corrupted. One should consider that these people, be they male or female, which are guilty of these things and this evil which they have performed, have learned this from the evil spirit … There were even those who killed their own children and fired and cooked them and took them to their company to eat them, and carried mischief and other things to church, so that everyone believed them to be children. But they had left their children at home and ate them later, when they so chose.[106]

The Diabolical Feast trope as a constituent element of the Diabolical Pact is impossible to miss, evidencing both Mobilisation and Targeting Phases in stirring up of the population of Valais against deviants of their own defining, based on an association of the Self and the moral Good and the conflation of the latter with the class privilege of feudal elites. Fründ evidences the blame-shifting and victim complex of the

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[105] Monter, *Witchcraft in France and Switzerland*, op. cit., 20; Hansen, *Quellen*, op. cit.

[106] Maxwell-Stuart, Peter G., *Witch Beliefs and Witch Trials in the Middle Ages: Documents and Readings*, London: Continuum, 2011, 182–184; Ostorero, 'The Concept of the Witches' Sabbath in the Alpine Region,' op. cit., 19. Bertrand, 'Notes sur les procès d'hérésie et de sorcellerie en Valais,' ibid.

Legitimation Phase by alleging that the Valais Witch Hunts were the fault of the victims for not confessing to crimes that had not been established in evidence. 'There have also been many of them, guilty of such evil, so great a heresy and so many murders,' he complained, 'that they with this evil, heresy and magic did not tell any to the priest, so that it may not be stopped.'

> And there were many of these people, who could speak more when they had been apprehended than other uneducated people, and who called upon God and his saints more than others. This they did so that they would be considered innocent. And some of them did not confess at all; some let themselves be tormented and tortured to death, rather than confess or say anything.[107]

That the victims of the Valais Witch Trials were guilty regardless of evidence, and even evidence to the contrary (including cries to God in the flames), lends towards the conclusion that they were subject to show trials motivated as a matter of definition by reasons that had nothing to do with those stipulated. It follows then that deviance production played a central role, as the labelling of those burnt at the stake depended on the power to control the meaning of the word 'deviant.' The refining of this power at the Council of Basel less than two years hence, in a city not two hundred miles away, indicates who was in possession of that power. The proximity of the Valais Witch Trials to Basel in fact indicates the pivotal role of the whole region in acting as a crucible for the emergence of the key panic trope of the Diabolic Pact, and the transformation of witchcraft into a capital crime meriting execution at the stake.[108] It also indicates the necessity of the power to define words to establishing pretexts in ideology for institutional terror.

Trier Witch Trials

The Trier Witch Trials (1581–93) are easier to trace, beginning the year after the appointment of the new Archbishop, Johann von Schönenberg. Widely noted for the great admiration in which he held

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[107] Hansen, *Quellen*, op. cit.

[108] Stokes, *Demons of Urban Reform*, op. cit., 'Toward the Witch Craze,' 3; Monter, *Witchcraft in France and Switzerland*, op. cit., 19–22.

the Society of Jesus founded by St. Ignatius of Loyola, mentioned above, von Schönenberg was also keen to impress his favoured circle of Jesuits and establish his authority over the people of Trier.[109] Tragically for the latter, this enthusiasm coincided with the fact that only two tolerable harvests were brought in in the entire eighteen years he was there, indications of what Midelfort describes as the kinds of communal stresses, along with famine and fear or war, that tended strongly to precede breakouts of witch panic.[110] Clearly mindful that such stresses tended also to undermine the rationales for the constituted powers, von Schönenberg targeted 368 residents of Trier for persecution on the pretence, characteristic of the Mobilisation phase, that crises of privation and famine were divine punishment for lack of faith, not products of a power structure legitimated by Divine Right and undermined by apostasy. Rousing of the masses against deviants during the Targeting Phase through crisis interpreted in terms conflating elite interests with the general interest is here particularly conspicuous; more so since references to natural disasters implies the use of central 'pestilential alliance' and Diabolical Pact tropes.

Johann Linden, a monk from St. Simeon, recorded a blistering criticism of von Schönenberg's reign of terror in his *Gesta Trevirorum* (1620), many of his observations illustrating the above. 'Inasmuch as it was popularly believed that the continued sterility of many years was caused by witches through the malice of the Devil,' Lindon recalled, 'the whole country rose to exterminate the witches.'[111] 'This movement,' he added scathingly, 'was promoted by many in office, who hoped wealth from the persecution,' as it was by those who fed belief in the Diabolical Pact.

> And so, from court to court throughout the towns and villages of all the diocese, scurried special accusers, inquisitors, notaries, jurors, judges, constables, dragging to trial and torture human beings of both sexes and burning them

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[109] Dillinger, Johannes, *'Evil People': A Comparative Study of Witch Hunts in Swabian Austria and the Electorate of Trier*, University of Virginia Press, 2009, 30–39; Brauner, Sigrid, *Fearless Wives and Frightened Shrews: The Construction of the Witch in Early Modern Germany*, University of Massachusetts Press, 2001; Levack, *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe*, op. cit., 174–180; Behringer, *Witches and Witch-Hunts*, op. cit., 93–97.

[110] Levack, ibid., 164; Burr, George L., *The Fate of Dietrich Flade*, GP Putnams, 1891, 15; Midelfort, Erik, *Witch-Hunting in Southwestern Germany 1562–1684: The Social and Intellectual Foundations*, Stanford University Press 1972, 121–122.

[111] Kors and Peters, op. cit., 314.

in great numbers. Scarcely any of those who were accused escaped punishment or were there spared even the leading men in the city of Trier. For the Judge, with two Burgomasters, several Councillors and Associate Judges, canons of sundry collegiate churches, parish-priests, rural deans, were swept away in this ruin. So far, at length, did the madness of the furious populace and of the courts go in this thirst for blood and booty that there was scarcely anybody who was not smirched by some suspicion of this crime.[112]

So far-reaching was the witch panic von Schönenberg set in motion that it swallowed officials within the secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies. A notable example was Dr. Dietrich Flade, City Judge of Trier, ex-Dean of the local law school, ex-rector of the University, and von Schönenberg's own deputy, who dared to give comfort to the brides of Satan by doubting the efficacy of torture and encouraging leniency in the treating of defendants. Another was Cornelius Loos, a Catholic priest and the first theologian to write critically about witch trials in Trier and elsewhere. Loos was censured and forced to recant under torture, on the heinous charge that he 'with heedless temerity tacitly insinuated the charge of tyranny against the aforesaid Elector of Trier.'[113] Its first victim from amongst the populace was one Braun Greth, a most unfortunate individual who, 'After an interval of more than a month, devoted perhaps to the gathering of further evidence … was arrested and put on her trial.'

> Under the torture the poor woman confessed to sad shortcomings, but persistently protested her innocence of witchcraft. Again and again, fresh evidence warranted fresh torture, and the trial dragged on through three whole months. But when, on the sixth application of the torture, nothing worse could be wrung from her than that she was indeed a poor sinner and had sometimes eaten broth on a fast-day.[114]

In this manner, the Trier Witch Trials laid waste to the surrounding villages such that, in 1588, two of them only had one woman apiece left in each.[115] Conspicuous in the charges against Flade and Loos were the double standards associated with the extraction of forced confessions of witchcraft for daring to suggest the local power was a tyrant. In

[112] Kors and Peters, ibid.

[113] Kors and Peters, op. cit.

[114] Burr, *The Fate of Dietrich Flade*, op. cit., 14.

[115] Kors and Peters, op. cit.

addition to exposing the deviance production behind Von Schönenberg's leveraging of a crisis he had politicised in his own favour to legitimate his own authority, they also illustrated the scapegoating dynamics of the Legitimating Phase, insofar as Von Schönenberg perpetrated victim-blamed by associating criticism of himself with the prevailing existential threat. Refusing to acknowledge any distinction between being criticised and being attacked, he cast dissent as an attack on his person and so insulating himself from accountability. Scapegoating of this kind was immensely profitable, becoming the basis for an entire industry from which 'notaries, copyists and innkeepers grew rich.'

> The executioner rode a blooded horse, like a noble of the court, and went clad in gold and silver; his wife vied with noble dames in the richness of her array. The children of those convicted and punished were sent into exile; their goods were confiscated; plowman and vintner failed–hence came sterility. A direr pestilence or a more ruthless invader could hardly have ravaged the territory of Trier than this inquisition and persecution without bounds: many were the reasons for doubting that all were really guilty… This persecution lasted for several years; and some of those who presided over the administration of justice gloried in the multitude of the stakes, at each of which a human being had been given to the flames.[116]

In this way had the witch trials understood broadly, Maria Mies observed, 'provided employment and money for a host of lawyers, advocates, judges, councils, etc'[117]—all of whom owed allegiance to Von Schönenberg. In casting himself the solution to a crisis of his own making, having opponents arrested as heretics plus magic and sowing terror over the inhabitants of Trier, Von Schönenberg can be said to have succeeded well and truly in cementing his authority.

By far the largest of the period, the Trier Witch Trials were emblematic of the wider European Witch Hunts in functioning as an industry for an army of jurists, functionaries and service agents, while enabling the reconstruction of class power in the face of prolonged social crisis. As in the case of the broader Witch Hunts, however, though 'the flames were

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[116] Kors and Peters, ibid, 315.

[117] Mies, Maria, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour*, Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 2003, 84.

still unsated,' at last 'the people grew impoverished, rules were made and enforced restricting the fees and costs of examinations and examiners, and suddenly, as when in war funds fail, the zeal of the persecutors died out.'[118] When the plunder was gone, and voices of doubt and dissention silenced, so too did the moral outrage of the von Schönenbergs of Europe fade away.

Lancashire Witch Trials

The Lancashire Witch Trials (18–19 August 1612) appeared amidst what Sharpe describes as 'population pressure,' which in referring to widespread poverty arguably means that privileged feudal elites were living beyond the means of everyone else. Such wrought conditions causing 'occasional disruption of the cloth trade,' and, a decade later, crisis levels of mortality 'following a bad harvest.'[119] The tendency of elites to place blame for these conditions elsewhere represents the basis for the Mobilisation Phase. Witch Trials in seventeenth-century England were distinguishable from those in other parts of Europe by the societal degree of scepticism towards witch panic, reflected in the fact that the judges in the Lancashire Trials felt sufficiently motivated to order the clerk to the Lancaster Assizes, Thomas Potts, to produce a retrospective justification. Potts duly authored a tract entitled *The Wonderfull Discoverie of Witches in the Countie of Lancaster*—the adjective-heavy title of which speaks to the subordinate position of the author in being obliged to flatter his superiors, and the anxiety of those whose judgement it was intended to exonerate.[120] It also reflects the tendency of crisis under witch panic to be framed in terms favourable to elites.

[118] Kors and Peters, op. cit.

[119] We return to the issue of population in the next section. Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, op. cit; Cohn, *Pursuit of the Millennium*, op. cit; Sharpe, James, 'Introduction: The Lancashire Witches in Historical Context,' in Poole, Robert, ed., *The Lancashire Witches: Histories and Stories*, Oxford University Press, 2013, 6; Healey, Jonathan, *The First Century of Welfare: Poverty and Poor Relief in Lancashire, 1620–1730*, Boydell and Brewer, 2014, Chapter 7 'Crisis Poverty,' 212; Hobsbawm, Eric, 'The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century,' *Past and Present* 54, no. 4, May, 33–53; 54, no. 6, October 1954: 44–65.

[120] Gibson, Marion, 'Thomas Potts's 'Dusty Memory': Reconstructing Justice in *The Wonderfull Discoverie of Witches*,' in Poole, Robert, *The Lancashire Witches*, ibid., 42–57; Almond, Philip C, *The Lancashire Witches: a Chronicle of Sorcery and Death on Pendle Hill*, IB Tauris, 1–12, 2012; Gibson, Marion, *Reading Witchcraft*, Routledge, 2005.

Part of the explanation for scepticism towards witch trials in Lancashire might be attributed to the political culture prevailing in the decades prior to the English Civil War (1642–51), a conflict that in bringing to the fore the Diggers, Ranters and Levellers evidenced a continuing radical mood comparable to earlier peasant rebellions.[121] These movements asserted sentiments threatening to European elites everywhere, tolerated by Cromwell and others amongst the Parliamentary faction only for as long as they were needed to defeat Charles I. A reason for imaging that this might be the case arises out of the fact that Lancashire at that time, as an outlying county palatinate prone to 'religious ignorance,' was on that count also given to heterodoxy—even if, paradoxically, the heterodox belief was Catholicism, having lately been given a taste of its own medicine by the English Reformation. Running parallel to this form of 'religious ignorance' was another, insofar as 'witchcraft' had become a growth industry amongst impoverished peasants. To all appearances, it made a sly but ultimately tragic use within a non-Catholic dominated milieu of the free advertising being bandied about the rest of continent by the moral entrepreneurs of witch panic. Unfortunately for these residents of Lancaster, the free PR was also having its own priming effects on the local reformers—as it would do later amongst the Puritans. That the effects of which would be borne out in the New World is arguably relevant to the next case study, as we will see.

Triggering the reformed authorities into the Targeting Phase in this respect was a quarrel in the streets of Lancaster. One Alizon Device, daughter of local wise woman and healer Demdike, cursed a pedlar, John Law, after he refused to provide her with pins used to manufacture 'love spells.' Suffering a seizure afterwards—possibly a stroke—Law reported Alizon to local magistrate Roger Nowell, who in charging Alizon with witchcraft also investigated a competing family of magic practitioners and herbalists, who promptly re-accused the Devices. That these new accusers might have also had vested interests in removing the competition for healing and other services associated with 'white' magic somehow failed to figure; as did the interests of the Devices in not abandoning their

[121]Navickas, Katrina, *Loyalism and Radicalism in Lancashire, 1798–1815*, Oxford University Press, 2009, Chapter 4, 'Radicalism, 1798–1805,' 131; Hill, Christopher, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution*, London: Temple Smith, 1972.

slice of the market for magic and healing to the local competition. The impetus towards deviance production and the Targeting Phase was too strong, the largesse of the Witch Industry too lucrative perhaps to turn down. In the end all were arrested, tried and convicted, bar Alizon's daughter who was made a witness for the prosecution, enabling of the Legitimation Phase by such improper means rationalised on the classic grounds for moral panics of emergency expediency. All defendants were hanged the next day.[122]

The Lancashire Witch Trials are by far the best documented case in England, notable for the relatively high number of victims executed simultaneously. Though the ten lives they claimed were only a small proportion of the estimated 500 victims of the witch-hunts in England—that figure itself only a minute proportion of the many tens, potentially hundreds, of thousands of victims of the European Witch Hunts overall—the Lancashire Trials nevertheless reflect the role of witch trials per se as exercises in vengeance-exacting and crisis-leveraging. So too might they be seen as means *par excellence* of avoiding dealing with the difficulties associated with precuring something as inexpensive and seemingly inconsequential as a pin, and the economic stresses that lead to a barney that snowballed in turn into a show trial—perhaps what was really at issue when all was said and done.[123]

The East Berwick Witch Trials

The Witch Trials in East Berwick, Scotland (1597) were an unusually overt example of panic-driven scapegoating and persecution of political opposition, fertile soil for which provided in the form of a volatile combination of ongoing religious and dynastic tensions arising out of the Scottish Reformation and the passing of the 1563 Witchcraft Act.[124] It

[122] Sharpe, 'The Lancashire Witches in Historical Context,' op. cit.; Hasted, Rachel, *The Pendle Witch Trial 1612*, Lancashire County Books, 1987.

[123] Larner, *Enemies of God*, op. cit., 15–16; Larner, Christina, *Witchcraft and Religion: The Politics of Popular Belief*, Basil Blackwell, 1984, 71–72; Sharpe, 'Introduction,' ibid., 3; Sharpe, James A, *Instruments of Darkness: Witchcraft in England 1550–1750*, Penguin, 1997, 125.

[124] Normand, Lawrence, and Gareth Roberts, *Witchcraft in Early Modern Scotland: James VI's Demonology and the North Berwick Witches*, University of Exeter Press, 2000, Chapter 1 'The Court and Politics,' 29–30.

was not for nothing apparently that the first major witch trial in Scotland began in the sleepy fishing town of East Berwick, that being also one of three sea ports linking the county of East Lothian to the rest of Europe. After Anne of Denmark, daughter of King Frederick II, was pledged to James VI in a political marriage designed to strengthen the Stuart dynasty, protestant ties and trading links, the sea lane linking that country gained preeminent importance, and so too the port, making it a focal point for stresses in the arrangement, the contextual religious and dynastic tensions, and everything in between.

James VI was a young king, having turned 21 in 1587, the same year he took the throne following the execution of his mother, Mary, Queen of Scots. The issue of the royal succession became immediately pressing, though the young king had displayed scant interest in the issue, such as to arouse doubt and suspicion amongst many about his sexual orientation and potency—feelings inevitably extending to his political capacity. As James argued in his own defence, however,

> I wes allane, without fader or moder, bruthir or sister, King of this realme and air appeirand [heir apparent] of England; this my naikatnes maid me to be waik [nakedness made me weak] and my Inemyis stark [enemies strong], ane man wes as na man, and the want of hoip [hope] of successioun bread disdayne; yea my lang delay bred in the breistis of mony a grite jealosie of my hinhabilitie [great suspicion of my impotence], as gif I wer a barraine stok.[125]

Such provided all the motivation James could have needed for reframing political crises in his own favour as per the Mobilisation phase of the panic-driven scapegoating model—even more so as other issues complicated matters even further. Economic mismanagement and social instability induced by famine between 1585–87 undermined confidence, disrupting 'traditional relationships in every sector of the economy.' A series of uprisings took place in the North, lead by Catholic earls hopeful of a papal Restoration, and aided in their endeavours by the protestant Earl of Bothwell and James's first cousin, Francis Hepburn, who was enveloped in a dynastic feud with the royal chancellor, Sir John

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[125] Normand and Roberts, *Witchcraft in Early Modern Scotland*, ibid., 32.

Maitland of Thirlestane.[126] The combined effect of these pressures and the unresolved issue of the royal succession precipitated a personal crisis for James in 1589 when the bride, wed to him *in absentia* in Denmark, was unable to proceed to Scotland due to a series of gales that caused the ship carrying her to leak several times, eventually forcing the fleet back to Copenhagen for repairs. Growing increasingly anxious and desperate, James eventually resolved to go to Anne, which he did without any trouble.

The return voyage was once again marred by the same kind of bizarre weather than had plagued Anne's original attempt to cross the North Sea; the ship that carried James and Anne was the only one to encounter contrary winds, though they travelled as a fleet, and they met a dense fog before arriving at their home coast, which they were saved from through the intervention of the English navy.[127] Normand and Roberts argue that it was during this period, which involved a great deal of contact between the Scottish and Danish royal courts, that the continental tropes of the Diabolical Pact and *sabbat* made their way into Scotland.[128] Upon his safe return to Edinburgh, James IV put them to good effect in recasting the succession crisis wrought by the difficulties of bringing Anne to Scotland as the product of witchcraft, identifying his own interests with the moral good in invoking the prevailing conspiracy theory and launching the Mobilisation Phase in so doing.

With his nemesis Bothwell held in Edinburgh Castle, arrested on 9 May 1591 on the charge of 'conspyringe the King's death by sorcerye,' the Targeting Phase appeared in what Larner calls 'treason trials'—the politicisation of witch panic, and the consequential framing of the Diabolical Pact as a political crime as well as religious one a significant innovation with much portent for the future.[129] Larner argues further that the allegation that Bothwell, in concert with witches, made an attempt on the life of the King accounted for 'the ferocity and tenacity

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[126]Normand and Roberts, ibid., 30, 39; Hobsbawm, 'The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century,' op. cit.

[127]Tyson, Donald, *The Demonology of King James I*, Llewellyn Worldwide, 2012, 1–22; Normand and Roberts, ibid., 36.

[128]Normand and Roberts, ibid., 35.

[129]Levack, Brian P., *Witch-Hunting in Scotland: Law, Politics and Religion,* Routledge, 2007, 41.

of the investigations'—cruelties rationalised by the elevated passions generated by the existential threat.[130] Such were metered out by James acting as a trial judge himself to Gilly Duncan, a maidservant and healer of North Berwick whose only apparent crime was being too good at healing, having learnt too well from Agnes Sampson, the 'Wise Wife of Heather-Keith'—herself having attracted attention from local moral entrepreneurs at the worst possible moment. Under torture, Sampson 'confessed' to conspiring with Bothwell to raise storms against James and Anne, to burn them in wax effigy, and to consummate the Diabolical Pact on the grounds of the North Berwick Kirk. Sampson, Duncan and an unknown (though large) number of others, convicted, were strangled and burnt at the stake. Bothwell, one of James's own class, was stripped of his titles and sent into exile.[131]

In the aftermath of the terror, if any doubts remained as to the political potency of James IV as expressed in scapegoating, none dared express them. While James went on to also ascend the English throne as James I, the Scottish Privy Council continued his work, James adding his own *Daemonologie* (1597) to the booklet *News from Scotland* (1591) to guide them. When, on 6 May 1659, the Cromwellian Protectorate ended, the judicial machinery of Scotland 'ground to almost a complete halt,' precipitating 'a serious legal crisis that only compounded the economic crisis that had been developing for a number of years.' The Great Scottish Witch Hunt (1661–62) that followed, in the increasingly standard manner, produced 660 victims.[132] In the meantime, James IV was now James IV and I, and confirmed as a staunch opponent of Satan.[133] As such, in

[130] Larner, Christina. 'James VI and I and Witchcraft,' in Smith, Alan G. R., ed., *The Reign of James VI and I*, London, Palgrave, 1973, 79.

[131] Larner, 'James VI and I and Witchcraft,' ibid.; Levack, *Witch-Hunting in Scotland*, op. cit., Chapter 3 'James IV and Witchcraft,' 40–54.

[132] Levack, Brian P., 'The Great Scottish Witch Hunt of 1661–1662,' *Journal of British Studies* 20, no. 1, 1980: 90–108; Levack, *Witch-Hunting in Scotland*, ibid., 81–97.

[133] Modestin, Georg, '"The King Is the Greatest Enemy He Hath in the World." The Relationship Between Witchcraft and Royal Power in *Newes from Scotland* (1591–1592) and King James VI's *Daemonologie* (1597),' unpublished seminar paper, via https://www.academia.edu/19864628/_The_King_is_the_greatest_enemy_he_hath_in_the_world_._The_relationship_between_witchcraft_and_royal_power_in_Newes_from_Scotland_1591–1592_and_King_James_VIs_Daemonologie_1597_, accessed 8 June 2018.

1604, James I convened the Hampton Court Conference to commission a new, reformed version of the Bible. As well as verses such as 'But speaking the truth in love, may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ' (Ephesians 4:15), and 'But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you,' (Matthew 5:44), the eponymous new version also featured innovative renderings of such passages as Samuel 15:23 ('For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft') and Exodus 22:18 ('Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live').

The institutionalisation and codification of witch panic was also reflected in culturally, not least of which being Shakespeare's adaptation of the themes of the East Berwick trials for *Macbeth*, noted for its witch content at the beginning of this case study. Such would be available to prime audiences right up to the present; if we no longer take the idea witches seriously, the same can very definitely not be said of the Ancient Fantasy, the existential threat archetype.

> The many of us who have farms … cannot bear the rents, whereby the peasants lose their property and are ruined … Some have appropriated meadows or arable that once belonged to the community. We wish to restore these to common ownership, unless they have been properly purchased …
>
> —*The Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants*, 1525[134]

Restoration Phase: The Beneficiaries of Moral Panic Collect

This fifth and final section of the first case study examines the question of who in particular benefitted from witch panic and the persecution of peasant women as heretics plus magic during the European Witch Hunts. At the Restoration stage, fixes impermissible under circumstances not dominated by moral panic and terror over existential threats, in being generally destructive of the Christian values invoked as justification for them, became possible. This final section argues that the summary arrest and torture of those accused of witchcraft, their subjection

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[134]Oman, C. W. C., 'The German Peasant War of 1525,' *The English Historical Review* 5, no. 17, 1890: 65–94.

to interrogative show trials through the use of the Inquisitorial method in the secular courts and the burning of those who refused to make false confessions amounted to a theocratic terror designed to re-establish and reinforce the class power of the largest landowner in Europe and its class allies. It contends that witch panic facilitated permanent class warfare, which in turn provided a permanent pretext for large scale social engineering over the course of three centuries to force European economic development in the direction of industrial capitalism.

Witchcraft and Feudalism

A clue as to the question of *Cui bono* in relation to witch panic arises out another event of great historical significance taking place in Europe at the same time as the catastrophes of the fourteenth century: the crisis of feudalism. Of particular interest is the fact that the European Witch Hunts bridge the period between the late medieval and early modern eras—in other words, the period following the terminal decline of the feudal system and the period directly preceding the Industrial Revolution. While feudal decline was a primary characteristic of the period spanning roughly from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, Mielants argues that it was also characterised by a mixed system reflecting multiple tendencies of potential social and economic development.[135]

This fact is of crucially significance in that it reflects the critical role of the Witch Hunts in shaping the future direction of economic development in Europe—and considering the global influence of European powers as colonial entities, much of the rest of the world also. The absence of both feudal social relations and the mass peasant revolts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries at the end of the Witch Hunts in the mid-eighteenth century arguably reflects their underlying function as a method for purging European society of challengers to the class-based order, while at the same time socially engineering workarounds for what was fundamentally an accumulation crisis within Feudalism. Once the mercantilist power that laid the basis for European capitalism had been established, there was no more need for a Terror; It was no more coincidence that the European Witch

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[135] Mielants, Eric, *The Origins of Capitalism and the "Rise of the West"*, Temple University Press, 2008, 12.

Hunts stopped at that point than it was that the European Witch Hunts bridged feudalism and the modalities that developed into the Industrial Revolution.

While some might see in this a conspiracy theory comparable to witch mythology, the common script of class interest and stereotype priming disprove any need for an organised conspiracy; knowing on which side one's bread was buttered was enough to for its moral entrepreneurs to gauge intuitively the function of witch panic. If we fear challenges to our power and privileges, and a moral panic can neutralise those threats by targeting those who present them, then the only reasonable conclusion possible that the imaginary hobgoblin at the heart of the moral panic is very real, and the matter very serious—very serious indeed. One would have to be in league with the imaginary hobgoblin to imagine otherwise. Such appears to be the logic at play.

Feudalism as a historically distinct mode of production was principally based on the seigniorial or manorial system of land tenure, one that evolved out of the practice under the Roman Empire of settling conquered enemies. If slaves could put down roots, went the reasoning, they wouldn't run away. Having grown out of the breakup of the Roman Empire, the feudal mode of production had inherited, perpetuated and adapted the class-based, hierarchical relationships of patronage and tribute that enabled the Roman plutocracy to enrich itself through territorial dominion and imperial warfare.[136] Such had been inherited and perpetuated by the Catholic Church, which capitalised on this toxic lineage by demanding the payment of tribute, not to Emperor, but to a King who ruled in the name of Divine Right in the form of an oath of fealty, to become the biggest landholder in medieval Europe.[137] The warrior aristocracy ruling the King's domains maintained

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[136] Hilton, Rodney, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism: Essays in Medieval Social History*, The Hambleton Press, 1985, 1–2. 'As George Duby has shown, plunder was for centuries a feature of surplus extraction in early feudal society, but eventually, as conditions settled, and as agrarian technologies improved, the plunderers settled down as landlords, holding or giving out fiefs in land in return for loyalty and military service.'

[137] 'The doctrine of royal theocracy cannot be dismissed as an aberration of the Dark Ages but was rather a continuing element in European political theory.' Tierney, Brian, *The Crisis of Church and State, 1050–1300*, University of Toronto Press, 1964, 74–75; Ellerbe, Helen, *The Dark Side of Christian History*, Morningstar & Lark, 1995; Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons*, op. cit.

the hereditary class hierarchies of the Roman Empire, lording over a manor divided between the *demesne*, land they controlled directly, freehold land farmed by ostensibly free peasants from whom they exacted ruinous, *villein* land farmed by enslaved peasants or serfs known as vassals or serfs, bound to the land through perpetual labour bondage, and the commons. Despite vassalage requiring permission from the feudal lord to till the small strip of land the peasant and his family possessed, feudal bondage also entailed customary rights established through collective refusal of work that set limits to the otherwise absolute power of the lord and demonstrated a capacity in the peasantry for collective self-defence—a fact whose import would presently make itself felt.[138]

By the Late Middle Ages, this system had become enveloped in crisis.[139] Essentially geared to the exploitation of slave labour, feudalism as a primitive 'surplus-extractive' system of production lacked mechanisms of self-correction, making productivity innovations or adaptation to changing conditions nigh on impossible. Complicating matters were *disincentives* to productivity, particularly as peasant families had no reason to produce more than sufficient for their own subsistence, the manor lords appropriating any surpluses. In lieu of more sustainable innovation in techniques to raise the productivity of the land, productivity gains were sought in 'horizontal expansion,' initially achieved though reclamation of uncultivated, marginal lands. This met with only limited success, as the ratio of available land to labour, the quality of the land and the length of time before it was exhausted gave rise to 'a classic case of diminishing returns.' Maladaptive and incapable of reproducing itself, feudalism was in terminal decline by the mid-twelfth century as famine appeared and

[138] Ganshof, F. L., *Feudalism*, London: Longmans, 1964; Allen, Robert C., *Enclosure and the Yeoman: The Agricultural Development of the South Midlands 1450–1850*, 60; Hilton, Rodney, *Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381*, Routledge, 2003, 93–94.

[139] Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, op. cit., 62. This topic has been the subject of significant debates, of particular note that between Robert Brenner, M. M. Postan and Emmanuel Laudrie in *Past and Present*, and Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy in 1963. For more see Aston, Trevor H., and Charles H. E. Philpin, eds., *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

spread exponentially.[140] The reader will recall that all of this took place prior to the end of the Medieval Warm Period and the climate events that created tinderbox conditions for pandemic.

Traditional explanations tend to focus on this outcome as an issue of population, the European peasantry compensating for the inability to increase productivity with larger families to raise the total volume of production, though Postan defends references to demographics as part of a larger picture.[141] As an explanation for the crisis of feudalism, however, demographics on their own fail to account for the fact that 'the social structure and the habits of the landed nobility did not permit accumulation for investment for the extension of production.'[142] The underlying social relations remain then the primary issue, along with the burden on medieval society created by an unproductive ruling class.[143]

The Watershed

Increasingly crucial to the question of who benefitted from witch panic, the crisis of feudalism came to a head in the wake of the Black Plague, when the loss of a third to a half of the population of Europe begat a

[140] Moore, Jason W., 'The Crisis of Feudalism: An Environmental History,' *Organization & Environment* 15, no. 3, 2002: 304; Bois, Guy, *The Crisis of Feudalism: Economy and Society in Eastern Normandy, 1300–1550*, Cambridge: Past & Present Publications, 1984; McNally, David, *Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, Chapter 5; Hilton, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism*, op. cit., Chapter 1; Hilton, Rodney, and Christopher Hill, 'The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism,' *Science & Society* 1953: 340–351; Aston and Philpin, *The Brenner Debate*, ibid.

[141] Postan, M, 'Population and Class Relations in Feudal Society,' in Aston and Philpin, *The Brenner Debate*, ibid., 64–78; Campbell, Bruce MS., ed., *Before the Black Death: Studies in the "Crisis" of the Early Fourteenth Century*, Manchester University Press, 1992, 5.

[142] Perroy, Edouard 'A l'origine d'une economic contractee: les crises du XlVe siecle,' Annales E.S.C., IV, 2, avr-juin 1949, 168, quoted in Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press, 1974, 21; Hilton, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism*, op. cit., 234.

[143] 'Changes in relative factor scarcities consequent upon demographic changes exerted an effect on the distribution of income in medieval Europe only as they were, so to speak, refracted through the prism of changing social-property relations and fluctuating balances of class forces.' Brenner, Robert, 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism,' *Past & Present* 97, 1982: 21.

labour crisis. With this came a historic shift in class power relations; historians describe this variously as a 'watershed' moment and a 'revolution in status and tenure' heralding a 'Second Feudal Age.'[144] The immediate consequences of the decimation of the labour force were predictable enough: rising wages, a squeeze on rents and taxes, and a general breakdown of the class power that had kept feudal elites maintained in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. For them, it was anything but a Golden Age, as the decline in seignorial revenues tipped depression over into crisis. As the peasantry worked for their own subsistence even during periods of prosperity, they were the first to feel the effects of economic contraction as rents and profits fell. Being obliged to look for other methods to make up the shortfall, they responded (1) with land grabs perpetrated under the guise of religious wars, (2) the extension of 'horizontal expansion' into colonialism, and (3) a revival of class war against the lower orders, eventually taking the form of the land grabs associated with the enclosure movement.[145]

Wars between European powers had 'in the past had tended to stop soon after they were begun,' but now were prolonged as means of replacing lost rent through pillage and ransom.[146] As such, they set the tone for colonial conquest. Only a few decades post conclusion, various national elites exported the violent covetousness of the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453) to the Americas, where 'horizontal' reclamation of marginal lands extended into bloody and violent conquering of the Incas and Aztecs and the looting of their gold and silver—inspiring Marx to write of the genesis of capital as a moment in which it appears 'dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt.'[147]

[144]Anievas, Alexander, and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism*, Pluto Press, 2018, 77–80; McNally, *Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism*, op. cit., 5; Seccombe, Wally, *A Millennium of Family Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe*, Verso, 1992, 136–141.

[145]Hilton, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism*, op. cit., 167; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, *How the West Came to Rule*, ibid., 79–81; McNally, *Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism*, ibid., 5–8.

[146]Hilton, ibid., 167–168; Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I*, op. cit., 51.

[147]Marx, Karl, Chapter 31 'Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist,' in Marx, Karl [1867], Trans. Ben Fowkes, *Capital: Vol. 1*, London: Penguin, 1976.

Establishment of trade routes supplied European colonialists and provided logistical support for their plunder, while the exporting of witch-hunts to divide and pacify conquered first nations provided the basis for further redeployment throughout Europe.[148] At the same time, feudal elites attempted to reimpose feudal social class relations through what Hilton describes as 'very violent class war,' this 'seignorial reaction' producing numerous unintended consequences.

> It was not only the burden of tax but the disorganization of the economy in the war zones which had to be borne by the poor, thus provoked to rebellion. Revolt in the towns disorganized industrial production and revolt in the countryside strengthened peasant resistance to the payment of rents. Rent and profits thus dropped even further—a vicious cycle.[149]

A phenomenon that would prove to have a shelf life well beyond the end of feudalism, very violent class war also anticipated the European Witch Hunts. The medieval courts through which manorial elites perpetrated witch trials using the borrowed Inquisitorial method were controlled by them as well; democratic concepts of a popular franchise and equality before the law were still some way off yet. The 'Statute of Labourers' (1349–51), introduced just as the Council of Basel was nearing the end of its period of convocation, placed limits on wages, provoking rebellion amongst the peasantry who had wasted no time in leveraging the tipping of the balance of power in their favour to roll back the feudal power structure.[150]

Nowhere was this more apparent than in major peasant insurgencies, not least of which being the French Jacquerie (1358), the English Peasant Rebellion (1381), and the German Peasant War (1524–5). In open

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[148] Silverblatt, Irene, *Moon, Sun, and Witches: Gender Ideologies and Class in Inca and Colonial Peru*, Princeton University Press, 1987, Chapter 9 'Cultural Defiance: The Sorcery Weapon,' 159–196.

[149] Hilton, ibid.; Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy of the Sixteenth Century*, University of California Press, 2011, 23, 51; Allen, *Enclosure and the Yeoman*, op. cit., 65.

[150] Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, ibid. '[The] chief cause [of social troubles] must be sought in the economic organization itself, which had reached a point when its operation provoked discontent in urban and rural populations alike.' Pirenne, Henri, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, Routledge, 2015, 196.

rebellion, the European peasantry rejected the reimposition of serfdom, feudal social relations and class society as such. It sought paths of social and economic development away from class exploitation and oppression and towards more cooperative modes of production orientated around the commons instead.[151] The terror this inspired in the largest landowner in Europe and in other elite groups fighting for survival is reflected in the fact that the witch conspiracy theory became an ideological pretext for wholesale class warfare on peasant movements for radical economic and social change. The nature of the desire of European ruling classes to smash movements threatening to interfere with their class privileges and to force-engineer social and economic development in directions suitable to themselves was particularly obvious where secretive meetings of radical dissenters and rebels held away from the ears of potential traitors were associated with the witches' *sabbat*. Here in particular, the archetypal elements of the Ancient Fantasy giving rise to the lie, based on guilt-by-association, that revolts against the constituted authorities were devil-inspired.[152]

As indicated by the outcomes, the changes as they took place over roughly three centuries were achieved amidst the theocratic terror of the European Witch Hunts, which broke the class power of the rebellious European peasantry, inspired in places by the Enlightenment, and forced it into new roles consistent with emerging capitalist modalities. As peasant uprisings were progressively defeated with the combination of terror and military force, land grabs in the form of enclosures ratified by Black Acts and monopolisation of lands by richer peasants enabled

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[151] Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, op. cit., 22; Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free*, op. cit.; Bercé, YM, *History of Peasant Revolts: The Social Origins of Rebellion in Early Modern France*. Polity Press, 1990, Chapter 1 'The Communes,' 3–70; Dobson, R. B., *The Peasants' Revolt of 1381*, London: Macmillan, 1970; Cohn, Norman, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, Random House, 2011; Engels, Friedrich, *The Peasant War in Germany*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956; Blickle, Peter, *The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants' War from a New Perspective*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981; Kautsky, Karl, *Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation*, TF Unwin, 1897; Montero, Roman A., *All Things in Common: The Economic Practices of the Early Christians*, Oregon: Resource Publications, 2017; Christoyannopoulos, Alexandre, *Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel*, Andrews UK, 2013, 'The Middle Ages and the Reformation,' 338; Russell, Jeffrey Burton, *Religious Dissent in the Middle Ages*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.

[152] Federici, ibid., 176.

them to form a class of yeoman landlords, while poorer peasants were expelled from the land and economically coerced into agrarian wage labour, before being pushed into urban centres to become factory fodder as rented wage slaves.[153] No less significantly, the historic defeat of insurgent peasants precipitated imposition by institutional terror of the domestic regime associated with what Federici calls the 'patriarchy of the wage,' whereby peasant women were driven into the home out of fear of being denounced as witches to perform the role of brood mares for capital, replacing the workforce that had been decimated by the Black Death and reversing the historic shift in the balance of class power to which it had given rise.[154] 'It is no exaggeration to say that women were treated with the same hostility and sense of estrangement accorded "Indian savages" in the literature that developed on the subject after the Conquest,' Federici argues;

> The parallel is not casual. In both cases literary and cultural denigration was at the service of a project of expropriation … the demonization of the American indigenous people served to justify their enslavement and the plunder of their resources. In Europe, the attack waged on women justified the appropriation of their labour and the criminalisation of their control over reproduction. Always, the price of resistance was extermination. None of the tactics deployed against European women and colonial subjects would have succeeded if they had not been sustained by a campaign of terror. In the case of European women, it was the witch-hunt that played the main role in the construction of their new social function, and the degradation of their social identity.[155]

[153]Wallerstein, op. cit., 116; Allen, *Enclosure and the Yeoman*, op. cit.; Marx, *Capital*, op. cit., Chapter 27, 'Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Land'; Thompson, E. P., *The Making of the English Working Class*, Open Road Media, 2016; Thomson, E. P., *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act*, Penguin Books, 1990; Broad, John, 'Whigs and Deer-Stealers in Other Guises: A Return to the Origins of the Black Act,' *Past & Present* 119, 1988: 56–72; Polanyi, Karl, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origin of Our Time*, Beacon Press, 1957; Chambers, Jonathan D., 'Enclosure and Labour Supply in the Industrial Revolution,' *Economic History Review* 5, no. 3, 1953: 319–343; Monbiot, George, 'A Land Reform Manifesto,' monbiot.com, 22 February 1995, via http://www.monbiot.com/1995/02/22/a-land-reform-manifesto/, accessed 27 June 2018; Bollier, David and Silke Helfrich, eds., *The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and State*, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2012.

[154]Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, op. cit., 68, 88.

[155]Federici, ibid., 102.

It was the witch-hunt that was responsible for invoking and normalising a false dichotomy between Society, represented by the established social order, and Nature, represented by wild, menacing forces of chaos and evil that required controlling, one that made possible the Othering of targets of witch-hunting through deviance production, and of the Oriental other—ultimately amounting to a project, Moore argues, of 'remaking the world in the image of capital.'[156] The mutually complementary features of the Self vs. Other and Society vs. Nature binaries *as* binaries and ontological foundations for moral panic, are reflected in the fact that witch trials facilitated plunder as well as did colonial extractivism. Both produced 'a new alchemy which made gold out of human blood' in the words of one contemporary observer, the proceeds of both plunders then used to pay the armies used to crush peasant insurgencies.[157]

The emergence of this 'world-praxis' suggests that the transition from feudalism to capitalism was not inevitable, the result of 'iron laws of capitalist development' as some have suggested, but rather that a continent-wide, three centuries long campaign of terror was necessary to close off alternative paths of social and economic development sought by the European peasantry.[158] In the face of multiple insurgencies against their class power and privileges, feudal elites had motive, means and opportunity to commit major crimes against humanity in the name of denying the European peasantry its long-sought for liberation from the class oppression and exploitation of feudal manorialism. In time, their power would be reasserted in the new work regimen called the wage system, a major innovation on the ownership of slaves insofar as it permitted the nascent capitalist class to lease them instead. Through the new modality, class elites owned the tools of production and appropriated all the product of rented slave labour, paying the slave back a proportion of that

[156] Moore, Jason W., 'The Rise of Cheap Nature,' in Moore, Jason W., ed., *Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism*, PM Press, 2016, 86; Said, *Orientalism*, op. cit.; Davies, Merryl Wyn, Ashis Nandy, and Ziauddin Sardar, *Barbaric Others: A Manifesto on Western Racism*, Pluto Press, 1993; Williams, Robert A., *Savage Anxieties: The Invention of Western Civilization*, Macmillan, 2012.

[157] Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale*, op. cit., 84–88.; Federici, ibid., 105.

[158] Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, op. cit., 71–72; Tawney, Richard Henry, *The Agrarian Problems in the 16th Century*, Harper and Row, 1967; McNally, *Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism*, op. cit., xi–xii, 1–21.

product as a wage.[159] This fact also means that they now had the means to innovate on methods of production; the crises of accumulation that had condemned feudalism on this basis would never again be a problem.

The Secret History of Primitive Accumulation

In more practical and specific terms, the fix for the feudal accumulation crisis, through which European elites salvaged their class power, took the form of 'primitive accumulation,' or the appropriation by military force of 'first capital' with which to kickstart production for private accumulation.[160] Through this process, they transformed the moribund feudal system into a new system that could sustain their power—until the tendency to treat the Earth as an infinite resource and infinite garbage dump began to undermine natural ecosystems and give rise to global warming, at least.[161] Moore refers to the objects of primitive accumulation as the 'Four Cheaps' (cheap raw materials, cheap energy, cheap food, cheap labour), all cornerstones of capitalism to this day.[162] Appropriated in

[159] Marx, *Capital: Vol. 1*, op. cit.; Vianello, Fernando, 'Labour Theory of Value,' in *Marxian Economics*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, 233–246; Bryer, Robert A., 'Why Marx's Labour Theory Is Superior to the Marginalist Theory of Value: The Case from Modern Financial Reporting,' *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 5, no. 4, 1994: 313–340.

[160] Perelman, Michael, *The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation*, Duke University Press, 2000; Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, op. cit.; Roberts, William Clare, 'What Was Primitive Accumulation? Reconstructing the Origin of a Critical Concept,' *European Journal of Political Theory*, 2017: 1474885117735961; Glassman, Jim, 'Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by 'Extra-Economic' Means,' *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 5, 2006: 608–625; Magdoff, Harry, 'Primitive Accumulation and Imperialism,' *Monthly Review*, 1 October 2013, via https://monthlyreview.org/2013/10/01/primitive-accumulation-and-imperialism/, accessed 24 June 2018.

[161] Moore, Jason W., *Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital*, Verso, 2015.

[162] Moore, *Anthropocene or Capitalocene*, op. cit.; Patel, Raj, and Jason W. Moore, *A History of the World in Seven Cheap Things: A Guide to Capitalism, Nature, and the Future of the Planet*, University of California Press, 2017; Moore, Jason W., 'The Capitalocene, Part I: On the Nature and Origins of Our Ecological Crisis,' *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 44/3, 2017: 594–630; Moore, Jason W., 'The Capitalocene, Part II: Accumulation by Appropriation and the Centrality of Unpaid Work/Energy,' *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 45/2, 2018: 237–279.

increasing volume through various plunders, expedited by major crimes against humanity committed against anyone in the way, primitive accumulation of the 'Four Cheaps' was rationalised through the 'world-praxis' of the Society vs. Nature, borne by witch panic-infested terror on the social body of European society like Plague-infested fleas on the bodies of so many fourteenth-century rats.

As primitive accumulation gained momentum, those who traded in the products of these early plunders as mercantilists increasingly began to resemble the industrial capitalists of today. The Industrial Revolution, typically cited as the beginning of a process, was rather the end of one—which is to say, when privately-held capital in the form of the 'Four Cheaps' (including the human variety) had reached sufficient quantities that private accumulation began to run under its own momentum, aided by the social reproduction of a perpetual class of rented slaves by the capitalist brood mare.[163] Now working for free from the domestic sphere, she birthed and raised future wage slaves without even dreaming of payment as a colossal gratuity to the capitalist mode of production and those who dominated it, those who ultimately benefitted the most from the three centuries of Witch Panic.

To recap, as developed by the nascent capitalist classes of the period between the end of the Late Middle Ages and the beginning of the Modern Era, the process of primitive accumulation took three main forms, all tied in one form or another to processes of colonisation, which necessarily involved crimes against humanity:

1. Colonisation of the feudal commons via enclosures, an act that first forced the landed peasantry out of the economic self-sufficiency they had known throughout the feudal era as the cornerstone of subsistence production, first into agrarian wage labour and then into the cities to become wage slaves in industry.[164]

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[163] Moore, *Capitalism in the Web of Life*, op. cit., 175–177; Wallerstein, Immanuel, 'The Industrial Revolution: Cui Bono?' *Thesis Eleven* 13, no. 1, 1986: 67–76.

[164] Perelman, Michael, *The Invention of Capitalism*, op. cit.; Thompson, E. P., *The Making of the English Working Class*, London: Vintage, 1963; Thompson, E. P., *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act*, London: Allen Lane, 1975; De Angelis, Massimo, 'Marx and Primitive Accumulation: The Continuous Character of Capital's Enclosures,' *The Commoner* 2, no. 1, 2001: 1–22.

2. Colonisation of militarily conquered and resource-rich imperial possessions overseas for exploitation of 'Cheap Natures' in the form of free land and the free labour of kidnapped and enslaved human resources.[165]

3. Colonisation of the female body as a way of breeding factory fodder for wage exploitation in industry and war fodder for military acquisition of colonial possessions; the subjugation of women in general to a patriarchal social order for the purpose of being rendered brood mares for capital and the state.[166]

4. Colonisation of individual subjectivity via binary-laden ideological suppositions, that in replacing independent thoughts with premade stereotypes, produced what social psychologists regard as automatic behaviour controlled from without, and along with it what we might characterise as Cheap Biopower.[167]

These point to another form of colonisation, that of individual subjectivity through the new 'world-praxis' of capital, the Society vs. Nature binary. While the specifics could fill another volume on their own, it suffices for the moment to point out that the colonisation of the outer world was mirrored by an inner colonisation of subjectivity, one that was achieved with the crucial aid of the witch stereotype. Primitive accumulation was not only a world praxis for world domination, based on a sociopathic mentality that viewed women, workers, the Oriental Other, the flora and fauna and ultimately the Earth itself as objects whose only

[165] Moore, Jason W., *Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital*, London: Verso Books, 2015; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, *How the West Came to Rule*, op. cit., 116; Said, Edward, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage, 1978; Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale*, op. cit.; Fanon, Frantz, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove Press, 1963; Taussig, Michael T., *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America*, University of North Carolina Press, 2010.

[166] Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, op. cit, Chapter 1 'All the World Needs a Jolt.'

[167] 'The concept of Empire is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries: Empire's rule has no limits … The object of its rule is social life in its entirety, and thus Empire presents the paradigmatic form of biopower.' Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, op. cit., xiv–xv; Wood, Ellen Meiksins, *Empire of Capital*. Verso, 2005. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behaviour,' op. cit.; Cisney, Vernon W., and Nicolae Morar, eds., *Biopower: Foucault and Beyond*, University of Chicago Press, 2015; Debney, B., 'Rising Above the Thinking Behind Climate Change: World Ecology and Workers Control,' unpublished chapter.

value resided in their exploitability for profit. It was also a world praxis that normalised covetousness, paranoia and pathological greed, just as it normalised the rental of slaves under the wage system as a substitute for the enslavement of serfs under feudalism. As the new system of rented slavery was a *fait accompli* of the new class power restored by witch panic, however, and its ideological contours normalised by the Victors, the panic-driven scapegoating so successful in expediting its rise to world dominance was relegated to the proverbial memory hole, to ensure that it did not prosper while it did ever.

> The law locks up the man or woman
> Who steals the goose off the common
> But leaves the greater villain loose
> Who steals the common from the goose.
>
> The law demands that we atone
> When we take things we do not own
> But leaves the lords and ladies fine
> Who takes things that are yours and mine.
>
> The poor and wretched don't escape
> If they conspire the law to break;
> This must be so, but they endure
> Those who conspire to make the law.
>
> The law locks up the man or woman
> Who steals the goose from off the common
> And geese will still a common lack
> Till they go and steal it back.
> —17th century anti-enclosure poem[168]

Conclusion

This chapter has compared the construction of witch panic against the analytical criteria nominated in the theoretical section of this research project. Beginning with the self-interested framing of the crisis by the moral entrepreneurs of the panic, it examined the use of moral panic

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[168] Boyle, James, 'The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,' *Law and Contemporary Problems* 66, no. 1/2, 2003: 33–74.

constructed around witch mythology as the basis for crisis leveraging and scapegoating, through targeting of scapegoats via deviance production and the establishment of a legitimating pretext for scapegoating via the victim complex enabled by moral disengagement. After looking at how persecutions enabled by witch panic were put into effect, it finished by exploring the underlying economic and social dynamics driving the construction of witch panic and whose interests it served. This case study now concludes with a summary of the material presented in the case study against the analytical criteria in preparation for comparison against the second and third case studies at the end of the study.

The 'Mobilisation phase' looked at the self-interested framing of social crisis in the fourteenth century by moral entrepreneurs of witch panic. It saw how, during this phase, moral entrepreneurs of witch panic reframed the Great Famine and the Black Death as 'God's Ordinance' and 'Divine Plague,' or divine punishment for permissiveness towards sin. It explored how this laid the basis for witchcraft conspiracy theory by explaining random events as foreseeable elements of the Divine Plan. In this formulation, the Catholic hierarchy equated its political hegemony with the will of God. Moral entrepreneurialism recast the effects of inconvenient historical developments in a misogynistic formulation of witch panic that shifted blame to sexual permissiveness, such as had allowed peasant women to be seduced by Satan. This paranoid mentality associated apostasy resulting from the breakdown of the mythology of a higher purpose, itself the product of the incapacity of religious orthodoxies to keep pace with social developments, with giving comfort to the demonised, indeed diabolical enemy. This process reflected the archetypal priming script associated with the Ancient Fantasy and, arguably, the Paranoid Style as a historical feature. This priming script would inform deviance production and blame-shifting in later stages.

The 'Targeting phase' examined production of deviance as finding targets for scapegoating, based again on the prior assumption that the power and privileges of feudal elites, including the Catholic hierarchy, were synonymous with universal Christian values and the moral Good. This section saw how the seminal Council of Basel, the veritable '*sabbat* of demonologists,' combined heresy with magic, a strategy that built on the prior priming work of the Inquisition by converging existential threats—heretics and witches. It saw how the Council of Basel used this 'heresy plus magic' formula as the basis for the conspiracy theory of a 'Pestilential Alliance' to destroy crops and induce pandemic.

Disseminated through the pulpit and the new technology of the Gutenberg press, it saw how, under this conspiracy theory, pagan rituals, midwifery, illicit drug use, popular 'magic' and folk knowledge and practices that the Church felt threatened their earthly power criminalised as 'witchcraft.' It demonstrated that the Catholic patriarchy manufactured the mythology of a diabolical conspiracy to overthrow Christendom through deviance production the fact that peasant women had a sexuality that they couldn't control.

The 'Legitimation phase' looked at the construction of a pretext through moral disengagement for witch panic-enabled crisis leveraging and persecution of scapegoats. This section explored how, having taken it on themselves to define Christian virtue and 'God' in their own interests, moral entrepreneurs of witch panic amongst the Catholic hierarchy constructed the victim complex necessary for crisis-leveraging and scapegoating through the myth, born of the False Dilemma, that abandonment of religious beliefs through apostasy, or simply embracing common folk culture, was tantamount to attacking God and the Church. Having equated its own religious hegemony with the will of God, in other words, the hegemon associated perceived threats to its power with abandonment of God—a set of assumptions informing the pervasive inconsistency between the lofty values used to rationalise the European Witch Hunts in the abstract, the markedly less lofty values characterising them in practice. From these derived its belief in 'righteous persecution.' It saw how witch hunters throughout Europe embraced the Inquisitorial method to this end, using it to target the class enemy such that anyone in the way when they asserted patriarchal class rule, or who contradicted, challenged or even doubted the legitimacy of that rule, was automatically associated with the Diabolical existential threat. In each case, the 'with us or against us' logic of the False Dilemma reflected the tendency of witch panic entrepreneurs to identify insufficient submission to the prevailing class and gender-based power structures with support for witchcraft.

The 'Persecution phase' explored four episodes of panic-driven crisis leveraging and scapegoating incorporating all prior stages of witch panic. The first explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation in the Valais Witch Trials (1428) as reactions to famine, religious tensions arising from the reformation and the Raron Affair (1415), adducing the relationship between the outcome of the Raron conflict and the first appearance of the Inquisition in the canton of Valais immediately prior to the Council of Basel (1431). The second explored mobilisation, targeting

and legitimation in the Trier Witch Trials (1581–93) as fallout from the arrival in Trier of the new Archbishop, Johann von Schönenberg. It reviewed the historical context of 16 famine years out of 18, and von Schönenberg's desire to prove his Jesuit credentials, reflecting on the gross opportunism that saw the trials turn into a profitable industry. The third explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation in the Lancashire Witch Trials (1682) as reactions to 'population pressure' precipitating 'crisis levels of mortality' coupled with religious and political divisions anticipating the English Civil War, examining the social pressures as they spiralled into witch panic following an argument the street over a pin. The fourth and final explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation in the East Berwick Witch Trials (1581–93) as a highly politicised and very specific reaction the succession crisis James IV inherited upon assumption of the crown, and threats of revolt deriving from religious conflicts rooted in the Reformation. Tropes associated with the Ancient Fantasy were evident throughout; similarly, all reflected the Paranoid Style as a feature of history.

The 'Restoration phase' looked at who benefitted from witch panic. As this section revealed, the terror sewn by thousands of show trials across the three centuries of the European Witch Hunts re-established the social dominance of the European ruling classes in the face of the watershed shifting in the balance of class power following the Black Death, and then the accumulation crisis at the end of the feudal period. Where it employed fear of the Other as a feature of the Paranoid Style as a feature of broader history, witch panic represented the convergence of 'black magic' with Ancient Fantasy tropes associated with previous campaigns of persecution. It enabled then a resurgent ruling class to wage permanent class warfare, with the goal of re-imposing class rule on European society and reasserting its social and economic privileges. A permanent pretext for class warfare, following the successful suppression of peasant movements pursuing alternative cooperative and self-managed economic forms of development in line with its newly found class power, the Diabolical Pact trope also provided a permanent pretext for primitive accumulation, through which the capital necessary to construct a mode of production geared towards private profit could be engineered. As we saw, this took the form of various forms of colonialism for the acquisition of the 'Four Cheaps'—the commons, resource-rich colonial possessions, the female body as brood mare for capital and the individual subjectivity of members of subject classes.

From these facts, this case study concludes that witch panic represents a model form of panic-driven scapegoating. Incorporation of the Ancient Fantasy into Catholic theology highlights (1) the malleability and adaptive potential of Ancient Fantasy narratives, and (2) their function as a tool of class warfare. In witch panic, feudal elites successfully combined established heretic narratives with magic culture they themselves had popularised to explain the part played by environmental disasters of the fourteenth century in God's Plan as punishment for sin. While individual accusations may have come from amongst the mass of the population, the demonology was elite-driven—revealed by the work of the Council of Basel. The existence of the witch stereotype, preached through the pulpit and spread through religious tracts such as those referred to throughout this case study, provided a pre-fashioned frame of reference that gave those looking to re-establish ruling class power with a ready-made accusation against perceived threats to their power. In so doing, they built on previous panic narratives related to other objects of fear and loathing and took advantage of fertile soil in widespread fear and desperation, going so far in the end as to create a paradigm for persecutions to follow.

Birth of the Panic-Driven Scapegoating Archetype

The destructive effects of this class warfare as it played out in the European Witch Hunts became the basis for the mode of production that replaced feudalism in Europe, and thanks to European colonialism and imperialism, that which prevails throughout the world today. Just as the imposition of capitalist modalities through terror required an enabling pretext, they also involved normalising of the Ancient Fantasy scapegoating archetype in what Jung would later describe as the collective unconscious. As an archetype factory, the European Witch Hunts were a response to the actual existential threat for theocratic elites of a random universe. Not only did the Church hierarchy need to explain away evidence against a divinely inspired, preordained Plan, but they needed to be able to explain away the even more significant question of why climate phenomena of necessity resulted in pandemic. Were the tinderbox conditions that produced the Black Death ordained by nature, or by man? The crippling poverty that enveloped the European peasantry in the fourteenth century is attributable to the work of Man—to the desire to dominate and exploit, and to the will to obey. Famine and pandemic

were not inevitable consequences of climate phenomena, but rather the result of a mode of production derived at least in part from slavery.

In suppressing this fact along with the religious dissent and rebellion of those whose apostasy pointed to it, those who profited from the construction of a scapegoating archetype allowed a third to a half of European society to die in vain to spare their power and privileges from inquiry into its causes. Thus the evils attributed to witch conspiracy as articles of moral panic are visible in fact in the class structure of medieval European society; what was feared from witchcraft was produced in fact by the social conditions that made the onset of bubonic plague so very deadly for such an unthinkably large number of people. Victimising aged women, the most socially vulnerable and least able to defend themselves, was necessary to rescue the work of Man and maintain the privileged few in their dominant position, even if they did render themselves cause and cure of the same problem in the process in reconstructing the social relations of class society out of the ruins of famine, pandemic and the undoing of feudalism.

Employing various elements of the witch archetype—the *sabbat*, the Sexual Pact with Satan, its consummation in the Diabolical Orgy, the Diabolical Feast, Night Flight—Witch Hunters blamed their victims for existing, played the victim, demonised their enemies, defended themselves on the logic of 'if you think for yourself, the Brides of Satan win,' and reversed the burden of proof. In so perpetrating the Witch Hunts, they were responsible for the horrors alleged to be inevitable were they not permitted free reign. In perpetrating torture, the ritual humiliation of show trials, and burning of human beings alive in public places. All 'sewed a lively terror,' to borrow from Churchill, producing the outcomes attributed to the purported existential threat. This would prove to be a key feature of moral panics more broadly; a strong clue for this fact can be found in the deep cultural resonance 'witch hunts' still has in the West as a metaphor for persecution.[169] In so expediting the development

[169]Trump, Donald J. [@realDonaldTrump], '….The Greatest Witch Hunt in Political History!,' Twitter, 6 June 2018, via https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1004174436759691266, accessed 6 June 2018; 'No Place in Australia for Witch Hunts: Malcolm Turnbull,' *The West Australian*, 3 November 2017, via https://thewest.com.au/politics/federal-politics/no-place-in-australia-for-witch-hunts-malcolm-turnbull-ng-b88649644z, accessed 6 June 2018; Brull, Michael, 'Into the Abyss: Right on Cue, Desperate Malcolm Turnbull Turns on Minorities', *New Matilda*, 31 October 2016, https://newmatilda.com/2016/10/31/into-the-abyss-right-on-cuedesperate-malcolm-turnbull-turns-on-minorities, accessed 20 May 2017.

of a world praxis that succeeded in normalising paranoid covetousness, witch panic also established in the collective unconscious of everyone touched by the European Witch Hunts and their aftermath an archetypal form of panic-driven scapegoating. In so doing, it primed the collective unconscious for receptivity to deviance amplification, creating ideal conditions for new, and to all appearances endless, variations on the Oldest Trick in the Book. Such conditions would be as tinderbox-like for moral panic as European society was in the face of bubonic plague. The next case studies will examine the extent to which this fact is demonstrated in more recent memory.

Case Study 2: Communist Panic

Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power.

—George Kennan, 1947[1]

We should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.

—George Kennan, 1948[2]

The means of defence against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.

—James Madison[3]

[1] Kennan, George, *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, via https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct, accessed 1 August 2016.

[2] Kennan, George, 'Memo PPS23 by George Kennan,' Wikisource, 1948, via https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memo_PPS23_by_George_Kennan, accessed 12 May 2018.

[3] Madison, James, 'Madison Debates, June 29,' in Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, 28 June 1787, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, via http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_629.asp, accessed 12 May 2018; Madison, James, *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, 4 vols., Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1865.

This second case study examines communist panic, the second of three case studies exploring historical patterns of moral panic and their relationship to scapegoating. It outlines the construction of communist panic as such according to the analytical criteria nominated in the theoretical section of this research project, looking at the self-interested framing of the crisis from which it derived by those responsible for the panic itself. It then examines the use of moral panic constructed around communist mythology as the basis for crisis leveraging and scapegoating. The case study finishes by looking at the underlying economic and social dynamics driving the construction of communist panic and whose interests it ultimately served. I conclude the chapter by summarising the material presented in the case study against the analytical criteria in preparation for comparison against the first and third case studies in the conclusion to the thesis itself.

Communist panic, often erroneously referred to in the post-war context as 'McCarthyism,' appeared throughout the world during the twentieth century in reaction to labour organising and various forms of opposition to social injustice and imperialism. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917) sent this incipient reaction into overdrive, where it stayed through most of the century. In the United States, communist panics arose at least twice during the latter decades of the nineteenth century, in reaction to the Paris Commune (1871) and the Haymarket Massacre (1886), at least thrice domestically throughout the first half of the twentieth century in the First (1919–1920) and Second (1946–1954) Red Scares and the War Scare (1948), and then repeatedly in the post-1945 period as the engine of US foreign policy in particular and US imperialism in general.[4] Ostensibly waged against totalitarian subversion of American democracy, in practise communist panic became the enabling pretext for class war on organised labour and political dissent domestically, and movements for independent development abroad challenging US economic and military hegemony around the world.

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[4] For general material on state persecution of dissent, 'Othering' of perceived threats to the status quo and scapegoating in general during the long era of communist panic, see Feldman, Jay, *Manufacturing Hysteria: A History of Scapegoating, Surveillance, and Secrecy in Modern America*, Pantheon, 2011; Hofstadter, Richard, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, London: Cape, 1966; Davis, David, *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971.

As such, this case study contends that communist panic represents the characteristic form of the Paranoid Style in twentieth-century America, insofar as the preoccupation with the social influence of Russian Communism was a vehicle for much older preoccupations with external subversion. Insofar as the Puritans, primed by the European Witch Hunts, imported the scapegoating mentality tied to the Ancient Fantasy into the British colonies in New England as cultural baggage, where it consumed Salem during the Witch Trials. The Paranoid Style as a key facet of communist panic might be considered a North American strain of the Ancient Fantasy, especially given its numerous religious overtones.

A notable precedent for communist panic in the United States can be found in the lead up to the Spanish–American War (1898), when coal placed within range of the radiant heat from the furnaces onboard the USS Maine, stationed in Havana Harbor, spontaneously combusted, producing an explosion.[5] Immediately prior, media oligarch William Randolph Hearst had received a cable from an illustrator stationed in Cuba, who requested to come home citing no war to report. Hearst cabled in reply, 'you furnish the pictures, I'll furnish the war.' Upon the unfortunate explosion on board the Maine and receipt of pictures from his illustrator, Hearst realised the fear within official Spanish circles immediately prior that the continued presence of the Maine would give rise 'by means of an accident or some other mishap to a conflict,' inflaming hatred of the enemy to boiling point, which then spilled over into the Spanish–American War.[6] In response, *The People*, newspaper of the Socialist Labor Party, argued that 'The freedom of Cuba is but a pretext.'

[5] Rickover, Hyman George, *How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed*, Naval Inst Press, 1976; Foner, Philip Sheldon, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895–1902*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, 230–253, 'The Road to War.'

[6] Ironically, Teddy Roosevelt complained in a letter to a friend on February 16, 1898, that 'the Maine was sunk by an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards' and that nobody would ever learn the cause of the disaster which would presumably be recorded as an accident.' Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War*, ibid., 231, 240; Wilkerson, Marcus M., *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War; a Study in War Propaganda*, PhD dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1932.

> The real object was war, and war is but the means to an end that our capitalist ruling class of the Republican variety has in mind, and promises to pursue athwart the din of "patriotism," and wading knee deep through the blood of the American as well as the Cuban working class.[7]

In response to such criticisms, Hearst and those who shared his interests turned the same strategy against their own critics. It became the driving force behind the First Red Scare (1919–1920) and the Second Red Scare (1947–1954), before being directed outwards in the 'War Scare' (1948), and the Cold War (1950–1991), as noted. During these periods, a general conflict emerged between the ideals and values invoked to justify the policies and campaigns of persecution that characterised them and the actions carried out in their name. As the facts appeared to favour of the Socialist Labor Party, this was not particularly surprising. Nevertheless, this paradox was compounded by the fact that the reviled enemy was subject to the same paradox, but from the other side of the divide, resulting in the fact that in addition to making themselves cause and cure of the same problem, the paragons of anti-communism tended to resemble much of what they claimed to oppose.

Communism as originally formulated was less the autocratic vanguardism it evolved into in the early decades of the twentieth century than a political platform advocating a radical redistribution of wealth based on the principle, 'From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.' Sufficient was the appeal of this principle of social equality for almost half of the 1004 Americans polled by the Hearst Corporation in 1987 that they understood it incorrectly to be an article of the US Constitution.[8] This basic tenet of economic equality had always had a strong appeal to the broad mass of the population, striking fear into the hearts of the privileged—all the more so as Marxist critiques of economic injustice combined with liberal critiques of political autocracy to produce a libertarian socialist critique of the autocratic hierarchies inherent to capitalist relations of production, inspiring visions of industrial cooperatives and workers' self-management, where the management

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[7] Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War*, ibid., 284.

[8] Marcus, Ruth, 'Constitution Confuses Most Americans,' 15 February 1987, *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/02/15/constitution-confuses-most-americans/47e6691c-e42b-4276-8adb-ec1b24539954/, accessed 13 April 2016.

of people was replaced by the administration of things.[9] As Marx famously noted in his introduction to *The Communist Manifesto* (1848),

> A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.[10]

Such continued to be the case over the next seventy years, until the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) raised the profile of the communist movement to international prominence, elevating communism into a spectre haunting the western hemisphere. It did so less this time less as ideal and more as a revolutionary dictatorship acting in the name of the proletariat, one that quickly degenerated into a party dictatorship acting in the name of the proletariat, and then into the dictatorship of Stalin, who exercised total power over the proletariat in the name of the proletariat.[11] From the perspective of state managers on both sides of the ideological divide, however, it was vital to maintain a pretence that the Soviet nightmare was a sincere and authentic reflection of social aspirations to cooperative self-management, lest anyone imagine they had been betrayed. The very resounding failures of the great experiment in Russia provided Western elites with all the ammunition they could hope for to encourage resignation to social injustice and economic autocracy amongst workers in the West, by implying that the cure was worse than the disease. Throughout the century they exploited this failure to the hilt, at every juncture accompanied by the pretence that the terminal shortcomings of Soviet Communism excused those of capitalist democracy.

This case study examines three examples of moral panic over communism, the First Red Scare (1919–1920), the Second Red Scare (1947–1954), and the Cold War (1950–1991). It treats each stage of the analytical criteria within each of these three examples simultaneously for the purposes of

[9] Dolgoff, Sam, ed., *The Anarchist Collectives: Workers' Self-Management in the Spanish Revolution, 1936–1939*, Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1974; Mintz, Frank, *Anarchism and Workers' Self-Management in Revolutionary Spain*, AK Press, 2013.

[10] Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Penguin, 1967.

[11] Brinton, Maurice, 'The Bolsheviks & Workers' Control, 1917 to 1921: The State and Counter-Revolution,' in *For Workers' Power: The Selected Writings of Maurice Brinton*, Oakland: AK Press, 2004, 293–378; Aufheben Collective, *What Was the USSR?* Edmonton: Thoughtcrime Ink, 2013; Dauvé, Gilles, *When Insurrections Die*, https://libcom.org/library/when-insurrections-die, accessed 6 August 2016.

cross comparison. Kofsky has treated the War Scare of 1948 in great detail; there is no room to explore these details at any length, though parts of his very important work have been incorporated where possible.[12] Although a broad phenomenon throughout the West, communist panic was most concentrated in the United States, and the actions of the US government in manufacturing and reacting to communist panic set the tone for much of geopolitics in the second half of the century. It is therefore in the United States that the study of communist panic is most relevant.

> Karl Marx dismissed God as a hoax.
>
> —Joseph McCarthy

Mobilisation Phase: Self-interestedly Framing the Parameters of Crisis

This first section of the first case study examines the initial mobilising stage of communist panic in the context of various forms of class conflict in the United States and geopolitical conflict between the United States and other countries unwilling to accept their allotted role in a US-dominated world order. In examining how this crisis was framed by industrial elites to mobilise the American masses around a scapegoating campaign, this first section argues that communist panic engineers politicised social crises arising from social conflict over class-based and social injustice in their own favour. They did so, it contends, by identifying their own class interests with the moral Good, and the moral Good with the Self, and then invoking a binary, Self vs. Other logic designed to polarise American society between themselves and the Other, identified with the moral Evil, and the forces of the alleged existential threat. As the US ruling class was hegemon, this binary was inevitably defined in terms of the battle between freedom and slavery to the autocratic state—and given the deeply religious attitude of many Americas, the eternal battle between God and Satan.

In this way, this section argues, the moral entrepreneurs of communist panic equated the servicing of those class interests with servicing of the common good and common interest of all Americans in rallying against the scourge of communism, including those of the Americans they were

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[12]Kofsky, Frank, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995.

attacking. This section then developments the argument that, by framing the existentialist crises in binary terms drawing on Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy archetype, architects of the communist conspiracy theory set the stage for the demonisation of unionists, critical thinkers and other enemies of class privilege, and for the construction of the existential threat they were said to pose.

Red Scare I (1919–1929)

The first alleged existential threat came from without. In the years after 1880, a surge in immigration into the United States, consisting mostly of poor Jews and Catholics from Southern and Eastern Europe, produced almost ten million new arrivals up to 1910.[13] This 'new immigration' coincided with a period of increasingly violent class struggle, beginning with the Great Railroad Strike (1877) and the Haymarket Massacre (1886), where a bomb was thrown into a crowded rally, killing several. Prominent anarchists in the organising committee were blamed, four of whom were subsequently hung following a show trial in which the presiding judge pronounced the defendants' guilt before it had even started.[14] The Homestead Strike (1892) ended in a shootout between strikers and Pinkerton private police, the Pullman Strike (1894) featured 3000 workers who went wildcat against their own union leadership, the Lawrence Textile Strike (1912) was an unequivocal win for organised labour, and the Colorado Coal Strike (1913–1914), sometimes referred to as the 'Colorado Coalfield War,' became 'the deadliest strike in the history of the United States' on account of the running battles between strikers and the Colorado strike police following the Ludlow Massacre (1914).[15]

[13] Hartman, E. G., *The Movement to Americanise the Immigrant*, Columbia University Press, 1948, 13–14.

[14] Fischer, Nick, *Spider Web: The Birth of American Anticommunism*, Chicago: Illinois University Press, 2016, 21–22; Avrich, Paul, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

[15] Stowell, David O., *Streets, Railroads, and the Great Strike of 1877*, University of Chicago Press, 1999; Krause, Paul, *The Battle for Homestead, 1890–1892: Politics, Culture, and Steel*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992; Papke, David Ray, *The Pullman Case: The Clash of Labor and Capital in Industrial America*, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999; Forrant, Robert, and Susan Grabski, *Lawrence and the 1912 Bread and Roses Strike*, Arcadia Publishing, 2013; Zinn, Howard, Dana Frank, and Robin D. G. Kelley, *Three Strikes: Miners, Musicians, Salesgirls, and the Fighting Spirit of Labor's Last Century*, Boston: Beacon Press, 2002; Brecher, Jeremy, *Strike!* Oakland: PM Press, 2014.

Many welcomed these developments as an indication that American workers were standing up for their rights and defending their interests in time-honoured union tradition. Others feared that the revolutionary upheavals of the Old World, resurfacing of late in the Paris Commune of 1870, had weaselled their way into the New. Nativist white supremacists, invoking the Mobilisation stage of communist panic in the language of xenophobia, lamented 'a distinct deterioration' in American society, blaming violent class conflict on mass immigration of persons not 'related to us in race or language,' who possessed 'habits of thought and behaviour radically different to those which have so far prevailed in the United States.'[16] MIT President Francis A. Walker bemoaned the 'insolence and savagery' of 'beaten men from beaten races, representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence,' blaming them for 'great cities threatened with darkness, riot and pillage.'[17] Edward Cubberly, Dean of Education at Stanford, blamed the influence of arrivals who were 'largely illiterate, docile, lacking in initiative and almost wholly without the Anglo-Saxon conceptions of righteousness, liberty, law, order, public decency and government,' regarding class conflict as 'a serious case of racial indigestion.'[18] In this burgeoning xenophobia, the black and whites of the ideological binary took on a literal as well as a metaphorical aspect in their deeply racist overtones, as they reinforced the prevailing assumption that the moral Good laid with the racial status quo.

A notable feature of nativism, the racialisation of American democracy made the association of elite interests with the common good unusually conspicuous, tying 'law and order' rhetoric associated with the maintenance of an unjust peace predicated on class rule with racial supremacism. This case study contends that the distortion of 'conceptions of righteousness, liberty, law, order, public decency and government' to serve the racialisation of democracy highlighted the politicisation of the crisis narrative in favour of elites, insofar as those demonised tended quite strongly to be denied any. We explore evidence to support this argument in the pages to follow.

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[16] Van Nuys, Frank, *Americanizing the West: Immigrants and Citizenship, 1890–1930*, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002, 16.

[17] Higham, John, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988, 142–143.

[18] Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*, op. cit., 17.

Red Scare II (1946–1954)

The next alleged existential threat came from within. By 1950, a secret cabal of Communist operatives installed within the State Department had successfully undermined US relations with China, contributing decisively to the 'loss' of that country to Communist expansionism in 1946. Or such was the claim of the junior Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, who at a public meeting in Wheeling, West Virginia on 9 February, announced a political crisis arising from Communist influence within the US State Department:

> It has not been the less fortunate, or members of minority groups who have been traitorous to this Nation, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had to offer … the finest homes, the finest college education and the finest jobs in government we can give … This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been most traitorous.[19]

In this, McCarthy added, 'We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.'[20] In such comments, the assumption that challenges to hegemony by a successful anti-imperialist movement in China were as good as attacks on the United States invoked a rabid Self vs. Other binary that carried McCarthy all the way to the False Dilemma in conflating insufficient imperialist aggression with active support for the enemy. The idea of an Ivy League *sabbat* within the State Department was, after all, predicated on the conspiracy theory that the Soviet Union had inherited the mantle of global conquest from the lately defeated National Socialists—who, paradoxically enough, had themselves subscribed to the same paranoid theory that envisaged a communist conspiracy behind anything they happened not to like. In much the same vein, McCarthy

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[19] McCarthy, Joseph, 'Speech in Wheeling, West Virginia,' U.S. Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress, 1950; Cardwell, Curt, *NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 166.

[20] Griffith, Robert, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph McCarthy and the Senate*, University of Massachusetts Press, 1987, 48.

claimed to general uproar to possess 207 names of communist infiltrators in the State Department, later reducing that number to 57 for entry into the Congressional record.[21] 'As one of our outstanding historical figures once said,' McCarthy concluded, neglecting to clarify which one, '"When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be because of enemies from without, but rather because of enemies from within."'[22] If China had decided not to be a vassal of western imperialism, according to the communist conspiracy theory, that was as good as evidence of Soviet expansionism—the sensational allegation of an Ivy League *sabbat* within the State Department the kind of doubling down that got one's name in the national newspapers.

The idea of McCarthyism is premised on the idea that communist panic is historically separate from the first Red Scare. This is not in fact true, in the main given that the same individual played a pivotal part in both scares in the form of FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover. Head of the General Intelligence Division of the Bureau of Investigation (BI), during the First Red Scare, Hoover rose to lead the BI by 1924, which he refashioned into the FBI 11 years later. Hoover continued the practise he had built his career on throughout that entire time of pursuing what he considered the enemies from within, not least of which included exceeding his own authority by maintaining a 'Security Index' of people he considered threats to Internal Security. This being the case, 'McCarthyism' was better described as 'Hooverism,' the practise of framing crisis in binary terms, associating the moral Good with a class-dominated status quo, and then using those terms to target enemies for demonising through moral

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[21] McCarthy, Joseph, 'Speech of Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9, 1950,' U.S. Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress.

[22] McCarthy was apparently citing himself while describing his opinions as those of an outstanding historical figure, as commentary from the founders supports the opposite view. In 1755, Benjamin Franklin wrote that 'those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.' Similarly, James Madison, 'Father of the Constitution,' declared that, 'The means of defense agst. [against] foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.' This quote is often cited, apparently erroneously, as, 'If Tyranny and Oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting a foreign enemy.' Madison, *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, op. cit. Thomas Paine wrote, 'He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.' Paine, Thomas, *Dissertation on First Principles of Government*. R. Carlile, 1819.

panic as a prelude to scapegoating and persecution. Hoover was chasing imaginary hobgoblins long before McCarthy and was still doing so long after he left; McCarthy was simply successful for a short time in reading from Hoover's script, starting with framing a crisis in terms favourable to elite interests by freely conflating them with the moral Good.[23]

Cold War (1947–1991)

The third crisis was an alleged existential crisis from without, threatening interests without. Despite declarations to the contrary from sources as authoritative as W. Averell Hartiman, secretary of commerce, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, chief of naval operations for the US Navy and the post-war estimates of Soviet intentions and capability from its own army intelligence units for 3 or 4 years running, on 5 March 1948, US military governor in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, cabled his Stateside counterpart, Lieutenant General Stephen J. Chamberlain, to report that World War III and the end of human civilisation was imminent.

> For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me the feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness. I cannot support this change in my own thinking with any data or outward evidence in relationships other than to describe it as a feeling of new tenseness in every Soviet individual with whom we have official relations. I am unable to submit any official report in the absence of official data, but my feeling is real. You may advise the chief of staff of this for whatever it may be worth if you feel it advisable.[24]

[23] Schmidt, Regin, *Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 1919–1943*, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000, 9; Fischer, *Spider Web*, op. cit., 258–259; Caute, David, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978; Heale, M. J., *American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830–1970*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1990; Cohen, Stanley L., 'Decency Lost: McCarthyism Revisited,' *Counterpunch*, 27 October 2017, via https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/10/27/decency-lost-mccarthyism-revisited, accessed 1 November 2017.

[24] Kofsky, *The War Scare of 1948*, op. cit., 104.

Chamberlain patently did, as the Clay cable sparked a scare over an imminent Soviet declaration of war that became the basis for a rearmament campaign (along with state subsidies to American industry in the form of military contracts).[25] This scare did not appear out of nowhere. In early 1946, the State Department had sent a request to the US embassy in Moscow for an assessment of Soviet thinking. The response arrived in the form of an 8000-word 'Long Telegram,' penned by the *charge d'affaires* at the embassy, George Kennan, later published anonymously in *Foreign Affairs* as 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct.'[26] Kennan's 'Long Telegram' proved to be instrumental in first articulating the communist conspiracy theory as a feature of foreign policy, an innovation on the Ancient Fantasy/Paranoid Style archetype in that it conceived of existential threats in geopolitical terms in which both interests and threats were externalised.[27] As a characteristic feature of the Mobilisation stage, such were inevitably framed in terms associating the status quo of US military hegemony with the moral Good, and threats to such defined in terms of 'U.S. interests,' wherever in the world they happened to be, with the moral Evil and the demonised Other.

As characteristic features of the Mobilisation stage, such were evident in Kennan's allegation that East–West tensions were the product of the 'Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs,' one rooted in its 'traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.' This fed a deep suspicion of the rest of the world, Kennan continued, that inspired 'a patient but deadly struggle for the total destruction of rival powers.' Stalin and those who served him, Kennan claimed, 'were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in

[25] Kofsky, ibid.

[26] Kennan, *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, op. cit.

[27] Later, some such as John Lewis Gaddis gushed that, 'rarely in the course of diplomacy, does an individual manage to express, within a single document, ideas of such force and persuasiveness that they immediately change a nation's foreign policy,' neglecting however to account for the official intelligence referred to in (Sect. 'Cold War (1947–1991)') that tells the opposite story. Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 19. Others took a more restrained view, conceding that Kennan contributed 'conceptual clarity to a foreign policy direction that was already emerging.' Craig, Campbell, and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009, 12.

the sphere of power which they coveted.' Beholden to authoritarianism, 'their sense of insecurity was too great.'

> Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a scepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power.[28]

Invoking race indicates the lengths to which Kennan was willing to go to demonise the Soviet Other, even if doing so ran counter to his allegations regarding Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise; more to the point, racialisation of democracy as the moral Good associated with US hegemony reflects the depths to which the engineers of communist panic were willing to go to reframe crises born of conflict between ruling and subject classes and nations in terms exonerating the prevailing power structure prior to argument or evidence by reflexively associating it with the moral Good. In a similar vein, Kennan declared in defiance of the double standard that 'It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy, for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.'[29] For the demonised Other, the neurotic 'antagonism remains. … from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose.'[30] Happily however,

> The Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.[31]

[28] Kennan, *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, op. cit.

[29] Kennan, 'The Long Telegram,' op. cit.

[30] Kennan, ibid.

[31] Kennan, ibid.

While Gaddis treats Kennan's *Foreign Affairs* article as a fleshed-out version of his 'Long Telegram,' they read quite differently. In the first place, Kennan argues in the telegram that 'experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible.'[32] This is the explicit opposite of his thesis in 'Sources of Soviet Conduct,' raising questions about the meaning of the difference between Kennan's internal and public statements—for which no ready explanations are apparent. In 'Sources,' Kennan wrote that 'the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion,' with the result that Russians are 'physically and spiritually tired,' and moreover 'disillusioned, sceptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad.'[33] Though intended to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the Soviet regime, this comment indicates the latter's incapacity for the expansionist designs attributed to it also; occupying two opposing states at once was necessary however to frame an alleged existential threat that would justify another war, if only a Cold one.

> Communism is older than Christianity. it hounded and persecuted the Saviour during his earthly ministry, inspired his crucifixion, derided him in his dying agony, and then gambled for his garments at the foot of the cross.
>
> —Rep. John E. Rankin (D-MI)

Targeting Phase: Constructing Targets for Scapegoating Through the Production of Deviance

This second section of the second case study investigates the Targeting phase of communist panic in the context of mass mobilisation in defence of elite interests via the binary-laden communist conspiracy theory. To that end, this section examines deviance production by engineers of communist panic in constructing deviant stereotypes—the 'radical alien,' the 'disloyal fifth columnist,' and so on—and how these 'Others' were juxtaposed with a 'Self' conflated a priori with the moral Good. While movements for economic and social justice domestically

[32] Kennan, ibid.
[33] Kennan, ibid.

and independent development geopolitically were real challenges to the economic and military hegemony of elites, this section contends, this threat was amplified into a threat to democracy based on the conflation of vested elite interests and the moral Good. In the name of demonstrating this, it examines elite control over the channels of mass communication as a characteristic feature of communist panic, and how the media hegemony they exercised gave them the power to 'manufacture consent' (Herman and Chomsky) through moral panic. In linking the purported existential threat of communism with other alleged threats, including diabolical influence and terrorism, this section contends that engineers of communist panic effected convergence with the archetypal priming material embodied in the Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy, further expediting their political goals.

Each of the three parts of the Targeting phase concludes by comparing the facts examined therein against the basic features of moral panics as discussed in Chapter 1.

Red Scare I (1919–1929)

The elite-driven nature of deviance production was, in the case of the First Red Scare, a matter of moral panicking by class elites and their industrial associations, rather than by their political subsidiaries. As in the case of witch-panic, the Targeting phase of communist panic built on the first stage of the panic-driven scapegoating model in that elite class interests were conflated with the moral Good. As American industrialists were a prominent faction within the anti-immigration nativist bloc, this framework doubled down in communist panic with an additional layer of nativist xenophobia, expressed as fears that unassimilated immigrants were vulnerable to 'un-American' unionism. The *New York Herald*, for example, blamed the Great Railroad Strike (1877) on the few union leaders of foreign birth involved, declared them to be 'incapable of understanding our ideas and principles,' and a member of Congress who in 1915 lamented in a similar tenor that 'the more illiterate of the aliens once here quickly absorb the teachings of the radical leader.'[34]

George Creel, future director of the wartime Committee on Public Information (CPI) took a leading role in deviance production and the

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[34] Preston Jr., William, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals 1903–1933*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1963, 76.

development of communist conspiracy theorising, writing in 1916 that lack of allegiance to the United States of 'great masses of aliens,' responsible for 'seditious attacks upon the government and bold disruptions of industry,' represented 'a domestic peril that threatens the permanence of American institutions as gravely as any menace of foreign foe.'[35] Here amplification of half-truths was evident in the claim that foreign-born American workers asserting their rights was tantamount to a conspiracy against America; the prior assumptions conflating elite interests and the moral good quite unmistakable. Not very surprisingly, Creel's theories about the 'radical alien' originated with the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an employers' organisation that had adopted, early in its existence, a hard-line stance against what it called the 'un-American institution of trades-unionism.'[36]

In an atmosphere of deep hostility towards organised labour, the 1903 NAM Convention had adopted a revised *Declaration of Principles.* Speaking to the *Principles*, President David M. Parry again attributed to the enemy attitudes and behaviours conspicuous in the attributing, declaring in the strongest language possible that

> Organized labour knows but one law, and that is the law of physical forces — the law of the Huns and Vandals, the law of the savage. All its purposes are accomplished either by physical force or by the threat of force. It does not place its reliance in reason and justice, but in strikes, boycotts and coercion. It is, in all essential features, a mob-power knowing no master except its own will … The stronger it grows the great a menace it becomes to the continuance of free government, in which all the people have a voice. It is, in fact, a despotism springing into being in the midst of a liberty-loving people…[37]

[35] Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*, op. cit, 46; Vaughn, Stephen, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism and the Committee on Public Information*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980; Fischer, Nick, 'The Committee on Public Information and the Birth of US State Propaganda,' *Australasian Journal of American Studies* 35, no. 1, July 2016, 51–78; Creel, George, *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe*, Harper & Brothers, 1920.

[36] Stalker, 'Americanism,' op. cit., 31; Foner, *History of the Labor Movement*, op. cit., 38.

[37] Gable, 'Birth of an Employers' Association,' op. cit., 542.

After 1903, the NAM expanded this avowal of class warfare 'to a degree undreamed of by even the most optimistic of the original members.' A House Committee investigating the political effects of corporate lobbying found the NAM in 1919 to be 'an organization having purposes and aspirations … so vast and far-reaching as to excite at once admiration and fear—admiration for the genius that conceived them and fear for the effects which the successful accomplishment of all these ambitions might have in a government such as ours.'[38] It noted also that 'the deliberate creation of a charged public opinion and consequent "coercion through propaganda" were an important means by which the new lobby operated,' its 'secretive, reprehensible and disreputable' methods appearing in a pamphlet series entitled *Educational Literature*, which despite its title did not reflect any teaching methodology.[39] On the contrary, it was an early but significant exercise in moral panicking.

To this end, the 'secretive, reprehensible and disreputable' propaganda produced by the NAM denounced 'typical labour demagogues,' who in being 'industry's worst enemies' and 'the greatest danger we have to face,' forced all 'patriotic, fair-minded, intelligent citizens' to choose between the Constitution and 'Gomperism,' Americanism and 'class distinction.' Revealing in brazen language the lengths to which it was willing to go, the NAM envisaged the peril of labour unions as a beast with 'seven heads and ten horns' that could be found 'stalking up and down the earth, demanding that no man should work, buy or sell, save that he had the name or mark of the beast upon his right hand or in his forehead'—the use of religious themes a direct appeal to religious priming associated with the Ancient Fantasy.[40] Immigrant unionists not only wanted to destroy America, but served Satan in doing so. As we have seen from the first case study, this latter claim tapped a rich pedigree of conspiratorial paranoia, later to become the focus of Richard Hofstadter.

Thus the NAM denounced 'the outbursts of anarchism' of Samuel Gompers, the notably conservative President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), as fuel to every 'loud-mouthed agitator and preacher of discontent,' who so lacked 'the instincts and sentiments of a patriot'

[38] Gable, ibid.; Edgar, Lane, 'Some Lessons from Past Congressional Investigations of Lobbying,' *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 14, no. 1, Spring 1950: 18.

[39] Lane, 'Some Lessons from Past Congressional Investigations of Lobbying,' ibid., 20.

[40] NAM, 'Where Do You Stand?', Educational Literature #2, 3–10.

that they dared to observe that 'the courts of this country are controlled by the rich to oppress the poor.'[41] Such abandon was behind the dream of a day when 'labour becomes its own master,' which could only become 'an oligarchy socially'—the double standards excusing the burgeoning oligarchy of American industrialists highlighting the deviance production designed to facilitate blame-shifting and scapegoating.[42] Against such heinous potentialities, the NAM proposed 're-discovery of the American,' contending this would help 'America' in 'the race for a dominant position in the markets of the world'—a prospect that would inspire 'the exhilaration which thrilled the first man of the white race who, standing upon the crest of the backbone of the American continent, looked out' at 'a whole world of … of peaceful and honourable conquest.'[43] In contemplating this dream of world conquest, the NAM pamphleteer alleged 'nothing, nothing, between me and the throne of God but the Cross of Christ and the flag of my country'[44]—the introduction of a feverishly zealous tone again making a direct religious appeal to the 'Ancient Fantasy' as a trigger of cultural priming and clarion call for class warfare against the demonised Other. To this religious formulation, immigrant unionists had rendered themselves enemies of God and servants of the diabolical power by organising in defence of their rights and advancement of their interests in the industrial *sabbat*.

In the NAM propaganda, the moral panic criteria examined in Chapter 1 compare as follows.

Stanley Cohen:

- *A suitable enemy*: immigrants demonised as the Other;
- *A suitable victim*: Americans lionised as the Self;
- *A consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities:* the beast with 'seven heads and ten horns' is marching up and down the country.

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[41] NAM, 'The Goal of the Labor Trust,' Educational Literature #3, New York: NAM, 1912, 3–7.

[42] NAM, 'Where Do You Stand?' ibid., 4–9, 15.

[43] NAM, 'The Next Step in Education,' Educational Literature #4, New York: NAM, 1912, 3; NAM, 'Let Us Send the Whole Boy to School,' Educational Literature #7, New York; NAM, 1912, 9–11.

[44] NAM, 'The Next Step in Education,' op. cit., 16–23.

Hall et al:

- *The intensification of a particular issue*: immigrants trying to overthrow America by pursuing rights for workers.
- *The identification of a subversive minority:* 'radical immigrants,' 'radical aliens';
- *'Convergence':* immigration, labour unions and radicalism conceived of as a conspiratorial or 'pestilential alliance';
- *The notion of 'thresholds'*: 'the permanence of American institutions'
- *The element of explaining and prophesying*: Labour unions are promoting 'monopolism' and 'anarchy' and will produce both if given free reign
- *The call for firm steps*: 'the rediscovery of the American.'

Goode and Ben-Yehuda:

- *Heightened concern*: Immigrant workers trying to destroy America by unionising is not always regarded an existential threat.
- *Increased hostility*: immigrant workers trying to destroy America was not always a preoccupation for American industrialists.
- *Widespread consensus*: The NAM was the peak body for U.S. industrialists.
- *Disproportionate appraisal*: Having rights is what freedom is all about; and
- *General volatility*: The scare produced a vociferous reaction against immigrant workers, demonised and made subject to thought policing to deter them from disobedience.

A general fit is apparent between the iteration of the communist conspiracy theory associated with NAM propaganda and multiple criteria of moral panic. As the backdrop to the First Red Scare, it may be understood as a moral panic.

Red Scare II (1946–1954)

The elite-driven nature of deviance production was, in the case of the Second Red Scare, driven by political elites, institutionalised within and in proximity to the walls of government—a fact arguably demonstrative of how well the fears expressed in 1919 by the House Committee

investigating corporate lobbying had been grounded.[45] With the threat of Nazism put to bed, traditional anti-communists now had room to revive pre-war hostilities against the only other remaining pole of world power. Birthing the Targeting phase in the post-war era, the FBI lead by J. Edgar Hoover sought to raise anti-communist political correctness to a national virtue, launching a campaign to tie political rights to ideological conformity with the US far right. As Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd alleged in proposing a widespread campaign geared to building an anti-communist consensus on this basis in February 1946,

> To a large extent, the power and influence of the Communist Party in this country, which is out of all proportion to the actual size of the party, derives from the support which the party receives from 'liberal' sources and from its connections in the labour unions. The Party earns its support by championing individual causes which are also sponsored by the liberal elements.[46]

As both liberals and communists were opposed to the values and priorities of the far right, deviance production was to take the form of associating anything not of the far right with support for a communist conspiracy against America; a similar mentality in the Soviet Union twisted any doubt in Stalin's judgement into a conspiracy to overthrow the communist revolution and restore capitalism and Tsarism. Ladd's claims reflect the use of 'convergence' in blowing mere expression of unfavoured political opinions out of all proportion for the purposes of deviance production and moral panic, a process demonstrated in notably brazen style by a group of former FBI agents operating under the name American Business Consultants (ABC) in New York City. These freelance communist hunters produced *Red Channels*, a manual listing names of Hollywood entertainment workers said to be communist or communist-aligned.[47]

Red Channels is a unique source in being one of the very few anti-communist texts that even purports to treat hard evidence. Describing

[45] See Footnote 35.

[46] O'Reilly, Kenneth, *Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace*, Temple University Press, 1983, 168.

[47] American Business Consultants (ABC), *Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television*, New York: Counterattack, 1950.

Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* as 'a standard textbook and guide for communists throughout the world' without acknowledging the deep ideological divisions between communists who subscribe to Leninism and those who don't, ABC included a quote they attributed to Lenin to the effect that 'the dictatorship cannot be effectively realized without "belts" to transmit power from the vanguard (the Communist Party) to the mass of the advanced class (the "progressive" writers, actors, directors, etc.) and from this to the labouring masses (the public).'[48] The existence of a communist *sabbat* in Hollywood was, on the basis of this quote, purported to be entirely consistent with communist theory and practice, and so its veracity can be considered critical to the claims attached to it. A reference check on the quote (given as 29–30 in the original text) turns up a series of lectures Stalin delivered at the Sverdlov University on 'The Foundations of Leninism'; a browser search for 'belts' in the entire chapter yields no results at all.[49] A similar search through the entire document turns up commentary on 'belts' two chapters later, though from Stalin, not Lenin, and in reference to trade unions, soviets, cooperatives, the Youth League and the Party itself in the Soviet Union, as opposed to 'the mass of the advanced workers' in capitalist democracies.[50]

The quote in *Red Channels* then, borrowed from a similar phrase elsewhere to sound like Leninist doctrine, is fabricated to producing a fit with the communist conspiracy theory used to rationalise the booklet per se. Using this fabricated evidence, the *Red Channels* authors apply the communist conspiracy theory to Hollywood. 'Dramatic programs are occasionally used for Communist propaganda purposes,' they alleged, since 'with radios in most American homes and with approximately 5 million TV sets in use, the Cominform and the Communist Party USA now rely more on radio and TV than on the press and motion pictures as "belts" to transmit pro-Sovietism to the American public.'[51] An important section on 'Domination of American Broadcasting' fares little better, providing another quote purporting to be from Lenin impressing on Communist Party members 'the necessity of proving to the

[48] ABC, *Red Channels*, ibid., 2.

[49] Stalin, Joseph, *Problems of Leninism*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1976, 29–30, via http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/FL24.html, accessed 28 August 2016.

[50] Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, 179–185.

[51] ABC, *Red Channels*, op. cit., 2–3.

bourgeoisie that there is not, nor can there be, a sphere or field of work that cannot be won by the Communists.' The supporting citation refers to pages 172–173 in Vol. X of the *Selected Works of Lenin*, published 1943, though that series wasn't first published in English until 1963 and only ran to three volumes, not ten (ten volumes of *Selected Works* doesn't seem very selective either). Pages 172–173 of Vol. X of Lenin's *Collected Works* consists of a discussion on land nationalisation, and the English translation of that series was not first published until 1963.[52]

Lastly, the section entitled 'The Counterattack' reproduced an editorial form a radio broadcaster's magazine declaring that 'Communists and Communist sympathisers have no place on our air,' and that 'where there's red smoke there's usually red fire,' therefore 'efforts to gloss over possible Communist infiltration of radio is dangerous.' Advocating screening, it generously stated that 'every safeguard must be used to protect innocents and genuine liberals from being unjustly labelled'— genuine liberals presumably being those who did not object to 'just labelling.'[53] In the case of *Red Channels*, 'just labelling' as the basis of deviance production over the Hollywood *sabbat* involved not just blowing issues out of proportion to make a fit with the conspiracy theory and construct a target for later scapegoating, but lying from whole cloth. Such were swallowed whole by then-actor Ronald Reagan, who recalled in his official memoirs that 'the Communist plan for Hollywood was remarkably simple' insofar as it was 'merely to take over the motion picture business,' though not merely for 'its profit, but also for a grand worldwide propaganda base.'[54] In so doing, the future President neatly summed up the communist conspiracy theory articulated in *Red Channels* as it applied to Hollywood.

> In these days before television and massive foreign film production, American films, dominated 95 percent of the world's movie screens. We had a weekly audience of about 500,000,000 souls. Takeover of this

[52] Lenin, V. I., *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, 172–173.

[53] ABC, *Red Channels*, op. cit., 6–7.

[54] 'Ellen Schrecker has suggested, based on recently opened FBI files from the Cold War years, that McCarthyism should properly be renamed "Hooverism" because of the pivotal role played by the Bureau in creating the anticommunist consensus: "For the FBI was the bureaucratic heart of the McCarthy era" Schrecker, Ellen, *Many Are the Crimes. McCarthyism in America*, Boston, 1998, 203,' in Schmidt, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 9fn; Reagan, Ronald, *Where's the Rest of Me?* New York: Dell, 1981, 186–187.

enormous plant and its gradual transformation into a Communist grist-mill was a grandiose idea. It would have been a magnificent coup for our enemies.[55]

Whether it would have been a magnificent coup for Reagan's perceived enemies because it was a grandiose idea, or whether it was a grandiose idea because it was driven by moral panicking over the existential threat posed by communism and falsification of evidence, Reagan did not clarify. Some clue was provided by Rep. John Rankin (D-MI), ranking member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), who alleged that

> Communism is older than Christianity. It hounded and persecuted the Saviour during his earthly ministry, inspired his crucifixion, derided him in his dying agony, and then gambled for his garments at the foot of the cross.[56]

Such terms recall the Eternal Jew and are said to have been a pet theme.[57] The use of an anti-Semitic trope to refer to an industry dominated by Jews yields insight into the reluctance of HUAC to investigate the far-right. It recalls at the same moment a much older historical institution, also apparently inspired by the Ancient Fantasy, that also had a problem with Jews—a fact pointing to a common lineage in deviance production, conspiratorial theorising and scapegoating.[58]

In the Second Red Scare, the moral panic criteria examined in Chapter 1 compare as follows.

Stanley Cohen:

- *A suitable enemy*: Communists, demonised as the Other.
- *A suitable victim*: Good, loyal Americans, lionised as the Self; and
- *A consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities*: the support the communists receive from 'liberal' sources; the plan was part of the Communist plan for world domination.

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[55] Ronald Reagan, *Where's the Rest of Me?* ibid.

[56] Navasky, *Naming Names*, op. cit., 109.

[57] Navasky, ibid.

[58] Litvak, Joseph, *The Un-Americans: Jews, the Blacklist, and Stoolpigeon Culture*, Duke University Press, 2009; See also Case Study I.

Hall et al.:

- *The intensification of a particular issue*: 'infiltration of Hollywood for propaganda purposes'
- *The identification of a subversive minority*: 'Communists';
- *Convergence*: The alleged communist plan for Hollywood coincided with broader geopolitical concerns about Communist expansion;
- *The notion of 'thresholds'*: communist takeover of the motion picture industry and radio as (1) the thin end of the wedge, (2) 'transmission belts' portending even worse to come;
- *The element of explaining and prophesying*: 'destroying American business and our American way of life,' 'the loss of 500,000,000 souls,' 'Communism is older than Christianity'; and
- *The call for firm steps*: An ideological purge of the industry was conducted through the Hollywood Show Trials.

Goode and Ben-Yehuda

- *Heightened concern*: Communist propaganda in Hollywood is not always alleged to be an existential threat;
- *Increased hostility*: Communist propaganda in Hollywood is not always the subject of a show trial;
- *Widespread consensus*: the communist conspiracy theory was entertained by prominent members of the political class including a future president;
- *Disproportionate appraisal*: dissent and critical thought are not a foreign-directed conspiracy against democracy, they are essential to it; and
- *General volatility*: the purging of 'communists' from the motion picture industry, tv and radio was the basis of the Hollywood Show Trials.

A general fit is apparent between the iteration of the communist conspiracy theory associated with the Second Red Scare and multiple criteria of moral panic. The Second Red Scare may then be understood as a moral panic.

Cold War (1947–1991)

The elite-driven nature of deviance production was, in the case of the Cold War, a matter of moral panicking by the architects of state policy, a reflection of how deeply the culture of it had set into the national political culture. National Security Council memorandum #68 (NSC68, 1950) was a top-secret policy document produced by the Policy Planning Subcommittee (PPS) of the US government defining the parameters of US foreign policy in the post-war period. PPS chair Paul Nitze presented NSC68 to Truman in April 1950.[59] Reflecting the tendency to frame political issues in theological terms, Nitze later described NSC68 as 'a gospel that lends itself to preaching.'[60] As in all matters of faith, the Gospel of Nitze abandoned empiricism for a theological approach based on the a priori assumption that beliefs speak as loudly as actions. Preferencing belief over facts as meaningful measures of reality, NSC68 was consistent with earlier iterations of communist conspiracy theory in conflating elite privilege with the moral Good and associating the Good with the Self prior to the facts.[61] This appears to account for why, in the course of 25,000 words, Nitze does not refer *once* to demonstrable conduct of either the USSR or USA to support his claims; on this count, NSC68 fails the minimum requirements for an essay in high school. The 'basic structure of its argument,' Chomsky concludes, has 'the childlike simplicity of a fairy tale.'[62]

What NSC68 did do was to promote binaries that served the purposes of demonising the enemy and deviance production on a geopolitical scale. Nitze claimed to that end in the 'Background of the Present

[59] *A Report to the National Security Council—NSC 68*, 12 April 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers, via https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf, accessed 30 July 2016.

[60] Drew, S. Nelson, and Paul Nitze, *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment*, DIANE Publishing, 1994, 4.

[61] 'It is widely recognized that the very existence of the Soviet Union constitutes aggression.' Chomsky, Noam, *Deterring Democracy*, London: Verso, 1990, 14.

[62] Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, ibid., Chapter 1, 'Cold War: Facts and Fancy,' 26; Wolin, Sheldon, *Democracy Inc: Managed Democracy and the Spectre of Inverted Totalitarianism*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008, 28–40; Kuzmarov, Jeremy, and John Marciano, *The Russians Are Coming, Again: The First Cold War as Tragedy, the Second as Farce*, NYU Press, 2018, Chapter 3, 'The Truth Is We Have Spent Trillions of Dollars on a Gigantic Hoax.'

Crisis' that 'the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.' Conflict, having become 'endemic,' is waged by the enemy only 'in accordance with the dictates of expediency,' and so 'with the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.' Nitze tilted against the 'the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will,' where 'all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith.'[63]

Faith is again a central feature in the second on the 'Fundamental Purposes of the United States and the Soviet Union.' In contrast to the 'fundamental purpose' of the United States, to 'assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual,' Nitze juxtaposes the Kremlin, which as a matter of definition has Designs. Primary amongst these were to 'retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control.'[64] 'The design,' he claims,

> calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass.[65]

Nitze provides not a sliver of proof to substantiate these claims; the Other is evil because it exists. The Self is good for the same reason. On this logic, and since 'the Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict between idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin,' the 'implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles.'

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[63] *NSC 68*, Truman Papers, op. cit.

[64] *NSC 68*, ibid.; Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, op. cit., 13.

[65] *NSC 68*, ibid.

The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it … For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.[66]

By way of demonstrating its moral superiority, the free society launched its second Red Scare in a quarter-century and the Hollywood Show Trials, under the aegis of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Anyone suspecting cognitive dissonance in this respect need not have been overly concerned, for as Nitze repeatedly alleged, freedom was a matter not so much of facts, but of faith.[67] As the actual foundation of the communist conspiracy theory as the defining feature of post-war US foreign policy, the major article of faith was that the United States was qualitatively different from the qualities ascribed to the Other—one born ultimately of deviance production and moral panic.

The Truman Doctrine

NSC-68 helped birth the Truman Doctrine—containment of alleged Soviet expansionism—which raised communist conspiracy theory to the core of US foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine had encouragement from the British also, who had inspiration in adopting communist conspiracy theory from their Nazi collaborator clients in Greece as the two cooperated in rooting out leftist partisan groups who had resisted Nazi occupation during World War II. The British economy had been dragged into disaster by an unusually severe winter of 1946–1947, and they were unable to continue aiding Greek fascists themselves.[68] Taking up the

[66] *NSC 68*, ibid.

[67] 'The deeply anti-democratic thrust of NSC68 reflects far more general commitments.' Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, op. cit., 22.

[68] Truman, Harry S., 'President Harry S. Truman's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947,' *The Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp, accessed 28 April 2016; Cardwell, *NSC 68 and the Origins of the Cold War*, op. cit., 81–84; Ninkovich, Frank, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century*, University of Chicago Press, 1994, 171–174;

anti-communism of Britain and their Greek collaborator clients, whose penchant for communist conspiracy theory was exceeded only by the National Socialists defeated in the late World War, Truman laid out the new iteration in his speech to Congress on 12 March 1947, committing to supporting the former Axis puppet government of Greece in fighting the alleged tentacles of Soviet power:

> The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.[69]

According to this formulation, civil war in Greece could not be taking place because fascism was objectionable, but only because of expansionist communist designs on the West. It was not necessary to prove border violations; the prior framing of crisis in binary terms, casting the Other in opposition to the Self, the moral Good, and the elite interests conflated with them, was enough to establish that communists were an existential threat.[70] Working in this mode, Truman declared: 'at the present moment in world history, nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life,' between 'free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression,' and 'the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority,' relying on 'terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.'[71] While these had been the policies of the Nazi collaborators

Freeland, Richard M., *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948*, New York: Knopf, 1972, 70–81; Villiotis, Stephen, 'From Sceptical Disinterest to Ideological Crusade: The Road to American Participation in the Greek Civil War, 1943–1949,' Unpublished Master's Thesis, 2013, University of Central Florida, via http://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3793&context=etd, accessed 25 June 2018.

[69] Truman, 'Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,' op. cit.

[70] Truman's reference to communist terrorists is also significant; we return to it in the next case study.

[71] Truman, 'Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,' op. cit.

he was proposing to support, Truman nevertheless insisted that 'it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.'[72]

Also odds with the burgeoning communist conspiracy theory was another inconvenient fact, this time that Stalin, having become less interested in exporting revolutions than gaining respectability within the geopolitical status quo, had already split with Tito over support for Greek anti-fascists following his meeting with Churchill at the Kremlin in October 1944 (the 'Percentages Agreement')—a fact that had already precipitated his betrayal of the anti-fascist cause in Spain.[73] There was no issue of Soviet expansionism, though the free peoples of Greece were, it is true, faced with the forcible imposition of 'the will of a minority upon the majority, terror and oppression,' but from the collaborationist Security Battalions. Remobilised by the British to restore the Greek monarchy as an anti-communist buttress, despite its own wartime collaboration with the Nazi occupiers, a white terror—the *Dekemvriana*—and the Greek Civil War resulted.[74] Material support to fascists and suppression of freedoms in the anti-communist cause, however, were inconvenient to deviance production and engineering of moral panic over communism, and were suppressed accordingly.

In Kennan's writings, NSC68 and the Truman Doctrine, the moral panic criteria examined in Chapter 1 appear as follows.

Stanley Cohen:

- *A suitable enemy*: The Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, demonised as the Other;
- *A suitable victim*: The United States and the West, lionised as the Self; and

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[72] Truman, 'Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,' ibid.

[73] Cardwell, *NSC 68*, op. cit., 28–57; Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power*, op. cit., 171–174; Resis, Albert, 'The Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944,' *The American Historical Review* 83, no. 2, 1978: 368–387; Radosh, Ronald, Mary R. Habeck, and Grigorij Sevostianov, eds., *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War*, Yale University Press, 2001.

[74] Vulliamy, Ed, and Helena Smith, 'Athens 1944: Britain's Dirty Secret,' *The Guardian*, 30 November 2014, via https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/athens-1944-britains-dirty-secret, accessed 25 June 2018; Wong, Wendy, '"Taking The Lead"— The *Dekemvriana*, British Foreign Policy and Yalta, 1944–1945,' *The Journal of Modern Hellenism* 17, 2000: 191–213.

- *A consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities:* 'Lenin and Stalin were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted.'

Hall et al:

- *The intensification of a particular issue*: 'Expansionist threats to world peace,' 'seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world';
- *The identification of a subversive minority*: 'The Kremlin,' 'Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership';
- *'Convergence'* and *the notion of 'thresholds'*: 'Constantly shifting geographical and political points,' the 'Domino Theory';
- *The element of explaining and prophesying* 'The total destruction of rival powers,' 'a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own'; and,
- *The call for firm steps*: 'The adroit and vigilant application of counter-force.'

Goode and Ben-Yehuda:

- *Heightened concern*: Communist expansionism is not always alleged an existential threat;
- *Increased hostility*: Society is not usually up in arms about Communist expansionism;
- *Widespread consensus*: Kennan was published in *Foreign Affairs* and the worldview he articulated became the basis for NSC68 and the Truman Doctrine;
- *Disproportionate appraisal*: the Soviets were in no position to conquer the world having just borne the brunt of Nazi aggression, Stalin had disavowed world communism; and,
- *General volatility*: Containment ideology became the basis of the Cold War.

A general fit is apparent between the iteration of the communist conspiracy theory associated with the Cold War, and multiple criteria of moral panic. Thus the Cold War may be understood as a sustained moral panic.

'He who is not for America is against America.'
—'America First' motto, circa World War I

'The only way to fight Prussianism is with Prussian tools.'
—Frederick Lewis Allen, 1917[75]

Legitimation Phase: Constructing a Pretext Through Moral Disengagement for the Persecution of Scapegoats

This third stage of the second case study examines the Legitimation stage of terrorist panic. As crisis framed in the favour of elites laid a foundation for demonising working-class unionists and political dissenters through deviance production, it argues, engineers of communist panic sought to make the communist conspiracy theory the basis for scapegoating through a victim complex based on victim-blaming, playing of the victim, the 'if you think for yourself, the communists win' logic of the False Dilemma, and other aspects of moral disengagement. This, it reveals, was achieved with the aid of corporate propaganda and mass media hegemony, which added the methods of moral panic to those it already employed for the manufacture of consent. In so doing, this section argues, moral entrepreneurs rendered communist panic the basis for scapegoating by recasting the class war already decided on as a proportionate response to provocation rather than inter-class aggression—recasting victims of this aggression as deserving.

To that end, it examines how this victim complex drew on the Paranoid Style; where religious sectarianism was introduced against communism as the province of Godless heathens, the Ancient Fantasy. These, it argues, were expressed in such texts as Lucia Maxwell's 'Spider Web Chart,' the Lusk Committee Report, *Red Channels*, NSC68, and *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, to name a few.[76] It looks at how the False Dilemma at the core of this victim complex identified organised

[75]Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*, op. cit., 60.

[76]Maxwell, Lucia, 'Spider Web Chart: The Socialist-Pacifist Movement in America Is an Absolutely Fundamental and Integral Part of International Socialism,' *The Dearborn Independent*, XXIV, 22 March 1924: 11, via http://womhist.alexanderstreet.com/wilpf/doc3.htm, accessed 20 April 2018; 'Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics with an Exposition and Discussion of the Steps Being Taken and Required to Curb

challenges to corporate supremacism and Western imperialism with the existential threat, arguing that the victim complex became the means of leveraging communist panic by legitimating the persecution of actual victims of corporate supremacism and imperialism to follow.

Red Scare I (1919–1920)

Panic over communist conspiracy had coalesced into the mythology of a 'radical alien' threat to 'America' by 1912, when foreign-born textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts went on strike, attracting nation-wide attention and galvanising onlookers on both sides. After an unusually violent nine and a half weeks, the strikers gained 'one of the few unequivocal victories in the history of American labour to that date.'[77] If the NAM and the interests it represented felt threatened by organised labour already, Lawrence precipitated outright panic. Trade paper *Iron Age* shrieked of an 'epidemic of strikes' brought on by the pestilential alliance of foreigners and reds; John Bruce McPherson of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers foretold in dread tones of 'an explosion of no mean dimension' when workers who,

> unacquainted with our customs; possessing ideals and views radically different from ours; of a highly excitable temperament; natives of countries where no representative government exists, and where revolutionary intrigue is a daily operation [find the requisite] cause and leadership.'[78]

In the face of such victimisation, the NAM immediately launched an 'Americanisation' campaign to teach immigrant workers the importance of identifying the class privileges of elites with the national

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It. Being the Report of the Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, in the State of New York,' in *Part I: Revolutionary and Subversive Movements Abroad and at Home*, Albany: JB Lyon Company 2, 1920, via https://archive.org/details/revolutionaryra00luskgoog, accessed 20 April 2018; Cline, Ray, and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, New York: Crane Russak, 1984.

[77] Foner, Philip S., *The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905–1917*, New York: International Publishers, 1965, 306–348; Carey, Alex, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, op. cit., 43.

[78] McPherson, John Bruce, *The Lawrence Strike of 1912*, Boston: National Association of Wool Manufacturers, 1912, 2.

interest[79]—their native-born compatriots having already been thus indoctrinated at school.[80] At the Ford Motor Company, the eponymous benevolent paternalist launched Industrial Americanisation, declared that 'these men of many nations must be taught the American ways, the English language, and the right way to live,' reserving the right to define the meaning of 'America' and 'the right way to live' for himself (and, commensurately, fire those who disagreed).[81] S. S. Marquis, head of the Ford Sociological Department, made the production line a metaphor for the Ford educational programme, referred in no uncertain terms to 'the human product we seek to turn out.' 'As we adapt the machinery in the shop to turning out the kind of automobile we have in mind,' declared Ford's head social engineer, 'so we have constructed our educational system with a view to producing the human product [sic] in kind.'[82]

Chasing more human product, the 1911–1912 Annual Report of the corporate-sponsored North American Civic League for Immigrants (NACLI) found lax naturalisation laws, coupled with increased participation of labour in lawmaking, and criticism of local authorities to be the source of industrial conflict. At the heart of all of these, it alleged, was the growth of that type of socialism 'which is synonymous with treason,' and encouragement of free speech 'which ignores legal restraints'[83]—a sober assessment of the constitutionality of free speech in assertion of workers' rights here eclipsed by the victim-playing of interested partisans. While 'vicious tendencies' evident at Lawrence and in 'many other minor disturbances' had raised the spectre of a 'threatened conflagration,' such had been checked for the moment; nevertheless, the NACLI remained doggedly vigilant, surmising that 'a smouldering blaze in the

[79] Hartman, E. G., *The Movement to Americanise the Immigrant*, New York: AMS Press, 1967; Van Nuys, *Americanising the West*, op. cit.; Gardner, Lloyd C., *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1923*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

[80] Carlson, Robert A., *The Quest for Conformity: Americanization Through Education*, New York: Wiley, 1975; Cody, Frank, 'Americanization Courses in the Public Schools,' *The English Journal 7*, no. 10, December 1918: 1–39; Issel, William, 'Americanization, Acculturation and Social Control: School Reform Ideology in Industrial Pennsylvania, 1880–1910,' *Journal of Social History* 12, no. 4, 1979: 569–590.

[81] Meyer, Stephen, 'Adapting the Immigrant to the Line: Americanization in the Ford Factory, 1914–1921,' *Journal of Social History* 14, no. 1, 1980: 70.

[82] Meyer, 'Adapting the Immigrant to the Line,' ibid., 74.

[83] NACLI, *Annual Report 1911–1912*, Boston: NACLI, 1912, 5.

dry thatch, which is screened by the tall grass, may do endless damage,' and counselling that the public should 'not only to learn of its peril through recent experiences but also to stamp out any errant flames which are feeding out of sight.'[84] The permanent victimhood of the interests represented by the NACLI provided a *carte blanche* in this respect.

Looking then to stamp out errant flames, the NACLI launched a new 'Americanisation' drive, building on the xenophobic conflation of 'foreign' and 'dangerous' inherent to the communist conspiracy theory. Organisational duties fell to the National Americanisation Committee (NAC), the offspring of a successful campaign to have 4 July 1915 made into 'Americanisation Day.' The NAC launched an 'America First' campaign in New York City on 15 October 1915, looking to indoctrinate immigrant workers in 'national unity and feeling, our pride in American citizenship [and] our faith in and devotion to American ideals of freedom, justice, humanity and good will.'[85] Some idea of how these ideals appeared in practice can be gathered from America First membership cards stating that 'the object of this Society is to oppose to the enemies of liberty and justice everywhere a solid front of one hundred million Americans, united in loyalty to one Language, one Country, one Flag.' Their motto was: 'He who is not for America is against America'— the notion, born of the False Dilemma, that asserting economic rights and challenging class privilege was victimising the rich.[86]

The Committee on Public Information

Adopting the Americanisation campaign during the Preparedness period had also, for the Federal Government, became the basis for its adoption nationally of the ultranationalist mores of '100% Americanism,' the thinking behind which was encapsulated in the 'America First' motto of 'those who are not for America are against it.' This development was one of the more notable feats of the Committee on Public Information (CPI), whose co-option of Americanisation tropes became the basis for a massive and heretofore unprecedented campaign of wartime propaganda.[87] One of the

[84] NACLI, *Annual Report 1911–1912*, Boston: NACLI, 1912, ibid.

[85] Kellor, 'National Americanization Day—July 4th,' 27.

[86] Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*, op. cit., 106.

[87] Fischer, *Spider Web*, op. cit., 47–49; Fischer, 'The Committee on Public Information,' op. cit.; *Dark Angel*, op. cit., 84–93; Carey, op. cit., 58–60.

more curious examples of CPI output resulted from the deep suspicion with which many Americans held the Bolsheviks following the Brest-Litovsk summit, which in removing Russia from the war was perceived as a betrayal of the anti-Prussian cause; the tantrum logic of 'for America or against it' conflated lack of favour with support for the Other—sentiments fanned with onerous predictability by the CPI, which tried to prove a conspiracy between the two.'[88]

The CPI argued its conspiracy theory in a publication that went to three editions in as many years that 'the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a betrayal of the Russian people by the German agents, Lenin and Trotsky.'[89] While no evidence existed to demonstrate a relationship, the conspiracy theory was entertained at the time as a convenience that simultaneously bolstered deviance production and facilitated the victim complex. No less than George Kennan conceded a full three decades after the fact that 'It is not conceivable that in these moments of deepest crisis Lenin should have concealed from his associates political circumstances of highest relevance to the great questions at hand,' stating clearly for the record that 'nowhere do the documents suggest that the Germans used this extensive implied authority in Petrograd to break the recalcitrance of the Soviet negotiators at Brest,' and that 'the captured German material contains a great deal of solid evidence that no such relationship existed at all.'[90] Kennan manages yet to contradict himself however by claiming that the Germans financed the Bolsheviks in the spring and summer of 1917, such that their victory might demoralise the Russian army to their benefit. 'In the sweeping demoralization of the Russian armed forces that accompanied the Bolshevik political triumph in Russia,' Kennan wrote, 'this German speculation was vindicated beyond the most optimistic dreams'[91]—apart from a great deal of solid evidence that no such relationship existed at all.

[88] Murray, Robert, *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria 1919–1920*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955, 34; Schmidt, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 24–27; Sisson, Edgar Grant, and National Board for Historical Service, *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*, War Information Series, Washington, DC: Committee on Public Information, 1918.

[89] Sisson, *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*, 3.

[90] Kennan, 'The Sisson Documents,' op. cit.

[91] Kennan, ibid., 154.

CPI propaganda of this type was part of a wider campaign on its part to shift American politics further into a 'jealous nationalism' whose defining characteristic Higham describes as 'a conformist loyalty intolerant of any values not functional to it; the demand for a high sense of duty towards the nation; the faith in a drumfire of exhortation and propaganda to accomplish desired social objectives, and the ultimate reliance on coercion and punishment.'[92] By war's end, many Americans were steeped in 100% Americanism, the CPI having pursued with a noted zeal the 'reinterpretation of American ideals' and 'the complete reorganisation of our life' in favour of a new ultranationalist consensus constructed on permanent victimhood, one justified as a necessary exigency to aid victory.[93]

After the Armistice, those such as Creel with the power to impose their interpretation of words on public opinion treated it instead as a desirable trait of citizens. This profound ideological shift was reflected in a parallel shift in communications theory generally; before the war, informing public opinion had been understood to be key feature of government communications, a progressive impulse that had initially motivated Creel to seek out the head role. Afterwards, it was more inclined to manipulate it.[94] So successful was Creel in this respect that Adolf Hitler credited the work of the CPI in *Mein Kampf* as one of the more prominent factors expediting the Allied victory:

> By representing the Germans to their own people as barbarians and Huns, they prepared the individual soldier for the terrors of war, and thus helped to preserve him from disappointments. After this, the most terrible weapon that was used against him seemed only to confirm what his propagandists had told him; it likewise reinforced his faith in the truth of his government's assertions, while on the other hand it increased his rage and hatred against the vile enemy.[95]

[92] Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, op. cit., 247; Fischer, 'The Committee on Public Information,' op. cit.

[93] 'It had "conscripted public opinion," wrote Frank Cobb, editor of the *New York World*, "as they conscripted men and money and materials. Having conscripted it, they dealt with it as they dealt with other raw materials. They mobilized it. They put it in charge of drill sergeants. They goose-stepped it. They taught it to stand at attention and salute."' Murray, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 12.

[94] Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines*, op. cit., 235.

[95] Hitler, Adolf R. Manheim, trans., *Mein Kampf*, Hitler, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1971, Chapter 6, 181.

Suffice it to note that Hitler made a point of learning from his enemies. For their part, deluged with propaganda later to inspire the leader of the National Socialist movement, the American public still thought 'with the mind of a people at war,' an attitude of mind guaranteed to make them receptive to 'putting aside some ideals and many controversies which have always seemed to us supremely important'[96]—including presumably the constitutional issues raised in the context of communist conspiracy theorising following the Lawrence strike referred to above.

Some idea of what this involved in practice appears in the fact that, immediately following the end of the war, many of the prosecutions carried out under the Espionage and Sedition Acts came before the courts, and as such 'served to remind the nation of the existence of disloyalty,' demonstrating that 'animosity to nonconformity was still very much the vogue.' Murray writes that 'to the 1919 public, the German was still a barbarian capable of committing any atrocity, while those who had sympathised with him or who had even slightly opposed the war were equally depraved.'[97] At the same time, however, few eyelids were batted at Council of National Defence member Frederick Lewis Allen, who wrote in 1917 that 'the only way to fight Prussianism is with Prussian tools'[98]—a comment indicative of a mentality that had already decided to use 'Prussian tools,' and simply adopted the pretence of overcoming a problem by adopting the thinking that created it to shift blame onto their victims.[99]

In the context of the reaction to Brest-Litovsk, such sentiments easily transferred to political radicals regardless of whether or they not identified with the same particular ideological tendencies as the Bolsheviks

[96] Murray, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 13–14.

[97] Murray, *Red Scare*, ibid.

[98] Murray, *Red Scare*, ibid., 14; Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*, op. cit., 60; Kohn, Stephen M., *American Political Prisoners: Prosecutions Under the Espionage and Sedition Acts*, Westport: Praeger, 1994; Smelser, Marshall, 'George Washington and the Alien and Sedition Acts,' *The American Historical Review* 59, no. 2, 1954–01: 322–334; Renshaw, Patrick, 'The IWW and the Red Scare 1917–24,' *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 4, October 1968: 63–72.

[99] 'The character of the enemy supplied the norm for the power demands that the democratic defender of the free world chose to impose on itself.' Wolin, *Democracy Inc*, op. cit., 37.

(many did not[100]). In this way, wartime ultranationalism and xenophobia continued after 1918, the habit of attacking the character and reputation of individuals and groups threatening to the power and privileges of the dominant class now welded into the national culture. Now well-integrated into the federal government, the Bureau of Investigation was the primary way for the latter to police and repress any political or worker dissent—or, in official terms, 'communism.'[101]

Red Scare II (1946–1954)

Inheriting the mantle of communist panic from the NAM and its offshoots was the Congressional House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), one of the primary engines of moral panic over communism during the 1950s, especially as directed against Hollywood—the 'flashing neon tip that captivated the nation's attention—precisely as HUAC hoped it would do.'[102] As a Congressional committee, HUAC was unique in producing no legislation, serving primarily to disseminate the communist conspiracy theory, updated to suit the post-war environment, and as a means of anti-communist virtue signalling.[103] Its role was demonstrated by the fact that HUAC (or 'The Committee') took its cues from Hoover's FBI, which since December 1939 had been compiling a 'Custodial Detention Index' (CDI), a list of alleged security threats who would be interned in a national emergency as were citizens of Japanese extraction during WWII.[104] Ordered by Attorney General Biddle to discontinue the CDI in 1943, by now including the names of many communists, dissidents and 'aliens,' Hoover instructed field agents

[100] See for example Avrich, Paul, *Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America*, AK Press, 2005; Avrich, Paul, *An American Anarchist: The Life of Voltairine de Cleyre*, AK Press, 2018.

[101] Schmidt, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 72–82.

[102] Ceplair and Englund, *The Inquisition in Hollywood*, op. cit., xiv.

[103] Carr, Robert K., 'The Un-American Activities Committee,' *The University of Chicago Law Review* 18, no. 3, 1951: 598–633.

[104] Weglyn, Michi, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps*, University of Washington Press, 1996; Robinson, Greg, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans*, Harvard University Press, 2001.

to refer to it as a 'Security Index,' and continued the surveillance pro-gramme in secret, his lawlessness enabled by his victim complex.[105]

Hoover's 'Security Index' became the basis for HUAC proceedings in short order, FBI support critical to its function as 'inquisitorial theatre,' as noted above. The ties between the two were close enough in fact that former FBI agents were known to become Committee investigators; one such unnamed investigator told the *Washington Star* in 1957 that 'We wouldn't be able to stay in business overnight if it weren't for the FBI.'[106] For his part, chairman J. Parnell Thomas (R-NJ), who conceded that 'the closest relationship exists between this committee and the FBI … I think there is a very good understanding between us.' It was something, however, he felt that 'we cannot talk too much about.'[107] While the theatrical aspect of the Hollywood Show Trials generated high drama before newspaper reporters and television cameras, behind the scenes members of the committee were fed information about those subpoenaed to appear before it in executive sessions. These functioned ultimately as dress rehearsals for the Inquisitorial performance to follow, where all would play the victim of a vast communist conspiracy.

HUAC held its first hearings in 1947, taking over from its pre-war predecessor chaired by Southern Democrat Martin Dies (D-TX), a fervent anti-communist who associated Roosevelt and the New Deal with the communist conspiracy on the 'with us or against us' logic of the False Dilemma. 'There are Communists in high places,' Dies had declared in 1939, long before Joseph McCarthy. 'This is particularly true of the New Deal agencies.'[108] Congressional efforts to check subversion had been continuing since FDR directed the FBI to investigate the German-American Bund in 1933, but it was not long before

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[105] Feldman, op. cit., 189; O'Reilly, *Hoover and the Un-Americans*, op. cit., 317–318; Theoharis, Athan G., and John Stuart Cox, *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, 'The Purge Begins,' 281–310.

[106] Feldman, op. cit.

[107] Feldman, ibid., 191. In a deeply ironic turn of events, J. Parnell Thomas later served nine months in a federal prison for corruption, alongside several of the Hollywood screenwriters (Lester Cole and Ring Lardner Jr.) he jailed for contempt of Congress after refusing to submit to his interrogation.

[108] Feldman, op. cit.

they were investigating the far left, leaving white supremacist groups unthreatening to elite privilege to flourish.[109] Carried along by the wave of anti-communist reaction produced by the War Scare of March 1948, HUAC, aided by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS)—its upper house equivalent chaired by Patrick McCarran (D-Nev)—declared as its mission the investigation of

> (1) the extent, character and objects of un-American propaganda activities within the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle or the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any remedial legislation.[110]

Some general sense of the tenor of Committee proceedings can be gathered from its tendency to project even the reversal of the burden of proof that characterised its own proceedings onto its targets. Identifying its critics as communists on the grounds that they dared suggest HUAC were 'Red-baiters,' 'witch-hunters' and 'Fascists,' a 1949 Committee booklet alleged that these were 'just three out of a tremendous stock of abusive labels Communists attempt to smear on anybody who challenges them.'[111] No one could have any other reason for associating HUAC, who were the real victims, with Red baiting, witch-hunting and fascism.

Cold War (1947–1991)

As we saw in Sect. 'Cold War (1947–1991),' the Domino Theory was the basis of the communist conspiracy theory directed internationally in the post-war era, the basis of the national victim complex for US

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[109] Ogden, August Raymond, *The Dies Committee*, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1945; Goodman, Walter, *The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968; McNiece, Matthew A., *"Un-Americans" and "Anti-Communists": The Rhetorical Battle to Define Twentieth-Century America*, PhD Thesis, Texas Christian University, 2008, via https://repository.tcu.edu/handle/116099117/4083, accessed 27 July 2016; Ceplair, Larry, *Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America: A Critical History*, ABC-CLIO, 2011.

[110] Griffith, *Politics of Fear*, op. cit., 32; Caute, *The Great Fear*, 89.

[111] House Committee on Un-American Activities, *100 Things You Should Know About Communism*, Washington: United States Congress, 1949, 16.

elites even amidst military and economic hegemony. In 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower described it in terms of countries in Asia falling to communism one by one. 'You have a row of dominoes set up,' claimed Eisenhower. 'You knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly.'

> So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences … when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people … So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.[112]

Freedom in this case was freely conflated with imperial privilege in exploiting the resources of other nations as per the binary framing of the Mobilisation phase. Convergence between practically endless existential threats of subversion provided for a perpetual victim complex; the metaphor of dominos as such lending itself to the idea of a rapid succession of uncontrollable events, with each carrying the accumulated momentum to the next. Such meant that at no point did Eisenhower have to explain how US control of material resources of other nations was the equivalent of freedom; the meaning of the conflation of elite interests and the common good was summarily taken for granted—the interpretation of freedom in this instance based on the assumption that the free world has the right to police and control the world, the United States is the free world, and that therefore the United States owns the world.[113]

It was on the basis of this assumption that Truman in 1947 had, as we have seen, pledged support globally for anti-communism. While declaring that, 'We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this

[112] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 'Domino Theory Principle, 1954,' *Public Papers of the Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1954, 381–390, http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/domino.html, accessed 30 April 2016; Reyna, Stephen P., *Deadly Contradictions: The New American Empire and Global Warring*, Berghahn Books, 2016, 195–196.

[113] Chomsky, Noam, 'Who Owns the World?' Chomsky.info, September 2012, via https://chomsky.info/20121026/, accessed 24 June 2018; Ninkovich, Frank, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy Since 1900*, University of Chicago Press, 2001, 192.

crisis,' the dire nature of the communist threat, Truman alleged, meant yet that 'the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.'[114] Unconcerned with trying to make sense of the purported failure of the UN to avert crisis, abandoning both it and international law was an expediency granted by the panic-driven victim complex. Using language reminiscent of George W. Bush half a century later, Truman invoked the binary characteristic of the Ancient Fantasy in declaring, 'At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life.'

> The choice is too often not a free one … One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression … The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.[115]

Doubling down on these claims, Truman expanded the communist conspiracy theory to allege other existential threats. It was only necessary, he added, 'to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation.'

> If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East … Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East … We must take immediate and resolute action.[116]

Linking by labelling of the imaginary hobgoblin de jure to other alleged existential threats in this way is a textbook example of 'convergence.'[117]

[114] Leffler, Melvyn P, 'Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War,' *International Security* 11, no. 1, 1986: 100.

[115] Truman, 'Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,' op. cit.

[116] Truman, 'Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,' ibid.

[117] See Chapter I, 'Moral Panics and Their Patterns.'

Stereotype priming is also indicated on the same basis; the communist folk demon could be applied to any number other targets of scapegoating, extending the victim-blaming, playing of the victim and associating of doubt or opposition with the prevailing conspiracy theory practically indefinitely. As an ideological pretext for military intervention based on the claim that the global military and economic hegemon was the victim in having to suffer challenges to its dominance, the Domino Theory presented as a perfect accompaniment to the proposition from Paul Nitze in NSC68 for 'A Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World.'[118] At no point had evidence been presented to justify this policy, but the dynamics of communist panic belied any need for proof. The hegemon, as perpetual victim, was at the same moment cause and cure of the same problem.

> I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.
>
> —Henry Kissinger

PERSECUTION PHASE: CRISIS LEVERAGING THROUGH SCAPEGOATING

This fourth section of the second case study examines the active leveraging by the geopolitical hegemon of all prior stages of communist panic for the purposes of persecuting scapegoats—in this case, foreign-born unionists, entertainment workers, radicals critical of the status quo and peoples of the global South in the way of US expansionism and imperialism. The Persecution stage explores some of the more conspicuous times that various parts of the US industrial elite cast themselves as cures to crises famed in their own interests—perpetrating class war to which they were already committed in reaction to the political crisis they had themselves created in so doing. Rather than being itself a form of conspiracy theory, this section argues that the prior stages in the development of a campaign of scapegoating driven by communist panic demonstrated that this was dictated by the reflexive defence of class privilege. It contends that the scapegoating campaign instituted by industrial elites and their governmental subsidiaries was destructive of the democratic values in whose defence they were allegedly

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[118]Nitze, Paul H., *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment*, National Defence University, 1994.

enacted—active destruction of such arguably the purpose of terrorist panic to begin with. To that end this section argues that these episodes were typical of panic-driven scapegoating in functioning to neutralise perceived threats to the class order, enabled through a conspiracy theory involving various iterations of a communist conspiracy theory to subvert and overthrow alleged Western democracy.

Red Scare I (1919–1929)

Frontal attacks on unions and workers organisations during the First Red Scare centred on coordinated raids of their offices throughout the United States in January 1920 by agents of the Bureau of Investigation, the forerunner of the FBI. Ordered by Attorney-General Mitchell A. Palmer; carried out under cover of the communist conspiracy theory articulated in terms of 'radical aliens,' the 'Palmer Raids' as summary persecutions were often executed without warrants—their targets having been criminalised by beliefs rather than actions, in line with the subjective nature of communist panic.[119] The Palmer Raids followed the deportation to Russia the previous December of 249 radicals aboard the USS Buford, nicknamed the 'Soviet Ark,' under no less summary circumstances. Deportees were denied due process, particularly in the right of appeal, as Justice Department treated such deportations as administrative rather than judicial matters.[120] While some describe both measures as responses to popular pressure to 'do something' about communism, as if democratic governments have ever been so responsive, in reality, the first Red Scare represents the enmeshing of various forms of deviance production dating back decades, and a long process of politicising crisis through identification of elite interests with the common good, a defining feature of the initial Mobilisation phase.[121]

Drawing these threads together, corporate-inspired xenophobia combined during World War I in the United States with ultranationalist war fever and hatred of the enemy Hun on the one hand, and horror at the

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[119] Coben, Stanley A., *Mitchell Palmer: Politician*, New York: Da Capo Press, 1972.

[120] Schmidt, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 27; Feldman, *Manufacturing Hysteria*, Chapter 7, 'A Lawless Government,' 106–128.

[121] Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, op. cit.; Feldman, *Manufacturing Hysteria*, ibid.; Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, op. cit.; Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*, op. cit.; Fischer, *Spiders Web*, op. cit.; Fischer, 'The Committee on Public Information,' op. cit.

Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 on the other, to raise passions socially to a fever pitch. On this note, Bailey concludes that, as a focus for those fanning war fever, the sinking of the *Lusitania* immediately prior to the American entry into WWI 'contributed powerfully to the inflamed state of mind which made possible the final break'—though the alleged barbarousness of the Hun in attacking civilian liners was mitigated long after the fact upon the discovery of munitions aboard.[122] With the cessation of hostilities, wartime hated and anger framed in binary terms suitable to elite crisis management had nowhere to go. Facing a sudden loss of sensational news to keep sales ticking over, newspaper editors channelled these passions by turning their attention to homegrown enemies—sensationalism being to circulation as winds to a wildfire.[123] When wartime passions did spill over into the overblown rhetoric and binary logic of the Targeting phase, they found fertile soil for pretexts constructed during the Legitimation phase for summary search and seizures, summary deportations and draconian incursions into free speech and whistleblowing in the Sedition and Espionage Acts.[124] The irony of using anti-democratic means to defend democracy from those said to imperil it was lost amidst the clamour of moral panic.

Red Scare II (1946–1954)

Attacks on ideological nonconformity during the Second Red Scare centred on Hollywood, carried out under cover of the communist conspiracy theory. 'As a symbol of "dangerous" radicalism,"' Ceplair and Englund argue, 'Hollywood was only the tip of an iceberg, but it was a flashing neon tip that captivated the nation's attention.'[125] It was also an example to the rest of the country of what would happen to anyone who defied the moral entrepreneurs of the Hollywood Show Trial who

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[122] Bailey, Thomas A, 'The Sinking of the *Lusitania*,' *The American Historical Review* 41, no. 1, 1935: 54–73; 'If Roosevelt Had a Richard Perle,' in Jarecki, Eugene, ed., *The American Way of War: Guided Missiles, Misguided Men, and a Republic in Peril*, Simon and Schuster, 2008, 44–52.

[123] Schmidt, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 36–38.

[124] The Espionage Act was used to prosecute Chelsea Manning for whistleblowing in July 2013, as noted above. Murray, op. cit., Chapter 13 'The January Raids,' 210–222.

[125] Ceplair, Larry, and Steven Englund, *The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community 1930–60*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003, xxiii–xxix.

took it upon themselves to define truth for everyone else. As the cultural beacon of the United States, Hollywood also represented a potential threat to the absolutist logic of Americanism; films like *Crossfire* (1947), which carried the tagline 'hate is like a loaded gun,' directly challenged the logic of deviance production upon which anti-communist panic turned.[126]

Aided by FBI dossiers that allowed them to identify Hollywood screenwriters, actors and directors with dissident and radical sympathies, HUAC, in building on the politicisation of crisis of the Mobilisation phase, the deviance production of the Targeting Phase and victim complex of the Legitimation phase, inevitably found the conspiratorial *sabbat* in Hollywood they sought.[127] They landed on a group who became known as the Hollywood Ten—so designated for refusing to 'cooperate' with the Committee by answering the question, 'Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?' The only way for victims of the Hollywood Show Trials to avoid industry blacklisting was to give the Committee names of associates as an act of deference to the class privileges conflated with the moral Good, the brutality and finality of betraying friends and loved ones the price paid for being allowed to return to work. 'Clearance' was required of entertainment workers in Red Scare Hollywood to avoid further suspicion of errant thinking, much the same as their counterparts in the USSR needed to avoid suspicion of 'Trotskyite' sympathies; where the American Legion asked those suspected of heretical thinking or association, 'Is this charge accurate?', 'Why did you joined the listed organization?', 'Who invited you to join?', and 'Whom did you invite to join?', so too did the NKVD ask its suspects, 'Who recruited you?', and 'Whom did you recruit?'[128] Refusing to purge themselves of deviant thoughts, established as such during the Targeting phase, the Ten were

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[126] Dmytryk, Edward, dir., *Crossfire*, Lon Angeles: RKO Pictures, 1947.

[127] Caute, *The Great Fear*, op. cit., Chapter 5, 'The FBI and the Informers,' 111–139; Navasky, Victor S., *Naming Names*, New York: Viking Press, 1980; Trumbo, Dalton, *The Time of the Toad: A Study of Inquisition in America by One of the Hollywood Ten*, Hollywood, CA: The Hollywood Ten, 1950; Everitt, David, *A Shadow of Red: Communism and the Blacklist in Radio and Television*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007.

[128] Navasky, *Naming Names*, ibid., 92; Tucker, Robert C., and Stephen F. Cohen, eds., *The Great Purge Trial*, Grosset & Dunlap, 1965.

cast as antagonists of democratic values conflated with the vested inter-ests of elites during the Mobilisation phase.

Despite its nominal status as a Congressional committee, then, HUAC functioned in practise as a show trial. In the first place, it embod-ied the Inquisitorial method in actively investigating the 'crimes' it was charged with resolving, in lieu of leaving such work to specialised officers who submitted their findings to the court for assessment; in not asking questions to which it did not already know the answer, its 'investigations' were tantamount to tests of servility, obedience and conformity.[129] In the second place, it criminalised beliefs rather than actions, reflecting a par-tisan, persecutory function consistent with the victim-blaming enabled by the Legitimation phase. In the third place, it denied due process to those brought before it—a denial predicated on a reversal of the burden of proof expressed in the logic of 'guilty until proven innocent.' In the fourth place, since they did criminalise personal convictions rather than actions and reverse the burden of proof, the Hollywood Show Trials also associated disfavoured political convictions with support for the enemy, a characteristic feature of the False Dilemma and deviance production. Although 'Communist' has a dictionary meaning—i.e. someone who subscribes to communist ideology and self-identifies as a Communist—in practice, HUAC labelled thus anyone who refused to submit to ideolog-ically-charged interrogation. That they were able to do so was a victory for each prior phase of panic-driven scapegoating in Mobilising public opinion against 'communism.'

Amplifying ideological nonconformity into 'communist' deviance in the Targeting phase, these engineers of communist panic were then able to construct a pretext for persecution by conflating 'cooperation' and 'obedience' in the Legitimation phase—a reflection, again, of the False Dilemma. Refusing to submit to inquisitorial-style interrogation on the grounds that the Committee had no right to police thinking was to offend its sacrosanct victim complex; those asserting their free-dom of speech were duly blacklisted (the blacklist was informal by vir-tue of being a trait of authoritarian societies; the United States did not have blacklists, nowhere more so than when it did).[130] Navasky observes that job security was treated not as a matter of individual rights, but

[129] Caute, *The Great Fear*, op. cit., Chapter 5, 'The Congressional Inquisition,' 85–111.

[130] Navasky, *Naming Names*, op. cit., 87.

in taking advantage of the economic compulsion at the heart of the wage system, as a way of rewarding obsequiousness and conformity.[131] Functioning as degradation ceremonies, the only practical function of the Hollywood Show Trials was to punish and stigmatise independent thought.[132] Ideologically secure films like *The Red Menace* (1949), carried an opening montage featuring a Russian octopus spreading his tentacles out to the four corners of the globe; amidst a scene of a group of protesters picketing a slumlord real estate agent, demonstrating its other potentialities. *The Red Menace* described

> The introduction of Bill Jones to communist strategy; a misguided young man, fallen under the spell of Marxian hatred and revenge, unaware that he is only the tool of men who would destroy his country. The [protest] signs didn't tell of the worldwide Marxist racket intent on spreading dissention and treason.[133]

The identification of dissention and treason was the ultimate purpose of the culture war at the core of the Committee's purpose, the ultimate purpose also of each of the prior stages of Mobilisation, Targeting and Legitimation.[134] To its logic, the conflation of elite privileges with democratic freedom and ideological nonconformity with the bugbear of 'communism' was the defence of freedom from tyranny; anything else was a part of a worldwide racket run by men who would destroy the country.

'McCarthyism'

As a footnote to this story, while the Second Red Scare dates from 1947, around the time of the HUAC hearings, Joseph McCarthy did not make his Wheeling speech until 1950. '"McCarthy" and "McCarthyism"' Griffith writes, 'did not spring alone and unaided from the fertile

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[131] Navasky, ibid., 109; 'So many "innocent people" were named by witnesses that any possibility of reply on their part became mechanically impossible, even if the Committee had shown interest in hearing such people, which it did not.' Carr, 'The Un-American Activities Committee,' op. cit., 630.

[132] Navasky, ibid., 319.

[133] *The Red Menace*, Republic Pictures, 1949.

[134] Fischer, *Spider Web*, op. cit., Chapter 9, 'Political Repression and Culture War,' 176–204.

imagination of the junior senator from Wisconsin … they were instead the symptoms of a malfunctioning of the entire political system.'[135] A far more decisive role was played by the Federal Bureau of Investigation lead by J. Edgar Hoover, taken on for no less ignoble reasons. The Bureau had deeply ingrained interests of its in finding a new domestic enemy following the end of the First World War to justify its internal security role; as lawyer Jackson Ralston pointed out to a Senate Committee hearing in 1921,

> That Department of Investigation had to justify its existence … there was a training up of the public mind in the first instance to expect red outbreaks, and I think that training up was deliberate … This bureau of investigation which had to get appropriations of liberal size from Congress.[136]

Thus, could Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson observe of the clamour over Red subversion that, 'The whole thing was done with a hurrah that gave the country the impression that it was honey-combed with anarchy and revolution,' though in reality 'most of the clamour had been manufactured and was due to the activities of the Justice Department.'[137] Such sits a long way from blaming McCarthy for everything, who, for all his feckless demagoguery, was only one person. To manufacture a scapegoat takes an institution; McCarthy was fair game for the same kind of scapegoating politics he perpetrated throughout his time in office once dethroned, in a manner not dissimilar from his spiritual forebears, Maximilien Robespierre and Leon Trotsky.

Cold War (1947–1991)

The first Cold War attacks on the global South under cover of the panic-driven communist conspiracy theory took place in Iran, Guatemala and Chile. Operation AJAX was the name the CIA gave to its campaign to overthrow the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister

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[135] Griffith, *The Politics of Fear*, op. cit., 116.; 'McCarthyism was not so much an aberration as a product of long-term processes that favoured conservative politics.' Heale, Michael J., *McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935–1965*, University of Georgia Press, 1998.

[136] Schmidt, *Red Scare*, op. cit., 84–86.

[137] Schmidt, *Red Scare*, ibid., 86.

Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953; a virulent propaganda campaign built on the communist conspiracy theory, combined with orchestrated street protests, destabilised the Mossadegh government until he was forced to resign.[138] The CIA drew up AJAX after Mossadegh nationalised the assets of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a forerunner of British Petroleum, following protracted but ultimately fruitless efforts to address the endemic poverty caused as the AIOC siphoned off the national wealth-.[139] 'Our long years of negotiations with foreign countries… have yielded no results thus far,' he lamented.

> With the oil revenues we could meet our entire budget and combat poverty, disease, and backwardness among our people. Another important consideration is that by the elimination of the power of the British company, we would also eliminate corruption and intrigue, by means of which the internal affairs of our country have been influenced.[140]

The prospect of such outcomes was, from the British and US point of view, intolerable, providing eminent grist to the mill of the Mobilisation phase. Office of Policy Coordination Chief for the Near-East Kermit Roosevelt launched AJAX at the behest of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his younger brother and CIA chief Allen Dulles, on

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[138] Kinzer, Stephen, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003, 150–160; Abrahamian, Ervand, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations*, New York, NY: New Press, 2013; Abrahamian, Ervand, 'The 1953 Coup in Iran,' *Science & Society*, 2001, 193; Gasiorowski, Mark J., *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004; Gasiorowski, Mark J., 'The 1953 Coup d'état in Iran,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 3, 1987: 261–286; Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran,' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 4, 2013: 4–24.

[139] Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup d'état in Iran,' op. cit., 261–286; 'Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran,' National Security Archives, 22 June 2004, via http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/, accessed 29 September 2016; 'CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup: Documents Provide New Details on Mosaddeq Overthrow and Its Aftermath,' National Security Archives, 2013, via http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/, accessed 14 September 2016.

[140] Nirumand, Bahman, *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action*, Monthly Review Press, 1969, 49.

the approval of President Eisenhower. Framing the crisis in self-serving binaries, AJAX cast Mossadegh, a liberal nationalist, as a tool of Soviet Communism on the grounds that the inability of the West to control Iranian oil might mean that others, including the Russians, had access to it.[141] In invoking the communist conspiracy theory, the United States had drawn inspiration from their colonialist allies; in October 1952, Mossadegh had uncovered a British plot similar to AJAX, responding by expelling the British embassy staff from Iran. Thwarted, they looked to their US allies for help. Truman was not sympathetic, though they had more luck with his successor, elevated to the Presidency in December after denouncing his opponent as 'soft on Communism.'[142] Seizing on the opportunity, Christopher Woodhouse, a senior agent of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), travelled to Washington shortly afterwards to meet with his US counterparts. Woodhouse adopted a shrewd approach: 'Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts out of the fire,' he later recalled, 'I decided to emphasize the Communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry.'[143]

Woodhouse was as familiar with colonialist tactics as he was with his allies, who for their part were very willing to oblige; Allen Dulles released US$1 million to the station in Tehran to use 'in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadegh.'[144] The CIA contribution to the cause fell on fertile soil; the SIS had, as noted, been spending £10,000 a month since the early 1950s to recruit active support amongst influential Iranian Royalists. One former CIA agent later estimated that four-fifths of the press in Tehran was under its influence, boasting that 'any article I would write—it gave you something of a sense of power— would appear almost instantly the next day in the Iranian press,' and adding that 'they were designed to show Mossadegh as a communist

[141] Abrahamian, 'The 1953 Coup in Iran,' op. cit., 193.

[142] Schlesinger, Stephen C., and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, Boston: Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 1999, 100.

[143] Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, ibid., 3–4, 151–152; Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 Coup d'état in Iran,' op. cit., 263–266.

[144] Kinzer, ibid., 156–160.

collaborator and as a fanatic.'[145] The deviance production associated with the Targeting phase was in full swing, all the more so as disturbances orchestrated by agents of Western spy agencies created a feedback loop of societal tension and disorder and western-orchestrated propaganda portrayed this as an effect of Mossadegh's incompetence. His demonisation in this manner laid the foundation for the Legitimising stage and the subsequent coup—some sections of the press persisting even after Mossadegh resigned, though the mythology of a communist conspiracy was finally confirmed as a lie when the CIA was forced to release documents confirming its role in 2013.[146]

The Communist Conspiracy Theory in Guatemala

The first of its kind in peacetime, the success of Operation AJAX set a precedent for subsequent coups throughout the world, all perpetrated in the name of fighting communism.[147] The communist conspiracy theory came next to Guatemala, after a democratic revolution in 1944, led

[145] Kinzer, ibid., 151; 6.

[146] Rundle, Walter G., 'New Regime in Iran Beats Reds to Draw by Narrowest of Margins,' United Press, Tuesday, August 25, 1953; Saghaye-Biria, Hakimeh, *United States Propaganda in Iran: 1951–1953*, PhD diss., Louisiana State University, 2009. Gasiorowski, 'The 1953 *Coup d'état* in Iran,' op. cit., 261–286; 'CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup: Documents Provide New Details on Mosaddeq Overthrow and Its Aftermath,' National Security Archive, 2013, via http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/, accessed 19 September 2016; see also: Dehghan, Saeed Kamali, and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'CIA Admits Role in 1953 Iranian Coup,' The Guardian, 20 August 2013, via, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup, accessed 19 September 2016, and The Mossadegh Project: http://www.mohammadmossadegh.com.

[147] Countries and regions affected included, in addition to Guatemala, Costa Rica, the Middle East, Indonesia, Haiti, Western Europe, British Guyana, Iraq, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Ecuador, Zaire, Algeria, Brazil, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Ghana, Uruguay, Chile, South Africa, Bolivia, Australia, Portugal, East Timor, Angola, Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Philippines, the Seychelles, South Yemen, South Korea, Chad, Grenada, Dutch Guiana, Libya, Panama, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Haiti, Bulgaria, Albania, Somalia, Mexico, Colombia and the former Yugoslavia. Blum, William, *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower*, Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 2005, Chapter 17, 'A Concise History of United States Global Interventions, 1945 to the Present'; Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights*, Boston: South End Press, 1979; Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, op. cit.

by liberal Juan José Arévalo, ousted US-backed dictator Jorge Ubico and initiated a much-needed programme of land reform in one of the most underdeveloped countries in Latin America.[148] Land reform under Arévalo elicited hysterical shrieks of expropriation from the Boston-based United Fruit Company, though he had offered them compensation on the basis of tax valuations. At that time, United Fruit till held 42% of the entire land area of Guatemala, of which no more than 50,000 acres, or around 9% of the total, was under cultivation at any one time.[149] Redistribution under the Arévalo reforms, continued by Jacobo Arbenz, confiscated roughly three quarters: 240,000 acres on the Pacific Coast, and 173,000 acres on the Atlantic. Though offered $600,000 in compensation on the basis of its own tax valuations, United Fruit insisted that its Pacific Coast holdings alone were worth over $15,000,000—though not apparently for tax purposes.[150]

   Conditions for the people in Guatemala under Ubico had been deplorable; even six years after his departure, roughly 70% of the population still worked as agricultural labourers for between five and twenty US cents a day, a handful of US corporations having reduced the country to the status of a 'Banana Republic.'[151] Nevertheless, the CIA launched Operation PBSUCCESS (1954) at the behest of United Fruit. As a former senior partner of the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation, John Dulles had handled the negotiations for the United Fruit takeover of the International Railways of Central America (IRCA), to whom he was engaged as a financial advisor (gaining control of transportation routes was a way of squeezing out the competition). Sensing opportunity, he negotiated at the expense of his client, drawing a windfall for Schroeder and gaining a powerful ally. It was this type of

[148] Gordon, Max, 'A Case History of US Subversion: Guatemala, 1954,' *Science & Society*, 1971, 129–155; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, op. cit.; Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991; Immerman, Richard H, *The CIA in Guatemala the Foreign Policy of Intervention*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.

[149] Gordon, 'A Case History of US Subversion,' ibid., 138.

[150] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, op. cit., 101–102; Gordon, Max, 'A Case History of US Subversion,' ibid., 141–142.

[151] Gordon, 'A Case History of US Subversion: Guatemala, 1954,' op. cit., 132–133; Chapman, Peter, *Bananas: How the United Fruit Company Shaped the World*, Berkeley: Canongate, 2014.

relationship specifically that United Fruit appealed to in its complaint; for Dulles, it an opportunity to do for Guatemala what he had done for the IRCA. So too for his brother, Allen Dulles, who had served on the board of United Fruit during the 1930s, John Moors Cabot, who in addition to being Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs was also a major UFC shareholder, and *his* brother Thomas Cabot, Director of Office of International Security Affairs at the State Department, had throughout 1948 been United Fruit Company President.[152]

Amidst increasing anti-communist panic domestically, UN Ambassador and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who was also a shareholder in United Fruit, denounced the Guatemalan labour code in the US Senate as a product of 'communist-influenced activity,' and 'discrimination' against United Fruit, which had, he alleged, suffered a 'serious economic breakdown'—though the rest of Guatemala was doing just fine. Democratic Majority leader John McCormack, also of Boston, denounced 'a minority of reckless agitators' who were trying to punish United Fruit for 'being American.'[153] The standard victim complex of the Legitimation phase provided a ready pretext for an attack on threats to privilege; in perpetuating the pretence that the problem was communist influence in Guatemalan society and not the self-interest of US elites, one hand washed the other. Framing the 'crisis' in terms serviceable to a status quo favouring the United Fruit land monopoly, PBSUCCESS provided political and material support (air support, production and distribution of propaganda throughout Latin America and the United States, bribes to army officers not to oppose the coup and pressure on the US press not to report the story) for far-right army officer Carlos Castillo Armas, who staged a successful military coup against Arbenz from neighbouring Nicaragua in 1954.[154]

The Role of PR in Guatemala

As the second in a long series, the Guatemalan campaign of panic-driven scapegoating produced further innovations in the geopolitical application of the communist conspiracy theory, spurred in the main by its

[152] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, ibid., 106.

[153] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, ibid.; Gordon, Max, 'A Case History of US Subversion,' ibid., 139–140.

[154] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, ibid., 102.

primary beneficiaries. As a backdrop, a CIA historian recalls a shift in the organisation from intelligence gathering to a more activist role in peacetime covert operations overseas throughout this period.[155] The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was established on 1 September 1948 under Frank G. Wisner, veteran of the OSS, on the basis apparently of the policy that 'political warfare is essentially an instrument of foreign policy,' as George Kennan argued in a policy meeting.[156] Command of PBSUCCESS passed to Wisner in August 1953 after Dulles offered it to Kermit Roosevelt, lately returned from Iran, who turned it down on the grounds that future coups wouldn't work unless people and the army in the countries concerned 'want what we want'; Roosevelt later recalled that Dulles 'did not want to hear what I was saying.' When he recounted his experiences in Iran, Roosevelt was 'dismayed' to find that the Secretary of State's 'eyes were gleaming; he seemed to be purring like a giant cat.'[157] By contrast, the official and redacted CIA history recalls of these developments that

> While TPAJAX achieved victory in less than six weeks, PBSUCCESS planners warned that Guatemala would require more effort and patience. The Agency would have to develop from scratch assets of the sort that it had used in Iran, a process that might take a year or more.[158]

United Fruit was well ahead of the agency, having enlisted the services of the 'Father of Public Relations,' Edward Bernays, in 1940 to improve its public image. It was well that they had done so as Armas ran into military difficulties in the process of launching his coup, and it was to no small part due only to the power of propaganda to confuse and demoralise the enemy, spread fear and convince Arbenz that the invading force was much larger than it was, that the CIA was able to achieve its objectives.[159] Only four years beforehand, in 1950, President of United

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[155] Warner, Michael, 'The CIA'S Office of Policy Coordination: From NSC 10/2 to NSC 68,' *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 11, no. 2, 1998: 211.

[156] Warner, 'The CIA'S Office of Policy Coordination,' ibid., 213.

[157] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, op. cit., 100–101.

[158] Cullather, Nick, and Piero Gleijeses, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, 43.

[159] Chapter 13, 'The Longest Day,' in Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, op. cit., 191–204.

Fruit, Sam Zemurray, had rejected Bernays' proposal to spread fear of Communism amongst Middle Americans on the grounds that 'the Indians' were 'too ignorant for Marxism.'[160]

Having had his initial proposal rejected, Bernays aimed to convince Zemurray through a practical demonstration of his ability to '*pull* the wires which control the public mind.' To that end, he persuaded the New York *Daily Tribune* to send writer Fitzhugh Turner to Guatemala to talk to Company officials; it did so, printing the series 'Communism in the Caribbean'—seen by *New York Times* publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger, who dispatched a reporter of his to Guatemala. The latter returned convinced of a communist conspiracy, as did many subsequent others whom Bernays successfully 'embedded' within United Fruit. When Zemurray's concerns over the security of the UFC became more acute following the election of Arbenz in 1950, Bernays came to him again urging a 'wider, more aggressive and sophisticated campaign,' on the grounds that, as Iran had nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 'Guatemala might follow suit.'[161] With the US Ambassador to Guatemala, Richard Patterson, subsequently weighing in behind Bernays, it was only a matter of time until Zemurray was on board—and with him, Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers. It was thus Bernays as much as the UFC who were behind public statements from the US Secretary of State to the effect that, 'For several years international communism has been probing here and there for nesting places in the Americas.'

> It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics … The master plan of international communism is to gain a solid political base in this hemisphere, a base that can be used to extend Communist penetration to the other peoples of the other American Governments … If world communism captures any American State, however small, a new and perilous front is established which will increase the danger to the entire free world and require even greater sacrifices from the American people.[162]

[160] Schlesinger and Kinzer, ibid., 80.

[161] Schlesinger and Kinzer, ibid., 86.

[162] Dulles, Allen, 'International Communism in Guatemala,' in United States. Dept. of State. *Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1954.

The anthropomorphising of the communist bugbear into a predatory monster as feature of deviance production in this instance is impossible to miss, recalling the beast envisaged by NAM President John Kirby, Jr with 'seven heads and ten horns' that could be found 'stalking up and down the earth.' Communists, it is true, were active in Guatemala, though the existence of communists had to be hyped into a conspiracy theory through communist panic to establish a link between the liberal nationalist Arbenz and Moscow. On the other hand, the nepotistic links between United Fruit, the US political establishment and propagandists like Bernays were deep and manifold. It was thanks to them that the fascist military dictatorship of Armas was able to inflict all of the barbarism alleged to be the preserve of the international communist conspiracy.[163]

The Communist Conspiracy Theory in Chile

The third major US attack on a Southern democracy under cover of the communist conspiracy theory was Chile. As a result of their efforts in Guatemala, the United States had suffered a sharp decline in prestige throughout Latin America, while popular sympathies towards victims of US imperialism spiked. In Chile, the anti-imperialist upsurge fuelled the political rise of Salvador Allende, a former physician who rode the popular radicalisation that also swept up Ernesto 'Che' Guevara—the latter working in Guatemala City as a medical doctor at the time.[164] National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger summarised the feelings of the US government, at that time under the administration of Richard Nixon, towards these developments in declaring:

[163] Sanford, Victoria, *Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Brett, Roddy, *The Origins and Dynamics of Genocide: Political Violence in Guatemala*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; Malkin, Elisabeth, 'An Apology for a Guatemalan Coup, 57 Years Later,' *New York Times*, 20 October 2011, via http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/americas/an-apology-for-a-guatemalan-coup-57-years-later.html.

[164] Hove, Mark T., 'The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, US-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 US Intervention in Guatemala,' *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4, 2007: 623.

> I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves.[165]

For all his democratic pretences, Kissinger was encumbered yet by the deviance production inherent to the communist conspiracy theory—much less to say the victim-playing inherent to the idea that the Chilean people were hurting the United States by exercising self-rule, or that this justified victim-blaming in the form of a brutal and bloody military dictatorship. Nevertheless, Nixon initiated Project FUBELT on this basis—a campaign of disruption and subversion of Allende's Chile that sought, in Nixon's own words, to 'make the economy scream.'[166] An internal memo describes the genesis of Project FUBELT not in terms of anti-communism, but rather the personal subjective preferences of Tricky Dick and his courtiers:

> The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States. The President asked the agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized ten million dollars for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defence.[167]

All involved recalled what happened when the State Department caught wind of covert operations from the Guatemalan experience; such mistakes were not to be repeated. The latter in particular had already been reminded by the US Ambassador to Chile Claude Bowers that Chile was regarded 'by universal consent … [as] the strongest, most inherent real democracy' in South America.' This being the case, felt Bowers, it would, in 'the great international battle of today … between totalitarianism and

[165] Hersh, Seymour, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, Simon and Schuster, 2013.

[166] Kornbluh, Peter, '"Make the Economy Scream": Secret Documents Show Nixon, Kissinger Role Backing 1973 Chile Coup,' *Democracy Now*, 10 September 2013, via https://www.democracynow.org/2013/9/10/40_years_after_chiles_9_11, accessed 16 June 2018.

[167] 'CIA, Genesis of Project FUBELT, September 16, 1970,' Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 11 September 1973, National Security Archives, via http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc03.pdf, accessed 5 December 2016.

democracy' be 'rather remarkable' if the United States made 'Chile our pet aversion.'[168] Characterising Allende as an 'able and decent man,' 'an able man of character and intelligence,' and an 'able physician,' Bowers had convinced the State Department of Chile's uniqueness as a democracy, the latter concluding on the one hand that 'It is of the utmost importance that friend be distinguished from foe' and on the other that it was 'ideologically … essential that we view Chile's problems in a sympathetic light.'[169] Seeming to be convinced of this fact, Louis Halle of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff concluded ominously that the problems of Chileans seemed to derive from the fact that they had 'more fear of U.S. interventionism than of Guatemalan communism.'[170]

As if to demonstrate, a variety of declassified documents collected by Peter Kornbluh document US imperialism direct from the source, one memorandum advocating 'providing covert assistance through secret CIA channels to … anti-Allende campaign uses.'[171] Despite portraying themselves as victims in the Legitimation stage of communist panic, Nixon was at pains to suppress the role of his administration in Allende's overthrow— possibly the first ever time in history a victim ever felt the need to hide their possession of the moral right. His involvement ended with the overthrow of the Allende government and the installation of a military dictatorship lead by military general Augusto Pinochet—a 'subfascist' who developed a penchant for making *desaparecidos* ('disappeared') out of political dissidents, trade unionists and others whose existence inconvenienced the multinational corporations representing his prime constituency. Foreshowing later terrorisms, Pinochet's *coup* was executed 11 September 1973—a freak irony that would, in later decades, haunt his patrons as they indulged their self-pity at the lack of appreciation globally for their civilised values.[172]

[168] Hove, 'The Arbenz Factor,' op. cit., 625.

[169] Hove, ibid.

[170] Hove, ibid., 633.

[171] Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk,' *Selected Documents on the 1964 Election in Chile from Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, Vol. XXXI, South and Central America: Mexico, Washington, 1 May, 1964, National Security Archives, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20040925/docs.htm#253, accessed 5 December 2016.

[172] For sub-fascism, see Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, op. cit. Guardiola-Rivera, Oscar, *Story of a Death Foretold: The Coup Against Salvador Allende, September 11, 1973*, Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2013.

The Communist Conspiracy Theory in Asia

The US assaults on South East Asia between the 1950s and 70s, the invasions of Korea and Vietnam and the bombings of Laos and Cambodia, are major examples of persecution carried out under cover of the communist conspiracy theory. There is simply no space to examine these here in any detail. Suffice it to say that these reflect the Persecution phase of communist panic, justified through Legitimation stages using the communist conspiracy theory to play the victim and blame the victims, based on deviance production from the Targeting stage to cast national movements for independent development in the global South as agents of communist expansion, to garner political support for actual military aggression in the Mobilisation phase. As applied to the propaganda used to rationalise the South East Asian aggressions, the Domino Theory encompasses all of the above—strategy applied with equal devastation throughout Latin America and the Middle East.[173]

As the event used by the US government to justify its invasion of South Vietnam, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident represents a textbook example of panic-driven scapegoating. In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson scared the American public in a televised speech with tales of North Vietnamese torpedo attacks on the USS Maddox, the *Los Angeles Times* the next day urging Americans to 'face the fact that the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities.' The victim blaming in this case became a model for the alleged liberators of Ben Tre during the Tet Offensive (1968), the commanding officer of whom declaring that 'we had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it'—the doublethink and cognitive dissonance associated with being cause and cure of the same problem unusually pronounced in this instance.[174] Only a year later, Johnson admitted that, 'for all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there.'[175] By then, however, he had already got his war.

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[173] For more on the parallels between the two see Chomsky, Noam, 'American Foreign Policy,' The Noam Chomsky Archive, 1985, via https://chomsky.info/19850319/, accessed 13 December 2016.

[174] 'Major Describe Moves,' *The New York Times*, February 8, 1968, 14; Miller, Michael D., Former Captain, US Army Corps of Engineers, 'Saving Ben Tre: About the famous quote of the Vietnamese 1968 Tet Offensive,' http://www.nhe.net/BenTreVietnam/, accessed 8 December 2016.

[175] Cohen, Jeff, and Norman Solomon, '30-Year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched Vietnam War,' *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting*, via http://fair.org/media-beat-column/30-year-anniversary-tonkin-gulf-lie-launched-vietnam-war/, accessed 8 December 201.

Corporations, which should be carefully restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people's masters.
—President Grover Cleveland, 3 December 1888

Restoration Phase: The Beneficiaries of Moral Panic Collect

This fifth section of the second case study examines the question of who benefitted from communist panic. At the Restoration stage, fixes impermissible under circumstances not dominated by moral panic over existential communist threats, in being generally destructive of the democratic values invoked as justification for them, became possible. This final section argues that the scapegoating of those demonised by various iterations of communist conspiracy theory, whether immigrant workers, dissenting entertainment workers in Hollywood or peoples of the global South in the way of US imperialism, amounted to state terror whose purpose was to pave the way for rising corporate power, first domestically, and once the US working class was pacified, geopolitically. It contends on this basis communist panic facilitated what amounted to permanent class warfare, constructed atop a crisis framed by conflation of the vested interests of industrial elites with the moral good, and which was generally destructive of universal democratic values in the name of upholding them.

Corporate Personhood

A clue as the *Cui bono* of communist panic is indicated by the fact that control over resources was a common source of conflict—immigrant workers, the National Association of Manufacturers and its affiliates fought over labour power, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Mossadegh in Iran fought over oil, the United Fruit Company and Arbenz in Guatemala fought over land, and transnational copper interests and Allende fought over the copper industry in Chile.[176] All reflect

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[176]For more on the linkages see Grandin, Greg, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, The American Empire Project, 1st ed., New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006; Gedicks, Al, 'The Nationalization of Copper in Chile: Antecedents and Consequences,' *Review of Radical Political Economics* 5, no. 3, 1973: 1–25.

an ongoing conflict between burgeoning corporate interests, democracy and development, a fact that invites further examination especially insofar as the protection of class privilege points to a common motivation for launching campaigns of panic-driven scapegoating to begin with.

Prior to the late 1880s, joint-stock companies were legal entities formed for specific, limited purposes, such as civic projects requiring large-scale capital expenditure (bridges being a prime example). Heavy legislative restrictions were imposed on these joint-stock companies as threats to freedom, as their concentrations of wealth were also concentrations of power. Since concentrations of power tend ever to grow, such threatened to overwhelm representative institutions and reduce them to corporate vassals—above and beyond their role in defending 'the minority of the opulent from the majority' and maintaining class privilege as stipulated by James Madison, the 'Father of the Constitution,' during the Constitutional Convention of 1776.[177]

By the late 1880s, things had begun to change as business interests in the United States recognised the potential power of corporatism and sought to whittle away at the legal protections defending the public sphere from the potentially harmful consequences of economic monopoly. Andrew Jackson noted this tendency as far back as 1837; in his farewell address he spoke out against the charter for the Bank of the United States he had fought throughout his Presidency:

> The result of the ill-advised legislation which established this great monopoly was to concentrate the whole moneyed power of the Union, with its boundless means of corruption and its numerous dependents, under the direction and command of one acknowledged head, thus organizing this particular interest as one body and securing to it unity and concert of action throughout the United States, and enabling it to bring forward upon any occasion its entire and undivided strength to support or defeat any measure of the Government. In the hands of this formidable

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[177] Madison, *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, op. cit.; Hartmann, Thom, *Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the Theft of Human Rights*, St. Martin's Press, 2002; Beatty, Jack, *Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865–1900*, Vintage, 2008; Bunting, David, *The Rise of Large American Corporations, 1889–1919*, New York: Garland, 1987; Zunz, Olivier, *Making America Corporate, 1870–1920*, University of Chicago Press, 1990; Horwitz, Morton J., *The Transformation of American Law 1870–1969: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

power, thus perfectly organized, was also placed unlimited dominion over the amount of the circulating medium, giving it the power to regulate the value of property and the fruits of labour in every quarter of the Union, and to bestow prosperity or bring ruin upon any city or section of the country as might best comport with its own interest or policy.[178]

The monopoly over the money supply acting as a precedent to all the rest, Jackson's comments extended to the monopolistic tendencies of trusts and cartels in general:

> The mischief springs from the power which the moneyed interest derives from a paper currency which they are able to control, from the multitude of corporations with exclusive privileges which they have succeeded in obtaining in the different States, and which are employed altogether for their benefit; and unless you become more watchful in your States and check this spirit of monopoly and thirst for exclusive privileges you will in the end find that the most important powers of Government have been given or bartered away, and the control over your dearest interests has passed into the hands of these corporations.[179]

The mischief to which Jackson refers traces back as far as the early modern period in England, the same era when that other great mischief was raging throughout Europe in the form of the European Witch Hunts. In Tudor and Stuart England, a succession of traders and trading companies formed the basis for the corporate model. As individual merchants realised they could do more by pooling their capital, a succession of trading companies appeared, ending with the East India Company (1600) under Elizabeth I.[180] As the European Witch Hunts fell into full swing, so too did the further development of British trading. The Virginia Company (1606) and the French Company (1609) were founded under James I (1603–1625), an enthusiastic witch-hunter, and continued for at least

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[178]Watts, J. F., and Fred L. Israel, *Presidential Documents: The Speeches, Proclamations, and Policies That Have Shaped the Nation from Washington to Clinton*, New York: Routledge, 2000, 84–85.

[179]Watts and Israel, *Presidential Documents*, ibid., 86.

[180]Nace, Ted, *Gangs of America: The Rise of Corporate Power and the Disabling of Democracy*, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2005, 33; Robins, Nick, *The Corporation That Changed the World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational*, London: Pluto Press, 2005.

half a century, with at least another four to follow. In the British East India Company, in particular, many of the forms of the modern corporation were developed, such as the concept of the joint-stock company as an entity separate from its founding members and its transferability as such to third parties uninvolved in supplying the capital with which to form it.[181]

Such forms the historical backdrop for the bartering away of the most important powers of government through the enabling of corporate power. Nace argues that this process occurred in three phases: (1) legislative and judicial creation of corporate quasi-rights (1820–present); (2) judicial creation of corporate constitutional rights (1886–1986); and finally trade agreement creation of corporate global right (1987–present).[182] Such represented a progressively escalating political crisis as the shortcomings of an electoral democracy built atop a class-divided economy were aggravated and accelerated by the growth of corporate monopolism; the crisis arose simply out of the fact that wealth imbalances are also power imbalances, and that disproportionate wealth also meant disproportionate influence over the political system—a problem that created a vicious cycle as influence was used to increase wealth, further increasing influence.

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad *(1886)*

In dealing a body blow to legal reigns on corporate power, the judicial creation of corporate constitutional rights also ushered in the age of corporate personhood—the age in which corporations gained the same legal rights as flesh and blood human beings under the relevant provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, originally drafted to protect the constitutional rights of freed slaves after the American Civil War.[183] No legal decision exists to point to that actually establishes corporate personhood as a matter of conventional legal process; what was taken as such and came the basis for corporate constitutional rights was a *fait accompli* established after the fact, on the basis of legal headnotes

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[181] Nace, *Gangs of America*, ibid., 34.

[182] Nace, ibid., 26–27.

[183] Lugosi, Charles I., 'Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence,' *Issues in Law & Medicine* 22, Fall 2006: 119.

attached to the case of *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad* (1886) which in themselves are not legally binding.

A dispute over land taxes along railway lines, *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad* was the result of an attempt by the latter to avoid paying them by claiming that as a person, it was being prejudicially treated by the country through which its line passed by being denied the right permitted persons to deduct the value of its mortgages from the taxable value of its property.[184] Before the official argument as made, however, presiding Chief Justice Morrison Waite stated:

> The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.[185]

In the actual proceedings of *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad*, the official documents note that 'Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court'—which as Waite already noted does not contain commentary on corporate personhood nor a measured judgment on the subject. The fact that one of all justices residing happened to agree with corporate personhood and its actual treatment in legal process, despite being two separate things, have since been treated as one and the same.[186] Despite having then no legal basis for doing so, *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad* became a bridgehead for the rise of corporate personhood, with all that entailed in terms of rolling back legal protections against monopoly and the aggravation of class antagonisms as corporate supremacism began to make ever greater incursions into workers' rights and wellbeing.

Three years later, in *Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Beckwith*, the Supreme Court ruled a corporation was a 'person' for due process

[184] Swisher, Carl Brent, 'Motivation and Political Technique,' *The California Constitutional Convention 1878–1879*, New York: Da Capo, 1969, 78.

[185] Hartmann, *Unequal Protection*, op. cit., 104; Nace, *Gangs of America*, op. cit., 22.

[186] Hartmann, *Unequal Protection*, ibid.; Nace, *Gangs of America*, ibid., County of Santa Clara V. Southern Pac. R. Co. People of the State of California V. Central Pac. R. Co. Same V. Southern Pac. R. Co, Legal Information Institute, via https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/118/394, accessed 18 September 2016.

and legal protection; a year after that, in 1890, Sections 7 and 8 of the Sherman Antitrust Act defined corporations as persons; and in 1893, *Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co.* gave corporations claim to the Bill of Rights.[187] Noting these developments, and apparently cognisant of their meaning, President Grover Cleveland said in his 3 December 1888 annual State of the Union address that

> As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the existence of trust, combinations and monopolies, while the citizen is struggling far in the rear or trampled to death beneath an iron heel. Corporations, which should be carefully restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people's masters.[188]

Implicit in these comments was recognition of the fact that, if the law had previously given property owners the right to exploit owned or rented slaves and owned or rented slaves the right to be exploited, the establishment of the doctrine of corporate personhood simply exacerbated the situation and created conditions ripe for class conflict. The formal structures of American democracy could no more serve both humans and corporations than they could serve the minority of the opulent and the majority as per Madison; the law could only serve the stronger of its two masters. Serving propertied over non-propertied classes, it would likewise serve corporations over humans, fulfilling Jefferson's fears of 'a corrupt alliance between business and government' characterised by 'the mass of toiling producers battling their exploiters in commerce, finance and other speculative enterprises dependent on the resources and favours of government.'[189]

A Meeting of Paternalisms and the Great National Safety Valve

The corruption inherent to the corporate–government nexus that developed in the wake of *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad* was reflected in the hostility of the rising corporate class towards individual rights and freedoms unserviceable to its interests—a hostility

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[187] Hartmann, *Unequal Protection*, op. cit., 45–156, 105.

[188] Hartmann, *Unequal Protection*, ibid., 121.

[189] Kelley, Robert Lloyd, *The Transatlantic Persuasion; the Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone*, New York: Knopf, 1969, 137.

only matched by the fear of perceived threats to its power and privileges. Such fears and hostilities combined easily with nativist hatred for the unassimilated foreigner, also born of a desire to defend privilege. Embodying a paternalist mentality reflecting privileged entitlement, nascent corporatists easily accommodated nativist racism insofar as the latter tended to be expressed in similarly paternalistic terms.[190] As natural allies, the two united around the myth that challenges to privilege was a conspiracy of unassimilated subversives, and later foreign powers and their agents, not spontaneous responses to the entirely homegrown injustice and inequality it tended to produce.[191]

The nativist half of the paternalist equation derived, as we have seen, from the racialising of American democracy in the nineteenth century, as some came to see it as a specifically Anglo-Saxon achievement. With the closing of the frontier and the resulting loss of economic opportunity, the United States was rapidly deprived of its 'great national safety valve,' its traditional mechanism for dampening the class conflict that had plagued Europe throughout the nineteenth century.[192] As a remedy, US elites found a new escape route in the mythology of the 'racial frontier,' the colour line running deep within the national unconscious separating 'whiteness' from 'Otherness'—'Others' against whom a racially purist notion of American national identity could be constructed.[193] Expressing this tendency, one US nationalist declared

[190] Hartmann, *Unequal Protection*, op. cit., 91; Dawley, Alan, *Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution*, Princeton University Press, 2013, 81.

[191] For the literature on nativism in the United States, see, Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, op. cit.; Horsman, Reginald, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, op. cit.; Bennett, David, *The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History*, Vintage, 1995; Davis, David Brion, ed., *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present*, Cornell University Press, 1970; Knobel, Dale T., *America for the Americans: The Nativist Movement in the United States*, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996; Coben, Stanley, 'A Study in Nativism: The American Red Scare of 1919–20,' *Political Science Quarterly* 79, no. 1, 1964–03: 52–75; Earle, Carvile, and Cao Changyong, 'Frontier Closure and the Involution of American Society, 1840–1890,' *Journal of the Early Republic* 13, no. 2: 163.

[192] Van Nuys, *Americanizing the West*, op. cit., 16.

[193] Van Nuys, ibid., 18–19. For more on Otherness and Othering in general, see Saïd, Edward, *Orientalism*, Penguin, 2016.

Californians are vividly conscious of their position as the warders of the Western mark. They hold not merely a political and geographic, but a racial frontier—the border between the white man's world and the brown man's world.[194]

Those who were to be instrumental in orchestrating 'the new structure of class rule' were not slow to associate the corporate paternalism with the logic of the 'great national safety valve.' Racism was a natural corollary of the exclusivity inherent to class privilege, particularly where those privileges were sanctioned ideologically in the case of corporatism. 'The material benefits of racial exclusion function, in the labour context, to stifle class tensions among whites,' writes Cheryl Harris; as long as a regime of racial privilege could be established and kept in place, white workers could be encouraged to believe 'that they had more in common with the bourgeoisie than with fellow workers,' since 'even when the white working class did not collect increased pay as a part of white privilege, there were real advantages not paid in direct income: whiteness still yielded what Du Bois termed a "public and psychological wage" vital to white workers.'[195] Racial privileging white workers provided a tried and true approach for those who sought to render scapegoats out of the victims of class exploitation who were not racially privileged by making the association of 'opponent' with 'foreign' a stick to the carrot of whiteness.[196] As the classic form of the elite 'divide and conquer' strategy, this trick was a leaf out of the proverbial oldest book.

Built on a combination of paternalism and the great national safety valve and set loose by corporate personhood, the 'corrupt alliance between business and government' unleashed a reinvigorated class war domestically and internationally. At home, amidst a brutal assault on organised labour, a test run of benevolent paternalism in Detroit took the Americanisation drive described above to industrial workers, as noted.[197] Overseas, the

[194] Van Nuys, ibid., 18–19.

[195] Harris, Cheryl, 'Whiteness as Property,' *Harvard Law Review* 106, no. 8, 1993: 1741.

[196] Harris, 'Whiteness as Property,' ibid., 1742.

[197] NAC, *Americanising a City: The Campaign for the Detroit Night Schools Conducted in Cooperation with the Detroit Board of Commerce and Board of Education, August-September 1915*, New York: NAC, 1915, 3–8; Korman, Gerd, 'Americanization at the Factory Gate,' *Industrial and Labo Relations Review* 18, no. 3, 1965: 396–419; Barrett, James R., 'Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880–1930,' *The Journal of American History* 79, no. 3, December 1992: 996–1020.

'corrupt alliance between business and government' fuelled the first forays of US elites into militarism and imperialism as corporate power grew and spread beyond American national boundaries, as in the case of United Fruit, newly enabled by American Orientalism.[198] Further adventures reflected the normalisation of imperialist aggression and the paternalist mindset of the perpetrators, who rationalised their actions on the equally paternalistic grounds of American Exceptionalism and the logic of the great national safety valve.[199] It was this logic that applied when, at the conclusion of the Second World War, economically unscathed and militarily victorious, the United States emerged as global hegemon.[200]

The American Moment and the Grand Area

US elites had put the communist conspiracy theory on ice during WWII, while defeating Nazism briefly demanded engaging with reality. Upon the successful conclusion of the war, the new status of the United States as economic and military hegemon provided elites with all the motivation they needed to dust it off again, as they eyed off against the USSR for the spoils of victory. One organisation who understood that there was much plunder and booty to be had was the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a corporate-sponsored foreign policy planning network formed after World War I by the internationalist faction of the American ruling class. In seeking to extend their national monopolies globally, the corporate interests behind the CFR began to develop detailed plans to that end, to be implemented through US diplomatic and military

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[198] Little, Douglas, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, University of North Carolina Press, 2008; Nayak, Meghana V., and Christopher Malone, 'American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony,' *International Studies Review* 11, no 2, 2009: 253–276.

[199] See for example, Miller, Stuart Creighton, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

[200] 'Once the battle lines between communism and the "free society" were drawn, the economy became untouchable for purposes other than "strengthening" capitalism. The ultimate merger would be between capitalism and democracy. Once the identity and security of democracy were successfully identified with the Cold War and with the methods for waging it, the state was set for the intimidation of most politics left of right.' Wolin, *Democracy Inc*, op. cit., 34.

power.[201] The conceptual framework for these plans, developed by the CFR War-Peace Group between 1939 and 1945, became known as the Grand Area, and defined the parts of the world that were to be subordinated to the needs of the US economy and the corporate class that was coming increasingly to dominate it.[202] As such, Grand Area concepts were driven by the fundamental assumption that 'we own the world.'[203]

Some idea of the influence of Grand Area thinking on US foreign policy be gained variously from the *New York Times* ('The Council's membership includes some of the most influential men in government, business, education and the press'; 'The CFR "for nearly half a century has made substantial contributions to the basic concepts of American foreign policy') and Newsweek (the Council's leadership is the 'foreign-policy establishment of the US').[204] Council alumni include a 'galaxy of establishment figures' like David Rockefeller (Chase Manhattan Bank), Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger, who in having begun his foreign affairs career in the Council credited it with 'inventing him.'[205] From without, the Council also enjoyed close ties to government. A corporation lawyer, Council director Henry L. Stimson held high-level offices under Taft, Hoover and Roosevelt; between the crucial period of 1940–1942, when post-war planning was first being formulated, CFR president and banker

[201] Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, op. cit., Chapter 1, 'Cold War Facts and Fancy.'

[202] Shoup, Laurence H., and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977; Chomsky, Noam, 'The Grand Area,' in *What Uncle Sam Really Wants*, Real Story, Berkeley: Odonian Press, 1992; Domhoff, G. William, *The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America*, New York: A. de Gruyter, 1990, 160.

[203] Wallerstein, Immanuel, 'The World-System After the Cold War,' *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 1, 1993: 1–6; Chomsky, 'We Own the World,' op. cit.; 'The terminology is revealing,' Chomsky observes. 'It is only possible to lose something that one owns … The tacit assumption was that the US owned China, by right, along with most of the rest of the world, much as post-war planners assumed.' Chomsky, Noam, '"Losing" the World: American Decline in Perspective, Pt. 1,' *The Guardian*, 12 February 2012, via https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/14/losing-the-world-american-decline-noam-chomsky, accessed 20 December 2016.

[204] Domhoff, G. William. 'The Council on Foreign Relations and the Grand Area: Case Studies on the Origins of the IMF and the Vietnam War,' *Class, Race and Corporate Power* 2, no. 1, 2014: 1, 12.

[205] Shoup and Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust*, ibid., 5.

Norman H. Davis had two phones installed in his office, one for regular calls, and a direct line to the White House, and met with Secretary of State Hull several times a week in addition to almost nightly bouts of croquet.[206]

A blueprint for the Grand Area concept, and so the contours of the post-war world, comes from CFR Economic and Financial Group report E-B34, 'Methods of Economic Collaboration: The Role of the Grand Area in American Economic Policy,' dated July 24, 1941. Citing the defence of the United States as pretext, the memorandum described the achievement of this as the realisation of the 'degree of complementarism [*sic*]' of the various blocs within the Grand Area, which included 'the Western Hemisphere, the United Kingdom, the remainder of the British Commonwealth and Empire, the Dutch East Indies, China, and Japan.'[207] Naturally the defence of the United States was to continue beyond the cessation of the war; to all intents and purposes it appears to be continuing to this day. Some clue as to why this was so could be found in the memorandum itself, which noted that 'In wartime the tendency is for such clashes of interest to be submerged and subordinated to the single goal of winning the war.' Unhappily however,

> At the peace and after it, they tend to re-emerge, sometimes more sharply than ever. With outside pressure of a common enemy removed, such conflicts of interest can easily destroy the whole program of continued international cooperation. One of the most important tasks of the Grand Area studies will be to detect present and prospective clashes of interest, define them so far as possible, and seek means of eliminating, alleviating, or compromising them. (E-B34, 1941, p. 5)[208]

Some indication of what this was to mean in practice was provided internally by none other than George Kennan, a member of the Council of Foreign Relations for 59 years,[209] who declared in 1946 that

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[206] Domhoff, 'The Council on Foreign Relations and the Grand Area,' op. cit., 3.

[207] Domhoff, ibid., 10–11.

[208] Domhoff, ibid., 12.

[209] Council on Foreign Relations, 'The Lasting Legacy of George F. Kennan,' *Cfr.org*, 4 June 2012, via http://www.cfr.org/world/lasting-legacy-george-f-kennan/p35268, accessed 18 December 2016.

We have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships that will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.[210]

Such comments represent a significant departure from allegations made only a year beforehand by Kennan regarding 'Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise' in contrast to Soviet 'fanaticism.' The desire of Kennan and other Grand Area planners to build on US economic and military hegemony, not containing the Soviet Union, was at the core of its military adventurism; as Kennan stated, he understood his task as maintaining economic disparity even of this involved provoking movements for independent nationalism, which certainly accounts for opposition to US aggression in South East Asia. Since Grand Area planners regarded the vested interests of the corporate class and the national interest as one and the same thing, any attempt by countries designated for a slave role to service their own national self-interest could only be regarded as an attack on US national security—a textbook example of victim playing, victim-blaming, abrogation of responsibility and conflation of opposition with attack characteristic of panic-driven scapegoating.

The Dollar Gap

Troubled by the recalcitrance of unwilling slaves and their desire to assert their human rights, in the immediate post-war period Grand Area planners also faced another concerted difficulty in the form of the 'dollar gap,'

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[210] Kennan, George F., 'Memo PPS23,' 28 February 1948, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. 1.2, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976, 509–529, via https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memo_PPS23_by_George_Kennan, accessed 17 June 2018.

or an international balance of payments crisis arising out of the brute economic reality that the devastated nations of Europe lacked the dollars to buy US exports.[211] The United States depended on high export rates to maintain a commensurate rate of economic growth at home; without some kind of solution to the problem of the dollar gap, not only would the laissez-faire ideology of the hegemon not remain hegemonic, but, relying as they did on the continuing robustness of the national economy, the Grand Area plans drawn up by the Council on Foreign Relations on behalf of a multilateralist corporatocracy had no chance of succeeding.

Committed to 'free trade, free capital flows, and free currency conversion' as a defining characteristic of the tendency, the multilateralist corporatocrats in the Truman administration were motivated by memories of the Great Depression, whose effects they attributed to protectionism—as they did the horrors of the Second World War when the Central Powers tried to overcome the disastrous consequences of the Treaty of Versailles and protectionism on the part of their adversaries through imperialist expansion into new markets. Open markets would, they felt, resolve a number of problems; without them, on the other hand, the global economy would flounder, leaving the nations of Europe to experiment with collectivist responses that would undermine US economic and political power.[212] In response to the dollar gap, the multilateralists responded with loans to Britain, Greece and Turkey, and the European Recovery Programme—the Marshall Plan. Problematically, however, as Cardwell notes,

> In pushing these endeavours, the multilateralists discovered that they did not have the support of the US Congress, many of whose members were not keen on the idea of providing either loans or grants to foreign nations, some of whom were the United States' foremost competitors in world trade. In their efforts to sell Congress on these programs, the multilateralists found that although Congress was not persuaded by the purely economic arguments associated with failing to pass them, it responded favourably when they cast them as moves aimed at stopping the Soviet Union from fulfilling its design for global conquest.[213]

[211] Cardwell, *NSC 68*, op. cit., Chapter 3, 'Multilateralism, the Dollar Gap, and the Origins of the Cold War,' 28–58.

[212] McCormick, Thomas, *America's Half-Century: US Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 5, quoted in Cardwell, *NSC 68*, ibid., 30–34.

[213] Cardwell, ibid., 59.

Perhaps the multilateralists had some familiarity with the experience of British colonialists in Iran. This Simpsons-esque state of affairs was further compounded by another small detail: the Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the Nazi war machine on the eastern front during the war and, still figuratively and literally limping away from the battlefield even in victory had neither the manpower or resources for world conquest, a truism apparently well understood by anyone operating outside of the sphere of propaganda. We find that what Cardwell describes as 'standard opinion amongst top level government officials concerning the Soviet Union's intentions' was laid out by George Kennan in a memorandum to Dean Acheson on 6 January 1950:

> Most recent indications are that Soviet attention is shifting to Germany and China, with reduced hopes for accomplishments of western European [Communist] parties. If this is true, it would indicate no Soviet intention of attacking in west at this juncture; and indeed, there are no indications that Soviet leaders are intending to resort to war at this stage to achieve objectives.[214]

Someone had neglected to inform Paul Nitze as he was preparing NSC68 to hand to Truman in April. While Truman declared later in 1950 that the communist empire was on the march as a result of the Soviet acquisition of the bomb (1949) and the Chinese Revolution (1949), Dwight Eisenhower didn't feel it made a difference, Acheson was not alarmed by China, regarding it if anything as potentially a 'strategic quagmire for the Kremlin,' and Truman himself left the chair of the Atomic Energy Commission vacant for six months, an act hardly indicative of a panicked preoccupation with communist expansion.[215]

For his part, Stalin was understood to be more concerned with security at home, not interested in exporting revolutions abroad.[216]

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[214]Cardwell, ibid., 51.

[215]Cardwell, ibid., 21, 23–44.

[216]Cardwell, ibid., 44; 'They want peace and seek to secure the peace. That means that the present war scare does not come from that direction. I think that the present war scare is aroused by the actions of certain political groups who are engaged in propaganda for a new war and are thus sowing the seeds of dissension and uncertainty.' Stalin, Joseph, 'Replies to Questions Put by Mr. Eddie Gilmore, Associated Press Correspondent,' 22 March, 1946, in *J. V. Stalin on Post-War International Relations*, Soviet News, 1947, via https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1946/03/22.htm, accessed 20 December 2016.

Stalin's own behaviour on the international stage mirrored his willingness to sacrifice principle to the expediencies of power at home—not least of which being the subordinating of the global communist movements to the foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union, a fact that actually made it a *counter*-revolutionary force globally. Beholden to the agreements he had made at Yalta, Stalin refused to provide political or material support to the Greek anti-fascist partisans, betraying them just as he had done the anti-fascists during the Spanish Revolution, there paving the way for 35-odd years of fascist dictatorship under Francisco Franco. Details of this type Truman relegated to the memory hole when declaring his containment doctrine later in the year, as did many others.[217] Such helps to account for other aspects of the anti-communist legacy, not least of which being the use of Pinochet's Chile a testing ground for neoliberal austerity economics[218]—exploitation of the disorientation and chaos created by the imposition of a US-sponsored terrorist police state marking the growth of what Naomi Klein calls the Shock Doctrine.[219]

Other details belied the communist conspiracy theory such as Stalin's declared policy of 'Socialism in One Country,' a conspicuously inward-looking doctrine for an expansionist state devoted to the overthrow of global capitalism. 'Socialism in One Country' represented such a profound break with traditional communist notions of worker internationalism as to produce a global schism in the authoritarian left between orthodox Stalinists and Trotskyist dissidents, in turn

[217] Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945*, NY: Random House, 1968; Broué, Pierre, and Emil Témine, *The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972; Peirats, José, *The CNT in the Spanish Revolution*, Vol. 1, PM Press, 2011; Wolfe, Alan, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat: Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus*, South End Press, 1984.

[218] Klein, Naomi, '40 Years Ago, This Chilean Exile Warned Us About the Shock Doctrine. Then He Was Assassinated,' *The Nation*, 21 September 2016, via https://www.thenation.com/article/40-years-ago-this-chilean-exile-warned-us-about-the-shock-doctrine-then-he-was-assassinated, accessed 20 December 2016; Letlier, Orlando, 'The "Chicago Boys" in Chile: Economic Freedom's Awful Toll,' *The Nation*, 21 September 2016, via https://www.thenation.com/article/the-chicago-boys-in-chile-economic-freedoms-awful-toll/, accessed 20 December 2016.

[219] Klein, Naomi, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, Melbourne: Allen Lane, 2007, Chapter 3, 'States of Shock: The Bloody Birth of the Counter-Revolution,' 75–97.

precipitating the Stalinist purges of the 1930s in the name of defending the workers' state from counter-revolutionary terrorists[220]—a communist conspiracy theory all of his very own.

The 1948 War Scare

Happily, the CFR multilateralists had a direct precedent of their own to draw on in the form of the War Scare of 1948, when for several weeks the country seemed on the verge of a new conflict with their erstwhile allies.[221] Having stated the prevailing (and uncontroversial) opinion that the Soviet bloc was not an expansionist threat, Truman changed his tune when it came to his attention that the US aerospace industry was financially crippled following the end of hostilities in 1945. While a fanatically laissez-faire and anti-communist Congress could not abide state intervention in the form of a subsidy, it could abide new contracts with the War Department against a resurgent communist threat.[222] Perhaps aware of sentiments of the kind expressed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a friend of James Forrestal, Truman's Secretary of Defence, that 'the country was always run by crises, and if one was not evident it had to be created to get things done,'[223] or that to the effect that 'as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available,' from President of Bell Aircraft Corporation Lawrence D. Bell.[224] Sensing the way the winds were blowing, the *Wall Street Journal* predicted in September 1947 that 'a Russian scare will be used to prod more Army-Navy money out of Congress.'—one, it turns out, with unusually conspicuous perspicacity.[225]

Ideas following the same kind of logic were hardly out of earshot of the President. Clark Clifford, a key advisor to Truman, write him a monograph in 1949 arguing that 'the worse matters get up to a fairly certain point—real danger of immanent war—the more there is a sense of crisis … In times of crisis, the American citizen tends to back

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[220] See Case Study III.

[221] Kofsky, *The War Scare of 1948*, op. cit.

[222] Kofsky, ibid., 37–38.

[223] Kofsky, ibid., 1.

[224] Kofsky, ibid., 10.

[225] Kofsky, ibid., 82, 88.

up his President.'[226] Truman got even more explicit advice when he approached sceptical Republican leaders to ask for $400 million to loans to the military governments of Greece and Turkey, Republican senator, and fortunate son of one of the richest families in America, Arthur H. Vanderbilt, advised Truman that if that was what he wanted there was only one way to get it—namely, to 'make a personal appearance before Congress and scare hell out of the country.'[227] For his part, Truman had not made it all the way to the presidency by being unaware of the side on which his bread was buttered, and obliged him.

> Scare hell out of the country.
>
> —Arthur H. Vanderbilt

> A Russian scare will be used to prod more Army-Navy money out of Congress.
>
> —*Wall Street Journal*

Conclusion

This chapter has compared the construction of communist panic in three historical instances against the analytical criteria nominated in the theoretical section of this research project. Beginning with the self-interested framing of the crisis by the moral entrepreneurs of communist panic, it examined the use of moral panic constructed around the mythology of anti-communism as the basis for crisis leveraging and scapegoating, through targeting of scapegoats via deviance production and the establishment of a legitimating pretext for scapegoating via the victim complex enabled by moral disengagement. After looking at how persecutions enabled by communist panic were put into effect, it concluded by exploring the underlying economic and social dynamics driving the construction of communist panic and whose interests it served. This case study now concludes with a summary of the material presented in the case study against the analytical criteria in preparation for comparison against the first and third case studies at the end of the research project.

In each of the three episodes of communist panic examined, changing emphasis of deviance production reflected innovations in scapegoating

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[226] Kofsky, ibid., 134.
[227] Kofsky, ibid., 198.

techniques. These took advantage of new targets and new opportunities for blame shifting, while retaining the essential elements of the overall process. Initially the communist conspiracy theory was associated with immigration, but as the pool of immigrant scapegoats was exhausted, so too was the usefulness of the immigration conspiracy theory and replaced with another targeting allegedly disloyal native-borns. Throughout the Cold War, the communist conspiracy theory was recalibrated once again to take advantage of the successful conclusion of the Second World War and the opportunities for world domination afforded by military and economic hegemony.

In the communist conspiracy theory of Soviet expansionism, the designs attributed to the hated and feared Other having become overt as US policy. Each time, the communist conspiracy theory was recast, priming mechanisms intact, the external existential threat trope reframed to meet new conditions. Doctrinal work to these ends from actors as varied as Joseph McCarthy, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and the authors of the Red Channels booklet, reflected the propensity of elite courtiers to follow the common script of dominant class interests without needing to be directed openly by them, as per the vulgar oversimplifications of conspiratorialism.

The 'Mobilisation phase' looked at the self-interested framing of crisis by moral entrepreneurs of communist panic. During this phase, politicised assumptions identifying the vested interests of the moneyed elite with the interests of the nation and the common good interpreted escalating class conflict as a threat to national security. Closely associated with nationalist ideology and rising corporate power, this framework became the basis of anti-communism. Viewed though this anti-communist lens, disruptions to the status quo and the privileged interests behind it from organised labour and political dissenters seeking greater freedom and social justice could only be interpreted as the machinations of imaginary hobgoblins as varied as unassimilated immigrants, disloyal fifth columnists and rogue states, as they eventually were. This paranoid, binary view associated challenges to both the status quo and the global designs articulated by groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers with giving comfort to the demonised communist enemy, reflecting the archetypal priming script associated with the Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy. This priming script would inform the deviance production and moral disengagement during the later stages of the scapegoating process.

The 'Targeting phase' looked at the construction of targets for scapegoating through the production of deviance. In the first example, the First Red Scare, the amplification of half-truths wrought the deviant mythology of the 'radical alien.' The fact that some American workers were foreign-born, and that some of foreign birth had joined unions, became a plot to overthrow America in the diabolical idea that workers had rights. In the second example, the Second Red Scare, the amplification of half-truths wrought the deviant mythology of the 'Disloyal Fifth Columnist.' The fact that some Americans were insufficiently deferential to the corporate interests that had captured the political and legal superstructure via the doctrine of corporate personhood, and that sometimes this involved experimenting with ideals of social justice, became a plot to help Josef Stalin colonise the United States by stealth. Steeped in Marxist ideology, the diabolical method of thinking for themselves and questioning what they were told reflected their automatic thinking and dangerous authoritarian tendencies. In the third example, the Cold War, the amplification of half-truths wrought the deviant mythology of the 'Domino Effect.' Insufficient deference to global corporate expansionism became a plot to overthrow the United States, using the diabolical method of asserting national sovereignty.

The 'Legitimation phase' looked at the construction of a pretext through moral disengagement for the persecution of scapegoats. Having taken it on themselves to define the meaning of 'America' in their own interests, the moral entrepreneurs of communist panic developed on this basis the victim complex necessary to enable scapegoating through the myth, born of the False Dilemma, that criticism of 'America' was tantamount to attacking it. Such accounts the inconsistency between the lofty ideals used to justify anti-communism as expressed in campaigns against radical immigrants, disloyal citizens and the falling of dominos throughout Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, and the markedly less lofty values characterising them in practise.

During the First Red Scare, immigrants who thought thoughts the government didn't like were arrested without warrant and deported without trial via the allegation that they lacked a proper appreciation of due process. During the Second Red Scare, citizens who thought thoughts the government didn't like were hauled before a congressional show trial and accused of subverting democracy by stealth. During the Cold War, counties who failed to toe the line and accepted their allotted role in the US-dominated world order were accused of being part of an

empire-building conspiracy. Anyone in the way when ruling class elites asserted their class rule, or who doubted, contradicted, challenged the legitimacy of that rule, or even just acknowledged that it existed, was automatically associated with the existential threat. In each case, the 'with us or against us' logic of the False Dilemma reflected the tendency of moral entrepreneurs of communist panic to identify an insufficient degree of submission to the dominant class power with support for the imaginary hobgoblins de jure.

The 'Persecution phase' looked at the three major periods of scapego-ating driven by communist panic, incorporating all prior stages. The first part explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation during the First Red Scare, as a reaction to the successes of organised labour by the state and far-right groups based on a conspiracy theory of imported threats from within. The second part explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation during the Second Red Scare, as a reaction to ideological plurality and political dissent by serial congressional show trials based on a conspiracy theory of exterior threats aided by domestic traitors. The third part explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation during the Cold War, as attacks on nations who got in the way of US imperialism based on a conspiracy theory of an expansionist exterior threat. In these three successive phases of communist panic, xenophobia served as a 'national safety valve' born of the need originally to compensate for the decline of the western frontier as a means of dampening class tensions.

Communist conspiracy theories so combined nativist and corporate paternalism, embedded in national political culture during the First World War. As moral entrepreneurs reasserted ideological legitimacy, reconstructed political orthodoxies around new contingencies and re-established a status quo favourable to their class power and privileges, wartime expediencies became permanent features of society, seen as desirable traits of citizens. A feature of US nationalism throughout the twentieth century as a result, xenophobia also featured in the War Scare of 1948, the Second Red Scare and the Cold War, all textbook examples of the Paranoid Style. The Ancient Fantasy was evident throughout, where anti-communism was couched in religious terms.

The 'Restoration phase' looked at who benefitted from communist panic. As this criteria revealed, the breaking of strikes, imprisonment and deportation of foreign-born unionists and radicals, state terror in the form of show trials and executions of radicals from the Haymarket Martyrs to Sacco and Vanzetti and Joe Hill, show trials of thought

criminals in Hollywood by HUAC, multiple major wars of aggression in Asia and support for dictators throughout Asia, Latin America and the Middle East all reinforced and extended the class power of a rising corporate oligarchy domestically and globally. Where it employed xenophobia as a feature of the Paranoid Style, communist panic represented the conjoining of nativist and corporate paternalism, a result of the accidental though significant fact that the loss of the western frontier as 'national safety valve' occurred at around the same time as the rise of corporate personhood. Communist panic then enabled a state of permanent class warfare waged by this ascendant corporate class with the goal of imposing corporate personhood in the name of defending the democratic freedoms it usurped. A permanent pretext for class and imperial warfare, it similarly provided a permanent pretext for law and order policing, a reign of terror by the national political police lead by Hoover, and endless corporate welfare to US industry through Eisenhower's Military Industrial Complex.

From this we can conclude that the perils of authoritarianism did land in America, but institutionally, from the centre outward, rather than from the periphery inward. A process of subversion on the part of authoritarian ideologues hostile to everything the ideals of democracy represented was being carried out, to be sure, but it was wholly native-born. The ultimate irony of communist panic is that, while moral entrepreneurs made endless moral appeals to norms associated with individual rights, they tolerated corporate supremacist values, and later neoliberal totalitarianisms, in their own midst. This paradox was reflected in the tendency to demonise Soviet state communism using half-truths, where facts already condemned it on their own. The only reason to rely on the production of deviance and moral panics where Soviet communism was concerned was to foster the pretence that, as imperialisms, the Soviet and US varieties were qualitatively different.

As the tendency of the United States to become cause and cure of the same problem through the production of deviance tends to suggest, panic-driven mythologies of communist subversion and Soviet expansionism served ultimately to project onto the enemy the aspects of the Self that US nationalists found shameful, but unable to acknowledge in themselves. In projecting those aspects onto a scapegoat and denouncing them, the architects of communist panic could enjoy the pleasures of doublethink and double standards in taking a moralistic stance against the subversion of freedom and imperialist expansionism while making them the defining features of their own domestic and foreign policies.

CHAPTER 7

Case Study III: Terrorist Panic

A terrorist is not only someone who plants bombs, but a person whose *ideas* are contrary to our Western, Christian civilization.
—Jorge Rafael Videla, Argentinian military dictator 1976–81[1]

A considerable number of the ANC leaders are Communists… When the ANC says that they will target British companies, this shows what a typical terrorist organisation it is. I fought terrorism all my life… I will have nothing to do with any organisation that practices violence.
—Margaret Thatcher, Vancouver 1987[2]

This chapter examines terror panic, the third and final of three case studies exploring historical patterns of moral panic and their relationship to scapegoating. It explores terror panic as a concept according to the analytical criteria nominated in the theoretical section of this study,

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[1] Feitlowitz, Marguerite, *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture*, Oxford University Press, 2011, 24.

[2] Phythian, Mark, '"Batting for Britain": British Arms Sales in the Thatcher Years,' *Crime, Law and Social Change* 26, no. 3, 1996: 271–300; Whitby, David, and Mark Phythian, 'Arming Iraq: How the US and Britain Secretly Built Saddam's War Machine,' *Crime, Law and Social Change* 27, no. 1, 1997: 73–84; Norton-Taylor, Richard, and Rob Evans, 'Margaret Thatcher's Lobbying of Saudi Royals Over Arms Deal Revealed,' *The Guardian*, 16 July 2015, via https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/16/margaret-thatcher-lobbying-saudi-royals-arms-deal, accessed 27 December 2017; Feinstein, Andrew, *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade*, London: Macmillan, 2011.

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focusing on the self-interested framing of crisis by those responsible for the panic, before exploring the use of moral panic constructed around terrorist conspiracy theory as the basis for crisis leveraging and scapegoating. The case study concludes by examining the underlying economic and social forces driving the construction of terror panic and whose interests it ultimately served. It summarises the material presented in the case study against the analytical criteria in preparation for comparison against the first and second case studies in the conclusion to the study itself.

While terrorism understood as an 'existential threat' is widely associated with the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the ideological framework of moral panic over terrorism first coalesced during the 1970s, in reaction to worsening geopolitical developments in the Middle East. At that time, a nascent counterterrorist conspiracy theory viewed various developments unfavourable to western elites through the lens of the Cold War, adopting its characteristic binary logic and all that involved in terms of the habitual tendency to conflate the interests of elites with the moral Good.[3] Borrowing from communist conspiracy theory, a terrorist conspiracy theory began to emerge, moral entrepreneurs of the new existential threat stoking fears of a demonised Other in the classic manner of the Paranoid Style. The development of terrorist conspiracy theory took off in earnest following the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, until the Iran-Contra scandal (1986) put Reaganites on the back foot. It was not until the high drama and horror of 9/11 that terrorist conspiracy theory could once again be rolled out as a cover for the kind of western violence Iran-Contra had exposed. At this point, a political culture conditioned by counterterrorism during the Reaganite period slipped it back on like an old coat, enabling 'terrorists' in their work in the process.

Despite the self-assuredness of counterterrorist ideologues, however, terrorism as a concept has been notoriously hard to define. Attempted definitions have been plagued by issues such as (1) attempting to introduce moral judgement into empirical processes designed to establish objective reality, (2) a tendency to conflate strategy and identity such that terrorists are defined not by what they do but by who they

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[3]Wolin, Sheldon, *Democracy Inc: Managed Democracy and the Spectre of Inverted Totalitarianism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, 40; Winkler, Carol, 'Parallels in Preemptive War Rhetoric: Reagan on Libya; Bush on Iraq,' *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10, no. 2, 2007: 303–334.

are (and are not), and (3) pervasive double standards.[4] Even the RAND Corporation, not one to challenge counterterrorist conventionality, acknowledged that 'definitions strongly reflect political points of view.'[5] As a case in point, the US State Department tried to develop a workable legal definition of 'terrorism' during the 1970s as the basis for law pertaining to 'material support for terrorism,' a project it eventually had to abandon when it could not find one that did not equally apply to material support the United States provided to the Contras in Nicaragua, death squads in Central America, 'sub-fascist' military dictatorships in South America, and the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Israel, amongst others.[6] In a 2006 interview with *Democracy Now*, former counterterrorism official under Reagan, Edward Peck, conceded that

> In 1985, when I was the Deputy Director of the Reagan White House Task Force on Terrorism, they asked us … to come up with a definition of terrorism that could be used throughout the government. We produced about six, and [in] each and every case, they were rejected, because careful reading would indicate that our own country had been involved in some of those activities.[7]

Despite failing in its original project, the State Department had nevertheless succeeded in highlighting the difference between 'terrorism' as a historical phenomenon and 'terrorism' as an ideological construct—one referring only to the violence of the weak, establishing double standards based on a concern for peace only where terrorism failed to serve elite interests. Where terrorism did favour elites, as US support for state

[4] Stampnitzky, Lisa, 'Can Terrorism Be Defined?' in Stohl, Michael, Richard Burchill, and Scott Howard Englund, eds., *Constructions of Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research and Policy*, University of California Press, 2017, 11–20; Stampnitzky, Lisa, *Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented 'Terrorism,'* Cambridge University Press, 2013, 101–103; Smith, Benjamin K. Smith, Scott Englund, Andrea Figueroa-Caballero, Elena Salcido, and Michael Stohl, 'Framing Terrorism: The Communicative Constitution of the Terrorist Actor,' in Stohl, Burchill, Englund, *Constructions of Terrorism*, ibid., 91–107.

[5] Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, ibid., 102.

[6] Brulin, Remi, 'Compartmentalization, Contexts of Speech and the Israeli Origins of the American Discourse on "Terrorism",' *Dialectical Anthropology* 39, no. 1, 2015: 112–113. For sub-fascism, see Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, South End Press, 1979.

[7] Quoted in Zalloum, Abdulhay Y., *Oil Crusades: America Through Arab Eyes*, Pluto Press, 2007, 6.

terrorists such as Augusto Pinochet made starkly apparent, counterterrorists were perfectly happy to embody all they claimed to despise. E. Howard Hunt, head of CIA operations in Guatemala in 1954 and one of the Watergate burglars, admitted as much to the BBC documentary filmmaker Adam Curtis, commenting that, during the successful campaign to overthrow the elected government of Jacobo Arbenz on behalf of the United Fruit company,

> What we wanted to do was have a terror campaign, to terrify Arbenz particularly, terrify his troops, much as the German Stukka bombers terrified the population of Holland, Belgium and Poland at the onset of WWII, and just rendered everybody paralysed.[8]

We find then that the development of terrorist conspiracy theory immediately prior to and during the Reagan years relied on an interpretation of the meaning of terrorism that differed markedly from its character as a historical phenomenon principally by virtue of the fact that, historically, terrorism is associated with states.[9] As a concept, terrorism appeared with the reactionary phase of the French Revolution, when the so-called Committee of Public Safety put tens of thousands of the public to the guillotine in the name of keeping them safe, thereby once more becoming cause and cure of the same problem. Robespierre, head of the Committee, had pronounced,

> Whoever seeks to debase, divide or paralyse the Convention, is an enemy of our country, whether he sits in this hall or is a foreigner. Whether he acts from stupidity or from perversity, he is of the party of tyrants who make war upon us … This project of debasement does exist.'[10]

[8] See Part II for more discussion. Curtis, Adam, dir., *The Century of the Self*, London: BBC, 2005, event at 36:33.

[9] 'The really massive and significant growth of terrorism since World War II has been that carried out by states.' Herman, Edward S., *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, Boston: South End Press, 1982, 83; Herman, Edward S., 'US Sponsorship of International Terrorism: An Overview,' *Crime and Social Justice* 27/28 (1987): 1–31; Brulin, 'Israeli Origins of the American Discourse on "Terrorism,"' ibid., 75; Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, op. cit., 9.

[10] Palmer, Robert Roswell, *Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of Terror in the French Revolution*, Princeton University Press, 2013, 71–72; Jordan, David P., *The Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre*, University of Chicago Press, 1989; Gough, Hugh, *The Terror in the French Revolution*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

As Palmer points out, after winning a vote of confidence, the Jacobins increasingly identified dissent and opposition to the Committee with the Great Debasement Conspiracy as per the deviance producing characteristics of the False Dilemma; when the revolution 'ate its own' and Robespierre himself finally fell afoul of the Committee, he had inadvertently established a pretext for his own demise before the guillotine.[11] The law of 22 Prairial (10 June 1794), as well as removing the right to representation by a lawyer, also criminalised 'diluting the energy and purity of revolutionary principles.' Easily interpretable in terms favourable to the Committee, it opened the way for a panic-driven Terror that claimed tens of thousands of lives.[12] So effective was the Reign of Terror in destroying the last embers of the Revolution that the Committee of Public Safety might well be regarded as the midwife of the Napoleonic Empire, having nurtured favourable conditions for the rise of a Napoleon in the form of a climate of increasingly acute paranoia and fear.[13]

Launching a monument to Robespierre in Moscow, Vladimir Lenin described him as a 'Bolshevik before his time,' a comparison that was certainly true enough if Robespierre's relationship to Napoleon Bonaparte was comparable to Lenin's relationship to Stalin—the tendency of both Robespierre and Lenin to conflate ideas they disliked with counter-revolutionary tendencies being not the least of which. Lenin's tendency to denounce unfavoured ideas as 'utopian' and 'petit-bourgeois' did not differ in terms of its essential function

[11] Palmer, *Twelve Who Ruled*, ibid., 72.

[12] Gough, *The Terror in the French Revolution*, op. cit., 54–57.

[13] 'Many left-leaning revolutions in history went through two stages, moderate followed by radical phase. The radical phase, which rejects the earlier moderate phase, will *eo ipso* contain a counterrevolutionary dimension. To disassociate themselves from their moderate revolutionary precursors, radical revolutionaries frequently resort to amplification typical of moral panics in that they proclaim their goal to be nothing less than the defence of the revolution itself. To accomplish their goals, radical revolutionaries have been willing to use the kinds of extreme methods that have given rise to the expression "the revolution devours its own children." Radical phases of revolutions, such as the Jacobin Terror, Great Stalinist Terror, and the Cultural Revolution, all rolled back freedoms, violated rights, and repossessed land and other resources attained in the earlier phases of the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions respectively. In doing so, they channelled moral panics in the pursuit at once of radical and counterrevolutionary goals.' Schafir and Schairer, 'The War on Terror as Political Moral Panic,' in Shafir, Gershon, Everard Meade, and William J. Aceves, eds., *Lessons and Legacies of The War on Terror: From Moral Panic to Permanent War*, London: Routledge, 2013, 15.

of demonising and stigmatising from Stalin's own tendency to iden-
tify doubt in his judgement and opposition to his rule with support
for counter-revolutionary terrorism (a fact that goes some way perhaps
towards explaining why, for all its relentless theorising, the Leninist
school has somehow neglected to produce a general critique of scapego-
ating).[14] The logic of the False Dilemma, lurking in tracts such as *"Left-
Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, became overt in the later
Stalinist Purges, dramatised in Orwell's *Animal Farm* and Koestler's
Darkness at Noon, where unfavoured ideas were identified with passive
or active support for the enemy.[15] In the case of the Stalinist Purges, it
was apparent in the tendency to conflate dissent and heterodoxy with
a Trotskyist conspiracy against the revolution, an imagined Project of
Great Debasement built on Stalin's elimination of a potential rival in
Sergei Kirov, head of the Leningrad Soviet, that became the pretext for
the bloodletting to follow.[16]

Ironically enough, Lenin's heir-apparent Leon Trotsky had, prior to
his own purging, himself found in the logic of the False Dilemma a suit-
able pretext for the crushing of an uprising of revolutionary sailors at
the Kronstadt naval base outside St. Petersburg in 1921. Despite hav-
ing, three years prior, hailed the Kronstadt sailors as the 'Cream of the
Revolution, Trotsky now denounced them as counter-revolutionaries
after they adopted a resolution demanding the free soviets (or councils)
the Bolsheviks had promised in 1917, but were now busy converting
into vassals of their own power. Their creamlike qualities more of a hin-
drance to his political ambitions now than a help, Trotsky ordered the
Red Army across the ice to massacre the Kronstadt sailors 'like par-
tridges.'[17] 'They have come out with dangerous slogans,' Trotsky alleged

[14] 'Freedom Is a Bourgeois Prejudice,' Aufheben, *What Was the USSR? Towards a Theory
of the Deformation of Value Under State Capitalism*, Edmonton, Alberta: Thoughtcrime
Ink, 2011.

[15] 'A petty bourgeois driven to frenzy by the horrors of capitalism is a social phenomenon
which, like anarchism, is characteristic of all capitalist countries.' V.I. Lenin, *"Left-wing"
Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, Sydney: Resistance Books, 1999.

[16] Knight, Amy W., *Who Killed Kirov? The Kremlin's Greatest Mystery*, New York: Hill
and Wang, 1999; Lenoe, Matthew Edward, *The Kirov Murder and Soviet History*, Yale
University Press, 2010; Oplinger, *The Politics of Demonology*, op. cit.

[17] An interesting choice of words considering the eminently bourgeois nature of game
hunting. Avrich, Paul, *Kronstadt 1921*, Princeton University Press, 2014; Getzler, Israel,
Kronstadt 1917–1921: The Fate of a Soviet Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2002;

of the Left Opposition to Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress, which by now included the Cream of the Revolution, lately subjected to the kind of purge that would later be visited on the Trotskyist Left Opposition to Stalin:

> They have made a fetish of democratic principles. They have placed the workers' right to elect representatives above the Party. As if the Party were not entitled to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship temporarily clashed with the passing moods of the workers' democracy.[18]

It was not Trotsky who had been corrupted by the exercise of absolute power; it was the fault of the Russian working class for asserting economic democracy in the midst of a workers' revolution. As well as demonstrating a practical understanding of the difference between a Party dictatorship, the workers' power it was purported to be, and the workers' movement in whose name the Bolsheviks had seized power, Trotsky had also successfully demonstrated the practical application of terror, (1) as a function of state power, and (2) as a product of the False Dilemma. It is this *statist* form of terrorism that has any historical meaning; besides the revolutionary examples, the Dirty Wars in Chile and Argentina during the 1970s and 80s figure prominently amongst many others, as noted.[19]

As Chomsky observes however, terrorism as an artefact of history is 'plainly is of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who, holding power, are in a position to control the system of thought and

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Brinton, 'The Bolsheviks & Workers' Control,' op. cit.; Volin, *The Unknown Revolution, 1917–1921*, Montreal: Black Rose Books Ltd., 1975, 'Part I: Kronstadt (1921).'

[18] Quoted in Brinton, 'The Bolsheviks & Workers' Control,' op. cit., 371.

[19] Oplinger, Jon, Richard Talbot, and Yasin Aktay, 'Elite Power and the Manufacture of a Moral Panic: The Case of the Dirty War in Argentina,' in *Moral Panics in the Contemporary World*, A&C Black, 2013; Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror*, op. cit.; Marchak, Patricia, and William Marchak, *God's Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s*, McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1999; Wright, Thomas C., *State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006; Burbach, Roger, *The Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and Global Justice*, London and New York: Zed Books, 2003; Lessa, Francesca, and Vincent Druliolle, eds., *The Memory of State Terrorism in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay*, Springer, 2011; Kornbluh, Peter, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*, The New Press, 2013.

expression.'[20] It has, he notes, largely been abandoned, in favour of terrorism as an article of ideology—namely, one used interchangeably with the 'retail terrorism' of non-state actors. On this count, he relates a story passed on by Augustine of Hippo, who tells of a confrontation between Alexander the Great and a captured pirate.

> When faced with the question as to how dare he molest the sea, the pirate replies by asking Alexander how he dare molest the world. 'Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an Emperor' This response, Augustine declared, was 'elegant and excellent,' capturing the essential nature of the relationship between the United States and various minor entities generally associated with international terrorism during the 1980s—'Libya, factions of the PLO, and others.' More generally, St. Augustine's tale illuminates the meaning of the concept of international terrorism in contemporary Western usage and reaches to the heart of the frenzy over selected incidents of terrorism currently being orchestrated, with supreme cynicism, as a cover for Western violence.[21]

'Whereas the term was once applied to emperors who molest their own subjects and the world, now it is restricted to thieves who molest the powerful,' he points out; 'an act of terrorism enters the canon only if it is committed by "their side," not ours.' In his critique of terrorist conspiracy theory, Edward Herman concurs, pointing out that 'state military resources are vastly larger, and the power of even small states to intimidate is much greater than that of non-state terrorists.'

> Only states use torture extensively as a means of intimidation, and if we use as our measure of the scale of terrorist violence either political murders or incarceration accompanied by torture, retail terrorism pales into relative insignificance. State terrorism is also much more important than non-state violence because it is rooted in relatively permanent structures that allow terror to be institutionalized, as in the case of Argentina's numerous and well-equipped torture centres. Retail terrorist are frequently transitory, and they are often produced by the very abuses that state terror is designed to protect.[22]

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[20] Chomsky, Noam, *Pirates and Emperors, Old and New: International Terrorism in the Real World*, Haymarket Books, 2015, vii.

[21] Chomsky, ibid.

[22] Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit., 83.

Contemporary interpretations of terrorism associated with terrorist conspiracy theory, then, not only sit at odds with history, but in reflecting a process of constructing meaning based on the power to control the usage and meaning of words amounting to deviance production, the central feature of moral panics.[23] In the case of the Dirty War, these contemporary definitions were delivered through state-controlled media, the only kind the Argentinian police state would permit, resulting in a self-serving bias in favour of state terrorism. A terrorist, alleged military dictator Jorge Rafael Videla, was 'not only someone who plants bombs, but a person whose *ideas* are contrary to our Western, Christian civilization.'[24] Here, as in the Great Terror and the Great Purges, state terrorism identified (1) unfavoured ideas with support for the enemy, (2) state terrorism as characteristically reactive, and, (3) in their own minds no doubt, the perpetrators helpless in producing through vicious cycles the undesirable outcomes attributed to their victims.

Where control over the channels of communication was in private hands, the outcomes were not much different, a fact reflecting the common class interests of managers of both public and private spheres and the tendency of corporate mass media to generate propaganda comparable to more overt forms of state control, for comparable reasons.[25] For those who felt that opposition to terrorism in words *of necessity* meant opposition to it in deeds, a preliminary survey of the history of state terrorism tends instead towards the idea that enabled by deviance production, state terrorists could use the violence of the weak as a pretext for their own. It did not matter so much that one person's terrorist was another's freedom fighter if 'one person' controlled the channels of mass communication; in

[23] Burchill, Scott, 'Radical Islam and the West: The Moral Panic Behind the Threat,' *The Conversation*, 16 June 2015, via https://theconversation.com/radical-islam-and-the-west-the-moral-panic-behind-the-threat-43113, accessed 26 June 2018.

[24] Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror,* op. cit., 27.

[25] Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op, cit., Chapter 4, 'Contemporary Terrorism: The Role of the Mass Media,' 139–199; Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, op. cit.; Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman, *After the Cataclysm: Post-War Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology*, Black Rose Books, 1979; Chomsky, Noam, *Deterring Democracy*, London: Verso, 1991; Chomsky, *Pirates and Emperors*, op. cit.; Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, op. cit.; Herman, Edward S., and Gerry O'Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror*, Pantheon, 1989; Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy*, op. cit.

many cases, they quite literally did. In this case, terrorism was defined simply as violence that did not benefit power and class privilege.[26]

This case study compares this kind of deviance production over terrorism in two instances—what I call the First Terror Scare, associated with the Reagan administration, and the Second Terror Scare, associated with George W. Bush and his administration of neoconservatives. The Terror Scare associated with Islamic State is forgone due to limitations of space, though is certainly relevant. This case study takes particular note of the relationship between terror and communist panics, considering the extent to which both incorporate priming features of the Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy.

> Experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it.
>
> —George Schultz, 1981

Mobilisation Phase: Self-Interestedly Framing the Parameters of Crisis

This first section of the third case study examines the initial mobilising stage of terrorist panic in the context of various geopolitical conflicts centred around the Middle East. In examining how moral entrepreneurs framed the political crises that arose out of them to mobilise the masses around a scapegoating campaign, this first section argues that the corporate elite and their political subsidiaries reacted to the violence of the weak by politicising the crisis in their own favour. It argues that they did so by identifying their own class interests with the moral Good—by identifying the Good with the Self, in other words—and invoking a binary, Self vs. Other logic designed to polarise global society between themselves and the Other, identified with Evil and the alleged existential threat. As the United States remains for the moment hegemon, this binary was inevitably defined in terms of the battle between democracy

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[26] A CEO is 'one person.' 'National security for him is, by implication, the security of Property interests; subversion is anything that threatens those interests. This is why he affiliates with and apologizes for right-wing dictatorships like those of Pinochet and Franco, and the apartheid system of South Africa, which create mass insecurity but protect established property interests.' Herman and O'Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry*, ibid., 112.

and barbarism. This section argues then that this became the basis for deviance production and terror panic as Western elites and their ideological servants equated servicing their own interests with servicing alleged western values and the common interests of all nations in rallying against the scourge of terrorism, including those of the nations they were attacking. By framing existential crisis in binary terms, this section argues, moral entrepreneurs set the stage for the demonisation of Arabs and Muslims and for the construction of the existential threat they were said to pose. By framing those who had 'built their communities on top of our oil' as the source of existential crisis, this section contends, they set the stage for blaming of the victim, and the scapegoating and persecution that followed.

Ia. Terror Scare I (1980–86). The first Terror Scare, what Herman refers to as a 'refurbished Red Menace,' began over the issue of airline hijackings.[27] Hijackings were not a notable part of international travel prior to the 1960s, much less to say one associated with 'terrorism,' which was not yet even a common part of political language. On this latter count, Brulin demonstrates the scant usage of 'terrorism' prior to the 1970s; only six more hijackings were carried out in the 37 years between 1930 and 1967 (85) than in the 12 between 1961 and 1973 (75), the majority of these after 1961 by Americans trying to defect to Cuba and vice versa.[28] So bereft of patriotic spirit were US authorities at this time that they sought to 'avoid over-dramatising hijacking' (*New York Times*) lest, in the words of Carter-era Federal Aviation Authority Director Najeeb A. Halaby, the 'many discontented, maladjusted people' who exist 'in every country … get the wrong idea.' Knee-jerk reactions from officialdom could all too easily be interpreted as evidence of their effectiveness, and be taken, entirely unintentionally, as encouragement.

Such encouragement was all too often forthcoming, reflecting conspicuous disinterest amongst policymakers for addressing root causes.

[27] Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit., 47.

[28] 'Until the early 1980s, the term "terrorism" was virtually absent from the political lexicon of American presidents and was used to refer to a very broad range of acts committed by non-state and state actors alike. It is only with the arrival of Ronald Reagan that the concept of "terrorism" came to occupy a central place in the political lexicon of the White House. In that sense, 1981 can be seen as the birth date of the American presidential discourse on "terrorism."' Brulin, 'Israeli Origins,' op. cit., 72; Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, op. cit., 1–2.

And so the hijackings continued, the general situation only worsening. The hijacking of El Al Flight 429 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) *en route* from Rome to Tel Aviv on 22 July 1968 was the first to involve hostage-taking, ending the era when the main role of hijacked passengers was to take an unscheduled trip to Cuba. Also significant was the fact that the PFLP only took Israeli hostages and let the rest disembark, a development indicating that the chaos in the Middle East, reflected in the radicalisation of Palestinians by the Israeli occupation of their territories, was having geopolitical ramifications.[29] Naftali notes that the tendency of dramatic events to precede sharp shifts in terrorist conspiracy theory is a recurring theme—as one might anticipate in situations where moral panic functions as an enabling dynamic for anti-democratic ideological shifts.[30]

A seminal moment in the development of terrorist conspiracy theories, the hijacking of El Al Flight 429 also precipitated a sharp shift in them as the United States used its veto power amidst debates over terrorism at the UN to suppress international condemnation of Israel. This tradition would extend long into the future in the name of framing the terrorist conspiracy theories we know today. As a member of the American delegation explained to the *New York Times* after the vote, in the future, Washington would use its veto to defeat any future resolution that 'condemned Israel but left unmentioned terrorist acts that provoked Israeli retaliation.'

> 'We are implementing a new policy that is much broader than that of the question of Israel and the Jews,' he added. 'What is involved is the problem of terrorism, a matter that goes right to the heart of our civilized life.'[31]

The issue of human rights in the Occupied Territories represented the pursuit of narrow, sectional interests, while Israel's unwillingness to restrain itself against provocation was everyone's problem. The framing of crisis to conflate the sectional interests of those with the power

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[29] Naftali, Tim, *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, Basic Books, 2009, 24.

[30] Naftali, *Blind Spot*, ibid.; Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, Penguin, 2004, 138.

[31] *The New York Times*, 11 September 1972, quoted in Brulin, 'Israeli Origins,' op. cit., 78.

to control the meaning of words with the interests of human civilisation could hardly have been much clearer.

Four years later, in 1972, a militant group called Black September, took eleven Israeli athletes hostage at the Summer Olympics in Munch, demanding the release of several hundred Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, as well as the founders of the Red Army Faction (RAF), a group of Marxist urban guerrillas, from West German prisons. Clad in ski masks and clutching automatic rifles, Black September presented fearsome images for the sensationalism-hungry news media, while ensuring worldwide media attention the cause of Palestinian human rights in prime time. Botched rescue attempts by West German police and the final shootout in which all hostages were killed were the icing on the cake of an intolerable challenge to the elite monopoly on violence, and the process of framing crises in terms serviceable to elites more generally. Marking another escalation of the violence of the weak, Munich precipitated bitter denunciations from the political establishment, who in sensing an existential threat discovered pacifist leanings. Democratic Presidential nominee and newly minted pacifist George McGovern rallied against 'senseless acts of terrorism,' denouncing Egypt for being too willing to 'bestow its blessing on indiscriminate terrorism as an instrument of its own foreign policy,' and Lebanon for providing a head office for 'terrorist gangs.' Taking from McGovern's lead, another born-again pacifist, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir denounced 'lunatic acts of terrorism, abduction and blackmail, which tear asunder the web of international life.'[32] Similarly at the UN, US Ambassador and irate pacifist George H.W. Bush alleged that

> We do not countenance violations of international law; we do not countenance terrorist acts. We seek and support a world in which athletes need not fear assassins and passengers on aeroplanes need not fear hijacking or assassination … Is it not a double standard to suggest that States must control their own forces – a point we readily grant – but that those States need not control irregular forces in their territory – forces of murder, forces of terror?[33]

[32] *New York Times*, 7 September 1972, quoted in Brulin, 'Israeli Origins,' ibid., 74.

[33] Security Council Official Records, 10 September 1972, S/PV.1662, United Nations, via http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.1662(OR), accessed 10 November 2017.

In suggesting that terror was an 'irregular' phenomenon, Bush associated 'irregular forces' with murder and terror, creating a *carte blanche* for states as instruments of class power to unleash their own. Such accounts for the fact that, within the space of a decade, the number of 'retail' terror groups had *quadrupled*—reprisal air raids for Munich from Israel against targets in Syria and Lebanon resulting in numerous civilian deaths, including those of children, indicative of the official double standard.[34]

As the Arab–Israeli conflict spiralled ever deeper into vicious cycles of violence while the crisis of violence was blamed entirely on one antagonist, hijackings involving hostage takings became ever more frequent. On 27 June 1976, two members of the PLFP-External Operations (PLFP-EO), a breakaway faction, along with two Germans of the far-left Revolutionary Cells, took control of an Air France flight *en route* from Tel Aviv to Paris. Diverting the flight to Entebbe, Uganda, they were welcomed by the military government of Idi Amin. There, the PLFP-EO separated the 94 Israelis on board from the rest of the passengers, who were released and sent home. They issued demands for the release of 40 of their comrades in Israeli jails, threatening to kill the Israeli hostages if these demands were not met. On 4 July 1976, the United States Bicentennial, the Israeli government dispatched 100 IDF commandos to Entebbe, who, in marked contrast to the failures at Munch, wiped out the hijackers, and liberated almost all the hostages. The Israeli commandos suffered one casualty, commander, Lt. Col. Yonatan Netanyahu, brother of the future Israeli Prime Minister, who would later attribute the wrath attendant to his own 'hard line against all terrorists' to his brother's death—guaranteeing the deaths of many more brothers in the process.[35]

While this time around more celebratory in tone, the political response reinforced yet the politicised crisis narrative and fed terrorist conspiracy theory in the west. In 1976, Walter Mondale, the Democratic Party vice-presidential candidate, 'got some of his biggest roars of applause' (McAlister) during his nomination speech in denouncing 'the

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[34]We return to this subject in Section IIIa. Hoffman, Bruce, *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, 73, quoted in Brulin, 'Israeli Origins,' op. cit., 74, 76.

[35]Thomas, Gordon, *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad*, Macmillan, 2009, 145.

idea that this nation must sit by passively while terrorists maim and murder innocent men, women, and children.'[36] That such comments came barely a year after the end of the Vietnam War dramatically reflects the historical amnesia attending the pacifist pretences of the counterterrorist double standard. Similarly, the Democratic platform censured 'terrorist groups which refuse to acknowledge their adversary's right to exist,' and while making token comments about the desire for 'continued progress towards peace,' insisted that peace could not be had by giving recognition to 'groups which have no legitimate claim to represent the people for whom they purport to be speaking'—neglecting to clarify who should represent various interest groups if not those belonging to them, and the rights of those people to exist.[37] Republicans identified 'terrorism' as an issue requiring 'strong steps' (Brulin) including 'sanctions against countries that aid terrorists,' citing the IDF raid at Entebbe as an example to follow. 'The world community should take appropriate action to deal with terrorist organizations,' said the RNC manifesto. 'We applaud the daring rescue by Israel of innocent civilian hostages who were kidnapped by terrorists.'[38] They liked their present.

In 1979, a popular uprising in Iran overthrew the western-backed Shah, the strongest US ally in the Middle East, installing an Islamic theocracy in its stead. Deprived of its most important asset in the region, the United States felt its regional power to be slipping, a perception only enhanced when Iranian student revolutionaries took over the US Embassy in Tehran, capturing and holding fifty-two US diplomats and citizens from 4 November 1979 to 20 January 1981. The longest in modern history at 444 days, the Iranian Hostage Crisis became a source of national humiliation for the United States, more so when eight US servicemen were killed during a botched rescue attempt. In the aftermath, Carter used his State of the Union address to try to save his presidency by entrenching terrorist conspiracy

[36] McAlister, Melani, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and US Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000*, University of California Press, 2001, 186.

[37] Democratic Party's Platform, 12 July 1976, quoted in Brulin, 'Israeli Origins,' op. cit., 92.

[38] Republican Party's Platform, 8 August 1976, quoted in Brulin, ibid., 92.

theory in the highest levels of office. Invoking Schrödinger's Cat, Carter declared that, 'at this time in Iran, 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy.'[39] The forces of totalitarianism and statelessness had united against all the odds, and intuition.

If this was an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the past, it was lost. The preoccupation of US elites with terrorist conspiracies and the adequacy of their own power would dominate its perception of crisis and counterterrorist orthodoxy for a long time to come. Further efforts would remain necessary to focus and refine counterterrorist doctrine, such that it could adequately sustain the popular paranoia and insecurity elites could leverage over the longer run.

Ib. Terror Scare II. On the morning of 11 September 2001, coordinated hijackings by 19 members of a predominantly Saudi Arabian retail terrorist ring resulted in the weaponising of four passenger airliners as suicide bombs. The retail terrorists—15 Saudi Arabians, two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt (ringleader Mohammad Atta) and one from Lebanon—flew American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 straight past US air defences and into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Centre in Manhattan, instantly killing everyone on board and hundreds in their path. After 90 minutes or so both towers collapsed, killing 2996 civilians and New York City first responders.[40] American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon,

[39] Jimmy Carter, 'The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 23 January 1980,' *The American Presidency Project*, via http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079, accessed 21 September 2017.

[40] *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Government Printing Office, 2011; Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, Penguin, 2004; Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, Alfred A. Knopf Incorporated, 2006; Burke, Jason, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, IB Tauris, 2004; Griffin, David Ray, *The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11*, Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2004.

while United Flight 93 crashed into a field in Pennsylvania following a passenger revolt (or so the story goes[41]). As saturation news coverage beamed live footage of the attacks into hundreds of millions of homes, continuing for days such that none could not turn on a television

[41]The official version of the 9/11 attacks present issues whose only apparent ultimate means of defence are plausible deniability. This seems to depend on subjective willingness to flatter power by defining plausibility in its favour rather than arguments based in evidence, and *ad hominem* attacks on heretical expressions of doubt. The fact that expressing doubt as though freedom of conscience matters does generate vicious pack wolf behaviour in reaction is telling in and of itself. Not least of the unresolved issues are how not one, but four, hijacked airliners got around the most sophisticated and lavishly-funded air defence system on the planet, and how fires neither hot nor widespread enough to weaken their metal structure caused both towers to collapse (especially in the South Tower where Flight 175 hit to one side, sending a sizeable chunk of the fuel to burn up outside the building as a fireball and leaving the stairwell on the opposite end passable). Ditto the entire issue of WTC 7 which, for an allegedly flimsy case of 'conspiracy theorising'—one that, in theory, should have been easily torn to shreds—never made it into the official report *at all*. The official treatment of building fires has not been aided much in more recent times by high profile disasters like Grenfell Tower in West London. The magic bullet here would appear to be absent.

That said, these concerns are also generally immaterial to the main focus of this study, which is how the political crisis created by 9/11 was framed and exploited. The reaction presents issues of much greater import, and unlike issues relying on plausible deniability, provides tangible evidence *dis*proving the case for war. Suffice it to say that the surprisingly salient criticisms Griffin raises are reflected in the *9/11 Commission Report's* conspicuously selective reading of history (see below). Such are broadly on par with a power structure looking to absolve itself and the President, who was aware of specific threats at least a month in advance, of culpability for failing to maintain adequate air and ground safety. The actually-existing 9/11 conspiracy theory was the one that got the Bush administration off the hook, suppressed historical facts failing to fit the thrust to war, suppressed the dynamics of moral panic at play and suppressed the existence of the corporate-state nexus (the 'deep state') as a situational factor at all. *The 9/11 Commission Report*, ibid.; Griffin, David Ray, *The New Pearl Harbor*, ibid. On Bush's forewarning of the specific scenario that eventuated on 9/11, see Coll, *Ghost Wars*, op. cit., 562. For other perspectives, see Dunbar, David, and Brad Reagan, eds., *Debunking 9/11 Myths: Why Conspiracy Theories Can't Stand Up to the Facts*, Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 2006. For a rejoinder, see Griffin, David Ray, *Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory*, Interlink Books, 2007. For more on the state-corporate nexus see Melman, Seymour, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline*, Touchstone, 1985; Melman, Seymour, 'From Private to State Capitalism: How the Permanent War Economy Transformed the Institutions of American Capitalism: Remarks Upon receiving the Veblen-Commons Award,' *Journal of Economic Issues* 31, no. 2, 1997: 311–332; Lofgren, Mike, *The Deep State: The Fall of the Constitution and the Rise of a Shadow Government*, Penguin, 2016; Wolin, *Democracy Inc*, op. cit.; Scott, Peter Dale, *The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America*, University of California Press, 2007; Scott, Peter Dale, *Dallas '63: The First Deep State Revolt Against the White House*, New York: Open Road Media, 2015. For more on heretical expressions of doubt, see Project Censored, 'Physicist Challenges Official 9-11 Story,' 29 April 2010, https://projectcensored.org/18-physicist-challenges-official-9-11-story/, accessed 1 October 2018.

without reliving them, 9/11 became a 'global media event' and 'perhaps the most dramatic media spectacle in history.'[42]

One of the more potentially telling aspects of 'perhaps the most dramatic media spectacle in history' in the politicisation of crisis was the dispassionate tenor of reporting as events transpired, compared to how they were represented afterwards. Archived footage from CNN began at 8.49 a.m. ET with smoke billowing from the North Tower, the anchors taking conspicuous care not to sensationalise the footage on the screen. At 9.02, an eyewitness on the ground described watching Flight 11 crash into the North Tower, excitedly narrating in real time as Flight 175 hit the south tower.[43]

> There's more explosions right now. The building's exploding right now. People are running up the street. The whole building just exploded, the whole top part. The building's still intact. Everybody's panicking.[44]

The CNN reporter, who did not appear to have seen the second plane hit, remained sceptical, stating that he wanted to avoid inflaming the panic to which the eyewitness referred; this was significant in being the last time such concerns were ever entertained, contrasting conspicuously with the tenor of reporting in years to follow. At 9.26, a reporter described President Bush reading a book to schoolchildren despite having been informed of the fate of Flight 11, which he interpreted as a desire to 'keep things on an even keel.'[45] The CNN anchors took up this idea with enthusiasm, noting that it was a 'sensitive time' and that the President would be wanting to 'not scare the children.'[46]

[42]Kellner, Doug, 'The Media in and After 9/11,' *International Journal of Communication* 1 (2007), Book Review 123–142.

[43]Cable News Network (CNN), '9-11-2001 Live Coverage 8:46.32 A.M E.T—5.00 P.M E.T,' 2001, via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CcpzBDTbniE, accessed 29 October 2017.

[44]CNN, ibid.

[45]CNN, ibid.

[46]'"He did the best that he could," said Chantal Guerrero, 17, now a student at the Sarasota military academy. "For me, it was right. If he had left straight away and freaked out that would have been the mindset he would have left for America. If he wanted the country to be calm he needed to stay calm." *The Guardian*, 'September 11: Schoolchildren Remember George Bush's Reaction,' 4 September 2011, via http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/04/september-11-schoolchildren-george-bush, accessed 31 October 2017.

At 9.30 a.m., Bush made a sombre live statement confirming the terrorist attacks, before inviting his audience to stand for a moment of calm silence.[47] Over the next 29 minutes, as further details emerged, the commentary proceeded in a conspicuously cautious manner. At 9.59, the South Tower collapsed. The anchor initially treated this as another explosion, not realising the tower had gone amidst the great plume of dust and smoke (the first footage from the ground showing the missing tower did not air until after 10.25 a.m.). At 10.28 a.m. the North Tower collapsed. Despite the horror and carnage of the unfolding events, at no point did anchors and reporters lose their cool, even to express their horror, their circumspection, restraint and professionalism almost annoying from the privileged perspective of hindsight.[48]

Significantly less concerned with 'not wanting to scare the children'[49] or 'inflame panic,' and to 'keep things on an even keel,' were newspaper front pages from 12 September 2001, which give us a better sense of what 'perhaps the most dramatic media spectacle in history' looked like once the mass media had had time to find its feet. The call for war was universal.[50] At the least hysterical and belligerent end of the spectrum, the *New York Times* described a 'Day of Terror,' giving prominent

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[47] CNN, op. cit.

[48] Once it has become well enough established that a coordinated terrorist attack is underway, CNN raises a banner on its screen with large bold text reading 'AMERICA UNDER ATTACK' in all-caps in front of the stars and stripes; 'and so it begins.' CNN, ibid.; Mueller, John E., *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them*, London: Simon and Schuster, 2006; Jackson, Richard, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism*, Manchester University Press, 2005.

[49] I travelled to the US for a conference in mid-2017; several of my Lyft drivers were undergraduate students in their early twenties. After telling them about my research topic, we inevitably began talking about the War on Terror. The young driver who took me to LAX as I was leaving, in particular, said she was too young to understand what was going on, but remembered that 'everyone was really scared.' Later I was molested by the TSA on the way through customs. Debney, Ben [Ites One], 'Fuck the TSA (If You're Molesting People, the Terrorists Have Already Won),' via https://soundcloud.com/itesone/fuck-the-tsa-if-youre-molesting-people-the-terrorists-have-already-won, accessed 16 February 2018.

[50] Ryan, Michael, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism: US Newspaper Editorials and Military Action in Afghanistan,' *Gazette* 66, no. 5, 2004: 378; Rothe, Dawn, and Stephen L. Muzzatti, 'Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral Panic, and US Civil Society,' *Critical Criminology* 12, no. 3, 2004: 332.

place to Bush's apocalyptic description of 'evil.' Less so was *The New York Post*, which shouted 'ACT OF WAR.' The *Daily News* yelled: 'IT'S WAR.' *The Los Angeles Times* imagined a 'Precisely Timed Choreography of Carnage.' *USA Today* declared an 'Act of War,' alleging in large type that, 'minute by minute, fear envelops the country … America's sense of security is shattered,' though neglecting to say if this reflected in, or was an effect, of its reporting. The *Chicago Tribune* invoked eternal struggle: 'Our nation saw evil.' The *San Francisco Examiner* simply read 'BASTARDS!', declaring 'A CHANGED AMERICA' beneath, neglecting to distinguish reflecting from effecting. The *Houston Chronicle* advertised the skills of the terrorists with 'TERROR HITS HOME.' The *Boston Globe* drew on priming from historical traumas in declaring a 'New day of infamy.'[51] The *Newseum* website features 115 covers, over ten times the number listed here. All are of the same or similar tenor; not one calls for calm or counsels against being provoked into vicious cycle of violence.[52]

Ryan argues that the 'changing of everything' was crucial to establishing the violence of the weak as grounds for a counterterrorist double standard, one in which the interest of the entire Earth was identified with the interest of global elites in defending their monopoly over the means of terror. 'The creation of the war narrative clearly was an exercise of power,' he argues; 'the symbolic codes were interpreted to suggest the terrorist attacks were acts of war, and the American response must include military intervention.'[53] Prodigious research into the framing of crisis post-9/11 has since established this as the basis for the manufacture of consent by the corporate media.[54] As Ryan demonstrates,

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[51] ABC News Online, 'Newspaper Front Pages from September 12, 2001,' 5 September 2011, via http://www.abc.net.au/news/specials/september-11-remembered/2011-09-05/september-11-newspaper-front-pages/2870784, accessed 14 October 2017. This page also includes newspaper covers in other languages besides English from Tokyo, Miami (in Spanish), Tel Aviv and Beirut.

[52] Newseum, 'Wednesday, September 12, 2001,' via http://www.newseum.org/todaysfrontpages/?tfp_display=archive-date&tfp_archive_id=091201, accessed 14 October 2017.

[53] Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' op. cit.

[54] Herman and Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent*, op. cit.; Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, op. cit.; Stohl, Burchill, and Englund, *Constructions of Terrorism*, op. cit.; Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' op. cit.; See also Reese, Stephen D., and Seth C. Lewis, 'Framing the War on Terror: The Internalization of Policy in the US Press,' *Journalism* 10, no. 6, 2009: 777–797;

the complicity of the corporate media in the 'changing of everything' as the foundation for crisis leveraging and scapegoating under cover of terror panic accounts for the fact that, of the ten largest newspapers in the United States, not one of the 104 published editorials argued against or suggested alternatives to military intervention.[55] Of the 42 editorials published in these papers between the day of the attacks and Bush's address to Congress on 21 September, all 42 'specifically suggested that military intervention was possible or likely,' and said war on terrorism inclusive of military strikes would stop some terrorism or did not question the possible impact of strikes, 31 said war was 'inevitable and necessary' and would be 'an effective deterrent to terrorism, if Americans are patient during a long and difficult campaign,' and 21 specifically asserted the requirement that governments of other countries stop sheltering terrorists. 14 editorials took advantage of militarist cultural priming by invoking the Gulf War, 14 the Cold War, and 11 Pearl Harbor, while

Steuter, Erin, and Deborah Wills, 'Discourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror,' *Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition* 2, no. 2, 2009; Giroux, Henry A., 'War on Terror: The Militarising of Public Space and Culture in the United States,' *Third Text* 18, no. 4, 2004: 211–221; Brennen, Bonnie, and Margaret Duffy, '"If a Problem Cannot Be Solved, Enlarge It": An Ideological Critique of the "Other" in Pearl Harbor and September 11 *New York Times* Coverage,' *Journalism Studies* 4, no. 1, 2003: 3–14; Holland, Jack, "Howard's War on Terror: A Conceivable, Communicable and Coercive Foreign Policy Discourse,' *Australian Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4, 2010: 643–661; Holland, Jack, and Mike Aaronson, 'Dominance Through Coercion: Strategic Rhetorical Balancing and the Tactics of Justification in Afghanistan and Libya,' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 8, no. 1, 2014: 1–20; Holland, Jack, *Selling the War on Terror: Foreign Policy Discourses After 9/11*, Routledge, 2012; Gleeson, Kathleen, *Australia's 'War on Terror' Discourse*, Routledge, 2016; Poynting, Scott, and David Whyte, eds., *Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The 'War on Terror' as Terror*, Routledge, 2012; Secunda, Eugene, and Terence P. Moran, *Selling War to America: from the Spanish American War to the Global War on Terror*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007; Butler, Michael, *Selling a 'Just' War: Framing, Legitimacy, and US Military Intervention*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Wolfe, Wojtek Mackiewicz. *Winning the War of Words: Selling the War on Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq*, ABC-CLIO, 2008.

[55] *The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, New York Daily News, Chicago Tribune, Newsday, Houston Chronicle* and *The Dallas Morning News*; Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid., 366–372.

only seven suggested caution and a flat zero opposed or sought alternatives to military intervention.[56]

Furthermore, in discussing disadvantages of military intervention, only one warned war could elicit more terrorist strikes, only one warned it would strengthen terrorists, zero warned it would create more refugees, only one warned a new wave of anti-Americanism would result, and only two warned it would destabilise moderate or Islamic states.[57] Not one argued for avoiding harm to civilians insofar as it was possible, and only two saw the objectives of the war as returning the United States to pre-attacks calm.[58] In the light of what we now know about the outcome of the war and continuing issues stemming from the destabilisation of the Middle East, such statistics are utterly damning, and reveal just how completely the corporate media fell into line in framing the crisis in terms leverageable to elites.[59]

A comparable study by Scott Bonn found that, of 1083 articles containing direct quotes from Bush administration officials, drawn from a sample of over five thousand relating to Iraq/Saddam Hussein in *The New York Times* between 1 March 2001 and 31 March 2003, the most frequently repeated keyword was 'evil.' 'Evil' was 21.2 times more likely post-9/11 to appear in administration rhetoric than before, followed by 'weapons of mass destruction,' 'threat,' 'terrorism' and 'sanctions.'[60] Such keywords reinforced a binary framing of the crisis already in the process of being politicised by the Bush neoconservatives before George W. had departed Emma E. Booker Elementary in Saratosa, Florida. That this binary framing could be traced back to various manifestations of the 'Paranoid Style,' and given its referencing of the eternal struggle, Cohn's 'Ancient Fantasy' as well, it was apparent this 'new kind of war' was not nearly as new as it was made out to be.

[56] Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid.

[57] Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid.

[58] Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid.

[59] Cockburn, Patrick, *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*, Verso Books, 2015; Burke, Jason, *The New Threat: The Past, Present, and Future of Islamic Militancy*, The New Press, 2017; Dyer, Gwynne, *Don't Panic: ISIS, Terror and Today's Middle East*, Random House Canada, 2015; Morgan, George, and Scott Poynting, *Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West*, Routledge, 2016.

[60] Bonn, Scott A., *Mass Deception: Moral Panic and the US War on Iraq*, Rutgers University Press, 2010, 54.

The roots of Soviet terrorism, indeed of modern terrorism, date back to 1879. I refer to the establishment in 1879 of a Congress in the small Russian town of Lipetsk, of an organization known as *Narodnaya Volya*, or the People's Will.

—Richard Pipes[61]

Targeting Phase: Constructing Targets for Scapegoating Through the Production of Deviance

This second section of the third case study examines the targeting stage of terrorist panic in the context of the mobilisation of society in defence of the interests of western elites using the terrorist conspiracy theory constructed atop a Self vs Other binary. It focuses on how, having politicised crisis wrought by geopolitical instability by conflating their class interests with the moral Good—defined in terms of western civilisation—western elites leveraged binary logic to build a terrorist stereotype as a tool with which to demonise future victims as a prelude to persecution.

To that end, this section investigates the use of deviance production as the primary driver of terrorist panic, examining the adaptation of the communist conspiracy theory in developing the terrorist as folk demon. It explores the use of the crisis framework politicised in that way to attack countries with substantial fossil fuel resources and to put down challenges to imperial world order from those attempting to cut paths of independent development outside of it. In looking at how western elites made scapegoats out of perceived threats to their global power, this section addresses elite control of mass communication, and the role of media propaganda in perpetrating deviance production for the purpose of manufacturing consent. In linking the terrorist conspiracy theory with priming material supplied by the Ancient Fantasy, this section examines how architects of terror panic effected convergence with the priming source material, further expediting their political goals.

IIa. Terror Scare I. The construction of terror panic began between 2–5 July 1979, as an Israeli think tank, the Jonathan Institute, convened the first Conference on International Terrorism in Jerusalem. Closed to points of view not serviceable to elites in monopolising terror, this conference brought together neoconservative academics, journalists,

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[61] Jonathan Institute, *International Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, Jerusalem 1979, 11.

politicians and militarists to refine the tenets of and propagandise terrorist conspiracy theory. The Jonathan Institute itself had been founded in September 1976 by former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Benjamin Netanyahu, who named it after his brother, the fallen leader of the Entebbe raid three years prior.[62] Enjoying close ties with the Israeli political establishment through the active support of committee members like Menachem Begin, Ephraim Katzir, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres and Ezer Weizman, and tasked with defending Israeli settler colonialism, the founding of a public relations think tank was an implicit admission that world opinion had turned against the illegal Israeli military occupation and ethnic cleansing of Palestine.[63]

For its part, devoted to what Stampnitzky calls 'the politicisation of expertise' on terrorism as a reaction to the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Jerusalem Conference defined state terrorism solely as an indirect product, through sponsorship, of the violence of the weak—the Palestinian struggle for self-determination framed of necessity than through the self-serving lens of counterterrorism as a Soviet conspiracy.[64] By the same token, the Conference endorsed as a basic operating assumption the violence of the strong, the historical context for terrorism as such and basis for the occupation, as a characteristic feature of the politicisation of expertise. Reflecting the close working relationship between neoconservative elements from both countries in developing counterterrorist doctrine, the majority of the attendees were Israeli (Netanyahu, Shimon Peres, Menachem Begin, Major General Shlomo Gazit, Major General

[62] Herman, Edward S., and Gerry O'Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror*, Pantheon, 1989, 104–106; Brulin, 'Israeli Origins,' op. cit., 93–94; Kumar, Deepa, *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire*, Chicago; Haymarket Books, 2012, 199–123; Paull, Philip, '"International Terrorism": The Propaganda War,' MA dis., San Francisco State University, 1982, 32–58.

[63] Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, ibid., Chapter 5, 'Terrorism Fever: The First War on Terrorism and the Politicisation of Expertise,' 109–138; Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit., 47–50, 104; Chomsky, Noam, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians*, South End Press, 1999; Said, Edward W., *The Question of Palestine*, Vintage, 1979; Said, Edward W., *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage, 2012; Finkelstein, Norman G., *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, Verso, 2003; Finkelstein, Norman G., *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-semitism and the Abuse of History*, University of California Press, 2008.

[64] Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, ibid., Chapter 5, 'Terrorism Fever: The First War on Terrorism and the Politicisation of Expertise,' 109–138; Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit., 47–50; Kumar, *Islamophobia*, op. cit., 120.

Aharon Yariv, Gideon Rafael, Mordecai Abir) and American (Henry Jackson, whose entourage Philip Paul describes as 'virtually an Israeli lobby group in the United States,'[65] Jack Kemp, George H.W. Bush, Major General George Keegan, Richard Pipes, Brian Crozier, Edward Teller, Thomas C. Schelling, George Will and Norman Podhoretz, amongst others).[66]

Israel was the major immediate beneficiary of this symbiosis; as we saw in Case Study II, the United States had decades of experience in manufacturing communist panic, based on decades more of acculturation in Hofstadter's Paranoid Style that key members of the Israeli political class patently wished to exploit. Applied to Middle Eastern politics, these would expedite 'convergence' with counterterrorism, tapping the emotive energy from one alleged 'existential threat' and linking it to another to associate the violence of the weak with an alleged Soviet plot to make the Paranoid Style a key feature of Middle Eastern as well as US politics. The settler colonist nature of both societies involved common assumptions regarding the right of Europeans to move in on land already occupied by others that further expedited the process.

The great value to the Jerusalem Conference of emotive power generated through convergence was reflected in the collection of reports published in 1979.[67] The double standard associated with counterterrorist conspiracy theory appeared in audacious style in commentary from Richard Pipes, Snr, who associated terrorism per se with the same political milieu that produced the Bolsheviks. 'The roots of Soviet terrorism, indeed of modern terrorism,' he argued, 'date back to 1879.'

> This year marks … the founding of that organization which is the source of all modern terrorist groups, whether they be named the Tupamaros, the Baader-Meinhoff group, the Weathermen, Red Brigade or the PLO. I refer to the establishment in 1879 of a Congress in the small Russian town of Lipetsk, of an organization known as *Narodnaya Volya*, or the People's Will.[68]

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[65] Paull, '"International Terrorism",' op. cit., 15.

[66] Brulin, ibid.

[67] Netanyahu, *Terrorism*, op. cit.

[68] Jonathan Institute, *International Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, Jerusalem 1979, 11.

Strangely enough for this approach to terrorist conspiracy theory, Pipes points out that the terrorism of the weak was successful insofar as it had the double effect of demystifying 'Russian rulers in the eyes of the people, but it also caused the government to overreact.'

> From 1879 onwards, the Imperial government introduced a series of extremely harsh countermeasures meant to prevent terror, but which had the effect of alienating moderate groups in Russia. In the long run this made it impossible for the regime to ever secure the support or moderately conservative and liberal elements in Russian society, and so it was left to fall, isolated and alone, in 1917.[69]

The sympathy Pipes held for the Russian Tsar says much about who terrorist conspiracy theories serve in practice. Poor mistreated aristocrats notwithstanding, Pipes claims this as the basis for convergence between the communist and terrorist existential threats, having 'left an indelible imprint on the minds of the Soviet leadership.' Thus 'nearly all the elements of Soviet global strategy are essentially an adaptation to foreign policy of methods which had been learned by the Bolsheviks and their allies when they were in the underground fighting the Imperial regime'[70] Paradoxically however, such were also the methods employed by Menachem Begin throughout his campaign as leader of the Irgun to expel the British from Palestine in the years following WWII, though Pipes was not so indecorous as to embarrass his hosts by saying so.[71] His allegations that 'their violence' was terrorism and that this reflects the evils of state sponsorship again highlight the double standards and circular logic at play—if not the fallaciousness of the mythology of state sponsorship as a means of effecting convergence in general, itself an effect of the False Dilemma.

A second Jonathan Institute-organised conference in Washington, DC in 1984 further embedded the Paranoid Style within Israeli political culture and reinforced it in the North American, a shared feature of co-produced terror panic. In the collection of long out of print reports arising from the conference, Netanyahu again described

[69] Pipes, Richard, 'The Roots of the Involvement,' Jonathan Institute, ibid.

[70] Pipes, 'The Roots of the Involvement,' ibid., 14.

[71] Pedahzur, Ami, and Arie Perliger, *Jewish Terrorism in Israel*, Columbia University Press, 2011, 11–15.

counterterrorism as part of 'a much larger struggle, one between the forces of civilisation and those of barbarism,' one that would 'continue to spread with disastrous consequences if left unchallenged.'[72] In the name of resisting barbarism, he asserted the right to define terrorism in his own favour, alleging that, in the 'war against terrorism,' free societies must reject 'absolutely the notion that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,"' in needing 'clear ways of distinguishing terrorists.'[73] Netanyahu's association of 'clarity' with the right to dictate truth was classic deviance production in presupposing the right to control meaning in political discourse, and one that, as a ploy perpetrated in defence of democratic freedoms, had a precedent in the Red Scares.

As the basis of communist panic, the Paranoid Style was also reflected in Netanyahu's theory that attempts to 'legitimise criminal actions' and 'divert public attention from the real forces behind terrorism' were a cunning form of manipulation based on presenting a point of view he disfavoured, as was acknowledging 'desperation' on the part of those responsible for 'terrorist' outrages.

> We in the West, after all, are accustomed to believe that there is always anther 'point of view' worth looking at, even when it comes to terrorists. Before we know it, the hijackers and killers have spokesmen and commentators of their own, and the terrorists have been transformed into merely another type of political activist, which a grievance that has to be 'considered,' even given equal time.[74]

The horror of associating democratic processes with examining all sides of an issue recalls the comment referred to earlier from Argentinian dictator Jorge Rafael Videla describing a terrorist as someone whose ideas were problematic.[75] The circular logic evident here problematised ideas as the basis for the 'terrorist' label, then justified the label with moral opposition to terrorism in the abstract, conflating the two on the basis of a self-serving double standard; to question Netanyahu's judgement on this count was to undermine democracy and give aid to terrorism. Netanyahu used this sophistic mangling of words and ideas as grounds

[72] Netanyahu, *Terrorism*, op. cit., ix.

[73] Netanyahu, ibid., ix-3.

[74] Netanyahu, ibid., 8.

[75] Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror*, op. cit., 24.

for a further claim, based on assuming the right to dictate truth in defence of freedom, that the West was the target of the violence of the weak in the form of armed struggle against illegal military occupation because its values were the antithesis of terrorism, and since 'legitimacy is derived from the consent of the governed … the government's power is limited by the strict observance of fundamental human freedoms'—a series of allegations at adds with the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, one that certainly does not reflect concern about consent of the governed or fundamental human freedoms.[76]

Allegations of this kind set the stage, however, for the victim-playing, victim-blaming and associating of doubt with support for the enemy that would become stock in trade of terrorist conspiracy theory and terror panic as they moved into the Legitimation phase. Taking advantage of the Paranoid Style born of the legacy of communist panic in the United States, terrorist conspiracy theories reflected a conspicuous tendency amongst producers and amplifiers of deviance around terrorism to attribute to the enemy behaviours and attitudes on display in the attributing. For the terrorist, alleged Netanyahu, 'there are no such restraints on either legitimacy or power.'

> Legitimacy is derived from whatever cause he is fighting for or professes to be fighting for. There is no need to ask the people. He, the terrorist, is the self-appointed arbiter of what is just and necessary. If others do not quite see it that way, they will be forced to submit to the terrorist's will be a fearful violence that knows no limits, and which claims everyone and everything as a legitimate target.[77]

The passionate humanitarian values responsible for this interpretation also explained why 'terrorists and their supporters view the West as uniquely vulnerable to their attacks,' which is to say they assumed that 'the West's humaneness and its emphasis on the rule of law will inhibit a powerful response,' Western saps, the true victims, being suckers for 'protestations of innocence' through which terrorists hoped 'to escape punishment.'[78]

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[76] Netanyahu, *Terrorism*, op. cit., 5; Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, op. cit.

[77] Netanyahu, ibid., 5.

[78] Netanyahu, ibid., 6.

This combination of flattery, moral panicking, victim-playing and victim-blaming before an audience of American neoconservatives, concluded by suggesting that terrorists assume 'if the democracies cannot affix blame, they will not act.'[79] Refusing to be baited into vicious cycles of terrorist violence precludes engaging in it as a matter of definition; to the victim complex underwriting terrorist conspiracy theory however, refusing to defend elite terror monopoly was as good as supporting the conspiracy—as was judging political leaders based on what they did, rather than what they alleged to represent. In this permanent victimhood the logic of the False Dilemma is evident, if not the autocratic character of counterterrorist ideology per se.

US Secretary of State George Schultz spoke at the Washington Conference, bringing the Paranoid Style, his counterterrorist double standards and his victim complex with him. Heralding impending US foreign policy doctrine in claiming 'terrorism' was on the rise, Schultz alleged that more had been killed since the 1960s 'when governments began keeping records.'[80] 'Even more alarming,' he added, was state-sponsored terrorism; 'full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate, and not so indiscriminate, murder' had formed what Schultz characterised as a 'League of Terror,' a cartoonish image inviting comparison with James Bond or Marvel villains.[81] Like Netanyahu and for the same reasons, Schultz went to some pains to assert the right to dictate truth in determining the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, insisting that all of the former were part of a plot against democracy. 'If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism,' he alleged, 'then totalitarianism is its ally,' his proof consisting of the claim that 'the number of terrorist incidents in or against totalitarian states is negligible.'[82] In this claim, however, Schultz neglected to mention that he had defining terrorism as that which failed to serve the interests of Western elites. This process he implicitly defined as 'democracy,' expressing surprise that it should attract the violence of the weak.

In the First Terror Scare, the moral panic criteria examined in Chapter 1 compare as follows.

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[79] Netanyahu, ibid.

[80] Schultz, George P., 'The Challenge to the Democracies,' in Netanyahu, ibid., 16.

[81] Schultz, 'The Challenge to the Democracies,' ibid., 20.

[82] Schultz, ibid.

Stanley Cohen:

- *A suitable enemy*: Arabs, perpetrators of the violence of the weak, demonised as the geopolitical Other;
- *A suitable victim*: Westerners, perpetrators of state terrorism, lionised as the geopolitical Self; and
- *A consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities*: 'a fearful violence that knows no limits, and which claims everyone and everything as a legitimate target.'

Hall et al:

- *The intensification of a particular issue*: terrorism that does not benefit Western elites;
- *The identification of a subversive minority*: those whose terrorism does not benefit Western elites;
- *'Convergence' or the linking by labelling of the specific issue to other problems*; 'a much larger struggle between the forces of civilization and the forces of barbarism'; 'state sponsorship in aid of Soviet expansionism,' 'League of Terror';
- *The notion of 'thresholds'*: 'it will continue to spread with disastrous consequences if left unchallenged';
- *The element of explaining and prophesying*: 'the roots of modern terrorism date back to 1879'; 'if the democracies cannot affix blame, they will not act'; and
- *The call for firm steps*: 'a successful war on terrorism.'

Goode and Ben-Yehuda:

- *Heightened concern*: Reflected in the formation of counterterrorist think tanks and concerted public relations campaigns;
- *Increased hostility*: Fear of the Other crystalizing into counterterrorist ideology;
- *Widespread consensus*: Consensus amongst neoconservative opinion makers from Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom and a number of other countries;

- *Disproportionate appraisal*: The definition of terrorism was limited to the violence of the weak; and
- *General volatility*: Violence in the Middle East continued to spiral out of control.[83]

A general fit is apparent between the terrorist conspiracy theory associated with the First Terror Scare and multiple criteria of moral panic. It may be understood then as an article of moral panic.

IIb. Terror Scare II. Immediately after 9/11, the administration of George W. Bush developed its own terrorist conspiracy theory. In this it was presented with numerous ethical, legal and factual obstacles, not least of which being the following:

1. The use of suicide attacks rendered the deterrence threat of conventional warfare obsolete insofar as those who would otherwise have borne retaliation were already dead;
2. To be differentiated from mere aggression, war demanded measures against a sovereign nation that had first attacked the US or an ally, or had declared war against the US, none of which had taken place;
3. The bombings of the World Trade Centre (1993), Pan Am 103 (1988), the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) and the Alfred P. Murrah building (1995) had been addressed with some success through federal and international criminal investigations';and
4. Baiting the United States into military aggression that would polarise east and west, driving Arabs into the arms of Islamists, was the main purpose of the attack.[84]

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[83]This summary draws elements from the primary material presented in the next stage of the analytical criteria for the First Terror Scare (i.e. Section IIIa), for two main reasons. In the first place, the lines between stages of the analytical criteria are not in every aspect clearly delineated, and in the second, reasons of spacing and pace prelude presenting all the relevant material in this section.

[84]'The failure of terrorists to incite repressive countermeasures … makes terrorism an impotent means of attaining long term objectives.' Dowling, R.E., 'Terrorism and the Media: A Rhetorical Genre,' *Journal of Communication* 36, no. 1, 1986: 12–24, quoted in Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid., 364, 374.

All of these problems were based on 'universal meanings within a symbolic system' that had, at the rhetorical level at least, been the basis of 'many traditional meanings and constants,' not least of which being international law and the rule of law.[85] To leverage a crisis framed by pacifist pretences, a double standard regarding terrorism depending on who benefitted from it and the conflating of the vested interests of transnational corporate elites with the moral Good and the interests of the whole world, the Bush neoconservatives were compelled to shatter these 'universal meanings' and 'constants.' What Ryan discusses here in the context of communication theory is the same as deviance production in sociology, the process of constructing an imaginary hobgoblin with which to assert elite monopoly over the means of terror, asserted though elite control over the channels of mass communication.[86]

Just as it was necessary then for the crisis to become the basis for a 'new kind of war,' it was also necessary to define a suitable enemy (foreign terrorists), a suitable victim (patriotic Americans) and convergence (nations that sponsor terrorism).[87] To that end, Bush invoked the conspiracy theory of state sponsorship in a nationally televised address on the evening of 11 September 2001. While the television images of the attacks had 'filled us with … a quiet, unyielding anger,' an emotion to be fanned and weaponised long after the sun had gone down, acts of mass murder intended to 'frighten our Nation into chaos and retreat' had failed (a cursory examination of Bin Laden's speeches would have found him expressing the desire to 'provoke and bait this administration' for the purpose of 'bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy,' a policy deriving from past efforts in 'using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the Mujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to

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[85] Ryan, "Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid.

[86] Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid.; see also Reese, Stephen D., and Seth C. Lewis, 'Framing the War on Terror: The Internalisation of Policy in the US Press,' *Journalism* 10, no. 6, 2009: 777–797.

[87] Ryan, 'Framing the War Against Terrorism,' ibid.

withdraw in defeat').[88] Having been provoked and baited into a long and costly war, Bush simply refused to acknowledge his horror- and panic-stricken nation, claiming instead that 'our country is strong,' feeding it with a bellicose, ultra-nationalistic jingoism that established both a suitable enemy and a suitable victim:

> A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.[89]

The idea that America was 'targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world' set the limit for neoconservative inquiry into the root causes of the violence of the weak. To be fair, the *9/11 Commission Report* did note that 'in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, fundamentalists helped articulate anticolonial grievances.'[90] A tokenistic yet crucial acknowledgement of facts defying the terrorist conspiracy theory, the *Report* quickly relegated it to the memory hole, speculating instead that, after 'gaining independence from Western powers following World War II, the Arab Middle East followed an arc from initial pride and optimism to today's mix of indifference, cynicism and despair.' Suppressing once again the long history of Western colonialism and imperialism in the region, it claimed instead that such negativity grew out of promises of 'a glowing future, often tied to sweeping ideologies' such as Arab Socialism, but which produced what were

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[88] Bush, George W., 'Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,' *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Government Printing Office, 11 September 2001, Book 02, Presidential Documents—1 July–31 December 2001, via https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/html/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1099.htm, accessed 27 November 2017; *Al-Jazeera*, 'Full Transcript of Bin Ladin's Speech,' 2 November 2004, via http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html, accessed 2 December 2017.

[89] Bush, 'Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,' ibid.; Rothe and Muzzatti, 'Enemies Everywhere,' op. cit., 332–334.

[90] *9/11 Commission Report*, op. cit., 52.

almost invariably autocratic regimes that were unwilling to tolerate any opposition—even in countries such as Egypt, that had a parliamentary tradition. Over time, their policies—repression, rewards, emigration, and the displacement of popular anger onto scapegoats (usually foreign)—were shaped by the desire to cling to power.[91]

According to the 9/11 Commission, then, America was targeted because it was being scapegoated by power-crazed foreign autocrats, a terrorist conspiracy theory reflecting its familiarity with the Paranoid Style. By the late 1970s, the *Report* claims, this scapegoating impulse had, in closing off peaceful opposition and forcing citizens to choose between 'silence, exile and violent opposition' demonstrated the bankruptcy of secular nationalism across the Muslim world. As an example, it cites Iran, whose 1979 revolution 'swept a Shia theocracy to power.' This in fact demonstrates the opposite. Iran was not previously a secular nationalist state, but a military dictatorship begat by a CIA-orchestrated coup, the Shah the main US ally in the region.[92] Suppression of such facts aside, the success of the Iranian revolution, the *Report* claims, 'encouraged Sunni fundamentalists everywhere,' aided by Saudi Arabia, 'awash in sudden oil wealth,' which used its good fortunes to promote Wahhabism, the Sunni fundamentalist reading of Islam.[93] Here the *Report* just abandons the lead, reporting nothing further and failing to even entertain the possibility of a connection between Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, sponsored by 'sudden oil wealth,' and the predominantly Saudi Arabian 9/11 hijackers.[94] Instead, we find that 'in this competition for legitimacy, the secular regimes had no alternative to offer,' trying in a number of cases to appease local Islamist movements with concessions that emboldened them, laying down the necessary roots for the rise of Osama Bin Laden (another Saudi Arabian 'awash in sudden oil wealth') in the process.[95]

Given the absolutist tenor of the terrorist conspiracy theory as invoked by Bush in the hours and days following the attacks, such deeply

[91] *9/11 Commission Report*, ibid.

[92] See Case Study II.

[93] Bush, 'Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,' op. cit.

[94] Norton, Ben, 'Saudi Prince Admits US Told Monarchy to Spread Extremist Wahhabi Islamist Ideology to Combat Communism,' Bennorton.com, 27 March 2018, via https://bennorton.com/saudi-arabia-us-wahhabism-islamism-communism, accessed 30 October 2018.

[95] Bush, ibid. See also Risen, James, *Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014, 71–122, 'Rosetta.'

politicised readings of history are unsurprising. The US President expedited production of deviance in his address to the nation in this sense by describing the experience in binary terms, thundering that, 'Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature,' and making sure to directly link the binary logic that demonised the Other, while lionising the Self, to the doctrine of (non-aligned, at least) state sponsorship, added: 'We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.'[96]

Asserting that the violence of the weak was also the work of regimes hostile to the United States because 'they hate our freedoms,' Bush asked for prayers for 'all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened.' In reminding his global audience to be fearful, Bush added 'they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me."' These comments followed the lead of the Jonathan Institute in framing the War on Terrorism as 'a much larger struggle between the forces of civilisation and the forces of barbarism'—'terrorists and the nations who harbour them' performing the role of barbarians in this case.[97]

Introduction of the religious element introduced the cultural priming of the Ancient Fantasy, leading into the concession from Bush on 17 September that, 'this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while'—a slip that, in referencing historical aggressions, disclosed his true frame of reference and the desire to capitalise on the theological dualisms of Christian fundamentalism.[98] This was not the first time Christians had cast a suspicious eye to the east, and the constituencies Bush was targeting knew those suspicions as well as he did. The Ancient Fantasy was alive and well, joining forces with the Paranoid Style which

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[96] Bush, ibid.

[97] Bush, ibid.

[98] For more on theological dualisms see Case Study I, Ebner, Julia, *The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism*, IB Tauris, 2017; Kumar, Deepa, *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire*, Haymarket Books, 2012; Waldman, Peter, and Hugh Pope, '"Crusade" Reference Reinforces Fears War on Terrorism Is Against Muslims,' *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 September 2001, via https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1001020294332922160, accessed 1 December 2017; Cockburn, Alexander, 'The Tenth Crusade,' *Counterpunch*, 7 September 2002, via https://www.counterpunch.org/2002/09/07/the-tenth-crusade/, accessed 1 December 2017.

remained as popular as ever. In the end it took only two days for the Senate and House of Representatives to approve the 'Authorization for Use of Military Force,' bill, giving the Bush neoconservatives a practically unlimited mandate to

> use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harboured such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.[99]

As in many other periods of history, crisis-driven panic had enabled leveraging of outcomes unthinkable under regular circumstances, within conditions ideal for anti-democratic outcomes given the pressures against due process. As Rothe and Muzzatti observe, connecting Bin Laden to 'rogue regimes' was essential, as 'without the acquiescence of the public and the legislative branches regarding the connection between Hussein and Bin Laden, the President must have Congress make the 'Call to War' according to the U.S. Constitution.'[100] In this case, they might have had to find evidence of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction *prior* to invading.

In the Second Terror Scare (the 'War on Terror'), the moral panic criteria examined in Chapter 1 compare as follows.

Stanley Cohen:

- *A suitable enemy*: Arabs, Muslims, 'rogue regimes' demonised as the ethno-religious Other, those whose violence neglected to serve Western elites;
- *A suitable victim*: The West, or 'America and our friends and allies,' lionised as the Self, those whose violence served Western elites; and
- *A consensus that the beliefs or actions being denounced were not insulated entities*: 'evil people may be planning further acts.'

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[99] Rothe and Muzzatti, 'Enemies Everywhere,' op. cit., 339–340.

[100] Rothe and Muzzatti, 'Enemies Everywhere,' ibid., 340.

Hall et al:

- *The intensification of a particular issue*: terrorism that does not benefit Western elites;
- *The identification of a subversive minority*; terrorists whose terrorism does not benefit Western elites, the 'Islamic Mafia'),
- *'Convergence' or the linking by labelling of the specific issue to other problems*; 'Good vs. Evil,' 'we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them,' 'the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century';
- *The notion of 'thresholds'*; the defence of civilisation;
- *The element of explaining and prophesying*: 'attacks were intended to frighten our Nation into chaos and retreat,' 'America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world,' 'their policies—repression, rewards, emigration, and the displacement of popular anger onto scapegoats (usually foreign)—were shaped by the desire to cling to power'; and
- *The call for firm steps*: 'war on terrorism'.

Goode and Ben-Yehuda:

- *Heightened concern*: Terrorism of the weak has not always been at issue;
- *Increased hostility*: Rampant Islamophobia, a spike in hate crimes committed against people of Middle Eastern appearance, multiple imperialist wars of aggression[101];
- *Widespread consensus*: The corporate media and the political culture fell in lockstep behind Bush[102];

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[101] Poynting, Scott, and Victoria Mason, '"Tolerance, Freedom, Justice and Peace"?: Britain, Australia and Anti-Muslim Racism Since 11 September 2001,' *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 27, no. 4, 2006: 365–391; Poynting, Scott, and Victoria Mason, 'The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Racism in the UK and Australia Before 11 September 2001,' *Journal of Sociology*, 2007: 43–61; Poynting, S., 'Islamophobia and Hate Crime,' in Perry, B., ed., *Hate Crimes: Issues and Perspectives. Volume 3: Victims of Hate Crime*, Praeger, 2009, 85–106; Morgan and Poynting, *Global Islamophobia*, op. cit.

[102] Greenwald, Glenn, 'Refusal to Call Charleston Shootings "Terrorism" Again Shows It's a Meaningless Propaganda Term,' *The Intercept*, 20 June 2015, via https://theintercept.com/2015/06/19/refusal-call-charleston-shootings-terrorism-shows-meaningless-propaganda-term/, accessed 27 December 2017.

- *Disproportionate appraisal*: The definition of terrorism was limited to the violence of the weak. Geopolitically the major threat to peace was Western imperialism; prior to and post-9/11 the major domestic terrorist threat in the United States was and remains white supremacists[103]; and
- *General volatility*: The US-centred axis committed the supreme international war crime of aggression in invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the violence and chaos that ensued spawned a new problem in Islamic State.

A general fit is apparent between the communist conspiracy theory associated with the Second Terror Scare (the 'War on Terror') and multiple criteria of moral panic. The terrorist conspiracy theory informing the 'War on Terror' may then be understood as an article of moral panic.

> Only after the PLO's expulsion from Beirut did captured PLO documents reveal the pivotal role of its terrorist mini-state in Lebanon as a training centre and launching ground for what had become a kind of terrorist international.
>
> —Benjamin Netanyahu

> America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.
>
> —George W. Bush

LEGITIMATION PHASE: CONSTRUCTING A PRETEXT THROUGH MORAL DISENGAGEMENT FOR THE PERSECUTION OF SCAPEGOATS

This third stage of the third case study examines the Legitimation stage of terrorist panic. As crisis framed in the favour of elites laid a foundation for deviance production, this section argues, engineers of terrorist panic made

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[103] Hasan, Mehdi, 'The Numbers Don't Lie: White Far-Right Terrorists Pose a Clear Danger to Us All,' *The Intercept*, 1 June 2017, via https://theintercept.com/2017/05/31/the-numbers-dont-lie-white-far-right-terrorists-pose-a-clear-danger-to-us-all, accessed 27 December 2017; Sharpe, Tanya Telfair, 'The Identity Christian Movement: Ideology of Domestic Terrorism,' *Journal of Black Studies* 30, no. 4, 2000: 604–623; Blee, Kathleen M., 'Women and Organized Racial Terrorism in the United States,' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 5, 2005; Michael, George, *The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right*, University Press of Kansas, 2010; Ebner, *The Rage*, op. cit.

the terrorist conspiracy theory the basis for scapegoating through a victim complex based on victim-blaming, playing of the victim, the 'if you think for yourself, the terrorists win' logic of the False Dilemma, and other aspects of moral disengagement. In so doing, it contends, moral entrepreneurs rendered terrorist panic the basis for scapegoating by recasting actions already decided on as proportionate responses to provocation rather than aggression—recasting victims of this aggression as deserving. To that end, it examines how, in the US context, the victim complex characteristic of the Legitimation Phase drew on the Paranoid Style, and where religious sectarianism appeared in the form of Islamophobic xenophobia, the Ancient Fantasy.[104] It looks at how the False Dilemma at the core of this victim complex tended to identify terrorist atrocities that failed to benefit Western elites with terrorist conspiracy, arguing that the victim complex then became the means of leveraging terrorist panic by legitimating the persecution of actual victims of imperialist state terror to follow—producing in effect a self-fulfilling prophecy.[105]

IIIa. Terror Scare I. With the 'crisis' established on a self-serving double standard and violence of the weak cast as deviance in the language of 'terrorism,' the next step for neoconservatives was to leverage the fears generated by constructing a suitable victim complex. Their opportunity arrived in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan, supported by evangelicals mobilised by the Likud Party in an effort to enlist the support of Christian fundamentalists receptive to the Ancient Fantasy and Paranoid Style.[106] Ending 40 years of consensus around the New Deal with a reactionary agenda that would eventually congeal into neoliberalism, Reagan also brought to the presidency a fervent anti-communism stemming from his days as a friendly witness at HUAC, virtually 'assuring an acceleration of Red Scaring.'[107] For playing the victim of mythical

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[104] Cf. 'Moral intervention often serves the United States, which charges itself with the primary task and then subsequently asks its allies to set in motion a process of armed containment and/or repression as the first act that prepares the stage for military intervention … often it is dictated unilaterally by the of the current enemy of Empire. These enemies are often called terrorist, a crude conceptual and terminological reduction that is rooted in a police mentality.' Negri, Antonio, and Michael Hardt, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, 2000, 37.

[105] Zulaika, Joseba, *Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*, University of Chicago Press, 2009.

[106] Toaldo, Mattia, *The Origins of the US War on Terror: Lebanon, Libya and American Intervention in the Middle East*, Routledge, 2012, 57–59.

[107] Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit., 48.

communist expansionism, blaming the victims of their own state violence, and conflating challenges to their global hegemony with support for the enemy as per the False Dilemma fallacy, the continuing Tehran hostage crisis served as surrogate and staging point. The only major difference would be the extra step of converging 'terrorist' and 'communist' existential threats.

Providing critical aid to this convergence and associated victim complex, was the 'special relationship' between the United States and Israel, borne from the US side by Reagan's belief in the critical value of Israel to his crusade against the Soviets. In an op-ed for the *Washington Post* prior to his election, Reagan conceded with a candidness that would be derided as unpatriotic coming from critics that, in the competition with Russia for 'territories and resources vital to our security and our national wellbeing,' the fall of Iran had 'increased Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely.'[108] We examine this theme in more detail below. Suffice it to say for the moment that Israel and the United States were able to find 'strategic consensus' in securing their respective 'national wellbeings'—predicated on the usual confusion of the vested interests of ruling elites with the common interest. This was especially true insofar as Israel was able to convince Reaganite neoconservatives that its enemies amongst the PLO and other political expressions of Arab nationalism around the Levant were part of a broader threat from the Soviet Union to its interests.[109] Perpetual victimhood was one point where the global hegemon and the beneficiary of 48% of all its military aid and 35% of its economic aid between 1978 and 1982 could agree.[110]

Such was a driving concern at the Washington Conference on International Terrorism in 1984, the second in the series organised by the Jonathan Institute. Having helped to politicise expertise such that enemy was understood to be a deviant evil of the order of an existentialist threat, Netanyahu moved to exploit the special relationship to the

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[108] These comments also contradict the framing of Middle Eastern geopolitics prior to the 1980s in the *9/11 Commission Report* alleging the root cause of 'terrorism' to be failure of secular states in the Middle East. Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, op. cit., 59.

[109] Toaldo, ibid., 62–63; Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, op. cit., Chapter 2 'The Origins of the "Special Relationship,"' 9–27.

[110] Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, ibid., 10.

hilt with the Soviet state sponsorship conspiracy theory in the construction of a perpetual victim complex. Terrorism, he alleged, was not 'a sporadic phenomenon born of social misery and frustration,' but was rather 'rooted in the political ambitions of expansionist states and the groups that serve them.' Lacking their support, to this theory, 'international terrorism would be impossible.'[111] It was this support in fact that made 'international terrorism' what it was, even if it did exist in a sterile historical vacuum. Terrorism in the deviance conspiracy theory 'began its rapid growth in the 1960s,' 'sparked' by early successes of the PLO and European radical factions. Soon terrorist groups, 'seemingly independent from one another … proliferated throughout Europe, Japan, North and South America and the Middle East.'

> But as the evidence piled up, the Arab PLO, the Iranian Mujahedeen, the Armenian ASALA, the German Baader-Meinhof gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, and others were found to be linked not only to one another but to the Soviet Union and radical Arab regimes as well. Only after the PLOs expulsion from Beirut did captured PLO documents reveal the pivotal role of its terrorist mini-state in Lebanon as a training centre and launching ground for what had become a kind of terrorist international.[112]

Neglecting to cite any such documents, Netanyahu instead claims that collaboration in the formation of a terrorist international, rather than being accidental, vis the result of the rise of communist totalitarianism and Islamic radicalism, which despite oppositional differences have joined forces in giving ideological impetus and material support in the form of weapons, training and money to practitioners of the violence of the weak. The 'League of Terror' (Schultz) also provides political support, such as when some try to justify the violence of the weak at the United Nations as part of struggles for national liberation—to their everlasting infamy, as 'the real goals of terrorists are related to their methods,' in that 'it is not only that the ends of terrorists do not justify the means they choose,' but that 'the choice of means indicate what the true ends are.'[113] As products of a campaign devoted to the production of

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[111] Netanyahu, *Terrorism: How the West Can Win*, op. cit., 7.

[112] Netanyahu, ibid., 11.

[113] Netanyahu, ibid., 12, 16.

deviance, these arguments were only true where the violence of the weak was concerned. The violence of the strong continued to justify the right to dictate truth and impose subjective interpretations of deviance and normality on political discourse, providing an ideological rationale for the mentality that the ends justify the means in the process.

Back in 1981, Jerusalem Conference participant and American journalist Clare Sterling had adopted these assumptions as her own, popularising the Soviet state sponsorship conspiracy theory with a bestseller entitled *The Terror Network*. 'Nothing in history could equal the bands of professional practitioners dispensing violent death in forty-odd countries today,' Sterling bellowed.

> Methodically trained, massively armed, immensely rich, and assured of powerful patronage, they move with remarkable confidence across national frontiers from floodlit stage to stage, able at a word to command the planet's riveted attention. A planeful of captive passengers, a kidnapped statesman, an embassy held at gunpoint, a cathedral occupied and barricaded, can bring them money, recognition, immunity, absolution, forcing government after government to its knees. Governments too have learned to use them, as instruments of diplomacy or to wage surrogate wars— employing the power of impotence to expose the impotence of power, as a Western diplomat described the Iranian seizure of the American hostages in Tehran.[114]

Government-backed terror was only a problem when western interests were not beneficiaries. Incoming CIA director William Casey agreed, seeking immediately after reading *The Terror Network* to substantiate Sterling's claims with a Special National Intelligence Estimate. Presented by his staff of professional analysts with something more approximating reality, Casey reportedly complained, 'I paid $13.95 for [Sterling's book] and it told me more than you bastards whom I pay $50,000 a year.'[115] Some indication of what Casey was so upset about, was later provided by Melvin Goodman, Head of the Office of Soviet Affairs from 1976 to 1987:

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[114]Sterling, Claire, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981, 6–7.

[115]Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, op. cit., 120.

When we looked through the book, we found very clear episodes where CIA black propaganda, clandestine information that was designed under a covert action plan to be planted in European newspapers, were picked up and put in this book. A lot of it was made up. It was made up out of whole cloth. We told him that point blank and we even had the operations people tell Bill Casey this. I thought this might have an impact but all of us were dismissed. Casey had made up his mind. He knew the Soviets were involved in terrorism, so there was nothing we could tell him to abuse him. Lies became reality.[116]

A year later Edward Herman came to the same conclusions in a wide-ranging critique of Sterling and the terrorist conspiracy theory that she had helped to popularise, concluding that its purpose was not to convince, but to supply a pretext for the violence of the strong.[117] Helping lies to become reality, the newly minted Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism began hearings into the Soviet state sponsorship theory on 24 April 1981, a theory it helped to coin with the aid of government employees called to testify. The *New York Times* argued several weeks later, however, that the SSST, like the House Committee on Un-American Activities before it, lacked any clear legislative purpose, functioning instead, as had HUAC, as a platform for virtue signalling, propagating the deviance conspiracy theory, and scaring the public.[118]

'Transmission Belts' and the Schultz Doctrine

Also aiding the process at this time were publications elaborating on the Soviet state sponsorship theory, including one that invoked the 'transmissions belt' propaganda trope constructed on falsified evidence by the authors of the *Red Channels* booklet.[119] Such are very long out of print in the Post-Soviet era, the absence of the great benefactor of evil something of a gap in the theory overall—an awkward, perhaps even embarrassing, development for the long-term health of

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[116]Curtin, Adam, dir., *The Power of Nightmares: Part 1 'Baby It's Cold Outside'*. Event is at 54.20; Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, op. cit., 119–121; Naftali, *Blind Spot*, op. cit.

[117]Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit.

[118]Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror*, op. cit., 122–127; Herman, ibid., 25.

[119]See Case Study II, Section 2b. Cline, Ray, and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, New York: Crane Russak, 1984, Chapter 4, 'The PLO Transmission Belt,' 31–54.

the alleged belts in particular. The potential for the enabling pretext to wear thin and then out over the longer term prevented few from jumping into the fray however. Revealing in doing so a limited understanding of politics, one whose only frame of reference was the Cold War binary, Reagan found a workaround in delegating power, which is how Secretary of State and Jonathan Institute conference speaker George Schultz came into authority over his counterterrorism policy. For Shultz, upholding the 'transmission belts' thesis of state support for 'terrorism' was crucial, lest (1) anyone notice the shortcomings in deterrence ideology, and/or (2) asymmetrical or irregular threats prove unserviceable to the Pentagon system of subsidies to private industry, a key aspect of supply-side Reaganomics.[120] With such concerns in mind, he declared during a speech immediately prior to the 1984 elections, in which Reagan was returned:

> We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defence to consider means of active prevention, pre-emption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it.[121]

These comments came in response to the killing of 241 US soldiers in Beirut on 23 October 1983, the circumstances around which we examine in the next section.[122] In the meantime, what became the Schultz Doctrine assumed a perpetual victimhood of the United States and Israel based on the double standards stemming from who benefitted from violence. If, on this basis, two wrongs made a right, they also justified striking first, on the grounds that the United States and Israel as perpetual victims would sooner or later become targets for the violence of the weak,

[120] Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, op. cit., 17; Toaldo, Mattia, 'The Reagan Administration and the Origins of the War on Terror: Lebanon and Libya as Case Studies,' *New Middle Eastern Studies* 2, 2012: 4; Chomsky, Noam, *On Power and Ideology: The Managua Lectures*, Haymarket Books, 2015, 106; Kofsky, *The War Scare of 1948*, op. cit.; Rousseas, Stephen, *The Political Economy of Reaganomics: a Critique*, Routledge, 2015; Davis, Mike, 'Reaganomics' Magical Mystery Tour,' *New Left Review* 149, 1985, 45.

[121] Toaldo, 'The Reagan Administration and the Origins of the War on Terror,' ibid., 1.

[122] Toaldo, ibid., 5–6.

as Palestinians and others in the region fought for national liberation.[123] Any retaliation from the weak that arose from striking first could then be portrayed as proof of impending attack justifying pre-emption in the first place; as cause and cure of the problem of terrorism, the perpetual victims were also able to have it both ways, to have their cake and eat it too.

One can only wonder at what FAA Director Najeeb A. Halaby would have had to say. It seems a likely bet he might have taken issue with the theory that the Reaganites learnt anything from experience, much less to say the idea that 'one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it.' While the panic-driven victim complex remained in play, enabling the 'certainty of swift and sure measures' in the form of the violence of the strong, the response from the weak was equally predictable and inevitable.

3b. Terror Scare II. On 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress under conditions of high drama, broadcast live around the world. A crucial moment that affirmed the basic pillars of the Schultz Doctrine as applied to the so-called War on Terrorism, Bush's speech upheld (or ramped into overdrive) the deviance production behind the original doctrine, laying the basis for his own. Invoking identical mechanisms of moral disengagement, Bush invoked

1. Victim-playing (the claim that 'they hate our freedoms' was virtually a mantra amongst neoconservatives, self-serving in demanding nothing from in terms of reflection or proof of the actual existence of said freedoms[124]);
2. Victim-blaming (conspiracy theories revolving around unsubstantiated claims of state sponsorship of the violence of the weak, leading to targeting of nations where non-state terrorist groups operated);

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[123]Chomsky, Noam, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians*, South End Press, 1999, 20–21.

[124]Van Bergen, Jennifer, *The Twilight of Democracy: The Bush Plan for America*, Common Courage Press, 2004; Cole, Dave, and James X. Dempsey, *Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security*, 2nd ed., New York: W. W. Norton; Herman, Susan N., *Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American Democracy*, Oxford University Press, 2011; Welch, Kyle, 'The Patriot Act and Crisis Legislation: The Unintended Consequences of Disaster Lawmaking,' *Capital University Law Review* 43, 2015: 481.

3. Abandonment of responsibility in simply refusing to reflect on their own role as global hegemon in creating geopolitical tensions, and, amongst other things; and

4. The tendency to conflate being doubted, contradicted or criticised with being attacked (invocation of the False Dilemma in 'you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists'-style logic).

All served to justify the unspoken assumption that unilateral pre-emption was defensible and just insofar as it served to maintain the monopoly of elites over the use of terror. Such was shortly to be applied through military aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq, and torture, the latter especially well understood to be a form of terror when used by official enemies and carried out with notorious gusto at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.[125]

As the core thesis of his address, Bush alleged that 'on September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country,' a claim that cast the United States in the role of permanent victim, though multiple options to war were available as we have seen. Since 'freedom itself is under attack,' Bush charged, 'Americans are asking, who attacked our country?'

> The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaida. Al Qaida is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money. Its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.[126]

Such could have just as easily described the alleged existential communist threat during the Cold War; commentary around expansionist radicalism aiming at world conquest reflects the lineage of this terrorist conspiracy

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[125] MacAskill, Ewen, and Julian Borger, 'Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan,' *The Guardian*, 16 September 2004, via https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq, accessed 28 December 2017; Rothe and Muzzatti, 'Enemies Everywhere,' op. cit., 336.

[126] Bush, George W., 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States; Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001,' *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Government Printing Office, 20 September 2001, Book 02, Presidential Documents—July 1 to December 31, 2001, via https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/html/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1140.htm, accessed 27 November 2017.

theory. In denouncing the hijackers' 'fringe form of Islamic extremism,' while suppressing the role of the United States' Saudi Arabian allies in disseminating the Wahhabism of which he was speaking throughout the region, Bush declared that 'thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries' had been recruited for training in 'the tactics of terror,' before being 'sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.'[127] Thus, while marginal extremists no reasonable person could take seriously,

> The leadership of Al Qaida has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see Al Qaida's vision for the world … We condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people; it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder.[128]

Unmentioned here was the long history of CIA support given to the Mujahedeen forces during the Soviet-Afghanistan War, despite the knowledge that many of them were religious fundamentalists as hostile to the West as to the Soviet Union.[129] Such facts were detrimental to the victim complex characteristic of the Legitimation phase, and thus to a legitimising pretext for war.

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[127] Bush, 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States,' ibid.; Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars*, op. cit., 75–77; Crooke, Alastair, 'You Can't Understand ISIS if You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia,' *New Perspectives Quarterly* 32, no. 1, 2015: 56–70; Leupp, Gary, 'On Terrorism, Methodism, Saudi "Wahhabism" and the Censored 9-11 Report,' *Counterpunch*, 8 August 2003, via http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/08/08/on-terrorism-methodism-saudi-quot-wahhabism-quot-and-the-censored-9-11-report, accessed 8 May 2016; 'Sleeping With the Devil: How U.S. and Saudi Backing of Al Qaeda Led to 9/11,' *Washington's Blog*, 5 September, 2012, http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/09/sleeping-with-the-devil-how-u-s-and-saudi-backing-of-al-qaeda-led-to-911.html, accessed 8 May 2016; Yousaf Butt, 'How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism,' *The World Post*, 22 March 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islam-terrorism_b_6501916.html, accessed 8 May 2016.

[128] Bush, 'Address,' ibid.

[129] We return to this topic in more detail in the next section. Johnson, Chalmers, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, Macmillan, 2000; Johnson, Chalmers, 'American Militarism and Blowback: The Costs of Letting the Pentagon Dominate Foreign Policy,' *New Political Science* 24, no. 1, 2002: 21–38.

Having established that Afghanistan was an existential threat to the United States, Bush demanded the Taliban turn over Bin Laden. Still not content, he added that since 'our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them,' his war on terror 'begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there.' Bush affirmed that 'it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated'—a fact would ultimately mean that the United States would 'pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.'[130] In these comments, Bush applied convergence between existentialist threats on a grand scale, turning entire countries into rogues, while establishing a pretext for a permanent war footing. Such measures, Bush argued, were essential, as 'the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.'[131] This being the case,

> Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.[132]

In this oft-repeated comment, the imperial double standard appears alongside the False Dilemma fallacy, encapsulating terrorist conspiracy theory in a few words. It reflects deviance production in assuming the right to determine the meaning of 'terrorism' and impose it on public discourse on a global stage—invoking the victim complex by conflating criticism of US foreign policy with providing aid to terrorists in the process. With this approach, Bush took full advantage of the passions aroused by the 9/11 attacks to impose an absolutist logic on political debate, one amounting in practice to the idea that 'if you think for yourself, the terrorists win'—an approach that counts in no small part for the ideological conformity and uniformity of the mass media.

Having compared heterodoxy in world order with terrorism, Bush moved to complete his legitimating rationale. Terrorists, he alleged, 'kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life,' and so, 'with every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends'—though again this claim was belied by the fact that the attacks were a tactic to provoke the United

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130 Bush, 'Address,' ibid.
131 Bush, ibid.
132 Bush, ibid.

States into a long and costly war, sidestepping the fact that the Bush neo-conservatives were fanning terror panic at the same time. The leveraging of a conspiracy theory, however, demanded belief in the idea that 'they stand against us, because we stand in their way.'[133] Despite assiduously dodging any actual statements of policy from Bin Laden upholding the claim that he entertained expansionist goals, Bush nevertheless declared that the Islamic Mafia was given to 'pretences to piety,' to which he declared he would not be deceived.

> We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism and Nazism and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends, in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.[134]

One might describe 'they hate our freedoms' as a 'pretence to piety,' the hypocrisy indicative of the double standard regarding the issue of who benefitted from terrorism. The deeper value of these double standards evident as Bush again utilised convergence and stereotype priming to link fear of the present existential threat to past incarnation by referencing 'all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century'—all save those that had spared US elites criticism or accountability. Bush's WWII reference added a historically spurious claim, given the commonalities between neoconservative terrorist conspiracy theories, National Socialist terrorist conspiracy theories (e.g. the Reichstag Fire Decree,[135]

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[133] Bush, ibid.

[134] Bush, ibid.

[135] According to Rudolf Diels, later first Gestapo chief 'The burning of the Reichstag was intended to be the signal for a bloody uprising and civil war. Large-scale pillaging in Berlin was planned for as early as four o'clock in the morning on Tuesday. It has been determined that starting today throughout Germany acts of terrorism were to begin against prominent individuals, against private property, against the lives and safety of the peaceful population, and general civil war was to be unleashed.' For its part, the Reichstag Fire Decree reads, 'On the basis of Article 48 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the German Reich, the following is ordered in defence against Communist state-endangering acts of violence: Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are for the time being nullified. Consequently, curbs on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, of association, and of assembly, surveillance over letters, telegrams and telephone communications, searches of homes and confiscations of as well as restrictions on property, are hereby permissible beyond the limits hitherto established by law.' Fest, Joachim C., *Hitler*, New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974, 397.

and other examples[136]) and Bolshevik terrorist conspiracy theories (the infamous 'Trotsky-Zinoviev terrorist centre' from the Moscow Show Trials[137]). Each of the above abandoned 'every value except the will to power' in the name of a double standard of pacifism and a pretence to counterterrorism.

Summing up, Bush alleged that the War on Terror was 'not, however, just America's fight,' and that what was at stake was 'not just America's freedom.' It was, on the contrary, 'the world's fight,' 'civilisation's fight,' and 'the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.' Since he had already invoked a permanent victim complex as a pretext for state terrorism, however, associating opponents of US military power with terrorism defined as an article of deviance production via a double standard via the False Dilemma, this had the effect of conscripting the ideals of progress, pluralism, tolerance and freedom into the service of the terrorist conspiracy theory. Taking this logic to its logical conclusions, Bush insisted that

[136] 'The head of the IDF liaison unit in Lebanon, General Shlomo Ilya, 'said the only weapon against terrorism is terrorism and that Israel has options beyond those already used for "speaking the language the terrorists understand." The concept is not a novel one. Thus, Gestapo operations in occupied Europe also "were justified in the name of combating 'terrorism'", and one of Klaus Barbie's victims was found murdered with a note pinned to his chest reading "terror against terror." This latter is the name adopted by an Israeli terrorist group and provided the heading for the cover story in *Der Spiegel* on the US terror bombing of Libya in April 1986.' Chomsky, Noam, 'Terrorism and American Ideology,' in Said, Edward W., and Christopher Hitchens, eds., *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, London: Verso, 1988, 104.

[137] 'Seeing no favourable prospects for themselves, they resorted to the gun; they organized underground terroristic groups and made use of the most detestable method of fighting, namely terrorism … This makes it necessary to adopt special and most severe measures against them. To chain them is not enough. We must adopt more determined and radical measures against them. Not political figures, but a gang of murderers and criminals, thieves who tried to rob the state, this is what this gang represents!' People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 'Report of Court Proceedings: The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre, Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R,' Moscow 1936, via https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/law/1936/moscow-trials/index.htm, accessed 31 December 2017.

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.[138]

As if to demonstrate just how intimately freedom and justice were a part of counterterrorist doctrine, hate crimes against Muslims and people of Arab appearance spiked in the three months to the end of 2001, such that figures for the entire year exceed those for 2000 by over ten times and 2002 by around triple.[139] If any lingering doubt remained as to the broad chasm between rhetoric and actions in Bush's counterterrorism doctrine, this fact in particular reveals its function and consequences in a quite unmistakable way. Constructing a terrorist conspiracy theory involving the self-interested framing of a crisis as an expression of ultranationalist jingoism, association of terrorism with Arabs and the construction of a victim complex that avoided reflection and confused criticism with being attacked left nowhere else for passions inflamed by panic to go. The summary, hateful violence metred out against Americans of a Middle Eastern background was qualitatively no different to that shortly be metred out against the Middle East itself.[140]

The Arabs will have to go, but one needs an opportune moment for making it happen, such as a war.

—David Ben-Gurion, 1937

PERSECUTION PHASE: CRISIS LEVERAGING THROUGH SCAPEGOATING

This fourth section of the third case study examines the active leveraging by the global hegemon of all prior stages of terrorist panic for the purposes of persecuting a scapegoat—in this instance, those in the way

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[138] Bush, 'Address,' op. cit.

[139] Ser, 'Data: Hate Crimes Against Muslims Increased After 9/11,' op. cit.

[140] Poynting and Mason, 2006, op. cit.; Poynting and Mason, 2007, op. cit.; Poynting, 2009, op. cit.; Morgan and Poynting, *Global Islamophobia*, op. cit.; Welch, Michael, *Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate Crimes & State Crimes in the War on Terror*, Rutgers University Press, 2006; Oakes, Dan, 'Australian Soldiers Flew Nazi Swastika Flag from Vehicle in Afghanistan; PM Says Diggers' Actions "Absolutely Wrong",' ABC News, 14 June 2018, via http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-14/photo-shows-nazi-flag-flown-over-australian-army-vehicle/9859618, accessed 14 June 2018.

of Western imperialism and corporate power. The Persecution stage explores some of the more conspicuous instances in which Western elites cast themselves as cures to crises famed in their own interests—perpetrating international wars of aggression to which they had already committed, in reaction to various political crises in imperial control. Rather than being itself a form of conspiracy theory, this section argues that the prior stages in the development of a campaign of scapegoating driven by terrorist panic demonstrated that this was dictated by the reflexive defence of imperial world order. It contends that the scapegoating campaign instituted by Western elites through imperial state terror was generally destructive of the democratic values in whose defence they were allegedly enacted—active destruction of such arguably the purpose of terrorist panic to begin with. To that end this section argues that these episodes were typical of panic-driven scapegoating in functioning to neutralise perceived threats to imperial world order dominated by an axis lead by the United States, enabled through a terrorist conspiracy theory revolving around a plot against alleged democracy in the West.

4a. Terror Scare I. As if to comment unintentionally on its own success to that point in deterring 'terrorist' acts, Israel invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982, on the pretext of securing their northern borders against 'terrorism.' It sent an army twice the size of the one that had defeated Egypt in 1973, six and a half divisions of up to 90,000 men, against 10–15,000 guerrillas.[141] In line with the Jonathan Institute-sponsored terrorist conspiracy theory, Israel construed a legitimating pretext in terms of cross-border raids by the PLO from Lebanon's southernmost regions, despite their own 'scorched earth' policy in that area—one that had killed ten times the Palestinians and Lebanese up to 1975 as Israelis killed by Palestinians up to 1982. This gross imbalance is indicative of the conspiratorial tenor attached to Palestinian activity in southern Lebanon, as is the question of why Palestinians were there to begin with; as Chomsky scathingly observes, 'they did not move there because they liked the scenery.'[142]

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[141] Hirst, David, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East*, Nation Books, 2011, Chapter 6, 'Its Greatest Folly: The Israeli Army Enters the Morass of Lebanon'; Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, op. cit., 70.

[142] Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, op. cit., 188–191; Morris, Benny, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 505–517.

Such questions were off the agenda and remain so. Operating outside of history, the 1982 invasion set both precedent and tenor for Reaganite counterterrorism, and ultimately the War on Terror. The Mobilisation stage began in this case as the Israeli ambassador to the UK, Shlomo Argov, was shot and seriously wounded in London on 3 June, three days prior to the invasion. Israel represented terrorism as the domain of the weak, defining the parameters of the crisis defined on a double standard favourable to the violence of the strong, before moving to the Targeting stage by treating the attempt on Argov as proof of an existential terrorist threat necessitating invasion, creating a suitable target by blaming the PLO prior to the facts.

As the UK press and its own intelligence analysts recognised at the time, however, the attempt on Argov had been made by Yassir Arafat's 'arch enemy' Abu Nidal, leader of a breakaway faction with whom the PLO had had a 'running battle' for the decade prior—its eponymous leader the subject of a death sentence by a PLO court for what Hirst calls a 'brand of pure, unbridled terrorism' directed so much more against the moderate PLO leadership than the Israeli enemy.[143] To acknowledge any distinction between the PLO and Abu Nidal, however, was to undermine the production of deviance, the tendency to conflate criticism with an attack, and the guiding assumption that disparate groups were united in trying to destroy Israel even (or, better yet, especially) when they were trying to kill each other, a logic indicative of the False Dilemma. While no distinction of any kind could reportedly be drawn between the PLO and Abu Nadal, neither could they have any other reason to exist other than to attack Israel, the self-serving nature of the manifest circular reasoning of crucial importance to the terrorist conspiracy theory—the effect of which was to produce a self-fulfilling prophecy born of the victim complex during of the Legitimation phase.

It followed then that the PLO was doing as a matter of terrorist conspiracy theory what Israel was doing in fact. Suppressing the differences between two groups also avoided distinctions between criticism and attack, a vital device for the Israelis to avoid accountability for their own role in perpetrating hostilities. In the Legitimation phase, the terrorist bogeyman invoked by Israel became the pretext for asserting

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[143]Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, op. cit., 196–197; Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit., 76–77.

its perpetual victim status once more, and, on that basis, to rational-
ise terror against Palestinians in southern Lebanon in defence of its
monopoly over the means of terror—this unique innovation reflect-
ing Schumpeter's observation that 'every war is carefully justified as
a defensive war by the government involved, and by all the political
parties, in their official utterances.'[144] As if to demonstrate, when the
Israeli cabinet met on 4 June, Begin alleged in discussing the coming
invasion that 'The alternative to this is Treblinka.'[145]

Having established that the only other option to military aggression
against a neighbour was a second Holocaust, Begin interrupted head of
the General Security Services Avraham Shalom, who had been trying to
explain the differences between the PLO and Abu Nadal, to announce
that 'they're all PLO,' in so doing confirming the False Dilemma.
Recognising the opportunity, Chief of Staff Eitan recommended the
Israeli Air Force be sent to bomb the 'terrorist organisations' in Beirut,
despite knowledge of an IDF memorandum prepared weeks earlier (the
'Saguy report') acknowledging that attacking the base of PLO opera-
tions would provoke retaliation, with inevitable civilian casualties on its
own side.[146] Israel proceeded with the bombardment the following day
anyway, killing more than 60 and provoking the anticipated response,
which killed one Israeli and wounded 15.[147] Now enabled with perpetual

[144] Schumpeter, Joseph, *Imperialism and Social Classes: Two Essays*, Ludwig von Mises
Institute, 1955, 71.

[145] Naor, Arye, *Government at War: The Government's Functioning in the Lebanon
War* [Hebrew], Tel Aviv; 1986, 47, cited in Zertal, Idith, and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the
Land: The War Over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–2007*, Hachette
UK, 2009, Chapter 2, 'Bad Faith.' Cf. Reuven Rivlin: 'Rivlin took issue with his idol
Menachem Begin's justification for the 1982 war in Lebanon, which was to "prevent
another Treblinka." He said that such an approach consigns the justification for Israel's
very existence to preventing another Holocaust. He described the approach as "danger-
ous," one in which "every threat is existential, and every enemy is Hitler." He decried
the division of the world to either "righteous gentiles or anti-Semitic Nazis," a separa-
tion that transforms any criticism against Israel to an expression of anti-Semitism. Instead,
Rivlin offered what he described as "a third way" that combines the Israeli vow of never
again, accentuates Jewish solidarity throughout the world and adopts the Jewish value
of respecting all men and women, regardless of their religion or race.' Shalev, Chemi,
'Rivlin Uses Holocaust Day to Challenge Netanyahu's Darkness and Despair,' *Haaretz*,
25 April 2017, via https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.785389, accessed
12 January 2018.

[146] Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, op. cit., 75.

[147] Toaldo, ibid.

pretext for violence as per Schumpeter's observations, Israel declared the Habib ceasefire that had been in effect for over eight months since its last attacks on Beirut, its prior attempts to provoke a reaction that could be used as a pretext for invasion, 'null and void'; in taking the opportunity to initiate what one historian called 'its greatest folly,' Israel also completed the process of making itself cause and cure of the same problem.[148] The invasion killed 20,000 mostly Lebanese civilians, including the massacre of several thousand unarmed Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by right-wing Lebanese militia—a crime against humanity perpetrated in the name of preventing them.

Plans for the military action were years in place prior, a fact reflecting Israeli designs on its northern borders—as did another plan Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon developed that went far beyond the maximum goals for the invasion, involving the reconstitution of Lebanon as a Zionist-friendly Christian state, and the expulsion of the remaining Palestinians to Jordan.[149] As a form of ethnic cleansing, the Sharon Plan reflected comments made by Zionist luminary David Ben-Gurion to the effect that 'The Arabs will have to go, but one needs an opportune moment for making it happen, such as a war.' Having been made in 1937, in the days mass ethnic cleansing under cover of war acquired something of a PR problem, such comments tend not to be broadly disseminated, but show nevertheless unmistakable evidence of a desire to engage in crisis leveraging and scapegoating.[150] In the name of fulfilling Ben-Gurion's vision of an ethnically cleansed Zionist state, Sharon, variously regarded within Israel as 'a war looking for a place to happen' and 'reckless, duplicitous [and] untrustworthy,' had no sooner extended the 'security zone'—established after Israel's previous invasion of Lebanon in 1979 to protect it from Palestinian retribution—than he went gunning for Beirut.[151]

Sharon was able to do so as a result of the conclusion by Israel of a historical separate peace with Egypt immediately prior to the invasion,

[148] Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, op. cit., Chapter 6, 'Its Greatest Folly: The Israeli Army Enters the Morass of Lebanon.'

[149] Hirst, ibid., Chapter 6, 'Sharon Plots the "How" and "When"'; Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, op. cit., 75.

[150] Pappe, Ilan, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Oneworld Publications, 2007. FIX.

[151] Hirst, *Beware of Small States*, Chapter 6, 'Morass of Lebanon,' op. cit.

which in taking Egypt out of the Arab–Israeli conflict altogether had freed the latter from the need to engage militarily in the south and focus on its enemies to the north. Exceeding the minimum goals of the invasion, defined in terms proportionate to the purported pretext for carrying it out in the first place, reflected his desire to wipe out the PLO in line with the geopolitical engineering of the Sharon Plan, expel the Syrian army and install Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Phalange, as Lebanese president.[152] The Phalangist massacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and the assassination of Gemayel soon after his election soon however rendered the Israeli position untenable. For his part, wanting to stand firm against pressure coming from the Europeans and Arabs to encourage a quick withdrawal by Israel, Reagan sought a 'strong commitment' from Prime Minister Begin for a breakthrough in negotiations, to which the latter responded with a story about having, three days prior, found and dismantled a 'huge Soviet base' near Sidon that he alleged was 'the headquarters of an international terror organisation'—perhaps the League of Terror to which Schultz had referred. 'There is no doubt' he boomed,

> That far more than simply arming the PLO, the Soviets had made Lebanon the centre of Soviet activity in the Middle East … based on documents they had captured, it was clear that a terror network sponsored by the Soviets and involving Hungary, Bulgaria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Pakistan, India, the People's Republic of China, East Germany and Austria were all involved in assisting the PLO.[153]

Comparable examples of blatant scaremongering on a geopolitical scale are relatively rare. When Reagan asked to see the relevant documents, he did not reply, though the same unsupported claims, which had originated in the Jonathan Institute conferences, had also appeared in Sterling's *The Terror Network*.[154] Invoking terrorist conspiracy theory however proved as good as empirical standards, and the arms continued to flow.

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[152] 'It was an open secret in Beirut, Washington, and elsewhere in the spring of 1982 that Israel would invade, and the only surprise was exactly when.' Khalidi, Rashid, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East*, Beacon Press, 2009, 146.

[153] Quoted in Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, op. cit., 82.

[154] Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, ibid.

Reagan responded to continuing violence in Lebanon by forming a first, and then a second, Multinational Force (MNF), in theory to establish a third-party presence that would help the PLO withdraw from Beirut, forestalling any further hostilities. In practice, however, the process was far less tidy. The second US contingent of 1983 found itself drawn into hostilities on the side of its local client state, drawing the ire of their antagonists, several of whom bombed the US embassy in Beirut on 18 April, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans. Later in the year, a much larger truck bomb targeted US marine barracks at the Beirut airport on 23 October, killing 241 US soldiers.[155] Still struggling with the legacy of Vietnam and the unwillingness of the American public to get caught up in overseas entanglements, Reagan was forced into an embarrassing withdrawal in February 1984, though the moment was more useful for Secretary of State Schultz, who exploited the opportunity to establish a platform for his new doctrine of pre-emption against the alleged state sponsors.[156]

While Schultz might have felt confident enough in his claim that, 'experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it,' history prior and since demonstrates otherwise. Not two years hence, US bombings of Libya precipitated, amongst other things, the bombing of La Belle discotheque in West Germany on 5 April 1986, an act that killed two and wounded 155, a third of the US servicemen.[157] 17 years later the failure of 'swift and sure measures' would be complete, though of course this would not prevent the doctrine from being taken up anew and allowing the United States to set itself up for new failures, just as Israel had done in Lebanon, using much the same rationale.

4b. Terror Scare II. A 1985 *Time* article by neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer named the Reagan Doctrine and declared it to involve 'overt and unashamed support for anti-communist revolution… declaring equally worthy all armed resistance to communism, whether

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[155]Toaldo, 'The Reagan Administration and the Origins of the War on Terror,' ibid., 5–6.

[156]See footnote 123; Toaldo, *The Origins of the US War on Terror*, op. cit., 64.

[157]Toaldo, ibid., 140.

foreign or indigenously imposed.'[158] Reagan Doctrine substituted 'roll-back' of the communist hobgoblin for Truman's 'containment'—hardly unfamiliar territory for US imperialists, who had been subverting disobedient governments in the name of anti-communism since the 1950s.[159]

While the counter-insurgency programmes enacted throughout this period had tended to conjure up the insurgencies meant to have justified the terror against them in the first place, through means indistinguishable from all they claimed to oppose, the process took on new zeal initially with the rise of Reagan, and then in the aftermath of Lebanon. As one RAND analyst put it, Reaganite zeal was the result of 'the horrible lesson of the 1980s'—namely, that 'terrorism works,' and that in order to best their Communist rivals they had to adopt 'their tactics, style and zeal.'[160] The projection of evil designs onto an enemy and adoption of 'their' methods again reflected the characteristic feature of deviance production in producing a problem to style oneself the solution to; the insistence that one had to adopt their tactics, style and zeal was merely a way of disguising the fact that said tactics, style and zeal had already been decided on before an enemy could be found to excuse their usage.

In the convergence of enemy hobgoblins, the Ancient Fantasy, via the Paranoid Style, lived on. Reagan made anti-communist rollback a *cause célèbre*, using it to mobilise his evangelical base. Following the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua, he declared in his 1985 State of the Union address that

> We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression … Support for freedom fighters is self-defence and totally consistent with the OAS and UN Charters …[161]

The State of the Union address was an ideal launching pad for a renewed Mobilisation phase, where the interests of US-based transnational corporations were identified with the interests of civilisation; on the basis of this logic, Nicaraguans defending themselves from imperialist terror

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[158] Lagon, Mark P., *The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter*, Praeger, 1994, 2; Grandin, Greg, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, Metropolitan Books, 2006, 83–99.

[159] See Pt. II.

[160] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*, op. cit., 105–111.

[161] Grandin, ibid., 119.

designed to pacify subject populations, so that they might be better exploited by US-based corporations, were cast as Soviet-sponsored terrorists. Knowing the Horrible Lesson, being associated with the power structure that taught it, Reagan formed the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean to modify understanding of the existential threat amongst his base to include 'terrorism,' in the sense of the politicisation of expertise under counterterrorism.[162] Conflating the class interests of their corporate backers with the popular interest throughout the western hemisphere as per the Mobilisation phase, and then couching them in the language of political liberalism, the Reaganites found, had for some inexplicable reason not proved an effective strategy for winning the hearts and minds of average Nicaraguans.

They tended then to rely on terror, such that one advisor to the Joint Chiefs could soon comment that the Contras were 'the strangest national liberation organisation in the world … just a bunch of killers.' By 1985, the killers had executed 4000 of their own countrymen, wounded an equal number and kidnapped around 5000, committing 'damnable atrocities' and 'hundreds of civilian murders, mutilations, tortures and rapes,' according to confessions from their own leaders, of which their 'CIA superiors were well aware.'[163] Mobilisation would be reserved then for domestic use. Reaganites had learnt to dodge more law-abiding and less violent colleagues in the State Department, and to disregard multilateral institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC). In Central America, they had learnt to dodge congressional oversight by, in the words of Grandin, 'creating a semiprivate, international network to carry out a clandestine foreign policy and to undermine post-Vietnam efforts to limit the use of military power for other than clearly defined, limited objectives.'[164]

[162] Grandin, ibid., 121–134.

[163] Grandin, ibid., 115.

[164] 'And it was there that the New Right, now in power, began to instil a culture of loyalty to the cause and incuriosity about the world: "To raise a question was to be a negative thinker," complained CIA agent Nestor Sanchez of the administration's fixation on Central America.' Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*, op. cit., 118–119; cf. 'No one wants to tell the emperor about his new clothes or lack thereof. The non-technical managerial class in Canberra would have assured the minister that all would be well rather than accept any blame for floating the idea that a data-matching system could be used in this indiscriminate and unverified way. It is literally blame aversion; it is not risk aversion', according to Paul Shetler, who was handpicked by Malcolm Turnbull to head the government's

As a force for domestic mobilisation, the victim complex of the Legitimation phase was overt. An evangelical backer of Reagan's terrorist operations in Central America wrote that 'for the Christian, there can be no neutrality in this battle: He that is not with Me is against Me (Matthew 12:30).'[165] Reagan's Office of Public Diplomacy also equated the Sandinistas with the Nazis, freely conflating opposition with being attacked, a mentality that also saw them accusing the Sandinistas of ties with the PLO, Libya, and terrorists. Modelling the Paranoid Style for his propaganda office, in a 1985 speech Reagan himself envisaged a Sandinista conspiracy also involving 'Arafat, Gadhafi, and the Ayatollah Khomeini'—a busy lot indeed. On this basis, Grandin concludes that, 'the road to Iraq passes through Latin America, starting first with Chile.'[166]

Communist Terrorist Conspiracy Moves from Chile to Afghanistan

In reacting against this all-pervasive and ever-industrious communist terrorist conspiracy, it was a short step for the Reaganite neoconservatives from creating a semiprivate, international network to carry out a clandestine foreign policy to assisting Mujahideen resistance fighters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The initial phases of the Oldest Trick in the Book were eminently portable. As widely documented since, these anti-Soviet forces came to include numerous foreign Islamist fighters, subsequent recipients of CIA funding and training later used to devastating effect on 9/11.[167] Reflecting the cavalier attitude behind these developments, during a 1998 interview, former National Security Adviser

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digital-transformation drive and was former digital-transformation office head. Shetler went on to say, 'The justifications…are just another example of the culture of "good news", reporting only good news up through the bureaucracy. That's how it works in the bureaucracy. Bad news is not welcomed, and when bad news comes, they try to shift the blame.' Gerard McPhee, 'Centrelink's Data-Matching Fiasco: A Very Predictable Disaster,' *Arena Magazine*, Issue #146, February 2017, via http://arena.org.au/centrelinks-data-matching-fiasco-by-gerard-mcphee, accessed 21 February 2017.

[165] Grandin, ibid., 125–128. See also Pt. I.

[166] 'Grandin, ibid., 154–155, 163–175.

[167] For example, Johnson, *Blowback*, op. cit.; Coll, *Ghost Wars*, op. cit.; Wright, *The Looming Tower*, op. cit.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was asked if he regretted 'having supported Islamic fundamentalism' and 'given arms and advice to future terrorists.' He responded:

> What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?[168]

The same lack of regard for consequences would, in time, define the war against the stirred-up Moslems as it had the conditions that created them. In launching that war, however, the nature of the stirred-up Moslems became subject to significant distortion, effects of the Mobilisation, Targeting and Legitimation phases of Terror Panic. Alleged mastermind of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden was in reality a wealthy Saudi Arabian supporter of the Afghan cause, a role that inevitably made him a focal point for Islamist organising in general.[169] Burke demonstrates this crucial nuance in distinguishing between the Islamist networks focused on Bin Laden as the primary funding source for many of the international Islamist fighters travelling to Afghanistan to join the battle against the Soviets, and the mythological 'Al-Qaeda' as a terrorist international, created and lead by a brown-skinned Dr Evil spreading his malevolent tentacles across the earth from a hi-tech lair somewhere in the Tora Bora mountains. The deviance production of the Targeting phase amplified the one into the other, the resulting hobgoblin slotting in deftly enough with the cultural priming of anyone who had seen way too many Bond films.

Al-Qaeda

As Burke reveals, the mythology of Al-Qaeda is disproven by the general lack of a historical record of anything referring to it prior to 2000; indeed, one feature on Bin Laden by Robert Fisk appearing in *The Independent* in 1993 describes Bin Laden putting 'Al-Qaeda,' who had

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[168] Gibbs, David, 'Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect,' *International Politics* 37, no. 2, 2000: 241–242.

[169] Burke, Jason, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, IB Tauris, 2004, Chapter 1, 'What Is Al-Qaeda?' 7–22.

laid down their weapons no less, to work on building projects in North Africa![170] Moreover, the by-line of this article accurately shows Bin Laden's role towards the Mujahadeen as a kind of HR specialist—a significant variation from the unreconstructed 1960s Bond villain of corporate media propaganda. Burke notes a 1996 report that mentions the idea once, ambiguously, as a function or strategy rather than an entity.[171] The mythical notion of 'Al-Qaeda' as an international terrorist conspiracy first appeared in 2001, during the trials of those charged with the 1998 African embassy bombings, when the prosecution represented Bin Laden as the mastermind of an international terrorist network known as 'Al-Qaeda' so that the prosecution could make use of US conspiracy laws. Doing so meant they could prosecute the leader *in absentia* if it could be proven that an organisation was behind the bombings. It did not matter if the leader was not directly implicated.[172]

In practice, this meant treating 'Al-Qaeda,' the name of a strategy, as an entity that could be fought and defeated—an approach tantamount to treating disparate Trotskyist factions around the world as a monolithic organisation called 'The Vanguard,' and portraying it as a global conspiracy on the cusp of establishing a Bolshevik police state—conflation of object and relation in treating terrorism as a thing conquerable through conventional warfare characteristic of deviance production during the Targeting phase.[173] Using these legalistic stretches, Bin Laden's sponsorship of Islamist fighters for the Afghan-Soviet War and the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa were retrospectively reframed as acts of a terrorist international, a propaganda victory achieved post-9/11 to suit the

[170] Fisk, Robert, 'Anti-Soviet Warrior Puts His Army on the Road to Peace: The Saudi Businessman Who Recruited Mujahedin Now Uses Them for Large-Scale Building Projects in Sudan,' *The Independent*, 6 December 1993, via http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/anti-soviet-warrior-puts-his-army-on-the-road-to-peace-the-saudi-businessman-who-recruited-mujahedin-1465715.html, accessed 29 January 2018.

[171] Burke, *Al-Qaeda*, op. cit., 10.

[172] Burke, ibid., 11; Curtis, Adam, dir., *The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear*, London: BBC, 2004, Pt. 3, 'The Shadows in the Cave,' event starts at 7.22–12.42.

[173] See Chapter I, Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis*, op. cit.; see also Simon, Jonathan, *Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear*, Oxford University Press, 2007.

terrorist conspiracy theory neoconservatives had been promoting since the early 1980s. Even if nothing else had proved the lie of terror panic, its opportunistic exploitation in this manner certainly did.

Paradoxically enough, the New York prosecutions for the 1998 bombings had secured an indictment for Osama Bin Laden, later summarily assassinated having been found living in Pakistan following an invasion costing USD$3 trillion; Risen notes that by the time of 9/11, the New York FBI office and the US District Attorney for the Southern District of New York had, in the process of doing so, become the leading government expert on the networks organised around Bin Laden.[174] For his part, Bin Laden was perfectly happy to adopt the Al-Qaeda brand once established through the dedicated efforts of the corporate news media, whose ideological conformity and commitment to the manufacture of consent through global moral panic made them crucial enablers on all sides. Bin Laden's notoriety afforded him ample opportunities to spite the West, and proof of his ability to get under the skin of the global hegemon for those he sought to recruit. Succeeding in spectacular fashion with the critical support of the greatest free PR campaign in history, it was not long before Al-Qaeda-type organisations emerged across the Middle East—not least of which was Al-Qaeda in Iraq, a group that did not exist prior to the US invasion and which, with time and material support from the United States, eventually mutated into Islamic State.[175]

While post-9/11 commentary speaks of Al-Qaeda prior to 9/11, no commentary produced prior to 2000 does because, for all its other faults, the western ideological system (as yet) lacks the facilities to falsify the historical record in the manner of Winston Smith slaving away at the Ministry of Truth. In his extensive review of the academic literature on terrorism studies, Magnus Ranstorp finds that

[174] Risen, *Pay Any Price*, op. cit., 76.

[175] Castner, Brian, 'Tracing ISIS' Weapons Supply Chain—Back to the United States,' *Wired*, 12 December 2017, via https://www.wired.com/story/terror-industrial-complex-isis-munitions-supply-chain, accessed 29 January 2018; Hellmich, Christina, *Al-Qaeda: From Global Network to Local Franchise*, Zed Books, 2012, Chapter 1, 'The Search for Answers,' 1–20.

> Only six articles were published on aspects relating to terrorism prior to the 1960s in the period 2000–7, which illustrates the tendency of terrorism studies 'towards a-historicity, presuming that "terrorism" began on 11 September 2001 and ignoring the historical experiences of numerous countries and the already burgeoning literature on "terrorism" published prior to 2001.'[176]

Ranstorp notes that it took two to three years for academics in terrorism research to begin publishing in earnest on Al-Qaeda in the two core terrorism studies journals, demonstrating the difficulties associated with developing appropriate framing of the issues and sourcing meaningful data.

> By contrast, in 2007 alone, almost half of all articles (thirty-nine of eighty) were devoted to al-Qaeda or a 9/11-related topic such as martyrdom, suicide bombings, or Muslim extremism. In fact, some have argued that the research agenda has disproportionately inflated the focus on certain topics such as al-Qaeda, suicide-bombing, and the threat of WMD … terrorism. And yet, few studies exist on the polymorphous nature of al-Qaeda that capture the way different layers are structured and connected to each other and the way the regional and local affiliations interact with core al-Qaeda elements and to different conflict zones.[177]

In effect, he concludes, 'Al-Qaeda means simultaneously everything and nothing—a catch-all phrase for trying to describe complexity and anything unknown.'[178] 'Bin Laden has been precise in telling America the reasons he is waging war on us,' points out Michael Scheuer, the senior CIA analyst responsible for tracking bin Laden from 1996 to 1999. 'US forces and policies are completing the radicalization of the Islamic world, something Osama bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial but incomplete success since the early 1990s …. As a result, I think it is fair to conclude that the United States remains bin Laden's only indispensable ally.'[179] Continuing difficulties with grasping the 'polymorphous nature

[176] Ranstorp, Magnus, 'Mapping Terrorism Studies After 9/11,' in Jackson, Richard, Marie Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds., *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, Routledge, 2009, 23.

[177] Ranstorp, ibid.

[178] Ranstorp, ibid.

[179] Krishna, Sankaran, *Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-First Century*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, 151.

of Al-Qaeda,' either as a continuing geopolitical problem or as a historical phenomenon, stem in the main from its origins as an imaginary hobgoblin. For its part, the significantly more tangible threat of Islamic State carries with it additional ideological difficulties in not having existed prior to the 2003 Iraq Invasion, and in its value to the United States as an asset against its regional enemies.[180]

> The question of peace is non-existent. [Israel] must calculate its steps narrow-mindedly and live by the sword … Towards this end it may—no, it must—invent non-existent dangers, and to do this it must adopt the method of provocation-and-retaliation. And above all - let us hope for a new war with the Arab countries, so that we may finally acquire our space.
>
> —Moshe Sharett[181]

> Only a crisis, actual or perceived, produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function; to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.
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> —Milton Friedman[182]

[180] Hoff, Brad, '2012 Defence Intelligence Agency document: West Will Facilitate Rise of Islamic State "In Order to Isolate the Syrian Regime",' *Levant Report*, 19 May 2015, via https://levantreport.com/2015/05/19/2012-defense-intelligence-agency-document-west-will-facilitate-rise-of-islamic-state-in-order-to-isolate-the-syrian-regime, accessed 22 February 2018; Hasan, Mehdi, 'Confronting the Consequences of Obama's Foreign Policy,' *The Intercept*, 22 June 2018, via https://theintercept.com/2018/06/22/is-it-time-to-reckon-with-obamas-foreign-policy-legacy/, accessed 28 June 2018; Durden, Tyler, 'Ben Rhodes Admits Obama Armed Jihadists in Syria in Bombshell Interview,' *Zero Hedge*, 24 June 2018, via https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-06-24/ben-rhodes-admits-obama-armed-jihadists-syria-bombshell-interview, accessed 26 June 2018; Cockburn, Patrick, *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*, Verso, 2015; Anderson, Tim, *The Dirty War on Syria: Washington, Regime Change and Resistance*, Global Research, 2016.

[181] Rokach, Livia, 'Israeli State Terrorism: An Analysis of the Sharett Diaries,' *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9, no. 3, 1980: 20–21.

[182] Klein, Naomi, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, Penguin, 2007, 6.

Restoration Phase: The Beneficiaries of Moral Panic Collect

This fifth section of the third case study examines the question of who benefitted from terrorist panic. At the Restoration stage, fixes impermissible under circumstances not dominated by moral panic over existential terrorist threats, in being destructive of the democratic values invoked as justification for them, became possible. This final section argues that panic-driven scapegoating, constructed atop a crisis framed by conflating the vested interests of transnational corporate elites with the interests of the whole world, serviced those vested interests in the name of universal democratic values. It explores the political fixes, impermissible under regular circumstances, applied on that basis, focusing on US interference in Central and Latin American affairs, support for Israeli aggression in the occupied territories, and US military aggression in the Middle East. This section argues that the scapegoating of those demonised by terrorist conspiracy theory, Arabs and Muslims, amounted in practical terms to imperialist state terror. It contends on this basis that terrorist panic facilitated what amounted to permanent global war, constructed atop a crisis framed by conflation of the vested interests of industrial elites with the moral good, and generally destructive of universal democratic values in the name of upholding them.

Die for Oil, Sucker

Where terror panic is concerned, the question of *Cui bono* presents a danger of oversimplification. Before, during and after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, many critics of US foreign policy responded in much the same manner as performer Jello Biafra, who, in satirising the 1991 Gulf War, had invited Americans to 'Die for Oil, Sucker.'[183] Major shortcomings in official pretexts included a general lack of evidence for WMDs, notable difficulties of developing any under a decade of UN sanctions, cross-purposes of fundamentalist Bin Laden and secular Saddam, and the Saudi origin of most of the 9/11 hijackers. To many it was patently obvious that ulterior motives were behind the US attacking the wrong enemy, much as Israel did in 1982—criticisms later confirmed by the

[183] Biafra, Jello, *Die for Oil, Sucker*, San Francisco: Alternative Tentacles Records, 1991.

disaster capitalist looting of Iraq's oil by US corporations, and by Alan Greenspan, who wrote in his memoirs that, 'I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil.'[184] While the desire of US elites to control what remains of the finite global oil supply might account for US intervention in Iraq to the extent that it serves as shorthand for 'control' or 'service of self-interest,' in this sense it performs poorly, doing less to create understanding than breed cynicism. It is rarely used in the far more accurate sense as a synonym for 'hegemony,' far closer to what the continued US push for control of global oil represents in fact.

Hegemony in this sense refers to the military and economic dominance in which the United States found itself after the end of the Second World War, the only combatant to see out the war with its industrial base unscathed; it also has an ideological element, a state in which 'one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour.'[185] As the legacy of its foreign policy attests, the United States has worked prodigiously in the seven decades since to maintain this position, extending its imperial reach across the globe in the name of combating a communist plot, using moral panic in this way to impose

[184] Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, op. cit., Part 4 'Iraq, Full Circle'; Beaumont, Peter, and Joanna Walters, 'Greenspan Admits Iraq Was About Oil, as Deaths Put at 1.2m,' *The Guardian*, 16 September 2007, via https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/16/iraq.iraqtimeline, accessed 7 February 2018; Juhasz, Antonia, 'Why the War in Iraq Was Fought for Big Oil,' *CNN*, 15 April 2013, via https://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html, accessed 7 February 2018; Robinson, Jerry, *Bankruptcy of Our Nation (Revised and Expanded): Your Financial Survival Guide*, New Leaf Publishing Group, 2012, Chapter 5, 'Or … Is It About the Oil?'; Cochran, John, 'WH Pushes Back at Greenspan: Oil Claim Is "Georgetown Cocktail Party Analysis,"' *Huffington Post*, 28 March 2008, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2007/09/16/wh-pushes-back-at-greensp_n_64624.html, accessed 7 February 2018; *Washington's Blog*, 'Newly-Released Memo by Donald Rumsfeld Proves Iraq War Started on False Pretences,' 20 February 2013, via http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/02/newly-released-memos-of-donald-rumsfeld-prove-knowing-iraq-war.html, accessed 8 February 2018; Muttitt, Greg, *Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq*, Random House, 2011.

[185] Quoted in Cypher, James M., 'From Military Keynesianism to Global-Neoliberal Militarism,' *Monthly Review*, 1 June 2007, via https://monthlyreview.org/2007/06/01/from-military-keynesianism-to-global-neoliberal-militarism/, accessed 21 February 2018; Femia, Joseph V., *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process*, Clarendon Press, 1987.

'one dominant concept of reality.'[186] The fracturing of this one dominant concept of reality by concerted popular resistance to the Vietnam War resulted in the dreaded Vietnam Syndrome, long a thorn in the side of US elites.[187]

Problematically for the United States, even more so for those in its way, is that its post-war hegemony is in long decline, presenting further difficulties for the 'one dominant concept of reality.'[188] This long decline traces back to the economic recovery of Germany and Japan, the former helped by Marshall Aid—both of whom then became competitors with US manufacturing for global markets. Their recovery was likewise aided by the establishment of the Bretton Woods system of global exchange at a meeting of representatives of 44 nations at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944, where the Allies established a measure of stability for post-war capitalism by linking the US dollar to gold at $35 an ounce and then pegging foreign currencies to the dollar. In making the dollar the global reserve currency, the Bretton Woods agreement set a basis for stable international trade; foreign dollar reserves could be held in confidence, being 'as good as gold.'[189]

By the late 1960s, economic dampeners in the form of a slowing rate of profit in primary industries like manufacturing due to increased competition and rising inflation (problems foreshadowing its offshoring in subsequent decades and concomitant gouging of the real economy) were compounded by massive deficit spending on the Vietnam War and LBJ's Great Society programmes, high inflation resulting from the reliance of US representatives on printing money to service the growing deficit, and rising unemployment.[190] The penchant of the United States for living high on the hog while exporting its deficits through printing more of the global reserve currency, weakening its value through inflation, increasingly undermined confidence in Bretton Woods—the viability of which had, from the outset, been predicated on US economic dominance, whose manufacturing output constituted a full half of the global total

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[186]See Case Study II.

[187]Cypher, 'From Military Keynesianism to Global-Neoliberal Militarism,' op. cit.

[188]Chomsky, Noam, *Who Rules the World?* Metropolitan Books, 2016, Chapter 5, 'American Decline: Causes and Consequences.'

[189]Robinson, *Bankruptcy of Our Nation*, op. cit., 58.

[190]Custers, Peter, 'Military Keynesianism Today: An Innovative Discourse,' *Race & Class* 51, no. 4, 2010: 89.

at the end of WWII.[191] The willingness of the United States to abuse its 'exorbitant privilege' and operate on increasing deficits as it pursued imperialist expansion and runaway consumerism, however, proved too much for Bretton Woods signatories like France and the UK, leading eventually to a rush on the gold stockpiles in the US (the ability to draw on them was an escape route for countries wanting to exit the system and sit on the international sidelines). As a result, the system collapsed within a quarter of a century, setting the stage for hegemonic crisis.[192]

1973 Oil Crisis and the Nixon Shock

With the collapse of Bretton Woods as the staging ground, two decisive crises in post-war US hegemony arrived in the early 1970s, both of which would add motivation for future military intervention in the Middle East and the need for a scapegoat to blame for such aggression. One was the 1973 Oil Crisis, the result of an OPEC oil embargo on countries that had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War of the same year. Principal targets were the United States, the Netherlands (as European gateway), Canada, Japan and the UK. When the embargo was lifted, following monthly cuts to the production of 5%, oil prices had raised 400%, plunging the third world into debt to the tune of $35 billion and making it easy prey for the IMF structural adjustment policies detailed by Naomi Klein in *The Shock Doctrine*. The resulting global debt crisis amplified even more the woes of the third world as the Federal Reserve raised US interest rates to record highs in 1979 in a bid to revive the flailing dollar.[193] As Klein reveals, leveraging of this debt crisis was stock in trade of the neoliberal corporate supremacism at the International Monetary Fund, inspired in the main by Milton Friedman, for whom opportunism was a defining facet of his libertarianism:

[191] McNally, David, *Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance*, PM Press, 2011, 89.

[192] Sklar, Holly, ed., *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, South End Press, 1980, 64–65, 'The Disintegration of the International Economic "System"'; Eichengreen, Barry, *Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System*, Oxford University Press, 2011.

[193] Clark, William R., *Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq and the Future of the Dollar*, Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 2005, 22; Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, op. cit.

Only a crisis, actual or perceived, produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function; to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.[194]

This statement is extremely significant insofar as it reflects the conscious use of crisis leveraging by western elites as a means of exerting control over and exploiting other nations; its influence reflects the will to do so amongst corporate elites and their 'fully owned subsidiaries' in office to engage in deception.[195] The initial crisis through which Friedman's Chicago School neoliberals made their impossible policies inevitable arose out of the CIA-sponsored Chilean coup on 11 September 1973, perpetrated in the name of defending the free world from communist conspiracy. The resulting 'sub-fascist' police state, which oversaw a reign of terror based on the practice of 'disappearing' its enemies with US support, provided an ideal crucible for the implementation of market supremacist doctrines, police state terror providing all the protection from other people's freedom for which any aspiring neoliberal could hope.[196]

The other decisive moment was Nixon's unilateral abolition of the gold standard in 1971. The 'Nixon Shock,' as it came to be known, rendered the US dollar a fiat currency, one lacking any relation to anything of tangible value in the real world, which was then floated on

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[194] Quoted in Klein, ibid., 6.

[195] Giroux, Henry A., *Terror of Neoliberalism: Authoritarianism and the Eclipse of Democracy*, Routledge, 2018; Lofgren, *Deep State*, op. cit.; Wolin, *Democracy Incorporated*, op. cit.

[196] Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, op. cit., Chapter 2, 'The Other Doctor Shock: Milton Friedman and the Search for a Laissez-Faire Laboratory,' 49–71, and Chapter 3, 'States of Shock: The Bloody Birth of the Counterrevolution,' 75–97; Boldeman, Lee, *The Cult of the Market: Economic Fundamentalism and Its Discontents*, ANU Press, 2013; Harvey, David, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, USA: Oxford University Press, 2007; Kelsey, Jane, *Economic Fundamentalism*, Pluto Press, 1996.

international exchange rates.[197] When the US economy failed to recover, in 1973 Nixon offered military protection and arms to the Saudis, desirous of defence against Israel, in return for (1) financing of US debt by purchasing of US government bonds with surplus oil revenues (the 'petrodollar') and (2) making oil sales exclusively in US dollars.[198] With this interventionist 'dollars for oil' (or 'Weapondollar-Petrodollar') *quid pro quo* with OPEC, Nixon effectively re-established 'exorbitant privilege.'[199] Replacing demand for dollars formerly tied to gold under Bretton Woods to dollars tied to oil ('black gold') through the 'US–Saudi Arabian Joint Commission On Economic Cooperation' meant that the United States, as custodian of the global reserve currency, could again export its debt by selling government bonds.[200] As long as global demand for dollars was strong, the United States could throw restraint to the wind and let the rest of the world pay for the consequences. Amidst economic crisis, Nixon had found opportunity.

Preparing for Oil War

The decline of US hegemony and the increasingly unstable basis of US dollar imperialism made the use of military power by the United States to achieve what its economic power no longer could—and so the

[197] 'The basic framework was strikingly simple. The U.S. would buy oil from Saudi Arabia and provide the kingdom military aid and equipment. In return, the Saudis would plow billions of their petrodollar revenue back into Treasuries and finance America's spending.' Wong, Andrea, 'The Untold Story Behind Saudi Arabia's 41-Year U.S. Debt Secret,' *Bloomberg*, 31 May 2016, via https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-05-30/the-untold-story-behind-saudi-arabia-s-41-year-u-s-debt-secret, accessed 15 February 2018.

[198] Spiro, David E., *The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets*, Cornell University Press, 1999, 21–28; Clark, *Petrodollar Warfare*, op. cit., 17–21; Engdahl, William, *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*, Pluto Press, 2004.

[199] Eichengreen, *Exorbitant Privilege*, op. cit.; Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler, 'Bringing Capital Accumulation Back in: The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition: Military Contractors, Oil Companies and Middle East "Energy Conflicts",' *Review of International Political Economy* 2, no. 3, 1995: 446–515. See also Bichler, Shimshon, Robin Rowley, and Jonathan Nitzan, 'The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition: Demise or New Order?' *McGill University Working Papers* 89, no. 11, 1989: 1–63.

[200] Eichengreen, *Exorbitant Privilege*, ibid.

engineering of moral panic as ideological cover—increasingly inevitable.[201] Complicating matters was the fact that Nixon, though rescuing the US economy in the short term, had tied its long-term fortunes to what was and remains a finite resource. In rendering the eventual collapse of the US economy a *fait accompli*, this fact also made 'Peak Oil Imperialism' to forestall it inevitable.[202] Discussing plans with Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger to send the USS John Hancock to seize the port of Abu Dhabi, Kissinger expressed not only his willingness to re-establish control over the supply of oil by force if necessary, but to lie about it.

Schlesinger: We need a public line on the Hancock when it arrives.

Kissinger: Routine. An exercise that we have been planning a long time….

Kissinger: Let's work out a plan for grabbing some Middle East oil if we want.

Schlesinger: Abu Dhabi would give us what we want.

Kisssinger: The Shah [of Iran] is cynical enough to discuss this with us.[203]

[201] Clark, *Petrodollar Warfare*, op. cit., 26.

[202] Foster, John Bellamy, *The Ecological Revolution: Making Peace with the Planet*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009, 'Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism,' 85–105.

[203] 'It was in the early 1970s, with oil prices rising, that Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran embarked on his ambitious effort to roll back Soviet influence in neighbouring countries and create a modern version of the ancient Persian empire…. Beginning in 1974, the Shah launched a determined effort to draw Kabul into a Western-tilted, Tehran-centred regional economic and security sphere embracing India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states…. The United States actively encouraged this roll-back policy as part of its broad partnership with the Shah…. SAVAK and the CIA worked hand in hand, sometimes in loose collaboration with underground Afghani Islamic fundamentalist groups that shared their anti-Soviet objectives but had their own agendas as well… As oil profits sky-rocketed, emissaries from these newly affluent Arab fundamentalist groups arrived on the Afghan scene with bulging bankrolls.' Cordovez, Diego, and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, Oxford University, 1995, quoted in Grandin, Greg, *Kissinger's Shadow*, Macmillan, 2015; Cooper, Andrew Scott, *The Oil Kings: How the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East*, Simon and Schuster, 2012, 129–130; US State Department, '314. Memorandum of Conversation; Washington, November 3, 1973, 8:47–9:50 a.m.,' FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXV, ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS AND WAR, 3 November 1973, via https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d314, accessed 17 February 2018.

Cynicism was becoming a prerequisite of entry into Middle Eastern geopolitics. 'Can't we overthrow one of the sheikhs just to show that we can do it?' Kissinger later complained, the question being whether the anticipated demonstration effect would be enough to bring recalcitrant nations to heel.[204] Kissinger's obsession with controlling the oil supply at any cost reflected the awakening in Washington to the extent of hydrocarbon deposits in Saudi Arabia during the Second World War; the oil resources of Saudi Arabia, head of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department advised Truman in 1945, represented 'a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in human history.'[205]

Others agreed. Immediately prior to the Oil Crisis, the Council on Foreign Relations published an article demonstrating their understanding—30 years prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion—of the potential need to enforce imperial discipline and sure up the oil supply. In the likely event of another oil crisis, speculated James E. Akins, the United States could reopen oil supplies 'through military means, i.e. war,' he mused, the main problem apparently being whether or not Europe and Japan would be willing to collaborate in violations of international law for the sake of controlling resources.[206] Taking these thoughts to their logical conclusions, a 1975 essay in *Harpers*, 'Seizing Arab Oil,' attempted a rationale for war.[207] Comparing OPEC to Hitler on the basis of its failure to

[204] US Department of State, 'Memorandum of Conversation: Washington, November 29, 1973, 1:20–2:38 p.m.,' FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXVI, ENERGY CRISIS, 1969–1974, 29 November 1973, via https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v36/d253, accessed 17 February 2018; Grandin, Greg, 'How One Man Laid the Groundwork for Today's Crisis in the Middle East,' *The Nation*, 28 September 2015, via https://www.thenation.com/article/how-one-man-laid-the-groundwork-for-todays-crisis-in-the-middle-east/, accessed 17 February 2018; Grandin, *Kissinger's Shadow*, ibid.

[205] Klare, Michael, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum*, Metropolitan Books, 2007, 32.

[206] Akins, James E., 'The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here,' *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973, via https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/1973-04-01/oil-crisis-time-wolf-here, accessed 17 February 2018.

[207] Ignotus, Miles, 'Seizing Arab Oil: How the U.S. Can Break the Oil Cartel's Stranglehold on the World,' *Harper's Magazine*, March 1975, via https://harpers.org/archive/1975/03/seizing-arab-oil/, accessed 19 February 2018; Dreyfuss, Robert, 'The Thirty-Year Itch,' *Mother Jones*, March/April 2003, via https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/03/thirty-year-itch/, accessed 19 February 2018.

supply the United States with cheap oil, 'Miles Ignotus' doubled down on his False Dilemma-driven tantrum by comparing the Western failure to break OPEC with Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, arguing that an embargo would be 'no longer a threat but an opportunity,' given the potential for crisis leveraging. 'An Arab embargo or supply cut, an atmosphere of crisis, most probably in the aftermath of a short but bloody war,' was the most useful scenario. 'Then we go in.'

> The first question is where. The goal is not just to seize some oil (say, in accessible Nigeria or Venezuela) but to break OPEC. Thus, force must be used selectively to occupy large and concentrated oil reserves, which can be produced rapidly in order to end the artificial scarcity of oil and thus cut the price … This being the ultimate goal, there is only one feasible target: Saudi Arabia.[208]

As it turns out, there were several. A long discussion of practicalities around invading and occupying Saudi Arabian oilfields followed, indecent enough to earn a public rebuke from James E. Akins, author of the *Foreign Affairs* article presaging it and then-US ambassador to Saudi Arabia. In 2003, Akins summarised his read on the *Harpers* article as 'how we could solve all our economic and political problems by taking over the Arab oil fields [and] bringing in Texans and Oklahomans to operate them,' noting a flurry of similar articles turning up elsewhere at the same time. 'I knew that it had to have been the result of a deep background briefing,' he recalled. 'You don't have eight people coming up with the same screwy idea at the same time, independently.' Akins had made a 'fatal mistake,' however, saying on television that 'anyone who would propose that is either a madman, a criminal, or an agent of the Soviet Union.' A briefing had taken place, by his boss, then-Secretary of State Kissinger. Akins was fired later in the year, once the hubbub had died down. In observing what was going on in Iraq in 2003, he concluded, 'It's the Kissinger plan. I thought it had been killed, but it's back.'[209] In light of the commentary from Milton Friedman, it might be said to have merely been on tour.

    [208] Ignotus, 'Seizing Arab Oil,' ibid.

    [209] Dreyfuss, 'The Thirty-Year Itch,' op. cit.; Clark, *Petrodollar Warfare*, op. cit., 46–47; Frankel, Glenn, 'U.S. Mulled Seizing Oil Fields in '73,' *Washington Post*, 1 January 2004, via https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/01/us-mulled-seizing-oil-fields-in-73/0661ef3e-027e-4758-9c41-90a40bbcfc4d, accessed 20 February 2018.

A cultural artefact from the Oil Crisis in the form of a board game called *Oil War* (1975) reflects the growing mood for the eponymous subject matter. *Oil War* features the classic image of US soldiers raising the flag at Iwo Jima, but with the flag pole replaced with an oil derrick upon which the Stars and Stripes were mounted instead.[210] Once the United States was actually preparing for oil war, however, it would no longer be possible to actually say so, facts coming off second best to the pretence that that atavistic regression and brutish aggression were features only of our enemies. In the years following 9/11, such truths would only appear in the Adbusters-inspired art movement of 'culture jamming,' through the artwork of Banksy, Winston Smith and similar others.[211]

Project for the New American Century

Neoconservatives demonstrated continuing interest in the Kissinger Plan and military intervention in the Middle East in the years immediately prior to 9/11. In a 1999 speech to the Institute of Petroleum, then CEO of Haliburton, the largest oil services corporation on the planet, Dick Cheney stated that 'the Middle East, with two-thirds of the world's oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies,' lamenting that, 'even though companies are anxious for greater access there, progress continues to be slow.'[212] Not for want of trying; *Rebuilding America's Defences,* a major policy study by neoconservative think-tank Project for the New American Century (PNAC), with which Cheney was closely associated, was concerned with 'the challenge of this coming century,' understood as preserving and enhancing an 'American peace' based on the ability to 'fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major-theatre wars.'[213]

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[210] 'Oil War' (1975), *Boardgame Geek*, via https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/5382/oil-war, accessed 16 February 2018.

[211] Klein, Naomi, *No Logo*, Vintage, 2009; L2005; Banksy, *Wall and Piece*, Random House, 2005.

[212] London Institute of Petroleum, 'Full Text of Dick Cheney's Speech at the Institute of Petroleum Autumn Lunch, 1999,' *Energy Bulletin*, 8 June 2004, via http://www.energy-bulletin.net/node/559, accessed 18 February 2018; Clark, *Petrodollar Warfare*, op. cit., 50.

[213] Quoted in Clark, *Petrodollar Warfare*, ibid., 41.

> To preserve American military pre-eminence in the coming decades, the Department of Defence must move more aggressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts and seek to exploit the emerging revolution in military affairs … the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalysing event—like a new Pearl Harbour.[214]

Their once-in-a-lifetime opportunity fell into their laps towards the end of 2001, like manna from heaven and so many falling towers. PNAC, which had 'sought for decades to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security,' was able then to fulfil its ambitions for hegemonic renewal and Pax Americana. While unresolved conflict between the United States and Iraq provided 'the immediate justification,' continued the *Rebuilding* authors, 'the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf for Euros.'[215]

Further inspiration for the Kissinger Plan, as carried forward by PNAC, came from former National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who outlined in his 1998 book *The Grand Chessboard* the 'three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy' as (1) preventing collusion and maintaining security dependence amongst the vassals, (2) keeping tributaries pliant and protected, and (3) keeping the barbarians from coming together.[216] Terror panic would provide through the divide-and-conquer characteristics of deviance production and amplification, the association of disobedience in the face of US imperial objectives with material support for terrorism (as per the 'either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists' logic of the False Dilemma). The state terrorism inherent to imperialist aggression, provided for by the counterterrorist ideology minted with the decisive aid of the Jonathan Institute, would ensure compliance and deter collusion amongst vassals and potential opponents.

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[214] Kagan, Donald, and Gary James Schmitt, *Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*, Project for a New American Century, 2000.

[215] Dowell, William, 'Foreign Exchange: Saddam Turns His Back on Greenbacks,' *Time*, 13 November 2000, via http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,998512,00.html, accessed 15 February 2018; *CNN Money*, 'Iraqi Threat Spooks Oil Price,' 26 October 2000, via http://money.cnn.com/2000/10/26/worldbiz/oil/, accessed 16 February 2018.

[216] Quoted in Clark, *Petrodollar Warfare*, ibid., 40.

Ideas of this kind became institutionalised in the National Security Statement of 2002.[217]

The Sacred Principle

A *Pax Americana* built on the back of counterterrorism and terror panic eminently suited the Israeli political class, including Jonathan Institute convenors, the contours of their own project articulated in unambiguous language in the diaries of the second Prime Minister of Israel, Moshe Sharatt. 'In the thirties, we restrained the emotions of revenge and we educated the public to consider revenge as an absolutely negative impulse,' wrote Sharatt.

> Now, on the contrary, we justify the system of reprisal out of pragmatic considerations …. we have eliminated the mental and moral brakes on this instinct and made it possible… to uphold revenge as a moral value. This notion is held by large parts of the public in general, the masses of youth in particular, but it has crystallized and reached the value of a sacred principle in [Sharon's] battalion which becomes the revenge instrument of the State. (31 March 1955, 840)[218]

Sharett notes the revenge instrument of the state and the sacred principle, held by what he understood to be 'large parts of the public in general, and the masses of youth in particular,' was clarified further by Jonathan Institute participant Moshe Dayan in conversation with Israel's UK, US and French ambassadors, with Sharett in attendance, recording it for posterity. 'The "retaliation" actions are our vital lymph,' explained Dayan, '… they make it possible for us to maintain a high tension among our population and in the army …'

> The conclusions from Dayan's words are clear: This state has no international obligations, no economic problems, the question of peace is non-existent. It must calculate its steps narrow-mindedly and live by the sword. It must see the sword as the main and only instrument with which to keep its morale high. Towards this end it may—no, it must—invent non-existent

[217]Wolin, *Democracy Incorporated*, op. cit., Chapter 5, 'The Utopian Theory of Superpower: The Official Version,' 82–94.

[218]Rokach, Livia, *Israel's Sacred Terrorism*, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980, Chapter 6, 'Sacred Terrorism.'

dangers, and to do this it must adopt the method of provocation-and-re-taliation. And above all—let us hope for a new war with the Arab countries, so that we may finally acquire our space. (B.G. [David Ben-Gurian] himself—Dayan recalled—said that it would be worthwhile to pay an Arab a million pounds to start a war against us!)[219]

Considering the historical association between Bin Laden and the CIA, others would appear to agree. This includes Benjamin Netanyahu, now Israeli Prime Minister, who during a 2008 dinner speech purred that, 'We are benefiting from one thing, and that is the attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon, and the American struggle in Iraq,' fortuitous events he felt had 'swung American public opinion in our favour.'[220] The sacred principle is valuable in other ways. The *Jerusalem Post* reports that Israeli military exports rose to US$6.5 billion in 2016, a rise of $800 million.[221]

Pentagon Capitalism

Exemplified in this case, the robust state of the armaments market reflects the preeminent value of a permanent, 'politically self-sustaining' terrorist threat in servicing Eisenhower's Military–Industrial Complex (MIC). The same can be said all that entails of the American mixed economy based on state subsidies to high-technology industry through what Melman calls 'Pentagon Capitalism,' and what has elsewhere

[219] Rokach, Livia, 'Israeli State Terrorism: An Analysis of the Sharett Diaries,' *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9, no. 3, 1980: 20–21.

[220] *Haaretz Service and Reuters*, 'Report: Netanyahu Says 9/11 Terror Attacks Good for Israel,' 16 April 2008, via https://www.haaretz.com/news/report-netanyahu-says-9-11-terror-attacks-good-for-israel-1.244044, accessed 20 February 2018; Sahhar, Micaela, 'Occupied Narrative: on Western Media Collusion with Israel's "Wars" and Recovering the Palestinian Story,' unpublished PhD thesis, Melbourne University 2015, via http://hdl.handle.net/11343/58374, accessed 14 May 2017.

[221] Ahronheim, Anna, 'Israeli Military Exports Rise to $6.5 Billion,' *Jerusalem Post*, 30 March 2017, via http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Military-exports-rise-to-65-billion-485574, accessed 20 February 2018.

been described as Military Keynesianism.[222] As an industry, Pentagon Capitalism represents an exemplary means for neoconservatives and those who walk in their footsteps to keep themselves in a job (for some, the largesse of terror panic has been unusually great[223]). In the context of Terror Panic, Military Keynesianism becomes 'the Terror Industry,' or 'Terror Industrial Complex' for the more adventurous. 'Terrorism … is a very good business,' writes Chris Hedges.[224]

In contrast to the traditional Military–Industrial Complex, however, the obscene expenditures and flagrant abuses of power generated by the 'Terror Industrial Complex,' not least of which being the US$11.7 billion in paper currency that simply went missing in Iraq, result from the 'politicisation of expertise' (Stampnitzky) as a feature of terror panic.[225] As Risen notes,

> The new homeland security-complex operates differently. It is largely made up of a web of intelligence agencies and their contractors, companies that mostly provide secret services rather than large weapons systems and equipment. These contractors are hired to help Washington determine the scale and scope of the terrorist threat; they make no money if they

[222] Melman, Seymour, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*, 1973; Melman, Seymour, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline*, Touchstone, 1985; Melman, Seymour, 'From Private to State Capitalism: How the Permanent War Economy Transformed the Institutions of American Capitalism,' *Journal of Economic Issues* 31, no. 2, 1997: 311–332; Duncan, Thomas K., and Christopher J. Coyne, 'The Origins of the Permanent War Economy,' *The Independent Review* 18, no. 2, 2013: 219–240; Cypher, James M., 'From Military Keynesianism to Global-Neoliberal Militarism,' *Monthly Review*, 1 June 2007, via https://monthlyreview.org/2007/06/01/from-military-keynesianism-to-global-neoliberal-militarism/, accessed 21 February 2018; Koistinen, Paul, *The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective*, Praeger, 1980; Chomsky, Noam, *The Essential Chomsky*, The New Press, 2008, 273, 'Containing the Enemy.'

[223] Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, op. cit., Chapter 15, 'A Corporatist State,' 308–322; Danner, Mark, *Spiral: Trapped in the Forever War*, Simon and Schuster, 2016, 135; Feinstein, *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade*, op. cit.

[224] 'Once you build secret archipelagos of prisons, once you commit huge sums of money and invest your political capital in a ruthless war against subversion, once you empower a network of clandestine killers, operatives and torturers, you fuel the very insecurity and violence you seek to contain.' Hedges, Chris, 'The Terror-Industrial Complex,' *Truthdig*, 8 February 2010, via https://www.truthdig.com/articles/the-terror-industrial-complex/ accessed 20 February 2018.

[225] Risen, James, *Pay Any Price*, op. cit., 'Pallets of Cash,' 3–30.

determine that the threat is overblown or, God forbid, if the war on terror ever comes to an end.[226]

As a feature of its form, then, the Terror Industrial Complex also generates the need for a 'politically self-sustaining' terrorist threat; to the extent that it must be cause and cure of the same problem, it amounts to industrialisation of moral panic. As a politically self-sustaining operation, the Terrorism Industry is not a recent one, hardly more so than the Military–Industrial Complex, having arisen in the 1970s alongside counterterrorist ideology in the form of government agencies and officials who 'establish policy and provide opinions and selected facts about official acts and plans on terrorist activity in speeches, press conferences, press releases, hearings, reports and interviews,' a private sector of think tanks and research institutes such as the abovementioned Jonathan Institute that provide employment and career opportunities for an army of disciplined academic cadres ready and able to assume the Terrorism Expert role, security firms dealing in 'risk analysis, personal and property protection, and training.'[227] Industrial Counterterrorism exploded in the wake of 9/11, as government expenditure on burgeoning homeland security, previously expected to grow by $5.5 billion, blew out to $13 billion after 2001, leading some in Washington DC to refer to a 'Doom Boom' as three of its counties became the most prosperous in the country.[228]

The Military Keynesian economic stimulus encompassed in this 'Doom Boom' has its historical roots in the experience of WW2, which ended the Great Depression and brought a period of prosperity in the conversion of the domestic US economy to war production. The lesson for the future survival of the 'free market' was not lost on US industrialists after the war, a fact Kofsky reveals in his research into the 'War Scare' of 1948, a successful strategy for squeezing subsidies out of Congress in the form of military contracts with the aid of communist

[226] Mueller, John E., *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them*, Simon and Schuster, 2006, 29–32; Mueller, John E., and Mark G. Stewart, *Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism*, Oxford University Press, 2016.

[227] Herman and O'Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry*, op. cit., 55.

[228] Mueller, John E., *Overblown*, op. cit., 36.

panic.[229] The benefit of corporate welfare over social welfare as a means of pump priming was that it didn't encourage the idea amongst the lower social orders that they had rights or dignity, the US business community having already been alerted to the perils of looming democratic ferment by then-corporate lawyer and future US Supreme Court Justice under Nixon Lewis F. Powell in his famed 'Powell Memorandum.'[230] As *Business Week* noted,

> There's a tremendous social and economic difference between welfare pump-priming and military pump-priming… Military spending doesn't really alter the structure of the economy. It goes through the regular channels. As far as a businessman is concerned, a munitions order from the government is much like an order from a private customer. But the kind of welfare and public works spending that [progressives favour]… does alter the economy. It makes new channels of its own. It creates new institutions. It redistributes wealth… It changes the whole economic pattern.[231]

It is, in other words, dangerous.[232] For this express reason, the post-war period heralded the birth of a 'free market' economy propped up by lavish corporate welfare distributed through the Pentagon, a regime of Military Keynesianism whose deficits could be exported through dollar imperialism and whose growth would eventually precipitate Eisenhower's warnings regarding the growth of the Military–Industrial Complex.[233]

The US$4 trillion sunk in this vein into the War on Terror following the New Pearl Harbour suggests these warnings have gone unheeded, as does the corporate welfare free-for-all over PNAC's hoped-for new technologies and operational concepts by Congressmen anxious to avoid

[229] Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948*, op. cit. See Part II for more discussion.

[230] *Reclaim Democracy*, 'The Powell Memo: August 23, 1971,' via http://reclaim-democracy.org/powell_memo_lewis/, accessed 22 February 2018.

[231] "From Cold War to Cold Peace?" *Business Week*, 12 February 1949, Chomsky, Noam, *Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace*, Boston: South End Press, 1985.

[232] Chomsky, Noam, *World Orders Old and New*, 1994, 100–101.

[233] Custers, Peter, 'Military Keynesianism Today: An Innovative Discourse,' *Race & Class* 51, no. 4, 2010: 79–94; Farnsworth, Kevin, *Social Versus Corporate Welfare: Competing Needs and Interests Within the Welfare State*, Springer, 2012; Nader, Ralph, *Cutting Corporate Welfare*, Seven Stories Press, 2011; Dawkins, Cedric E., 'Corporate Welfare, Corporate Citizenship, and the Question of Accountability,' *Business & Society* 41, no. 3, 2002: 269–291.

being labelled 'soft on terrorism'—the understanding being that 'withholding corporate welfare for the rentier corporate aristocracy gives aid to the terrorists.'[234] The value of this logic to Military Keynesian pump priming of the moribund US economy through perpetual war, neoliberalism, corporate supremacism and dollar/peak oil imperialism, helps account for the question of *Cui bono* inasmuch as it reflects getting 'so caught up in trying to throw money at the terrorist and counterterrorist problem that we essentially are creating an industry that will only exist as long as you keep the terrorist threat pumped up.'[235]

One very useful tool for keeping the terrorist threat pumped up is racism—the old 'national safety valve.'[236] As imperialist warfare overseas provokes Islamist insurgencies useful as new imaginary hobgoblins, domestic counterterrorist programmes target minority groups for surveillance, and in the service of the politically self-perpetuating Terror Industrial Complex, mass entrapment and show trials by media circus.[237] As a former Assistant Director of the FBI points out,

[234] Hudson, Michael, *Killing the Host: How Financial Parasites and Debt Bondage Destroy the Global Economy*, CounterPunch, 2015.

[235] Rana, Junaid, 'The Racial Infrastructure of the Terror-Industrial Complex,' *Social Text* 34, no. 4, 129, 2016, 112; Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, op. cit., 43; Hartmann, Chapter 8, 'Transnational Corporations: The Ghost of the East India Company,' in *Unequal Protection*, op. cit., 136–155; Rothkopf, David, *Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008; Vitali, Stefania, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston, 'The Network of Global Corporate Control,' *PLoS One* 6, no. 10, 2011: e2; Coghlan, Andy, and Debora MacKenzie, 'Revealed-The Capitalist Network That Runs the World,' *New Scientist*, 19 October 2011, via https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354-500-revealed-the-capitalist-network-that-runs-the-world/, accessed 8 February 2018; Negri, Tony, and Michael Hardt, *Empire*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 2000.

[236] Rana, ibid.; Van Nuys, *Americanising the West*, op. cit., 16. See also Part II.

[237] Aaronson, Trevor, *The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI's Manufactured War on Terrorism*, Ig Publishing, 2014; Szpunar, Piotr M., 'Premediating Predisposition: Informants, Entrapment, and Connectivity in Counterterrorism,' *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 34, no. 4, 2017: 371–385; *Human Rights Watch*, 'Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions,' 21 July 2017, via https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/21/illusion-justice/human-rights-abuses-us-terrorism-prosecutions, accessed 17 February 2017; 'US: Terrorism Prosecutions Often an Illusion: Investigations, Trials of American Muslims Rife with Abuse,' Human Rights Watch, 21 July 2014, via https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/21/us-terrorism-prosecutions-often-illusion, accessed 17 February 2017; Greenwald, Glenn, 'Why Does the FBI Have to Manufacture Its Own Plots if Terrorism and ISIS Are Such Grave Threats?' *The Intercept*, 26 February 2015, via https://theintercept.com/2015/02/26/

If you're submitting budget proposals for a law enforcement agency, for an intelligence agency, you're not going to submit the proposal that 'We won the war on terror and everything's great,' cause the first thing that's gonna happen is your budget's gonna be cut in half. You know, it's my opposite of Jesse Jackson's 'Keep Hope Alive'—it's 'Keep Fear Alive.' Keep it alive.[238]

The gross exercise in deviance production and amplification associated with the opposite of Jesse Jackson's 'Keep Hope Alive' is exemplified by case of the Newburgh Four, where unemployed black men with tenuous links to the US Muslim community were offered six-figure sums to execute a plan created, funded and planned by an informer who came to be in the service of the FBI after having been arrested himself for fraud. The FBI informer carried his recruits across state lines prior to the planned attack in the name of collecting inert materials to make it a federal offence, and the NYPD brought out 100 officers, a semi-trailer, an armoured tank, the bomb squad and the Joint Terrorism Task Force for the benefit of the news cameras, despite the fact that the materials used in the sting were inert and there was no threat whatsoever of explosion. Furthermore, due to the intervention of the Four, the attack was attempted at night, when there was no one around.[239] They were

fbi-manufacture-plots-terrorism-isis-grave-threats, accessed 21 February 2017; Aaronson, Trevor, 'Timeline: The Making of an FBI Superinformant,' *Mother Jones*, September/October 2011, via http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/shahed-hussain-fbi-informant, accessed 20 February 2017; Aaronson, Trevor, 'The Best Terrorists Money Can Buy,' *Mother Jones*, September/October 2011, via http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-sting-targets, accessed 23 February 2017; Aaronson, Trevor, 'Court Throws Out Terrorism Conviction in Canada, Citing Police Entrapment,' *The Intercept*, 3 August 2016, via https://theintercept.com/2016/08/03/court-throws-out-terrorism-conviction-in-canada-citing-police-entrapment, accessed 21 February 2017; Cushing, Tim, 'Canadian Judge Tosses Case After Finding Law Enforcement Entrapped Supposed Terrorists,' *TechDirt*, 3 August 2016, via https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160731/18162435122/canadian-judge-tosses-case-after-finding-law-enforcement-entrapped-supposed-terrorists.shtml, accessed 21 February 2017; McLaughlin, Eliott C., 'FBI Planting Spies in U.S. Mosques, Muslim Groups Say,' *CNN*, 20 March 2009, accessed 9 April 2017; Adams, Guy, 'FBI Plant Banned by Mosque Because He Was Too Extreme,' *The Independent*, Tuesday, 7 December 2010, accessed 9 April 2017; Markon, Jerry, 'Alarmed Mosque-Goers Turn FBI Informant Over to FBI,' *Common Dreams*, 6 December 2010, accessed 9 April 2017; Webb, Suhaib, 'Watch For The Violence Mongers: Mosque Informants, Agent Provocateurs and Disruption in the Muslim American Community,' *Virtual Mosque*, 13 March 2009.

[238] Heilbroner, David, and Kate Davis, dirs, *The Newburgh Sting*, HBO Documentary Films, USA, 2014. Event is at 1:06:50.

[239] Heilbroner and Davis, *The Newburgh Sting*, ibid.

nevertheless arrested amidst high drama, charged and convicted of terrorism-related offences as the corporate news media reported the arrest of 'extremely violent men who embraced every opportunity for terrorism,' 'career criminals' and 'four men with a shared hatred for America.' 'Just one cell of many,' the news media, party to the campaign to Keep Fear Alive, alleged that 'the FBI is worried about all sorts of things around the country.'[240]

> The companies think it's time we all sit down, have a serious get-together, and start another war… We'll just cook up a good Soviet threat story in the Middle East, we need that oil…
> —Dead Kennedys, *Kinky Sex Makes the World Go 'Round*, 1982

> You're telling me that you're gonna fake some terrorist thing, just to scare some money out of Congress?
> —Mitch, *The Long Kiss Goodnight*, 1996

Conclusion

This chapter has compared the construction of terrorist panic in two historical instances against the analytical criteria nominated in the theoretical section of this research project. Beginning with the self-interested framing of the crisis by the moral entrepreneurs of terrorist panic, it examined the use of moral panic constructed around the mythology of counterterrorism as the basis for crisis leveraging and scapegoating, through targeting of scapegoats via deviance production and the establishment of a legitimating pretext for scapegoating via the victim

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[240] US District Judge Colleen McMahon: '[The FBI] created acts of terrorism out of [Cromitie's] fantasies of bravado and bigotry, and then made those fantasies come true.' Said dissenting judge in the trial, Judge Jacobs: 'The government agent supplied a design and gave it form, so that the agent rather than the defendant inspired the crime, provoked it, planned it, financed it, equipped it and furnished the time and targets. There simply was no evidence of predisposition under our settled definition of the term. The government made them terrorists. I am not proud of my government for what it did in this case.' Benjamin Weiser, 'Convictions in Synagogue Bombing Plot Upheld,' *The New York Times*, 23 August 2013, via http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/nyregion/appeals-court-upholds-convictions-of-men-in-bronx-synagogue-plot.html, accessed 17 February 2017; Sullivan, Andrew, 'America Has Never Been so Ripe For Tyranny,' *New York Magazine*, 1 May 2016, http://www.nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/04/america-tyranny-donald-trump.html, accessed 16 May 2016.

complex enabled by moral disengagement. After looking at how persecutions enabled by terrorist panic were put into effect, it finished by exploring the underlying economic and social dynamics driving the construction of terrorist panic and whose interests it served. This case study now concludes with a summary of the material presented in the case study against the analytical criteria in preparation for comparison against the first and second case studies at the end of the research project.

In both episodes of terrorist panic, changing emphasis of deviance production reflected innovations in scapegoating techniques, a phenomenon also noted by Naftali. These took advantage of new targets and new opportunities for blame-shifting, while retaining the essential elements of the overall process. Initially the terrorist conspiracy theory was associated with the Soviet Union, but after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the usefulness of the communism–terrorism nexus was exhausted, replaced then by Islam. After 9/11 the terrorist conspiracy theory was recalibrated in consideration of the geopolitical needs of the United States, which invaded Iraq and Afghanistan in the name of responding to an atrocity perpetrated by predominantly Saudi Arabian hijackers—the contradiction in this instance matched by the fact that the feared consequences of allowing the hated and feared Other to run amuck without active opposition would eventually become conspicuous as the actual consequences of US policy in the Middle East. The counterterrorist conspiracy theory having been recast after its first incarnation during the Reaganite period, priming mechanisms intact, so too was the existential threat trope, updated to meet new conditions.

The 'Mobilisation phase' looked at the self-interested framing of crises by moral entrepreneurs of terror panic. During this phase, politicised assumptions identifying the vested interests of transnational corporate elites with those of the entire globe interpreted escalating geopolitical conflict as threats to global security. Closely associated with neoliberal ideology and corporate supremacism, this framework became the basis of counterterrorist mythology. Viewed through the counterterrorist lens, disruptions to the global corporate status quo from those living predominantly Muslim countries whose existence represented an obstacle to their designs for world power—admitted quite frankly and openly in the *Educational Literature* of the National Association of Manufacturers[241]—could only be interpreted as the machinations of

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[241] See Case Study II, Part 2.

imaginary hobgoblins in the form of Palestinians fighting to defend their human rights and people simply adhering the Islamic faith. The paranoia informing this 'projecting' mentality associated challenges to the status quo with giving comfort to the demonised Muslim enemy, reflecting the archetypal priming script associated with the Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy. This priming script would inform the deviance production and moral disengagement during later stages of the scapegoating process.

The 'Targeting phase' looked at the construction of targets for scapegoating through the production of deviance. In the First Terror Scare, amplification of half-truths wrought the deviant mythology of the terrorist as a practitioner of the violence of the weak. Violent responses to violent oppression became a plot against western civilisation sponsored by 'rogue states,' as did violent responses to knee-jerk official reactions inadvertently demonstrating the effectiveness of violence in provoking it. In the Second Terror Scare, otherwise referred to by a deeply politicised descriptor embodying the counterterrorist double standard, the 'War on Terrorism,' the amplification of half-truths wrought the deviant mythology of the 'Islamic terrorist.' The fact that a miniscule minority of radical jihadists educated and funded by allies of the West had decided to utilise violence by weaponising hijacked airliners as human-filled bombs became a plot by a billion Muslims to destroy it. Steeped in awareness of historical injustices perpetrated by the west through such episodes as the Crusades, the legacy of British and French colonialism, US intervention to overthrow democracies in countries like Iran and Afghanistan, and settler colonialism and apartheid in Palestine allegedly reflected a jealous hatred for alleged western values. Insufficient deference to global empire became a plot to overthrow the west, using the diabolical strategy of existing.

The 'Legitimation phase' looked at the construction of a pretext through moral disengagement for the persecution of scapegoats. Having taken it on themselves to define the meaning of 'western civilisation' in their own interests, the moral entrepreneurs of terrorist panic developed on this basis the victim complex necessary to enable scapegoating through the myth, born of the False Dilemma, that lack of reverence for the alleged values of western civilisation amidst social conflict deriving from the historical injustices referred to above was tantamount to attacking the west. Such accounts the inconsistency between the lofty ideals used to justify counterterrorist operations in Lebanon, Latin America, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the markedly less lofty values characterising

them in practice. During the First Terror Scare, Israel invaded Lebanon and oversaw the associated atrocities on the grounds that violence was neither morally legitimate or an effective way to solve geopolitical conflict—logic later the basis for the Schultz Doctrine. During the Second Terror Scare, the Bush Doctrine added unilateralism and pre-emption to the Schultz Doctrine, and invaded two countries, neither of whom had had any involvement in the terrorist attacks in the United States, in the name of upholding the rule of law. Anyone in the way when Bush neo-conservatives asserted their state monopoly over the means of terror, or who doubted, contradicted, challenged the legitimacy of that monopoly, or even just acknowledged that it existed, was automatically associated with the existential threat. In each case, the 'with us or against us' logic of the False Dilemma reflected the tendency of moral entrepreneurs of terror panic to identify an insufficient degree of submission to the dominant geopolitical power with support for the imaginary hobgoblins *de jure*.

The 'Persecution phase' looked at the two major periods of scapegoating driven by terror panic, incorporating all prior stages. The first part explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation during the First Terror Scare as reactions to the unintended consequences of settler colonialism and apartheid in Palestine, based on a conspiracy theory of existential threats sponsored by a 'rogue regime' in the form of the 'Evil Empire.' Once the Soviet Union entered the dustbin of history, however, the pretext changed. The second part explored mobilisation, targeting and legitimation during the Second Terror Scare as reactions to the unforeseen and unintended consequences of decades of intervention in other countries, including CIA funding and training of Osama bin Laden—originally a CIA asset. It looked at how these processes enabled imperialist assaults on Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a myriad of other anti-democratic assaults domestically and geopolitically, from curtailment of civil rights and surveillance, to torture and rendition, based on a conspiracy theory of existential threats sponsored by nations refusing their place in a US-dominated world order cast as 'rogue states.' In this way, both scares enabled attacks on nations who got in the way of United States and allied imperialism based on a conspiracy theory of an expansionist existential threat, just as the Cold War had previously. As moral entrepreneurs of terror panic reasserted the ideological legitimacy of US hegemony, reconstructed political orthodoxies around new contingencies and re-established a global status quo favourable to their control.

The Ancient Fantasy was also evident throughout, especially where counterterrorism was couched in religious terms (such as in the case of the 'Clash of Civilisations' thesis).

The 'Restoration phase' looked at who benefitted from terrorist panic. As this criterion revealed, US interference in Central and Latin American affairs, support for Israeli aggression, and its own aggression aimed at staying declining economic power, all buttressed the power of a transnational corporate class whose interests had been conflated with the defence of civilisation. Where it employed xenophobia as a feature of the Paranoid Style, both phases of terror panic, like the communist panic from which they derived, conjoined nativist and corporate paternalism, extending the racist and xenophobic dynamic that had replaced the western frontier domestically as 'national safety valve' outwards. As a tool of geopolitics, xenophobia served once more—this time as an 'international safety valve' in neutralising tensions created by western empire building and distracting from domestic economic crises associated with the unforeseen consequences of corporate globalisation, such as the loss of the national manufacturing base, and neglect of national infrastructure. In distracting from domestic problems and extending the reach of neo-feudal corporate imperialism, terror panic did in the name of defending the democratic freedoms it usurped—provided at the same moment an ongoing pretext for a domestic reign of terror against targets for entrapment. The very public arrests of these domestic scapegoats provided fodder for the panic-feeding corporate news media, and corporate subsidies via the Terror Industrial Complex.

All of this tends towards the conclusion that terror panic reflects the continuing paradox of deviance production as a process that rendered its architects cause and cure of the same problem; having created a problem that they could then style themselves the solution to, they gifted themselves a pretext to pursue ulterior motives already decided on. Lacking any other way to generate demand for US dollars and to keep the value of its currency artificially inflated, the United States resorted to petrodollar system. This fact became the imperative for permanent war and the 'ends justify the means' ethos of the Bush neoconservatives grouped around PNAC, who allowed themselves to be provoked into a knee-jerk military response to the 9/11 attacks in defence of petrodollar capitalism, coopting the 'rogue state' mythology their forebears had bequeathed from communist panics, while replacing the Soviet Union with states who disobey the US-dominated world order. Constructed

with the same binary logic as communist and witch panics, terror panic demonstrates a comparable tendency to conflate object and relation, such that terrorism, a social relation and political strategy, is imagined as a tangible object that can be fought and defeated by conventional means—the manufacture of which constitutes an additional form of pump priming of the decrepit US economy. Along with the petrodollar system, Military Keynesianism keeps global corporatism alive; moral panic around the aims and purposes of a highly politicised definition of terrorism keep it ticking over, while terrorist attacks continue to be carried out in the main by whites, as they were before 9/11.[242]

In the examples studied in this chapter, the neoconservative moral entrepreneurs of terror panic had already adopted the terrorist strategies they purported to oppose, and then purported to oppose them when faced with the consequences of their own state terrorism, projecting them onto the victims. Terror panic gave them the mean to locate and target scapegoats and to leverage crises of hegemony for their own ends, while suppressing the origins of counterterrorist ideology in the 1980s and its lineage with anti-communism, witch-hunts, Cohn's 'Ancient Fantasy,' Hofstadter's 'Paranoid Style' and other cultural relics of archetypal fascism—the unintended consequences of making bargains with the devil now apparent in the insurgent reaction of the Trump Presidency. Prime beneficiary of the legacy of the Terror Scare and living incarnation of the Paranoid Style, Trump also reflects Gramsci's observation that 'The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.' Political corruption finds parallels in financialisation of the economy; fractional reserve banking and other instruments of finance capital like synthetic collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) precipitated the Global Financial Crisis (2008). As signposts of the downward spiral of the American Empire into collapse, each tends towards the conclusion that, in its hubris and overreach, Bush fell into Bin Laden's trap. In allowing itself to be provoked into war, instead of pausing and reflecting on its own part in global conflict, the Bush administration, along with those who followed, did the job he and his associates wanted to be done to American society themselves.

[242] Morlin, Bill, 'Study Shows Two-Thirds of U.S. Terrorism Tied to Right-Wing Extremists,' Southern Poverty Law Center, 12 September 2018, via https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/09/12/study-shows-two-thirds-us-terrorism-tied-right-wing-extremists, accessed 30 October 2018.

Conclusion: Scapegoating Doth Ever Prosper

In order to rally people, governments need enemies. They want us to be afraid, to hate, so we will rally behind them. And if they do not have a real enemy, they will invent one in order to mobilise us.

—Thich Nhat Hanh, Vietnamese monk

The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule.

—Walter Benjamin

Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war whenever a revolt was apprehended.

—James Madison

The empire never ended.

—Philip K. Dick[1]

This study has theorised a model of panic-driven scapegoating, tracing a considerable body of evidence indicating that such occurs and recurs in a historically patterned manner. In collecting these clues and systematising them using a framework drawn from interdisciplinary studies in sociology and social psychology, this study has sought to demonstrate

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[1] Dick, Philip K., *Valis*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011; Stone, CJ, 'The Empire Never Ended: Philip K Dick, *Valis*, and the Psychopathology of War,' *Hubpages*, 17 December 2017, via https://hubpages.com/religion-philosophy/War-Is-A-Racket, accessed 27 June 2018.

a pattern of moral panic using witches, communists and terrorists as Mencken's imaginary hobgoblins. It has argued that the common traits between these different panics are signature traits of the proverbial Oldest Trick in the Book—the manufacture of a panic over a menacing hobgoblin so allegedly diabolical as to imperil society itself, for the express purpose of styling oneself the cure. It has been predicated on the rationale that, despite indicating the existence of such a pattern, this body of clues has tended not to coalesce into a model of scapegoating due to the fact that history is written by the victors. Insofar as the world as it stands is a product of patterns of scapegoating, this study has been justified on the grounds that such clues, if not written out of history entirely, have neither been recognised as indicating a pattern of panic-driven scapegoating, one from which new iterations might be identified.

Establishing a pattern based on these clues on a solid empirical foundation and demonstrating that historical parallels between various forms of panic-driven scapegoating are neither an accident, nor coincidence, but rather reflect larger forces at work, has been the purpose of this study. To this end, it has theorised five stages of panic-driven crisis leveraging and scapegoating encompassing (1) a Mobilisation phase (construction of a spurious crisis), (2) a Targeting Phase (constructing targets through deviance production), (3) a Legitimation Phase (constructing a rationale for moral disengagement), (4) an Execution Phase (crisis leveraging through scapegoating) and finally (5) a Restoration Phase (resolution of the actual crisis). This study applied these stages to each of the three case studies, with a view to establishing each as examples of panic-driven crisis leveraging and scapegoating that, combined, indicated a broader historical pattern consistent with the proverbial Oldest Trick in the Book as a political tool that continues to dominate the fate of humanity by virtue of our institutional, ideologically driven ahistoricism.

To reinforce the point, the Communist Panic case study incorporated three examples, the First Red Scare, the Second Red Scare and the Cold War, while the Terror Panic case study incorporated two, what this study terms the First Terror Scare (1980–1986), and the Second Terror Scare (2001–2013). The conclusions to each case study made preliminary assessments about their individual relationship to the analytical criteria. The final assessments incorporating all of these appear below.

Summary of Findings from Analytical Criteria

I. *Mobilisation phase: Self-interestedly framing the parameters of crisis.* In each study, crises were constructed on heavily politicised grounds, involving narratives produced by elites and their ideological mouthpieces that equated their own vested interests with the universal virtues associated with the dominant value systems of their respective societies. In each case, elites and their agents drew on binary logic consistent with the Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy archetypes. Their Self vs. Other dynamic became the basis for moral panics through deviance production, self-serving victim complexes facilitated by moral disengagement mechanisms and everything else that followed in terms of panic-driven crisis leveraging and scapegoating.

Case Study I (Witch Panic) demonstrated construction of a spurious crisis by examining how European religious theocrats reframed the Great Crisis of the fourteenth century as divine retribution for sin, salvaging the narrative of a Divine Plan (and the need for kept religious officials to interpret it for the mass) in the face of famine and plague, which in claiming believers and sinners alike wrought mass apostasy as evidence to the contrary undermined doubt in the existence of such. Explanations like 'Divine Plague' and 'God's Ordinance,' masked the unpredictable nature of the cosmos, invoking instead a binary logic in service of a heavily politicised crisis narrative alleging that European society had brought the Great Crisis on itself via permissiveness towards the existentialist threat of Satan.

Case Study II (Communist Panic) demonstrated construction of a spurious crisis by examining how US elites framed crises rooted in class and international conflict throughout the twentieth century as the product of threats to American freedoms, associating at the same moment their own vested class interests with the national interest. These they attributed variously to (1) unassimilated immigrants, (2) traitorous dissidents and (3) rogue states influenced or dominated by the Soviet Union. In each case, powerful groups invoked a binary logic as the basis for multiple, heavily politicised crisis narratives alleging an existentialist threat in varying forms of 'Godless Communism.'

Case Study III (Terror Panic) demonstrated construction of a spurious crisis by examining how elite neoconservatives primarily in the United States and Israel framed crises rooted in geopolitical conflicts, attempts on Israeli officials and the 9/11 attacks especially, as threats to a global order built on a conflation of the vested interests of transnational corporations with the broad interests of humanity. Elite reaction to the violence of the weak before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, upon whom blame initially rested, was characterised by a binary logic as the basis for multiple, heavily politicised crisis narratives alleging an existentialist ideological threat in the form of 'Arab and Islamic terrorism.'

All forms of mobilisation were superficially different insofar as the nature of the threat differed according to the nature of the perceived or actual threat to elite interests and the targets available for scapegoating. Nevertheless, in all cases, a heavily politicised crisis narrative invoked a binary logic, enabling the construction of a demonised existentialist threat, often with heavy religious overtones, and so politicised crisis. The added conflation of elite interests with universal values and the defence of the common good enabled mass mobilisation around elite interests.

II. *Targeting Phase: Constructing Targets Through Production of Deviance*. In each case study, deviance production leveraged the binary logic characteristic of the politicised parameters of the crisis to demonise an enemy targeted for scapegoating and persecution. Building on the conflation of elite vested interests with the general interests of all, deviance amplification targeted groups considered threats to those vested interests by refining the universal Other of the 'Self vs. Other' binary into a recognisable stereotype contingent on the needs of the moment. In each case, this was carried out through elite-controlled channels of communication, using power over public discourse to demonise and victimise using labels borrowed from the Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy archetype.

Case Study I (Witch Panic) demonstrated target construction through the production of deviance by examining the work of the Council of Basel (the '*sabbat* of demonologists'). Case Study II (Communist Panic) did so by examining the origins of anti-communism in the work of the National Association of Manufacturers, the Committee on Public Information, the FBI and private outfits like that which falsified evidence

for the *Red Channels* booklet. Case Study III (Terror Panic) did so by examining the origins of counterterrorist ideology in the work of the Jonathan Institute, which facilitated the 'politicisation of expertise,' expediting the migration of the Paranoid Style from neoconservatives in the United States to their counterparts in Israel along with the double standards limiting the concept to the violence of the weak.

Case Study I examined the development of the witch stereotype through the combination of the 'heresy plus magic' formula with tropes such as the 'pestilential alliance.' The elite origins of witch panic were revealed in the way landed feudal elites borrowed the Inquisitorial method to persecute 'witches' in secular European courts they controlled, the spreading of witch panic from the pulpit and use of the newly invented printing press to publish tracts such as the *Malleus Maleficarum*, all of which used of the Basel stereotype rooted in the Ancient Fantasy. Case Study II examined the evolution of communist stereotypes alongside the changing framework of politicised crises, from foreign import, to internal rot and expansionist threat, noting their Paranoid Style and links to the Ancient Fantasy archetype. The elite origins of communist panic were revealed in corporate media manufacture of consent, government officials anxious to justify big budgets and PR from beneficiaries of Military Industrial Complex subsidies/corporate welfare. Case Study III explored the adaptation of the politicisation of counterterrorism expertise in the aftermath of 9/11 to the politicised crisis framework in the demonisation of Arabs and Muslims. The elite origins of terror panic were revealed in the work of closed, deeply ideological think tanks like the Jonathan Institute and PNAC, concerted efforts by the Bush/Cheney administration to modify the Schultz Doctrine to serve as an ideological basis for the War on Terror, and widespread manufacture of consent by a complicit corporate media.

All forms of targeting were superficially different insofar as the scapegoat chosen for targeting varied with the conditions producing crises for elites and their ideological servants and groups available for demonisation and victimisation. The nature of the motivating ideologies also appeared to play a part, as reflected in the difference between the targeting of women under the Witch Hunts and the targeting of political dissidents of all genders and backgrounds under the Red Scares. Nevertheless, in all cases, the double standards established by politicised crisis narratives were amplified through deviance production, which established deviant stereotypes of witches, communists and terrorists

reflecting common Self vs. Other binaries facilitating Othering and labelling of targeted groups as deviant. In all cases, these deviant labels were applied to scapegoating targets through elite-controlled channels of communication by moral entrepreneurs who exhibited the malevolent qualities they attributed to their targets, typically during the process of attributing.

III. *Legitimation Phase, Constructing a Morally Disengaged Pretext for Scapegoating.* In each case study, elites and their ideological mouthpieces leveraged moral panic they created through a victim complex based on victim-blaming, victim-playing, the False Dilemma and other mechanisms of moral disengagement. Any contradiction of or challenge to the ideologically constructed victim complex was associated with the ideologically constructed existentialist threat.

Case Study I (Witch Panic) examined construction of a morally disengaged pretext for scapegoating in the victim complex developed in reaction to the witch stereotype, as witch-hunters rendered themselves cause and cure of the same problem. It looked at deviance production as a form of moral disengagement through exploration of victim-blaming tropes like the Sexual Pact and the Witches' *Sabbat*, examining similarities with the Ancient Fantasy. It focused on the use of misogyny as a pretext for male witch-hunters to fashion themselves victims of demonised female sexuality, while justifying human rights abuses as 'righteous persecution' and accusing critics of heresy via the False Dilemma.

Case Study II (Communist Panic) did so by examining the victim complex developed in reaction to the communist stereotype, as anti-communists also rendered themselves cause and cure of the same problem. It looked at deviance production as a form of moral disengagement through exploration of victim-blaming tropes like the 'Radical Alien,' 'Red Channels' and the 'Domino theory,' examining similarities with the Paranoid Style and, where religion was invoked, the Ancient Fantasy. It focused on patriotism, Americanism, 'national security' and 'defence of American interests' as pretexts for 'reinterpretation of American ideals,' victimisation of dissenters and opposition political organisers, denial of constitutional rights, human rights abuses and imperialist war.

Case Study III (Terror Panic) did so by examining the victim complex developed in reaction to the Islamic terrorist stereotype, with the result that counterterrorism experts again rendered themselves cause and cure of the same problem. It looked at deviance production as a form of moral disengagement through exploration of victim-blaming tropes like 'Islamic Mafia,' 'League of Terror' and 'terrorist international.' It examined similarities with the Paranoid Style and Ancient Fantasy reflected in heavy religious overtones, and focused on patriotism, democratic norms, freedom, civilised values, 'national security' and 'defence of American interests' as pretexts for the subversion of democracy, imperialist aggression and human rights abuses.

All forms of legitimation were superficially different insofar as the ideological rationalisations of the self-serving victim complex and moral disengagement varied with the situational contexts and specific momentary needs of elites and their ideological courtiers and servants. Nevertheless, in each case study, a stereotype produced through deviance amplification established the groundwork ideologically for a victim complex enabling elites to rationalise all they claimed to oppose through victim-playing and victim-blaming in the name of defending what they undermined and destroyed. In so doing the victim complex enabled them to demonise targets for scapegoating and anyone defending their targets for scapegoating or challenging their power as the existential threats in theory they represented in fact.

IV. *Persecution phase: crisis leveraging through scapegoating.* In each case study, engineers of moral panic, having pronounced crises in self-serving terms, proceeded to actively leverage them through the persecution of scapegoats, effecting self-serving solutions to crises of their own making through state terrorism and other acts profoundly antithetical to, and generally destructive of the universal values in whose name they were being enacted. In persecuting scapegoats, elites and their ideological servants reasserted ideological legitimacy, reconstructed political orthodoxies around new contingencies and re-established a status quo that would preserve their class power, privileges and control.

Case Study I (Witch Panic) demonstrated crisis leveraging via scapegoating in examining the rise of the European Witch Hunts in open reaction to peasant uprisings including the French Jacquerie, the

English Peasant Rebellion and the German Peasant War. Case Study II (Communist Panic) did so by examining the emergence of multiple Red Scares and the Cold War in open reaction to worker organisation and agitation, and movements for independent development in the second and third worlds. Case Study III (Terror Panic) did so by examining the emergence of what this study describes as the First and Second Terror Scares, campaigns of transnational state terrorism perpetrated in reaction to challenges actual and potential to imperial world order.

Case Study I focused on watershed Witch Trials in Valais, Trier, Lancashire and East Berwick, exploring their function as theocratic terror cum 'Inquisitorial theatre.' It assessed the function of this terror in enabling the Catholic hierarchy to reinvent itself on an ideologically legitimate foundation, as crusaders against Satan, and in so doing to re-establish its ideological hegemony, while suppressing threats to its power and imposing an ideologically rigid status quo on a foundation of misogyny and authoritarianism. Case Study II focused on the Americanisation campaign initiated prior to the First Red Scare, the Palmer Raids, the HUAC Hollywood Show Trials and 'McCarthyism.' It assessed the function of this terror in enabling a bought political class of corporate subsidiaries in public office to reinvent its own ideological legitimacy as crusaders against 'Communism,' thereby defending ruling class and geopolitical hegemony, while suppressing threats to power and imposing an ideologically rigid status quo on a foundation of xenophobia, corporatism and reactionary authoritarianism.

Case Study III focused on the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, exploring these state terrorisms as means for imperialist neoconservatives to reinvent aggression and other war crimes on an ideologically legitimate foundation, as terrorist crusaders against 'Terrorism.' A quiescent complicit corporate media manufactured consent through panic-driven show trial by media, implicitly defending imperialist hegemony and multinational corporate supremacy, while explicitly persecuting minorities, provoking hate crimes, undermining civil and human rights, suppressing threats to imperial order geopolitically and imposing an ideologically rigid global status quo on a foundation of xenophobia, disaster capitalism and corporate supremacism.

All forms of persecution were superficially different insofar as the persecutors and persecuted were materially unique, and insofar as the specific scapegoating discourses were specific to each individual

circumstance. Nevertheless, in all cases, moral panic provided ideological cover for gross criminality, up to and including state terrorism, that would not be as easily perpetrated where deviance production had not disengaged society from its moral anchors. The ideals whose defence formed the pretext for such criminality also enabled engineers of moral panic to dress up their violence in positive terms and rescue themselves from accountability for the consequences of their own actions.

V. *Restoration Phase: The Beneficiaries of Moral Panic Collect.* In each case study, panic-leveraged scapegoating, built on crises framed by the identification of vested elite interests with the common good, enabled servicing of those elite interests in opposition to and destruction of the abstract moral values of the societies they ruled over.

Case Study I (Witch Panic) demonstrated how and where the beneficiaries of moral panic collected by examining the role played by Witch Panic in providing cover for social engineering to overcome the breakdown of feudal class relations and restore class society, reconstructed on a new mode of production that would eventually develop into industrial capitalism. Case Study II (Communist Panic) did so by examining the role played by Communist Panic in providing cover for the rise, outside of all democratic processes, of the legal principle of corporate personhood, and for the subsequent establishment of a second master for the law—an immortal one that could draw on deep financial reserves in defence of its vested interests. Case Study III on Terror Panic demonstrated how and where the beneficiaries of moral panic collected by examining the role played by Terror Panic in providing cover for the maintenance of post-war US military and economy hegemony and the nascent corporate supremacism it underwrote.

Case Study I examined the function of the European Witch Hunts in imposing patriarchal social relations on the peasant women of Europe, inclusive of the new social role of 'broodmare for capital,' domestic slaves required to reproduce the labour force as a historical gratuity of unholy proportions to private accumulation. Case Study II explored the function of multiple Red Scares in crushing popular threats to corporate capture of liberal democracy, and that of the Cold War in crushing movements internationally for independent development free of the multinational spread of US corporations. Case Study III explored the function

of multiple Terror Scares in during up declining US hegemony and the use of US military power to achieve the goals that its weakening economic power no longer could, principally through wars of aggression over control of finite hydrocarbon resources in the Middle East.

All forms of restoration were superficially different insofar as the social and class composition of each historical scenario gave rise, within the context of class-divided societies and the overarching imperatives of elites and their ideological servants to save power and privilege from threats from below, to somewhat varying motivations and outcomes. In the case of the European Witch Hunts, this imperative manifested as the rescuing of class society per se from levelling, horizontal social tendencies; in the case of the Red Scares and Cold War, it appeared instead as the imperative to suppress democratic thrusts in the service of class warfare and imperialism, and in the case of the Terror Scares, maintain control over declining natural resources. Nevertheless, in each case, the construction of a moral panic, in addition to providing a scapegoating mechanism for social conflict, disorder and dysfunctionality associated with the maintenance of class privileges and the domination of class elites, also facilitated surreptitious political changes to those ends. It is of particular note that these changes appear to reflect a continuity in the development of world order. The salvaging of class society out of the decline of feudalism was enabled through three centuries of Witch Panic. This established the basic capitalist framework for the eventual rise of corporate power amidst Communist Panic, which in turn established the imperial world order on which the totalitarian power of transnational corporations is based. Terror Panic was required as a means of mobilising popular support around elite interests in defence of that imperial world order once established. In each case, moral panic served to mask the true purposes of the actions carried out in their names—purposes, to the extent that actions speak louder than words, measurable by their outcomes.

These conclusions are consistent with what we have established about scapegoating as a concept, insofar as it presumes both privileges to defend and the power to shift blame. In the specific context of the three case studies, and given their historical continuity, they can be seen to have laid the basis for the construction and development of a new global empire, a *Pax Americana*. In comparing the two, we might conceive of a *Pax Imperio*—the broader meaning perhaps of the observation from author Philip K. Dick that 'the empire never ended.' Its present iteration

we might conceive of as a *Pax Capital*.[2] These concepts are arguably crucial insofar as they help us to conceptualise a counter-frame through which to be able to perceive the Oldest Trick in the Book as it plays out historically and in the present—in so doing, in the words of Black Flag, rise above the jealous cowards who try to control. If the fundamental lie of the Oldest Trick in the Book is born of instituting a controlling logic in the name of opposing it, then counter-frames that transcend it are a must, even if establishing them necessitates neologisms through which they can be envisioned.

The Imperial Peace

This study began by arguing that scapegoating doth never prosper— for if scapegoating does prosper, none dare call it such. It argued that none dare call it such because the rationale for scapegoating becomes the enabling ideology for the status quo and the vested interests behind it, and that this fact doesn't change because, for whatever other differences exist, the dynamics of societies riven by class hierarchies never change. Those who benefit from class hierarchy and the privileges afforded dominant social classes always seek to protect those privileges from levelling tendencies. The desire to protect and maintain injustice provides the fundamental motive for scapegoating; as noted in the introduction to this study, we do not carry out scapegoating campaigns to protect nothing. Thus we find a strong tendency of history to repeat on this basis, while scapegoating discourses, along with the mechanics that drive all of them regardless of their window-dressing, are written out of history in the process of being normalised and incorporated into a hierarchy-based status quo. This study has argued that this has been a result of the fact that history is written by the victors. In demonstrating that scapegoating doth in fact prosper, and that it doth in fact prosper greatly because history is written by the Victors, the case studies tend towards the conclusion that the history written by the Victors is that of the *Pax Imperio*—a peace without justice that exists outside of, and in conflict with, historical facts unfavourable to prevailing power structures constructed atop, and for the purpose of sustaining, class hierarchy.

[2] 'There's class warfare, all right,' Mr. Buffett said, 'but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning.' Steinnov, Ben, 'In Class Warfare, Guess Which Class Is Winning,' *New York Times*, 26 November 2006, via http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/business/yourmoney/26every.html, accessed 19 March 2018.

If the evidence supplied in preceding chapters is anything to go by, the *Pax Imperio* reveals and asserts itself in the form of an ideologically driven emotional hijacking at each Mobilisation stage, where politicised crisis based on the invocation of a binary logic between Self and Other, or Nature vs Society, is created, associating the interests of elites with the broad interests of society. This lays the basis for a Targeting phase, where deviance production begets an imaginary hobgoblin or existential threat, setting the scene for granting of the proverbial Two Minutes Hate. The process progresses to a Legitimation phase, resulting in an ideologically constructed victim complex built atop the 'if you think for yourself, the evildoers win' logic of the False Dilemma, which rationalises the persecution to come during in the Persecution phase, where the fruits of crisis leveraging and scapegoating are borne. Finally, a Restoration phase transfers the largesse from the panic to its architects, the moral entrepreneurs of the *Pax Imperio*. As the commonalities between the case studies reflect, servicing of the *Pax Imperio* capitalises on priming features of moral panic to link new panics with remnants of priors on the basis of cultural archetypes—Cohn's Ancient Fantasy and Hofstadter's Paranoid Style.

We find on the basis of these observations and the evidence supporting them that the Oldest Trick in the Book constitutes a dominant theme in history, if not the primary form in which history repeats itself. The continuing prevalence of the Ancient Fantasy and Paranoid Style as existential threat archetypes, perpetually recycled with the aid of stereotype priming, suggests a kind of a historical feedback loop taking the form in practical terms of something approaching a collective psychosis. The perpetual war of Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* examined at the beginning of this study serves as a useful literary metaphor for this historical feedback loop; regular doses of Two Minutes Hate induce ideologically rooted amnesia expediting fertile soil for the constructions of scapegoats in collective paranoia—in this instance, the geopolitical enemy and followers of Emmanuel Goldstein. With apologies to commentary from Andy Warhol to the effect of everyone in the modern world having fifteen minutes of fame, every moral panic allows us all our own Two Minutes Hate.

Miller's *The Crucible* offers a textbook example of the proverbial Two Minutes enabled by the *Pax Imperio*. In comparing the Salem Witch Trials and the Second Red Scare, Miller reveals a historical continuity between premodern and modern societies, insofar as the

premodern power dynamics of the Witch Trials are also visible in the Red Scares and Terror Scares in the form of deviance production, moral disengagement and stereotype priming. Both Orwell and Miller revisit pre-Enlightenment mentalities within modernity, under forms of democratic government alleged to have dispensed with lawlessness and the tyranny of the strong over the weak—a fact that appears to account in no small part for the fact that the Oldest Trick in the Book does in fact remain the oldest. Normalisation of moral panic within modernity through the writing of history produced through panic-driven scapegoating is reflected in the far-right rejection of modernism, placing it squarely in the milieu of the European Witch Hunts. In that sense, the Witch Hunts were perhaps more honest than any more recent examples of panic-driven scapegoating; while even liberal modernists often reveal few compunctions in abandoning the allegedly civilised morés of modernity in the name of defending them, medieval theocrats seemed to suffer no such conflicts. The only real difference is perhaps that modern moral entrepreneurs attend their morality plays and abandonment of the kinds of concerns about authoritarian overreach typically associated with Enlightenment thinking with an extra sprinkling of guilt (sometimes).

Normalisation of moral panic within modernity represents the basis for the ongoing currency of scapegoating discourse embodied in the Oldest Trick in the Book. The central premise that 'society' is beset by an 'existential' threat has been and continues to be characteristically defined in opposition to the status quo of class privilege, demanding a political response that reinforces that status quo while enabling policies and actions serving them in advance and aiming to hold the victims accountable for the consequences. In the case studies examined in preceding chapters, the 'existential' threat appears as witchcraft, communism and terrorism, though numerous others remain for further scrutiny (the initial problem in starting this study as it happens was working out what to exclude). While the window dressing differs, the underlying dynamics remain the same.

We find from the empirical evidence then that Terror Panic shares commonalities with Communist Panic; these we might describe in terms perhaps of 'Rogue Regime' and the 'Expansionist Threat' tropes. Similarly, Communist Panic referenced tropes Witch Panic tropes in what we might characterise in terms of the 'Diabolical Cabal' and 'Useful Idiots of Evil' tropes or archetypes. Through the logic of the

False Dilemma, failures to defer to ruling class power are associated with the prevailing imaginary hobgoblin, while anti-hobgoblin crusades disguise ulterior motives in the servicing of vested interests. As the preceding case studies reveal, this pursuit of ulterior motives in the servicing of vested interests can take a variety of different forms—from the reconstruction of class power and forced economic development towards industrial capitalism in the case of witch panic, the repression of organised resistance to the rise of corporate power in the case of communist panic, and the defence and maintenance of imperial world order in the case of terror panic. As case studies pointing towards a feature of history tending to repeat itself episodically, these episodes are representative of broader tendencies and innumerable other examples. As noted above, the reader will likely not have a great deal of trouble thinking of others.

The pursuit of ulterior motives in the servicing of vested interests under conditions of scapegoating carried out under conditions of moral panic reveals the *cui bono* of the discourses that arise from them, reflecting the fundamental reality that ruling classes were and remain primary material beneficiaries of panic-driven scapegoating. This fact helps to account for Voltaire's truism that 'It is dangerous to be right in matters where established men are wrong.' On this count, the role of Oldest Trick in the Book in helping established men became and remain so reflects its character as an institutional and permanent feature of societies beset by class tyranny and perpetual class warfare waged by elites and their ideological servants and courtiers.

The Capitalist Peace

As a service to the class tyranny manifest in the *Pax Imperio*, the case studies reveal panic-driven scapegoating as the ideological expression of elite counter-revolution. It is hardly a coincidence that, for all their preoccupation with existential threats from without, panic-fuelled conspiracy theories and the paranoid discourses associated with them are blind to economic class divisions and all their injustice, inequality and misery. Likewise are they purposefully blind to hierarchical social relations, with all their attendant oppression and injustice—much less to say the predatory capitalist gaze that sees workers, women, peoples of the Global South, the flora and fauna and finally the Earth itself simply as objects whose only value is exploitability for profit. If the evidence examined

in the preceding case studies is anything to go by, enabling predation can be understood as the underlying function of the scapegoating functions critical to establishing and maintaining class power—a product of the reflexive tendency to equate the vested interests of elites with the moral Good, so as to conflate challenges to power and privilege with one or another constructed bogeyman. In this respect, The Oldest Trick in the Book might be considered then to reflect and sustain then a *Pax Capital*—the latest incarnation of the peace without justice characteristic of the *Pax Imperio.*

Problematically however, the transnational corporate empire at the centre of the *Pax Capital* is threatened by periodic crises yet, be they crises of accumulation like the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, or unforeseen consequences of treating the planet like an infinite resource and infinite garbage dump in climate change. As in the *Pax Imperio* writ large, conditions within the *Pax Capital* periodically generate the need for panic-driven scapegoating, and so existential threats to posit in opposition to the threatened power and privileges of elites. In every instance these are conflated with an ideological abstraction with which the mass of the population can identify, and in so doing be mobilised around elite class interests to the detriment of their own. Where its internal crises are becoming critical, as in the case of climate change, transnational corporate elites are faced with the problem of how to deal with critical systemic problems that have historically been swept under the rug purely out of convenience. While some will no doubt try to blame the effects of climate change on refugees, alleged terrorists or 'watermelons' for a while, in the final analysis climate change itself, what happens when we keep using panic-driven scapegoating to sweep history under the rug, will not bear the Oldest Trick in the Book.

The conundrum for elites and their ideological courtiers and intellectual enablers within the paradigm of the *Pax Capital* then is that, if we are to resolve the actual existential threat of climate change, those who created the problem by treating the Earth an infinite resource and infinite garbage dump must be made accountable. A future beyond climate change demands overcoming the historical legacy of panic-driven scapegoating, as there are no class privileges on a dead planet. If in collectively recognising this fact we are to come to terms with this legacy, we must also recognise that under the *Pax Capital* we inhabit merely the latest iteration of a kind of historical feedback loop, one that causes history to skip over like a broken record. We must recognise, in contrast to

allegations from Francis Fukuyama concerning the 'end of history,' that history has not yet *begun*—at least not as something subject to its writing by the Victors in the name of ensuring that Scapegoating Doth Never Prosper. Expressed in conspiracy theories, history dominated by victorious ruling classes dominates our collective destiny, 'projecting' all they do not wish to address onto a convenient target cast through deviance production as the Other. They permit the rest of us a proverbial Two Minutes Hate for an orgy of authoritarian co-dependency in naming and denouncing what we fear most about ourselves while directing blame onto our victims.

As a defining facet of the Capitalist Peace, the invitation to participate in panic-driven Two Minutes Hate in the name of servicing elite power through scapegoating represents the classic imperial strategy of divide and conquer. Such offers token privileges to subject classes on the basis of various forms of identity politics—whites against non-whites, men against women, the heterosexual against LGBTIs, the able-bodied against the differently abled, rich against poor and any other possible binary anyone can think of. Informal social hierarchies measuring every possible kind of difference measurable against the proverbial Life Plan from Birth provide further opportunities for competition and round out the process of stratification and social division. All such preoccupations serve to blind targets of the Oldest Trick in the Book to campaigns by elites, their mouthpieces in corporate media and their wholly owned subsidiaries in national governments to resolve the terminal crises of late capitalism through the strategies of scapegoating that produced them. Subject to Divide-and-Conquer preoccupations, we fail to recognise panic-driven conspiracy theories as ruling class self-talk, or 'dog-whistling,' tending instead to confuse it with facts established through empirical inquiry, such that we assume the truth of an idea is determined by the number of people who believe it and that the power to control the meaning of words is tantamount to command of facts. In reality, neither of these assumptions are true, but the effect of panic-driven scapegoating discourses associated with the Oldest Trick in the Book is to establish pretences to the contrary, reinforcing stereotypes that direct rather than reflect reality. Scapegoating discourses render engineers of moral panics cause and cure of the same problem, permanent victims of crises for whom others are always to blame. As such, they guarantee the continued existence of vicious cycles of blame and violent retribution, and their completely and utterly foreseeable and preventable consequences, which

are inevitably used to launch new iterations of such vicious cycles again and again and again.

Reduced to its fundamental logic, the scapegoating mentality of the Oldest Trick on the Book and the vicious cycles of violence to which it gives rise is one Chomsky describes in terms of children fighting in a sandpit over a spade; one child has the spade, while the other child covets it. The second child hits the first, and takes the spade, and when an adult comes to investigate the howling from the first child, the second child cooks up a story about the spade having been his originally, and the first child being a thief who stole it from him.[3] Here the first child arguably represents classes and nations, while the second child represents moral entrepreneurs from amongst the courtiers, servants and enablers of class hierarchy and social and economic privilege; the lie to the adult amounts to the panic-driven scapegoating conspiracy theory. The spade represents the state terrorism used to force the situation to the preference of the child who covets the spade and maintain an unjust peace. While the lie told in the sandpit is a small lie, the lie told through channels of mass communication becomes the Big Lie ('the bigger the lie, the more people will believe it'). The child who covets the spade and hits the other represents tyrants and tyrannical dominant classes (and perhaps, to stretch the metaphor even further, their collective narcissism). The prevalence of what the sandpit mentality represents in these terms condemns us to repeat history endlessly, subject to collective psychosis swirling like an inner black hole around the 'if you think for yourself, the evildoers win' logic of the False Dilemma. While the window dressing changes and updates to suit new circumstances, the logic of children fighting over a plastic spade in the sandpit remains the same, as do the hierarchical social relations of domination and control that sustain it.

As we try to extricate ourselves from historical circumstances rooted in and sustained by the mentality of children fighting in a sandpit, we find then that, where those with a mind for conflict and oppression always seek to exonerate themselves of blame, those of us not inclined to substitute economic growth for personal growth and have a mind for justice and peace start by asking what role our own actions play in creating conflict. We find that those who seek justice and peace in actions

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[3] Personal correspondence, 23 November 2017. Chomsky speculates in reading the draft that the two are brothers, the child who covets the spade being the older of the two—the 'Big Brother,' as it were.

as well as words refuse to submit to provocations, while those who seek conflict and oppression blame our enemies for our own failure to restrain ourselves from being provoked. In the construction of moral panics for the purposes of scapegoating, this represents all the difference between the child with the spade and the one who covets it, between those on the take, and those in the way. If this study is any indication, the presence in the public realm of any of the features of panic-driven scapegoating discussed herein will indicate the scheming of the small child who covets the spade and is willing to hit the other and then lie to get what they want. In capturing the logic of panic-driven scapegoating, especially insofar as it represents the elevation of an infantile tantrum to the level of ideology, a tantrum that becomes pathological and violent in the process, the sandpit metaphor also encapsulates the collectively paranoid and sociopathic sickness at its core.

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