

Draft Paper: Line of Amity, Line of Enmity, Large Policy Men and the *American Großraum*

by

Christopher R. Rossi, UiT, The Arctic University of Norway

Carl Schmitt's intrigue with the Monroe Doctrine as an American *Großraum* is an essential component of his critique of nihilistic geopolitics (Schmitt 2003; Schmitt 1939). Schmitt concentrated on this *Großraum* because it analogously inspired and usurped his theoretical attempt to frame one for Germany when he began writing *Nomos of the Earth* during WWII (Orsi 2019; Reilly 2009, 1; Carty 2001; Gruchmann 1962).¹ Although literally translated to mean "Great Space," Schmitt's usage intended the term to mean sphere of influence or geopolitical space (Beneyto 2020, 1478; Elden 2010, 19; Rossi 2018 a, 633; Schmitt 1939, 52 n. 1). Schmitt's interest in the Monroe Doctrine remains influential but it is in need of supplementation. Schmitt imparted normative significance to his notion of *Großraum*, but the sustaining influence of his critique eclipses a fuller appreciation of integrative, egalitarian, and historically informed aspects of the doctrine to which it is commonly associated. This paper adapts Schmitt's conceptual framework in view of international and domestic political considerations attaching to the Monroe Doctrine with an aim toward imparting concrete complexity to Schmitt's spatial abstraction.

Lines of Demarcation

Schmitt's general idea of the *Großraum* required demarcations. These demarcations connected to his involved understanding of *nomos*, a term that implied apportionment and which derived from the Greek meanings "to divide" and "to pasture" (*nemein*) (Schmitt 2003, 78, 70). He noted in the first line of *The Concept of the Political* that the concept of the state

¹ Schmitt also lectured on *Großraum* weeks after the 1938 Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, a lecture that "contributed to his moniker as *Kronjurist* to the Third Reich" (Rossi 2018 a, 634).

presupposed the concept of the political (Schmitt 2007, 19). He expounded on the political as the natural organizing condition of the person, who created telluric boundaries or actual physical carvings in the earth to actually take (*nehmen*) or appropriate land. This possessory attribute of *nomos* developed historically into the sovereign state, which conceptually formed after the cartographic disruption to the Ptolemaic worldview wrought by the discovery of the New World. Schmitt's lines of demarcation extended beyond the geographic. For Schmitt, the state personified a dialectic line of distinction that represented what it meant to be political, and what it meant to be human. He referred to this distinction as the friend/enemy distinction (Schmitt 2007, 26). Schmitt regarded this distinction as fundamental to the human condition and he regarded the conflict it created as a feature of an ordered world. To Schmitt, this condition of conflict inextricably formed part of the political; it occupied "a permanent presence . . . at the origin of order (Galli and Fay 2010, 2)."

In Schmitt's mind, the ordered world of states created boundary lines to demarcate friends and enemies. Hither to, or within the demarcation line was the pluralistic *nomos* of the friend and ally—who formed a community of shared values or minimally *understandings*, which managed the human instinct to dominate. Schmitt associated these shared values with the common code of European conduct (*inter gentes Europae*) to limit war (Schmitt 2003[1974]). Nether to, or beyond the line was the primordial *nomos* of the Other—the enemy—who inhabited an unregulated or undistinguished space and to whom the rules and understandings did not apply. This was a lawlessly unlimited spatial order "that denied the political and historical contemporaneity of regions beyond" the *jus publicum* (Netzloff 2019, 56). Here, the unrestricted activities of Europeans resulted in the understood condition that there was 'No peace beyond the line' (König 2015).² For Schmitt, the friend-enemy dialectic,

² Schmitt took pains to note that the founding of the Congo Free State after the Berlin Conference also contributed to the demise of the traditional concept of European international

like all political concepts, contained an inescapable and concrete tension that separated amity from enmity, good from bad, order from disorder, and dominance from servitude (Schmitt 2009, 5; Schmitt 2007, 27).

Schmitt's almost obsessive interest in the Monroe Doctrine involved spatial and normative critiques of its line of demarcation. The spatial framework of this American *Großraum* decentered the structured operation of his idea of the *jus publicum europaeum* and ended his wistfully C(c)atholic bracketing of civility and international order (Scarfi 2020, 1474; Koskenniemi 2004, 495). His international order had modeled the *jus publicum europaeum* in line with French and Spanish negotiated Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559): Territories south of the Tropic of Cancer and west of the prime meridian (the Azores) fell beyond the line(s) of European amity (Mattingly 1963, 145, 149). These divisions allowed for the 300-year imperial domination of the Indigenous peoples and landscapes of the Americas. It began to end in the early nineteenth century following the retreat of Metropolitan powers, principally Spain and France, then Britain and Russia.³ By the end of the nineteenth century, the US began to form a new, dangerous, and de-personalized *Raum*—a normative *nomos* framed by the emerging *jus publicum Americanum*.

law because of the disorder associated with exporting the idea of the *publicum* beyond the European line of amity (Schmitt 2003, 217-21)

³ The demise of Spanish imperial rule in the Americas began with Simón Bolívar's widespread revolutionary independence movement in 1810. France's retreat from much of North America began with sale of the Louisiana Territory to the US in 1803. British interests in North and Central America waned after resolution of the Oregon Territory dispute in 1846 and between the periods marked by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 1850 and its abrogation with the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1901. The period between these treaties marked intense suspicions about British regional and hemispheric intentions regarding its holdings in Central America, including its historical presence on the Mosquito Coast, its interests in British Honduras [Belize], the Bay Islands off the Atlantic coast of Honduras and control over the Isthmus of Panama, long identified as the likely pathway for a transoceanic concourse or waterway between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Russia's imperial claims to the northern Pacific Coast in the Americas ended in 1867 with the sale of Alaska to the US.

This new *publicum* promoted the US' seductive creeds of republicanism, liberalism and internationalism and it had turned the Monroe Doctrine inside-out. Although originally construed as a defensive shield against external hemispheric interference, its twentieth century incarnation reworked the Monroe Doctrine into an adulterated nihilistic projection—a new *nomos* that eroded Schmitt's concept of the state and replaced his bracketed Eurocentric idea of the *publicum* with a spaceless Anglo-American universalism (Teschke, 2011, 181).

Schmitt regarded this new *nomos* as a global linear expression of intervention (Schmitt 1939, 52), founded on naval supremacy, which untethered the *rayas geográficas* (geo-spatial dividing lines) that provided spatial dimension and true meaning to the *publicum* (Gruchmann 121). In Schmittian terms, the new global order revealed itself to be a normless *nomos* (Antaki 2004, 322)—a destructured (*raumlose*), borderless, groundless (telluric-less) exportation of spatially undifferentiated political theology (Schmitt 1939, 47). This normless *nomos* would not serve the bracketed ordering of his *publicum* as regulated by the dialectical conflict between the friend and enemy, but rather the abstract political theology of techno-managerialism (*Technizität*), corporatism, Anglo-Saxon capital, and propagandism (Schmitt 48) masquerading as liberalism, Good Neighborly non-intervention,⁴ free exchange, and rational choice.

Schmitt's idea of the Monroe Doctrine as a cooptation of the spatial construct of the *Großraum* has grown significantly due to his rediscovery by critical theorists in the 1970s and 1980s (*Telos* 1987; Ulmen 1987; Ulmen and Piccone 1987; Habermas 1989; Luke 2009). Despite his reprehensible affiliation with Nazism and anti-Semitism—and National Socialism's bio-organic cooptation of *Raum* studies (Ratzel 1897; Kjellén 1917) under the

⁴ US President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the Good Neighbor policy to “resolutely respect[] the rights of others ...and ...the sanctity of ...agreements in and with a world of neighbors” in his First Inaugural Address to Congress, March 4, 1933. See Avalon Project, Yale Law School https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/froos1.asp, accessed 15.05. 2023.

rubric of *Lebensraum* (Haushofer et al. 1928; Hervig 2016)—his portrayal of the American *Großraum* as a dangerous and authoritarian projection of vapid liberal values resonates today with critiques of globalism, universalism, international law and the modern and endless state of exception (Schmitt 1985 [1922], 5; Teschke 2011) involving the global war on terror (Cristi 1980). His view that liberal internationalism promotes a stealth agenda of hegemony also resonates with a variety of liberalism's critics, including realists, radicals, and reactionaries as well as humanists and theologians, who decry modernity's abnegation of community and personhood.

Schmitt influentially connected the Monroe Doctrine to liberal internationalism's tools of dominance, namely protective tariffs, colonial treaties, the rhetoric of free trade, the myth of most favored nation status, and the Shylockian deceit of the Open-Door policy (Rossi 2018 a, 621-22). Perhaps the Schmittian template now connects to other forms of authoritarian dominance, including China's emerging claims to *Großräume* involving the South China Sea and possibly the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea. The dispute over the South China Sea, the world's fifth largest body of water, suggests the non-negotiable establishment of another Sino Reich on par with Beijing's claims to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang (Rossi 2017, 231, 236-37). If China is seeking a playbook for its twenty-first century superpower ascendancy, perhaps it should look no further than the pages scripted by the US' early twentieth century *Großraum* over the Caribbean Sea.

Schmitt's powerful conception of the Monroe Doctrine as a *Großraum* maintains its currency. His interpretation provides a conceptual mannequin to dress up contemporary critiques of the doctrine's everchanging significance. However, this paper imparts more embroidered focus on the concrete tension informed by his binary and theoretical distinction between amity and enmity, or friend and enemy. This focus reveals a greater complexity to the domestic and hemispheric considerations that attach to the Monroe Doctrine's twentieth

century expression than Schmitt's orientation would ever allow. To be sure, Schmitt's treatment of the Monroe Doctrine has solid grounding. Yet the Monroe Doctrine also helped to animate conversations of regional integration, sovereign equality, and anti-imperialism, sentiments that residually inform hemispheric relations today, as fraught as they may otherwise appear.

This paper draws on diplomacy and foreign policy emphases of the English School (Butterfield & Wight 1968; James 1973; Linklater 2011) to better inform critical interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine's contemporary and indeed lasting twenty-first century significance mindful of Schmitt's brooding, powerful yet ultimately stilted interpretation. To understand the Monroe Doctrine's everchanging significance, it is critical to revisit the tempestuous hemispheric period between 1890 and 1914 and the Large Policy Men who attempted to braid together the competing interests and ideals of the emerging American *Großraum*. Their imprint on the Monroe Doctrine facilitated Schmitt's coming and sustaining association of the Monroe Doctrine with an array of metonymies for imperialism, nihilism, and subjugation.

An Interlude: The 1914 American Society of International Law Meeting

The entire substantive agenda of the annual meeting of 1914 American Society of International Law dealt with the continuing significance of US President James Monroe's 1823 message to European powers to stay clear of colonial intrusion in the Americas. Participants in the conference discussed the Monroe Doctrine as a "gospel of peace" and hemispheric unity (Proceedings [Wambaugh] 1914, 119), as a cornerstone of US foreign policy, and as "a right of self-protection" (Proceedings [Root], 11)—a proto-formulation of regionalism and peace maintenance as expressed in the League of Nations Covenant (Article 21) and in the UN Charter's rights of individual and collective self-defense (Article 51) and self-determination (Article 1(2)).

Some conference participants declared that the doctrine had outlived its purpose. The Holy Alliance in Europe no longer posed a threat to order in the New World (Proceedings [Hoynes] 200). The US had ascended to world power status over the intervening 91 years and, critically, had long before foreshadowed its improving naval capabilities with coordinated operations on the Pacific coast and in the Gulf of Mexico during the Mexican-American War (1846-48).⁵ Any supposed “spirit of guardianship” embedded in the doctrine purportedly had been supplanted by “strong, stable nations in South America [that] no longer need[ed] the protection of this traditional foreign policy” (Proceedings [Blakeslee] 217-18).

US President Theodore Roosevelt had declared almost a decade before that “certain republics to the south . . . had already reached . . . a point of stability [where] they themselves . . . are among the guarantors of [the] Doctrine” (Message of the President 1905). The scion of US diplomacy, Elihu Root, had toured South America in 1906 and had asserted an “all-American” project of hemispheric unity with the “elder sisters in the civilization of America” (Rossi 2019, 59). Forwarding Alexander Hamilton’s republican idea of cis-Atlantic “regions of futurity,” regions that would teach moderation to “that assuming brother [Europe]” (Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 11), Root repeatedly “emphasized the historical likenesses or ‘past commonalities among countries of the Western Hemisphere’” that would make the twentieth century “the century of phenomenal development in South America” (Rossi 2019,

⁵ The Mexican-American War demonstrated US rising seaborne capability, nowhere near evident in 1823 when the Monroe Doctrine was announced. At war’s outset, the US Navy “made the seizure of Mexican Pacific coast ports from Mazatlán up the California coast to Oregon an almost immediate objective . . . a stratagem motivated more because of Britain’s designs on California rather than grievances with Mexico.” It then opened up a second theatre in the Gulf of Mexico, “blockading then seizing key ports of Veracruz and Tampico in the Yucatan Peninsula. Establishing this two-theatre naval operation in seas [4,023 km] apart by land and [22,531 km] apart by sea” impacted significantly US thoughts about naval capability and impacted the development of Manifest Destiny (Rossi 2015, 823).

136). Even supporters of the doctrine could not deny that “another world had . . . come into existence” since the doctrine had been enunciated (Proceedings [Adams] 30).

Other participants were more unsure of the Monroe Doctrine itself, not because it had become a foreign policy anachronism, but because of what else it had become (Proceedings [Hull], 156). The doctrine had originally been presented as a line of amity to defend fledgling American republics, uphold sovereign equality, and promote hemispheric fraternity. Its shortcoming as a militarily enforceable policy imparted more bluster than menace to its European interpretation, although its defense against monarchical interference broadly reflected rising republican sentiments across the Americas. However, concerns arose that it had transmuted amid a maw of corollaries and doctrines—the Olney Doctrine, the Cleveland Doctrine, the Lodge Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Lodge Corollary, the American Doctrine, the (soon-to-be announced) Wilson Doctrine, as well as Latin American qualifiers such as the Calvo Clause, the Drago Doctrine and the forthcoming Meléndez Doctrine—into a blunt line of enmity, a foreign policy bludgeon of imperial anti-colonialism (Williams 1959) to punish both internal and external challengers to US hemispheric authority. One participant reminded the conferees that US President Grover Cleveland’s Secretary of State, Richard Olney had “far out-Monroed Monroe” when he expounded his eponymous doctrine in 1895 that the US’ great distance from Europe made it the “practical sovereign” on the continent with “fiat” power on “the subject to which it confines its interposition” (Olney 1895).

The near history of the doctrine and its linear attributes of amity and enmity weighed on the minds of the conference participants. President Cleveland, in his famous 1895 Message to Congress (drafted mostly by Olney), had elevated the Monroe Doctrine to a principle of international law (Message [Cleveland] 1895)⁶ while presenting a thinly-veiled ultimatum

⁶ Responding to communications addressed by the British prime minister to his ambassador Paunceforte in Washington, Cleveland declared: “[The Monroe Doctrine] may not have been

(Humphreys 1967, 155)⁷ to Britain to arbitrate a long-simmering boundary dispute with Venezuela over British Guiana and control of the Orinoco River (Schoenrich 1944).⁸

Cleveland revived the Monroe Doctrine but his actions oriented it along the contours of his generally anti-imperialistic foreign policy objectives. These objectives tended to limit entangling alliances and territorial expansion, as his foreign policy record indicated. He withdrew from senatorial consideration the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty, which would have created an option with Nicaragua to construct and co-manage a transisthmian canal. He negotiated an end to a festering dispute involving North Atlantic fishing rights off Canada and Newfoundland, and an end to the inherited dispute between Britain and Russia over Alaska's boundary with the Canadian Yukon. He resisted German imperial moves to abrogate a neutrality treaty (1889 General Act of Berlin) to gain control over coaling stations in the Samoan archipelago during the Samoan civil war (Cleveland 1889), and most notably resisted (only to delay) the annexation of Hawai'i during its period of civil strife.

admitted in so many words to the code of international law, but . . . it has its place . . . [and finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced." Message of the President [Cleveland], Office of the Historian, US Department of State, December 17, 1895, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1895p1/d526>.

⁷ "Cleveland's message was virtually an ultimatum" (Humphreys 155)). Cleveland requested funds from Congress to order an investigation commission leading to an arbitration, stating ". . . nothing remains but to accept the situation . . . and deal with it accordingly . . . it is now incumbent upon the United States to take measures . . . I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow." Message of the President [Cleveland], *ibid*.

⁸ The Venezuelan Government began complaining about British territorial violations in 1814. Britain had acquired British Guiana (now Guyana) by treaty from the Netherlands, however the western boundary remained unclear. The British-commissioned survey done by Robert Schomburgk in 1835 drew a line (the Schomburgk Line) that granted Britain an additional 30,000 square miles, all of which disputed by Venezuela. Venezuela countered with a claim of its own, essentially extending its territorial control over two-thirds of British Guiana. A gold strike in the overlapping disputed territory resulted in another British territorial extension of the Schomburgk Line 33,000 square miles westward, prompting repeated appeals from Venezuela to the US to invoke the Monroe Doctrine (Schoenrich 1949). The dispute went to arbitration and the award found largely in favor of the British position as represented by the 1835 Schomburgk line (Award Regarding the Boundary Between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela 1899).

At the 1914 meeting, former US Secretary of State John W. Foster attempted to refine the Monroe Doctrine's meaning with his conference paper on its misconceptions and limitations. He claimed the doctrine only prevented the *permanent* occupation by European nations of any American territory or the overthrow of their political institutions. He claimed that "European governments are free to make war upon the American states, or to resort to force to support their complaints, provided they observe the two conditions . . . as to respecting territory and political institutions" (Proceedings [Foster]119-20).

Foster claimed his interpretation represented the longstanding view of the US, and he had nearby support. Roosevelt had earlier expressed Foster's informal corollary in his 1901 Message to Congress: "[T]he Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil." However, the US did not "guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, *provided that* punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power" (Roosevelt First Annual Message 1901).

Roosevelt's proviso attaching to Cleveland's assertion of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of general international law sought to except the US from its own prejudicial moralism and interventionist activity in the hemisphere. This moralism contained a racial component as well. Charles Francis Adams, grandson of John Quincy Adams—who had played a central role in the formation of the doctrine—expounded during the conference on the curious yet "still operative" racial theory, which he called Mommsen's Law. He distilled this interpretation from his reading of Theodore Mommsen's epic *History of Rome* and its theme of degeneracy due to unnatural imperial enlargement. As true as the law of gravity, any sentiment of land hunger or hegemony projected by the US in the Western Hemisphere related, according to Adams, only to police power, and was in any event limited by the political nonage of the Latins and the realization that "hegemony, practically speaking, is only

possible with communities of the same racial descent” (Proceedings [Adams] 28). One could only speak of a Pan-American family of nations as a euphemistic form of discourse (“nutritive deglutition”) (Proceedings [Adams] 32).

Revolutionary activity and political unrest had wracked American states beginning in the 1890s, and the Monroe Doctrine intended only to preclude belligerent European actions such as those posed by the Venezuelan crisis. However, the line of enmity asserted against European intrusions into the Western Hemisphere created tensions in view of a series of US belligerent occupations. Operating in accordance with the doctrine of protection of nationals, US troops had intervened in Argentina (1890), Chile (1891), Haiti (1891), Brazil (1894), Nicaragua (1894, 1896, 1898, 1899, 1907, 1910, 1912-), Cuba (1898, 1906-1909, 1912), Puerto Rico (1898-), Honduras (1903, 1907, 1911, 1912), the Dominican Republic (1903-1904), and Panama (1908, 1912) (Becker 2011).⁹ Many authorities from around the US had polled dissatisfaction with the doctrine based on such adventurism, although few supported its recission (Proceedings [Blakeslee] 219) or registered their willingness to join in a doctrinal funeral procession to bury it (Proceedings [Herrick], 196). Of 146 US professors of international law and diplomacy surveyed, only 13 believed the doctrine should be continued substantially unchanged (Blakeslee 219).

The rhetorical nineteenth century sense of common hemispheric cause had taken on the Pickwickian quality of a fraternal platitude, making it more of an obsequious liability than a foreign policy asset (Proceedings [Wheless] 171). Latin American writers referred to the doctrine with derision, likening it to the status of the Black Legend (*legenda negra*) (Benvenuto Murrieta 1935, 636), which was a propaganda tool originally developed to

⁹ The Brazil ‘intervention’ amounted to a show of naval force to protect commerce and US merchant vessels at Rio de Janeiro during a period of internal conflict. Nevertheless this showing “robbed the insurgents of all hope of victory” (da Gama, Benham and McCloskey 1946, 297).

demonize Spanish imperial rule (Juderías y Loyot 1917). However, historian George Blakeslee reminded the audience of a recent British opinion: “To the Americans the Monroe Doctrine is like God or religion to a small child—something fearful, something to inspire awe” (Blakeslee 218). One respected authority, Hiram Bingham, tore into it as an example of the US’ “patronizing insolence” (Proceedings [Bingham] 1914). He viewed it as a shibboleth for hegemonic intervention, a mutation of the idea of hemispheric fraternity and a Trojan Horse-like deception to excuse US unilateralism and interference.

The Monroe Doctrine’s Turning Point: The Venezuela Crisis

The Venezuelan crisis marked the arrival of the US’ assertion as a world power. It was the seminal turning point for the Monroe Doctrine. “For the first time [the US asserted] a more outward-looking . . . policy, particularly in the Western Hemisphere” (US Department of State, Office of the Historian), and specifically against the interests of the reigning thalassocratic power, Great Britain. The bluntness of the US’ directive to arbitrate the boundary dispute with Venezuela “startled and shocked Great Britain” (Humphreys 156). Despite indications of a pre-arranged diplomatic deal between Britain and the US (Joseph 1970, 58), the British-Guiana arbitration hardly quieted European concerns regarding Venezuela’s tumultuous political implosion. The problem of Venezuela would almost immediately reappear, not as a territorial dispute, but as a financial crisis following Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro’s 1901 default on millions of dollars in bonds owed to European creditors.

This time, the US response to European intrusions took the form of a threat of war rather than a diplomatic overture to arbitrate. There is some historical debate about the threat itself given the oblique belligerent message conveyed. However, the Monroe Doctrine’s line of enmity and a possible world war loomed ominously behind the US’ 1902 insistence that Germany, Great Britain, and Italy end their blockade and bombardment of Venezuela to force

the recovery of delinquent sovereign debts. Construed as a protective sheath, Roosevelt's actions could have been interpreted as a fraternal line of amity to shield Venezuela. However, Roosevelt held Castro's regime in contempt and thought it deserved to be punished for its corrupt internal misrule (Morison 1954, 1102). Roosevelt had originally approved of Germany's plan for self-help to collect monies owed provided that it not annex any territory (Theodore Roosevelt Center, Venezuelan Debt). However, the accumulated devastation wrought by expanded European military actions of Italy and Great Britain (involving the seizure of Venezuelan vessels, coastal bombardments, and naval blockades), resulted in the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which not only made the US the protector against European re-colonization but also deputized the US as the guarantor of Western Hemispheric order and stability.

In arriving at his expanded corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt later recalled that he had threatened to deploy Admiral Dewey and the US Navy to "supervise" foreign squadrons and "forbid their occupying one foot of [Venezuelan] territory" unless blockading powers submitted within ten days to arbitration. (Rossi 1994, 56 n. 45). His leading biographer, Edmund Morris, wrote that the "full extent of the crisis has still to be inferred from the existence of an extraordinary void, hinting at some vanished enormity" (Morris 2002, 74).

Germany and other powers (including the US, Mexico, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden and Norway) negotiated a peaceful means of settlement (Venezuelan Preferential Case 1904), marking an important, underacknowledged, even historic contribution of the Monroe Doctrine to the twentieth century *jus ad bellum* regime. Although diverted from the object of prohibiting force to recover *sovereign* debt, Hague Convention II restricted recourse to war for purposes of recovering *contract* debts (Hague Convention II, 1907). It marked the first restriction of a state's previously unfettered right to

resort to war and facilitated a fervent internationalist movement, which resulted merely two decades later in the complete outlawry of war (General Treaty for Renunciation of War, 1928).

*

Elihu Root bookended the conference with opening and closing remarks. Root's priority of place at the conference stemmed from his stature as the co-founder (along with James Brown Scott in 1906) and long-time President of the American Society of International Law (from 1906 to 1924). Root had a distinguished pedigree as a US statesman (Secretary of War, 1899-1904, Secretary of State, 1905-1909, US Senator from New York (1909-1915), principal architect of numerous arbitration agreements) and he made it his objective to set the tone of the conference by reminding its participants about the "Real Monroe Doctrine" (Root 1914). He viewed it as an unchanging expression of virtuous republicanism that bound together a hemispheric identity borne of common cause—the struggle against European colonization and domination (Root 1914).

Root had been awarded the 1912 Nobel Prize (received in 1913) in large part due to his attempts to strengthen hemispheric amity. His remarkably successful and appreciated 1906 tour of Spanish speaking American countries—Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Panama, Colombia (and later, Mexico)—the first ever by a US Secretary of State, produced the Root Doctrine:

We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except for our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire; and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic (Root, Address to the Third Conference of the American Republics 1906 [1917], 10).

He helped to sponsor the 1907 Central American Peace Conference in Washington, which led to the creation of the world's first international court, the Central American Court of Justice, and he played an instrumental role in crafting a plan for Cuban self-rule, a democratic charter for governance in the Philippines, and on resolving important tariff questions involving Puerto Rico and the toll payment controversy on the use of the Panama Canal.

Acting as toastmaster of the banquet to conclude the annual meeting, Root stood up to summarize the significance of the Monroe Doctrine and to prospectively reinforce his idea that it presented a "general principle for the future" (Root 1914). However, his admiring biographer Philip Jessup noted that during his speech his voice "shook with emotion," and that tears were "running down his cheeks" (Jessup 1938, 260). Root's Hamiltonian-inspired vision of hemispheric futurity had been shaken. As he spoke, US Marines and Navy Bluejackets were storming the port of Veracruz in the very first days of a seven-month invasion of Mexico (Root 1914).

The Huerta regime in Mexico was corrupt, unpopular, and unstable. It exemplified the *caudillo* culture that had endemically tarnished republican movements across Latin America. It had come to power in a *coup d'état* and concerns of support from German armament shipments lent a sense of Congressional urgency and concern for the internationalization of Mexico's civil war. Root voted in the Senate to provide retrospective approval for the Wilson Administration's intervention, however he unsuccessfully attempted to limit Senate support to the need to protect American citizens and property. Wilson's religiously and racially inspired sense of rectitude prompted him to articulate the need to "teach the South American republics to elect good men." Root, however, had a more textured regard for the reprobate. He later expressed concerns that the cause was not just, and he may have suggested the same at the closing conference when he said, "no side is always right" (Rossi 2019, 8-10).

Large Policy Men, the Caribbean Großraum, and the "Measure of Well-Being"

Root exemplified the recombinant internationalist. He was a lawyer, politician, diplomat and promoter of international law as part of foreign policy. He was also one of America's Large Policy Men. Large Policy Men were Theodore Roosevelt-styled imperialists. Root's Large Policy makeup personified the historical complexity of the Monroe Doctrine's dual attributes as a line of amity and a line of enmity, which could be further sub-divided into geographic and ideological components. His associates included the military Governor of Cuba and Governor-General of the Philippines General Leonard Wood, the anti-Wilsonian unilateralist Henry Cabot Lodge, Alabama Congressman and Spanish-American War hero Richmond P. Hobson, naval strategists Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen Luce, and nationalist Senators Albert Beveridge and Cushman Davis (Gardner 1976, 228; Rossi 2018 b, 140). Root stature as a principal within the group waned during the Wilson Administration due to his objection to Wilson's neutrality policy and equivocal regard for possible collective security entanglements projected by Article X of Wilson's inspired League of Nations Covenant (Dubin 1966).

Large Policy Men embraced Brooks Adams' *fin-de-siècle* thesis of expansion, centralization, and control of markets and trade as components of civilization (Adams 1895). Large Policy Men looked outward, in line with Frederick Jackson Turner's seminal thesis on the boundlessness of the American spiritual frontier (Turner 1893). Large Policy Men operationalized the appropriation of the sea, which separated global history from its pre-modern telluric dominion (Schmitt 1974, 49). Consequently, Large Policy Men were Big-Navy Men (Morris 2002, 74) and their efforts grew the US Navy by 1909 to five times its size in 1890 (Adams 1969, 41). Their advocacy pushed forward ambitious naval expansion programs to contest British pelagic supremacy by constructing 156 ships of all classes. A reluctant Wilson Administration eventually signed the legislation in August 1916 (Beiriger 2017, 5) only to shelve it at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 after the peace of

WWI had been won. The principal reference points during the 1916 Naval Shipbuilding Legislation debate had focused on the conflict with Mexico and the adaptation of the Monroe Doctrine to the emerging importance of the Caribbean Sea.

The two Venezuelan affairs had reignited US foreign policy interests over the Caribbean at its fulcrum leading to the Pacific—the Isthmus of Darián (Panama). A feigned interest by Britain and the US to end rivalry over control of the Isthmus (negotiated with the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty) projected the idea of a jointly-administered Anglo-American canal. However, when the French attempt to carve a waterway across the Panamanian province of Colombia failed, the US abrogated the British agreement and proceeded to build its own canal (the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty), working as well to stymie construction of any rival transit route. Colombia's Congress, however, refused to ratify a treaty with the US on the basis of payments offered. To finish the job,¹⁰ Roosevelt dispatched warships to Panama City on the Pacific, and Colón on the Atlantic to facilitate Panamanian independence, which in 1903 secured US control over a ten-mile-wide corridor for the canal in return for a one-time payment of \$10 million, an annual annuity of \$250,000 and a US guarantee of Panama's independence (the 1903 Bunau-Tarilla Treaty).

German and British intentions in Central America continued to stoke Congressional suspicions (Adams 1969, 60). Thomas Jefferson's yearning to acquire Cuba led to his more "sensible" appraisal that the US must "oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power" over Florida, the Gulf of Mexico, Cuba and the countries bordering on the Isthmus in order to "fill up the measure of our political well-being" (Jefferson 1823).

The opening of the interoceanic canal in 1914 served as the *dénouement* to more than four centuries of geostrategic conjecturing about the Caribbean. Its completion made the

¹⁰ The Panama Canal opened in 1914.

Caribbean *Großraum* even more of a *Großraum*: It became the springboard to world power for Roosevelt and his Large Policy Men by bringing into play the Pacific Ocean. The Canal stirred sentiments of US national pride, exceptionalism, and beneficence but it generated security concerns about how to protect against construction of a rival trans-isthmian route and how to secure the Panama Canal's approaches from a blockading power.

The explosive acquisition of US territory between 1898 and 1903 reinforced this Large Policy ethos of expansion, which naturally facilitated taking control of the Caribbean. The US victory over Spain in the Spanish-America War (1898) marked the first of a series of territorial acquisitions that brought under US rule Cuba, Guam, part of Samoa, Wake Island, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Hawai'i. Never again would the US acquire so much territory so quickly (Rossi 2019, 3). Cushman Davis, who chaired the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the Spanish American War, participated as a US Commissioner in peace treaty discussions at its conclusion and wrote a treatise on international law that explicitly linked the vulnerability of the western coast of the US to the need to annex Hawai'i (Davis 1897, 46).

Large Policy Men agreed with Davis' rationale and provided a solution to securitization of the Caribbean *Großraum* with an expanded frontier thesis. The naval base in Cuba (Guantanamo Bay, 1903), the possession of Puerto Rico and plans for a naval airstrip at Roosevelt Roads,¹¹ and a ninety-nine year renewable lease for construction of naval bases on Nicaragua's Great Corn Island and Little Corn Islands had already secured the Atlantic approach to the Canal. To protect intrusions from the Pacific coast of Mesoamerica, the US negotiated an option for a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca (Rossi 2018 b, 123). After

¹¹ The US took over Puerto Rico at the end of the Spanish American War in 1898. The naval air station at Roosevelt Roads was surveyed in 1919 and constructed as a full naval station in 1943.

Congress learned of German and Japanese corporations prospecting for land ventures in and around the Baja California peninsula in Mexico, the Senate ratified the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1912), which precluded foreign corporate acquisitions of Western Hemispheric territory sufficient to disrupt sovereign control.

Elihu Root and the Mechanics of Administrative Control

To fortify its expanded line of enmity, Large Policy Men also remodeled domestic and international institutions to bureaucratize the administration of the Caribbean *Großraum*. Large Policy Men echoed Roosevelt's admonition that "[t]here are few evils greater than divided sovereignty, where no one can say in whose hands the final power is lodged (Roosevelt 1913, 592)." They worked to centralize Roosevelt's ethos of decision-making and they helped to draw solid lines of administrative responsibility to operationalize control of the Caribbean *Großraum* and to guard against its collateral attack.

Although preoccupied by geostrategic securitization concerns involving the Caribbean *Großraum*, an ideological project to guard against divided sovereignty accompanied the refashioning of the emerging international legal landscape. Root embraced Roosevelt's edict from an international legal perspective. He helped to centralize and clarify the rule-applying authority of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Procès-Verbaux 1920). He worked to frame its statutory law-creating clause (Article 38), which codified the sources of law judges could apply to settle international disputes. Root favored limiting the sources to firm "rules contained in conventions and positive international law," meaning treaties and written agreements. He expressed doubt about including the customary practices of states and general principles of law as additional law-creating sources; indeed, he "could not understand the exact meaning" of general principles of law and how they could be applied to resolve disputes. He could not discern how they differed from the abject application of judicial discretion (equity) (Rossi 1993, 100). Representatives from Civil law countries contested and

ultimately outvoted Root and his British colleague, Lord Phillimore, on the understanding of these formal sources of law. However, Root's positivistic understanding of law never swayed from an implicit hierarchy (*naturalle précellence*) and arrangement of ordered rules and recognized customary practices.

Root's ordered mindset also helped to bureaucratically modernize the contours of the Monroe Doctrine by reorganizing the American military. He streamlined the War Department along the lines of industry, established the Army War College as a "military graduate school," enlarged the nation's foremost military academy, West Point, created the Chief of Staff and General Staff positions, strengthened the National Guard, supervised the brutal occupation of the Philippines and the suppression of the Moro Rebellion (White 1998), authored article III of the Platt Amendment, which turned Cuba into an American protectorate by granting the US a right to intervene militarily in Cuban affairs (Platt Amendment 1903),¹² and staunchly supported US Secretary of State John Hay's "Open Door" policy, which mandated China's trade with western nations (Esthus 1959).

The Penchant to Steer Clear

However, Large Policy Men had a complicated relationship to the Monroe Doctrine. They tended to "steer clear" of overt invocation of the Monroe Doctrine because "it contradicted their rationale for colonial expansion," contested their "romanticized" near history of the US' rise to power and disturbed their whiggish articulation of American exceptionalism and virtue (Rossi 2019, 150-51). Root's project at the 1914 American Society of International Law meeting had been to avoid "say[ing] anything novel" about the Monroe

¹² Article III of the Platt Amendment held: "That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba."

Doctrine but to “restate[] well settled matters which seem to have been overlooked in some recent writings” (Proceedings [Root] 6). Those writings increasingly favored the formation of the doctrine as a principle of general international law. Framed as a hemispheric political doctrine, the doctrine preserved US autonomy and unilateral interpretation. Framed as a principle of international law, the doctrine invited references to sovereign equality and reciprocity while stirring thoughts beyond the pelagic and strategic confines preferred by Large Policy Men. Roosevelt rejected any juridical association of the policy with law. “Lawyers . . . have absolutely nothing whatever to say about it,” he wrote; it would be a “waste of breath” to recognize it as a principle of international law (Roosevelt 1897, 230).

In 1914, Root perhaps had sensed the difficulty of balancing these political and principled distinctions on the Monroe Doctrine’s doctrinal and geographic tightrope. He reminded the audience at the 1914 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law that “No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a rule of international law or that the doctrine which he declared has become international law” (Proceedings [Root] 10). Yet its inclusion in the League Covenant raised substantial questions, dismissed by President Wilson at the Versailles Conference, about whether the Covenant invalidated or superseded the Monroe Doctrine (Spencer 1936, 412 n. 41), or whether the Covenant had redrawn the lines of the doctrine to accommodate a regional expression of international law.

The Monroe Doctrine’s Connection to Anti-Imperialism and Proto-Federalism

Schmitt’s influential critique of the Monroe Doctrine as the locus of futurity for the American *Großraum* validated the tensions embedded in the Large Policy ethos and its auto-interpretative understanding of the Monroe Doctrine. However, elements of the Monroe Doctrine, and certainly the Root Doctrine itself, animated discussions among select domestic and international constituencies that escape Schmitt’s geopolitical mindset and nihilistic view of liberalism. These constituencies included the sublimated republican and proto-federalist

sentiments sympathetic to an American approach to international law and hemispheric order (Inman 1923) and the broadening anti-imperialist movement in the US (Beisner 1968).

Many jurists across the Americas embraced the Monroe Doctrine's emphasis on sovereign equality and reciprocity as an alternative to European intervention. John Quincy Adams' Secretary of State, Henry Clay (term: 1825-1829) championed the ethos of an economic and hemispheric American System and affirming if at other times ambivalent expressions of hemispheric association were also made by US Founders George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and James Monroe (Barrett, 1916, 157). This ethos nevertheless reflected multiple meanings that expressed unreconciled isolationist and internationalist perspectives, expansionist and anti-annexationist views, ideological and self-interested intentions, and Anglo-Saxon and Pan-American frameworks (Grandin 2012).

More affirming views, such as those espoused by the Colombian journalist Santiago Pérez Triana (Rausch 2017), crystallized within the establishment in 1912 of the American Institute of International Law (AIIL) and later the Pan-American Union (1920-1936). Progressive voices of a distinctly American approach to world order stimulated a cadre of interwar Latin American contributions to the Hague Academy lectures (Abello-Galvis and Arévalo-Ramírez 2016). Such internationalists included the Venezuelan international lawyer Simón Planas-Suárez (Planas-Suárez 1924), Colombian jurists Jesús María Yepes (Yepes 1930, 1934, 1937) and F. J. Urrutia (Urrutia 1928), Guatemalan José Matos (Matos 1929), Uruguayan Senator and diplomat Albert Guani (Guani 1925), and most influentially the Chilean internationalist, Alejandro Alvarez (Alvarez 1909). Latin American interpretations concentrated on the Monroe Doctrine's dual intellectual stimulants of non-intervention and multilateralism (Scarfi 2014; Rausch 2018), the soft balancing influences of diplomacy (Pape 2005, 36), the equality of states, and above all, regional integration (Barbosa 1939; Scarfi

2018). Uruguayan foreign minister Baltasar Brum (1883-1933), citing the Monroe Doctrine, molded this affirming view of hemispheric solidarity into a proposal to establish a League of American Nations to supplement Wilson's (1856-1924) grander proposal for a League of Nations. However, cracks in the Pan-American profile of solidarity began to appear. James Brown Scott directly criticized Brum's proposal for infringing on the exclusive right of the United States to invoke the Monroe Doctrine. The work of the AAIL eventually gave way to the hemispheric network of the Inter-American movement. An important branch of the Inter-American movement developed a decidedly critical approach to international law as the structural support of hemispheric inequality and dependency, spawning in the late 1940s the work of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the UNCTAD movement under Argentine economist, Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986), and introducing the Dependencia School's proto-call for the establishment of a New International Economic Order based on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources. TWAIL and post-colonial theorist now form the Schmittian-like vanguard against post-modernity's encounter with the Monroe Doctrine's nihilistic reverberations.

Not to be overlooked, however, were the Monroe Doctrine's influence on progressive domestic communities as well. Anti-expansionist domestic policy interests grew from the Anti-Imperialist League (1898), the Mugwump movement within the Republican Party, the suffragist movement, and Roosevelt's 1912 Bull Moose Party platform of equal rights for women. In her 1924 speech on the Monroe Doctrine, suffragist Carrie Chapman Catt decried the doctrine as false and pernicious because it betrayed its implied Golden Rule of treating the twenty republics of South and Central America as the US would expect them to do unto it (Catt 1924). Samuel Gompers' trade-unionist advocacy created and headed the American Federation of Labor (1886-1894/1895-1925), which stirred hemispheric interest and eventually created the Pan American Federation of Labor. James Blaine championed the

integrationist commercial sentiments of the Monroe Doctrine to establish the Pan-American Union precursor, the International Union of American Republics and the First International Conference of American States (1889). At its Mexico City Conference in 1924 it announced its own Monroe Doctrine of Labor that forewarned of interference from European syndicalists (Toth 1965, 615). Sharp-tongued satirists such as Ambrose Bierce and Mark Twain, the industrialist Andrew Carnegie, and the thrice-nominated Democratic Party presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryan espoused the latent tensions of the doctrine that Large Policy Men had overlooked.

Conclusion

Political theorists debate Carl Schmitt's concept of *Großraum* and its usefulness as a tool to analyze contemporary international politics (Orsi 2019, Kalpokas, 2017), imperial history, and the breakdown of the Westphalian system (the *katechon*?) (Hell 2009, 284). His theoretical orientation has invigorated geographic and spatial studies (Minca and Rowan 2016; Legg 2011; Kleinschmidt 2008) and specific references to *Großraum* have made it a compelling narrative to address contested spatializations involving Russia and Ukraine, Syria, China and the South China Sea, Russia and the Northern Sea Route/Northeast Passage (mirrored by Canada and the Northwest Passage), and perhaps coming soon, the Arctic *Großraum*, or what will remain of the cryosphere given this period of rapid ice melt.

Schmitt fashioned his idea of *Großraum* as a direct genealogical antecedent to the Monroe Doctrine only to lament its displacement by a new creed of spaceless universal interventionism. If he did not radically alter the conceptual history of international law, he powerfully contributed to its evolving vocabulary and geospatial reacquainting with lines of amity and lines of enmity. His project was incomplete because as much as he made liberal internationalism the object of derision, his authoritarian and conservative proclivities occluded consideration of domestic and hemispheric sentiments that contributed more

complexity to the doctrine. Certainly, the spatial orientation and bureaucratic practices of Large Policy Men helped to turn the Monroe Doctrine into a Caribbean *Großraum*. Their consolidation of interests during the period between the 1890s and 1914 not only propelled the US to dominance in the twentieth century but turned the Monroe Doctrine into a metonymy for imperialism. How completely the Monroe Doctrine shed its association with republicanism, sovereign equality, non-intervention, and hemispheric solidarity remains at issue in the minds of under-explored domestic constituencies and Latin American interlocutors who at that time, and perhaps one day, will turn components of the Monroe Doctrine into an American region of futurity.

Bibliography

- Abello-Galvis, Ricardo and Walter Arévalo-Ramírez. (2016). The Influence of the Latin American Doctrine on International Law: The Rise of Latin American Doctrines at The Hague Academy During the Early Twentieth Century. In Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida and Jean-Marc Sorel (Eds.), *Latin America and the International Court of Justice: Contributions to International Law*, 287-310. London: Routledge.
- Adams, Brooks. (1895). *The Law of Civilization and Decay: An Essay on History*. London: Macmillan & Co.
- Adams, John W. (1969). The Influences Affecting Naval Shipbuilding Legislation, 1910-1916. *Naval War College Review*, 22(4), 41-70.
- Alvarez, Alejandro. (1909). Latin America and International Law. *American Journal of International Law*, 3(2), 269-353.
- Antaki, Mark. (2004). Carl Schmitt's Nomos of the Earth. *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, 42(2), 317-34.
- Award Regarding the Boundary Between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela. (899). 28 RIAA 331-40 (October 3, 1899), https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVIII/331-340.pdf.
- Barbosa, Rui. (1939). Los conceptos modernos del derecho internacional. In *Conferencias y discursos*, 75-179. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Justicia e Instrucción Pública.
- Barrett, John. (1916). Pan Americanism and Its Inspiration in History. *Records of the Columbia Historical Society*, 19, 156-159.

- Becker, Marc. (2011). History of US Interventions in Latin America (2011), <https://www.yachana.org/teaching/resources/interventions.html>.
- Beiriger, Eugene Edward. (2017). Building a Navy ‘Second to None’: The U.S. Naval Act of 1916, American Attitudes Toward Great Britain, and the First World War. *British Journal for Military History*, 3(2), 4-29.
- Beisner, Robert L. *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Beneyto, José María. (2020). Camilo Barcia Trelles on Francisco de Vitoria: At the Crossroads of Carl Schmitt’s *Grossraum* and James Brown Scott’s Modern International Law. *European Journal of International Law*, 31(4), 1477-1492.
- Benvenuto Murrieta, Pedro. (1935). La doctrina Monroe. Sus antecedentes. Principales aplicaciones. *Revista de la Universidad Católica*. Tomo III Año 4 N° 19, 636-650.
- Butterfield, Herbert and Martin Wight eds. (1968). *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Carty Anthony. (2001). Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International Legal Order Between 1933 and 1945. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 14(1), 25-76.
- Catt, Carrie Chapman (1924). The Monroe Doctrine. Iowa State University Archives of Women’s Political Communication, <https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2018/09/24/the-monroe-doctrine-1924/>.
- Cleveland, Grover. (1889). Special Message to Congress, January 15, 1889. *American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-903>.
- Cristi, Renato. (1998). *Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- da Gama, Saldanha, Luiz Philippe, A.E.K. Benham, and Michael B. McCloskey (1946). The United States and the Brazilian Naval Revolt, 1893-1894. *The Americas*, 2(3), 296-321.
- Davis, Cushman K. (1896). *Lectures on International Law*. Classic Reprint Series: Forgotten Books.
- Dubin, Martin David. (1966). Elihu Root and the Advocacy of a League of Nations, 1914-1917. *Western Political Quarterly*, 19(3), 439-455.
- Elden, Stuart. (May/June 2010). Reading Schmitt Geopolitically: Nomos, Territory and *Großraum*. *Radical Philosophy*, 161, 18-26.
- Esthus, Raymond A. (1959). The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 46(3), 435-454.

- Galli, Carlo and Elisabeth Fay. (2010). Carl Schmitt and the Global Age. *CR: The New Centennial Review*, 10(2), 1-25.
- Gardner, Lloyd. (1976). *The Creation of the American Republic: United States Diplomatic History Since 1839*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy [Pact of Paris/Kellogg-Briand Pact]. (1928). League of Nations Treaty Series No. 2137.
- Grandin, Greg. (2012). The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights, Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism. *American Historical Review*, 117(1), 68-91.
- Gruchmann, Lothar. (1962). *Nationalsozialistische Großraumordnung. Die Konstruktion einer "deutschen Monroe-Doktrin."* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
- Guani, A. (1925). La solidarité internationale dans l'Amérique Latine, *Recueil des Cours*, 8, 203–340. Hague Academy of International Law.
- Habermas, Jürgen. (1989). The Horrors of Autonomy: Carl Schmitt in English. In Jürgen Habermas (Shierry Weber NicholSEN, ed. & trans.), *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hague Convention II (1907). Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607, entered into force January 26, 1910.
- Hamilton, Alexander. [November 23, 1787]. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy, for the Independent Journal. *The Federalist Papers: No. 11*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.
<https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-11-20#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493282>.
- Haushofer, Karl, Erich Obst, Hermann Lautensach & Otto Maull (1928). *Bausteine zur Geopolitik*. Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag.
- Hell, Julia, Katechon: Carl Schmitt's Imperial Theology and the Ruins of the Future. *The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory*, 84(4) 283-326.
- Hervig, Holger H. (2016). *The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer "Educated" Hitler and Hess*. Lanham, Bolder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Humphreys, R. A. (1967). Presidential Address: Anglo-American Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 17, 131-64.
- Inman, Samuel Guy. (1923). *Pan-American Conferences and Their Results*. *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly*, 4(3), 238-266.
- James, Allan. (Ed.). (1973). *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Jefferson, Thomas (1823). Letter From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823. *Founders Online, National Archives*,
<https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-3827>.

- Jessup, Philip. (1938) *Elihu Root*. Volume 2. New York: Dodd Mead and Company.
- Joseph, Cedric L. (1970). The Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Arbitration of 1899: An Appraisal: Part I. *Caribbean Studies*, 10(2), 56-89.
- Juderías, Julián. (1914). *La leyenda negra y la verdad histórica: contribución al estudio de concepto de España en Europa, de las causas de este concepto y de la tolerancia política y religiosa en los países civilizados*. Madrid: Tip. de la Rev. de Arch., Bibl. Y Museos.
- Kalpokas, Ignas. (2017). The New Nomos of the Earth and the Channeling of Violence. *Journal of International Political Theory*. 13(2), 162-180.
- Kjellén, Rudolf. (1917). *Der Staat als Lebensform*. Leipzig: S. Hirzel Verlag.
- Kleinschmidt, Jochen. (2008). Politische Räume, Großräume und Weltgesellschaft. In Rüdiger Voigt (Ed.), *Carl Schmitts Kategorie der Großraumordnung*. 71-98. Stuttgart: Steiner.
- König, Hans-Joachim. (2015). Lines of Amity. In Graeme Dunphy & Andrew Gow (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Early Modern History Online*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2352-0272_emho_COM_019473.
- Koskenniemi, Martti. (2004). International Law as Political Theology. How to Read *Nomos der Erde*. *Constellations*, 11(4), 492-511.
- Legg, Stephen (Ed.). (2011). *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Letter from Mr. Olney to [US Ambassador to Great Britain] Bayard, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895, Part I (July 20, 1895). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, US Department of State. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1895p1/d527>.
- Linklater, Andrew. (2011). Process Sociology and International Relations. *The Sociological Review*, 59(1), 48-64.
- Luke, Timothy W. (2009). The 'Americanization' of Critical Theory: A Legacy of Paul Piccone and Telos'. *Fast Capitalism*. 5(1), 1-8.
- Matos, José. (1929). L'Amérique et la Société des Nations, *Recueil des Cours*, 28, 1-104. Hague Academy of International Law.
- Mattingly, Garrett. (1963). No Peace beyond What Line? *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 13, 145-162.
- Message of the President [Theodore Roosevelt], December 5, 1905. Office of the Historian, US Department of State, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1905/message-of-the-president>.
- Minca, Claudio and Rory Rowan. (2016). *On Schmitt and Space*. London and New York: Routledge.

- Morison, Elting E. (Ed.). (1954). *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*. Volume 8. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Morris, Edmund. (2002). 'A Matter of Extreme Urgency:' Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902. *Naval War College Review*, 55(2), 73-85.
- Netzloff, Mark. (2019). Lines of Amity: The Law of Nations in the Americas. In Tracey A. Sowerby & Joanna Craigwood (Eds.), *Cultures of Diplomacy & Literary Writing in the Early Modern World*, 54-68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Orsi, Roberto. (2019). On the Relevance of Carl Schmitt's Concept of *Großraum* in Contemporary International Relations. *Journal of International Political Theory*, 17(3), 295-315.
- Pape, Robert A. (2005). Soft Balancing Against the United States. *International Security*, 30(1), 7-45.
- Planas-Suárez, Simón (1924). L'extension de la doctrine de Monroe en Amérique du Sud, *Recueil des Cours*, 5, 267-366. Hague Academy of International Law.
- Platt Amendment (1903), National Archives, <https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/platt-amendment>.
- Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 1914. Volume 8 (April 22-25, 1914). Cambridge University Press. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i2565649>.
- Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16-July 24, 1920 with Annexes. Geneva: League of Nations.
- Ratzel, Friedrich. (1897). *Politische Geographie*. München und Leipzig: Verlag von R Oldenbourg.
- Rausch, Jane. (2017). *Santiago Pérez Triana (1858-1916): Colombian Man of Letters and Crusader for Hemispheric Unity*. Princeton, New Jersey, Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Rausch, Jane M. (2018). Santiago Pérez Triana (1858-1916) and the Pan-Americanization of the Monroe Doctrine. *Revista Historia y Sociedad*, 35, 223-240.
- Reilly, John J. (2009) Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. *Comparative Civilizations Review*, 60(60), 1-10.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. (1897). *American Ideals and Other Essays Social and Political*. New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons; The Knickerbocker Press.
- _____. (1901). First Annual Message to Congress (3 December 1901) [Roosevelt First Annual Message]. *American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/first-annual-message-16>.
- _____. (1913). Speech [Democratic Ideals] at Museo Social, Buenos Aires, Argentina (7 November 1913), Theodore Roosevelt Center, <https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record/ImageViewer?libID=o279253&imageNo=1>.

- Root, Elihu. (1917). Address to the Third Conference of the American Republics (31 July 1906), Speech of the Secretary of State, Honorary President of the Conference. In R. Bacon & J.B. Scott (Eds.), *Latin America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root*. 6-11. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rossi, Christopher R. (1993). *Equity and International Law: A Legal Realist Approach to International Decisionmaking*. Irvington, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc.
- _____. (1994). Jus ad Bellum in the Shadow of the 20th Century. *New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 15(1), 49-82.
- _____. Jura Novit Curia? Condominium in the Gulf of Fonseca and the “Local Illusion” of a Pluri-State Bay. *Houston Journal of International Law*, 37(3), 793-840.
- _____. (2017). Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome: Sovereignty ad Absurdum and the South China Sea Arbitration. *Cornell International Law Journal*, 50(2), 231-283.
- _____. (2018a). The Nomos of Climate Change and the Sociological Refugee in a Sinking Century. *The George Washington International Law Review*, 50(3), 613-652.
- _____. (2018b). The Gulf of Fonseca and International Law: Condominium or Imperial Anticolonialism? *Jus Gentium: Journal of International Legal History*, 3(1) 115-153.
- _____. (2019). *Whiggish International Law: Elihu Root, the Monroe Doctrine, and International Law in the Americas*. Leiden and Boston: Brill Nijhoff.
- Scarfi, Juan Pablo. (2014). In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1893-1933. *Diplomatic History*, 40(2), 189-218.
- _____. (2018). Globalizing the Latin American Legal Field: Continental and Regional Approaches to the International Legal Order in Latin America. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 61(2), <https://www.redalyc.org/journal/358/35860343005/html/>.
- _____. (2020). Camilo Barcia Trelles on the Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and the Legacy of Vitoria in the Americas. *European Journal of International Law*, 31(4), 1463-1475.
- Schmitt, Carl. (1941). *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumpfremde Mächte: Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- _____. (1985 [1922]) *Political Theology. Four Chapters on The Concept of Sovereignty*. Translated by George Schwab, Foreward by Tracy B. Strong. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- _____. (2003 [1974] [1950]). *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press.
- _____. (1939 [2011]). *Großraum versus Universalism: The International Legal Struggle over the Monroe Doctrine [Großraum gegen Universalismus: der völkerrechtliche Kampf um die Monroedoktrin]*. In Stephen Legg (Ed., trans. Matthew Hannah), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos*, 46-54. New

York and London: Routledge.

_____. (2007 [1927]). *The Concept of the Political, Expanded Edition (Translation, Introduction, and Notes by Georg Schwab With "The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations" (1929) translated by Matthias Konzen and John P. McCormick With Leo Strauss's Notes on Schmitt's Essay, translated by J. Harvey Lomax, Forward by Tracy B. Strong.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Schoenrich, Otto. (1949). The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute. *American Journal of International Law*, 43(3), 523-30.

Spenser, John H. (1936). The Monroe Doctrine and the League Covenant. *American Journal of International Law*, 30(3), 400-413.

Telos. (1987). Special Issue. Carl Schmitt: Enemy or Foe? Telos Press.

Teschke, Benno Gerhard. (2011). Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl Schmitt's International Political and Legal Theory. *International Theory*, 3(2), 179-227.

Theodore Roosevelt Center (accessed 22 March 2023). Venezuelan Debt Crisis, <https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/Foreign-Affairs/Venezuela-Debt-Crisis.aspx>.

Toth, Charles W. (1965). The Pan American Federation of Labor: Its Political Nature. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 18(3), 615-620.

Turner, Frederick Jackson. (1893). The Significance of the Frontier in American History. *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 197-227.

Ulmen, G. L. (1987). American Imperialism and International Law: Carl Schmitt on the US in World Affairs. *Telos*, 72, 43-71.

Ulmen, G.L. and Paul Piccone. (1987). Introduction to Carl Schmitt. Carl Schmitt on the US in World Affairs. *Telos*, 72, 3-14.

Urrutia, Francisco-José. La codification du droit international en Amérique. *Recueil de Cours*, 22, 81-236. Hague Academy of International Law.

US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Venezuela Boundary Dispute, 1895-1899, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela>, accessed March 22, 2023.

Venezuela Boundary Dispute, 1895-1899. US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Washington, D.C. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/venezuela>, accessed March 22, 2023.

Venezuelan Preferential Case (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Venezuela et al), *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, 9, 99-110 (February 22, 1904), https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_IX/99-110.pdf.

- White, Richard D. (1998). Civilian Management of the Military: Elihu Root and the 1903 Reorganization of the Army General Staff. *Journal of Management History*, 4(1) 43-59.
- Williams, William Appleman. (1972 [1959]). *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Yepes, Jesús María (1930). La contribution de l'Amérique latine au développement du droit international public et privé', *Recueil des Cours*, 32, 691–800. Hague Academy of International Law.
- _____.a. (1934). Les problèmes fondamentaux du droit des gens en Amérique, *Recueil des Cours*, 47, 1–144. Hague Academy of International Law.
- _____. (1947). Les accords régionaux et le droit international, *Recueil des Cours*, 71, 227–344. Hague Academy of International Law.