doi:10.1093/bjc/azx047 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL

EXPANDING MORAL PANIC THEORY TO INCLUDE THE AGENCY OF CHARISMATIC ENTREPRENEURS

Paul Joosse*

Working beyond latently Durkheimian figurations of moral panic which depict a dialectic between 'right-thinkers' and folk devils, this article integrates charismatic entrepreneurs into a tripartite model that sheds light on two new pathways of interaction that are relevant for the sociology of morality. First, charismatic leaders can outflank *traditional leaders' aspersions of folk devils, taking the principle of 'one-upmanship' to an extraordinary (and therewith charismatic) extreme. Second, charismatic leaders can creatively subvert traditional mores, overturning value tables to* 'bedevil' *traditional leaders. Because moral panic and charismatic enthusiasm implicate distinct, complementary, and unitary social processes, I argue that, taken together, the work of Max Weber and Stanley Cohen offer a more theoretically profitable vision of moral denaturation and reformulation than either would alone. Donald Trump's charismatic ascension during his 2015–16 US Presidential campaign is used to illustrate the theoretical contribution.*

Keywords: moral panic, charisma, moral entrepreneurs, Max Weber, Donald Trump

Introduction

Stanley Cohen (1972[2002]) and Max Weber (1922[1978]) made lasting contributions to social theory by modelling how moral enthusiasms trouble and establish the social order. Both viewed morality as something that was determinative of social structure, and it was in large part through moral mechanisms that they carved out space within their respective theories for individual agency (Shils 1965; Eisenstadt 1968; Hall *et al.* 1978; Greenfeld 1985; Jenkins 1992; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009; Hier 2011; Joosse 2014; Abrutyn and Van Ness 2015). This article seeks to uncover some deep-seated conceptual affinities between two key social phenomena they describe; namely, moral panic and charismatic upheaval. The practical takeaway is a synthetic model that draws on this untapped complementarity to provide moral panic scholarship with a more dexterous theory of moral transformation.

Given the prominence of the theorists involved, it is noteworthy that there has been little interaction of this sort in the past. Indeed, a search within the vast literature produced in the wake of Cohen's seminal book *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (1972) retrieves only passing references to Weber (cf. McDermott 2015), and no dedicated treatments of charisma proper. This lack of contact has persisted in spite of some prominent calls for interaction from each of these respective literatures.[1] For example,

*Paul Joosse, Department of Sociology, 9th Floor, Jockey Club Tower, Centennial Campus, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; pjoosse@hku.hk

[1]Because of space constraints, my intention is not to engage too deeply with the obstreperous task of weaving together the profuse and divergent literatures that have been built upon Weber and Cohen. For good reviews of these various strands, see Critcher (2008), Dawson (2011), Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994), Smith (2013), and Joosse (2014).

Goode and Ben-Yehuda comment in the epilogue of their influential book *Moral Panics* (1994;2009]: 246) that:

> [t]he excitement stirred up during a moral panic is similar to the charisma possessed by certain leaders. This excitement, like charisma, is volatile and unstable. The feelings that are generated during this period of influence are intense, passionate.

Writing from the 'charisma side,' Philip Smith remarked that:

> Because the symbolic logic of charisma hangs upon binary codings and salvation narratives, images of 'evil' must be present in the forest of symbols surrounding each charismatic leader …. Love of the charismatic leader often seems to be predicated on hatred of the evil against which they fight, and, indeed will be magnified as this perceived evil intensifies and is incarnated in a specific 'folk devil'. (2000: 104)

These observations suggest that moral panics and charisma are features that erupt from of a common moral-cultural substrate. As valuable as such comments may be, however, they remain mere signposts pointing to the possibility of synthesis, rather than synthetic attempts in their own right.

This article posits that Weber's descriptions of charismatic agency stand to complement customary accounts of moral panic, broadening our understanding of how socially instantiated moralities evolve. Whereas moral panics have conventionally been conceived in latently Durkheimian terms, involving 'right-thinking people' (Cohen 1972[2002]: 1) who use the moral challenges of folk devils to strengthen societal orthodoxies (Garland 2008; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994; 2009; Reed 2015), Weber's charismatic entrepreneurs can exhibit a creative agency that evades this conservative moral recapitulation. This they do in two ways. First, charismatic leaders can *outflank* traditional leaders on their own moral territory, taking the principle of 'one-upmanship' to an extraordinary (and therewith charismatic[2]) extreme. This outflanking move denatures the moral field by repositioning traditional leaders awkwardly as defenders of the folk devils they would have previously decried. Second, at times charismatic leaders can creatively work to subvert traditional moralities (and concomitantly, traditional moral actors), overturning established value tables in ways that 'bedevil' traditional moral leaders, refashioning them as folk devils for wholly new dialectics of moral panic.

Together, these two pathways of interaction help to explicate situations where charismatic entrepreneurs use discourses of moral panic in ways that (1) deride 'folk devils' in the conventional manner predicted by moral panic theory, while simultaneously, (2) corroding traditional power structures—something that conventional models of moral panic tend not to predict. By making the case for regarding charismatic entrepreneurs as distinct interactants who may subvert, exacerbate, or inaugurate processes of moral panic, the article thereby calls for an expansion of the conceptual architecture; from the bipartite model present in the classic statements of moral panic theory, to a tripartite model that includes charismatic agents alongside traditional authorities and folk devils.

[2]As will be discussed below, the most distinguishing feature of charismatic leaders, according to Weber, is their 'extraordinary' status of being 'set apart', '*spezfisch außertäglichen*', or 'specifically outside the everyday' (Weber 1922 [1956]: 140; see also Weber 1922: 241, 1111, 1115).

Case and Method

This dynamic between moral panic and power-challenge was strikingly evident during the 2015–16 US Presidential contest, when Donald Trump combined classic rhetorics of 'deviance amplification' (his aspersions of Mexican immigrants and Muslims, for example) with trenchant attacks on establishment figures from the Republican party and wider political establishment (his promise to 'drain the swamp' in Washington). This dual challenge was enacted through a combative political style that defied norms of decorum at every turn; outraging and enthralling audiences while ensuring maximum press coverage. For the purpose of this article, the contention will be that this political style was 'charismatic.' Weber defined charismatic leaders as those who are 'considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities' (1922: 241); his main thesis being that once followers attribute such extraordinary qualities to leaders, these leaders are accorded a certain 'radical freedom' that is seldom found in non-charismatic modes of the social contract (1922: 244–5, 1115–8; see also Reed 2013: 280–3). Weber frequently stresses the creative or 'virtuousic' quality of charismatic interventions in moral systems, which can take place through the use of rhetorical flare or dramatic action, and which affect alchemical transformations of moral culture (1922: 542, 565, 599). Because of their antinomian presence, charismatic leaders tend to be 'sharply opposed … to everyday forms of domination' and indifferent and intransigent in the face of all 'formal and regulated [processes of] appointment or dismissal' (1922: 244, 246).

'Alt-right' media figures have continuously been describing the nature of Trump's appeal in these terms—that is, in ways that non-supporters have only been able to see or acknowledge in hindsight. For example, in January of 2016, long before Trump had secured the Republican nomination, Rush Limbaugh observed that:

> Everything he's doing goes against the book…. Everything that any analyst or consultant or professional would tell you not to do, Donald Trump is doing it, and he's leading the pack [of Republican candidates]. *This creates its own set of emotions and feelings and thoughts that run from person to person*…. Trump is functioning totally outside this structure that has existed for decades. As such, the people who are only familiar with the structure and believe in it and cherish it and want to protect it, feel threatened in ways that you can't even comprehend [emphasis mine].

Rich descriptions of Trump's charismatic appeal are also to be found in the ethnographic work of Arlie Hochschild (2016*a*; 2016*b*). In a recent essay entitled 'The Ecstatic Edge of Politics', for example, she described the following scene:

> The day before the Louisiana Republican primary in March 2016, I watched Donald Trump's Boeing 757 descend from the sky at the Lakefront Airport in New Orleans. Inside the crowded hangar, Elton John's 'Rocket Man' was playing. Red, white, and blue strobe lights roved sideways and up. Cell phones snapped photos of the blond-haired candidate as he stood before thousands waving and shaking signs that read MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN. A small, wiry man bearing this sign with both hands, eyes afire, called out within earshot, 'To be *in the presence* of such a man! To be in the *presence* of such a man'. There seemed to be in this man's call … a note of reverence, even ecstasy. (2016*b*: 683) [emphasis in the original]

This article recognizes the evidentiary importance of such observations, and it justifies applying the descriptor 'charismatic' to Trump as Weber would—without endorsement

or invidious judgement.[3] It is my contention that recognizing and understanding these dynamics is a matter of contemporary importance that extends beyond the case of Trump, however, since a variety of populisms and nationalisms in the United States and across Europe seem posed to propel moral 'outsiders' into cultural prominence, if not political power. To demonstrate the promise of this line of analysis, evidence from Trump's 2015–16 Presidential campaign is used to illustrate the theoretical contribution.

Data were derived from transcripts of the 12 GOP debates that occurred during the course of Trump's 2015–16 Republican nomination bid (from the first on 6 August 2015 to the last on 10 March 2016), the three debates between Trump and Democratic Nominee Hillary Clinton (from 26 September to 19 October 2016), 20 speeches made by Trump at campaign rallies, and a variety of Trump's media interviews.[4] The debate transcripts were collated into a document (672 pages or 327,447 words long), 15% of which was initially read by myself and a research assistant with the aim of developing a series of themes that were applicable to the literature on charismatic leadership and moral panics. After reaching a consensus on the developed coding scheme, the research assistant coded the remaining 85% of the transcript data, while I coded the speech and interview material. This data, in turn, was informed and assessed amid a more general daily practice of consuming the constant flow of commentary produced about Trump between when Trump announced his presidential run (16 June 2015) and the election night on 8 November 2016. Before presenting this work, however, the proposed synthesis must be justified social-theoretically. A brief discussion of the aetiological, performative and processual affinities between moral panic and charismatic upheaval will therefore serve as a point of entry into the analysis of the Trump case itself.

Aetiology: Moral Eruptions from the Traditional Order

As mentioned, one key affinity between moral panics and charismatic upheaval is aetiological. Both Weber and Cohen describe eruptions within the social order, and these eruptions are said to originate first and always within the sphere of values; as challenges to traditional morality. In the case of Cohen, this point hardly needs making (although it is often ignored [Garland 2008: 11]), since he was explicit; even borrowing a phrase from Becker to describe panics as a sort of churning, protean process that helps to establish 'the moral constitution of society' (quoting Becker 1963[2008]: 3). That his abiding concern was with moral firmaments is further evidenced by a telling anthropological distance he erects between his vantage point and the objects of his gaze: the 'folk devils' who trouble the social body, the 'right-thinking people' ('editors, bishops,

[3]Weber described St. Francis of Assisi, Napoleon, Joseph Smith and Genghis Khan, and a variety of his contemporaries including Bavarian revolutionary Kurt Eisner (among many others) as charismatic leaders, and although the adjective 'charismatic' could be regarded either as a complement or a criticism in colloquial discourse, Weber maintained a moral agnosticism in his analysis (1922: 241–2, 1112). 'Legitimacy', for Weber, rests solely within the *confidence* of followers in their leader: 'How the quality in question would ultimately be judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for the purposes of definition … it is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma'(1922: 241–2; see McDermott 2013 for a recent integration of Weber's concept of legitimacy into moral panic theory).

[4]While the analysis is based on full transcripts of the debates and speeches, the collection of material from Trump's media interviews was less systematic, since full clips were not always available. This necessitated a somewhat 'piecemeal' approach to his voluminous interviews, but all selections were unedited within the clips themselves.

politicians') that these devils contrast, and the 'moral barricades' that both of these two dialectically instantiate. Recent extensions by those like Hier (2002; 2011) and Critcher (2009), who seek for further integration between moral panic theory and general sociological theories of moral regulation are thus in keeping with Cohen's original intentions, as much as they are logical extensions of his founding premises.

With Weber's 'charisma', the situation is slightly more complex, since his theory of social power implicates a tripartite typology of domination [*Herrschaft*] that involves 'charismatic authority' as something that stands over and against not just traditional morality, but also (and more famously) legal-rational legitimacy. This means that the alignment proposed here between charismatic upheaval and moral panic needs to be justified by centralizing the charisma/tradition dialectic within Weber without reducing his model in a way that sacrifices its complexity.

Thankfully, we can find statements throughout *Economy and Society* (1922) that are permissive of such a move. Many of these statements appear as remarks that Weber intended to serve as contextual backdrop for his overriding concern with rationalization. For example, while Weber allowed for the possibility that charisma will intermittently perturb the modern rationalized world in which he lived, he tended to emphasize that charisma *and tradition* are, by contrast, more primordially twinned. It is 'in traditionalist periods', Weber tells us that 'charisma is *the* great revolutionary force' (1922: 245, emphasis in the original). Elsewhere, he writes that charisma is increasingly salient 'the further we go back into history' (1922: 1111). The special relationship between charisma and tradition is also evident in Weber's stress on Jesus' famous anaphora, 'it is written … but I say unto you…, (1922: 243, 978)'[5] and his emphasis on the distinction between the (charismatic) prophet and the (traditionalist) priest (1922: 439–42),[6] suggesting that he viewed charismatic challenges primarily as a Jesus-like/Pauline repudiation of 'the Law'—this being 'law' in a custom-bound, traditional sense, rather than a rational-legal one (Turner 2011: 233; also Weber 1922: 510–1).

This notion of a primary opposition between charisma and tradition can also be found in the *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), his most famous work and the foundation of his rationalization thesis. Here, we find Weber depicting rationalized modernity as something of a death-knell for other forms of authority, charisma and tradition included. The relevant 'iron cage' passage is almost so well-known that it need not be quoted, save for the opportunity to insert a few points of emphasis:

> No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely *new prophets will arise*, or there will be a great *rebirth of old ideas and ideals*, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance (1905[1920]: 182, emphasis added).

'Old ideals' (read: tradition), and 'new prophets' (read: charisma) are thus positioned together, standing rather feebly against rational organization to complete, albeit in

[5]Weber maintained that, 'every charismatic authority would have to subscribe to the proposition' (1922: 243). On the biblical basis for Weber's usage, see the 'Sermon on the Mount' in Matt. 5–7, especially Matt. 7: 28–29: 'When Jesus had finished saying these things, the crowds were amazed at his teaching, because he taught as one who had authority, and not as their teachers of the law'.

[6]'[T]he prophet declares new revelations by charisma, whereas the priest serves to a sacred tradition. It is no accident that almost no prophet has come from the priesthood' (1922: 440).

tacit form, the tripartite model that would later emerge more explicitly in *Economy and Society*.

For Weber, then, it is clear that charisma is most in its element not when it is opposing rationally instantiated bureaucracies. Rather, the startling scope of charisma's disruptive capacity is most on show when it butts up against entrenched traditions and conventional mores. Pre-modern societies, in so far as they are (according to Weber) bereft of rational organization, are thus nearly if not completely capturable in terms of a dialectic between charisma and custom,[7] with charisma representing both a threat to extant traditions and a wellspring for new, 'proto-orthodox' cultural forms. This is a self-sustaining economy of social power that need never give rise to rational-legal structures, but if and when rational organizing principles do eventuate, both tradition and charisma tend to persist merely within social enclaves or in *pianissimo* forms—as phenomena whose capacity for growth and influence is continually stunted by the insidious and totalizing proclivities of bureaucratic regulation.

Weber's rationalization thesis has stimulated a legion of detractors and defenders whose arguments need not be rehearsed here. These are not so relevant for the current discussion as is the fact that we can now discern more clearly the aetiological similarities between how charisma and moral panics trouble the social order. Charisma, like the moral panic, springs most readily from the ground of traditional culture.[8] Moreover, if tradition is the repository and curatorial space for the moral canon, then charisma (which 'transforms all values' [1922: 1115]) and moral panics (whose folk devils threaten 'all the conventions and values of life' [1972: 51]) both present as alternately radioactive and rejuvenating challengers of such moral substance. With this commensurability established, it behooves us to entertain questions about whether the dynamics of moral panic and charismatic enthusiasm implicate distinct, complementary, or unitary social processes of moral denaturation and reformulation.

Performativity: Moral Characters

One 'way in' to such questions is to examine the protagonists, or *moral characters* that take centre-stage in each author's analysis (e.g. Alexander 2010; Joosse 2012*a*; Reed 2013; Wright 2015). For Weber, this is the charismatic hero; for Cohen, the folk devil. Immediately, we can notice that these characters share some common features. The first involves the concentration of emotional and normative sentiment into a point of attention that affixes to an individual or small group of individuals. Second, this concentration, in turn, has a propensity to radiate back outward, such that these characters, who initially would have been subjects of attention only for particular acts or behaviours, increasingly come to be seen as representatives of the entire 'moral situation' of society. Third, because of their focus on the above two processes, Weber and Cohen both tended to stress that these characters should be understood as *social fictions*. Weber writes that charismatic qualities have authoritative efficacy 'regardless of whether this

[7]'In prerationalistic periods,' Weber writes, 'tradition and charisma between them have almost exhausted the whole of the orientation of action' (1922: 245; also 37).

[8]Greenfeld (1985) argues that Weber's charisma relates to two distinct categories of phenomena: (1) proximity to ultimate values and (2) a personal ability to generate excitement. While I do not see such a stark bifurcation in Weber's writing myself, the tendencies I am stressing here align best with her first category (also Shils 1965; Geertz 1977).

quality is actual, alleged, or presumed' (Weber 1922: 295),[9] and in his discussion of folk devils, Cohen quotes a version of the pragmatist truism that, '[i]t is the perception of the threat and not its actual existence that is important' (Cisin and Clark 1962, quoted in Cohen 1972[2002]: 16).[10] Such statements indicate a preoccupation with describing how social mediation works to exaggerate morally relevant qualities, eroding any consonance that initially may have existed between the 'actual person' and the hero/devil that they come to represent.

It would seem that the similarities end there, however. For Weber, the charismatic hero emerges as a subject of valorization, whose justification rests 'on devotion to the [leader's] exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character' (1922: 215). His two prophetic forms—the 'ethical prophet' (who demands allegiance to an innovated moral system [i.e. Laozi]) and the 'exemplary prophet' (whose style or way of life demands imitation [i.e. Buddha])—both derive their constituency through a motivational mechanism that is alternately aspirational and mimetic (1922: 448–9). It is clear that the distinguishing feature of the charismatic leader is thus his or her emblematic status for a new or newly-invigorated[11] morality.

Folk devils, by contrast, accrue what we might refer to as a 'negative constituency'. Rather than inducing an inclination among onlookers to admire or imitate, they function as 'unambiguously negative symbols' (1972: 38) serving as 'visible reminders of what we should not be' (p. 2). Whereas the charismatic leader inspires hope among followers by providing the vision for a better society, the folk devil is 'defined as a threat to societal values and interests' (1972: 1), he or she is 'symptomatic' of wider problems (Garland 2008: 11), and regarded 'as a barometer to test the health or sickness of a society' (Jewkes 2015: 67). While the charismatic hero emerges and gains prominence through processes of valorization, folk devils are the product of a 'full-scale demonology' (1972: 41); the 'personification of evil' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 28; Hier 2002: 313). Thus, while the devil and the hero are united by the reputational and performative modes of their cultural instantiation, their point of divergence is with respect to *moral value itself.*

Process: Moral Dialectics

With the common aetiology and performative antinomy between the charismatic hero and folk devil now laid bare, some new questions emerge and invite analysis, most pointedly with respect to how the charismatic hero may interact with systems of moral panic. In what follows, I introduce two constellations involving heroes, devils and traditional moral agents, and describe how the dialectics that are incited by the addition of the charismatic hero stand to transform conventional understandings of moral panic. While the primary aim here is to lay the conceptual groundwork for future empirical

[9]See note 3 for further discussion on this point. See Joosse (2017*b*: 57–64) for a description of how different groups compete in this fictionalizing process.

[10]Young (1971: 27) also opens up his early analysis by citing a version of the 'Thomas[es] theorem': 'a situation defined as real in a society will be real in its consequences'.

[11]'No radical distinction will be drawn between a 'renewer of religion' who reveals a new meaning in an older revelation, actual or fictitious, and a 'founder of religion' who brings completely new revelations' (1922: 439).

applications, the potential for such applications will be illustrated with reference to the charismatic ascension of Donald Trump during the 2015/16 Presidential campaign.

Dialectic One—Outflanking the Traditionalist Leader

First, it becomes evident that in certain circumstances these two moral characters can play concomitant and complementary roles vis-à-vis the representatives of traditional authority. Like the central panel of a sacred triptych, holders of traditional authority may at times be double-flanked; revealed to wider publics by way of a contradistinction with both the hero and the devil. The Cohenian dialectic between the traditional moral actor and the folk devil is well-known and well-understood, but the Weberian/charismatic dialectic is in need of further explication, because its challenge to those holding power via traditional means is more subversive.

That is, while the charismatic hero may present as one who is 'on the side' of traditional mores, traditional power holders themselves (for Cohen, the 'editors, bishops, politicians' or for Weber, those possessing '*Ordnungen und Herrengewalten*' ['orders and powers of the Lord'] 1956: 130) will typically feel threatened by the incipient charismatic leader, recoiling at the tenor, scope and methods of the charismatic mission. The 'fundamentalist' hero, for example, will tend to make proposals to restore society to a prelapsarian past that seems dangerously purist and retrograde. The progressive hero (meaning, a charismatic leader working from within a progressive moral *tradition*) will, by contrast, seek to draw upon more 'forward-looking' elements of what Shils (1975: 6) referred to as the 'utopian potentiality' of the value system, striving for idealistic transformations that will be regarded as impossible, unserious and impractical in present circumstances.[12]

Whichever the case may be, the idealism of these would-be heroes will invariably be distasteful to elder statesmen who have grown accustomed to 'manning moral barricades' while maintaining a direct line of sight toward practical exigencies of the 'political game.' In these circumstances, the charismatic hero thus occupies the familiar position of the gadfly: a 'voice of one, crying in the wilderness'[13] who shames established leaders into living up to the traditional values that they espouse.

If the traditional power-holders are sufficiently weak or lacking in moral credibility, however, then this *modus vivendi* with the moral critic will break down, and one can see how the idealism of the incipient charismatic leader can serve as the animus behind a real bid for power. In this type of interaction, it is evident that the charismatic leader spars with 'folk devils' only in a secondary, superficial sense—that is, as a means of affecting a more fundamental performative distinction with the traditional leader, as Weber described. For these conventional authority figures, this outflanking move will no doubt feel like a cruel trick: their folk devils have been stolen from them, and the moral centre has shifted from under their feet, leaving them in an off-kilter position vis-à-vis their moral base. Figure 1 below illustrates this particular constellation.

Certain aspects of the political ascendance of Donald Trump during the GOP Primary contests are illustrative here. On the one hand, Trump clearly crafted his public persona

[12]See Hier (2016) for an important recent contribution on the possibility of 'good' moral panics.
[13]See John 1: 23 and Isaiah 40: 3.



Fig. 1 Outflanking the traditional leader

and campaign style by invoking traditional folk devils ('illegal immigrants' and Muslims, for example), and for this reason, it would seem appropriate to consider Trump to be one of Cohen's 'right-thinkers'. On the other hand, rather than manning the moral barricade in the Cohenian sense (i.e. as a traditionalist leader who emblematically represents and shores up the authority of 'the establishment') he instead used the barricade to send volleys in the opposite direction—against the GOP leadership itself. Indeed, on the immigration issue, Trump has proven to be a perilous threat to traditional GOP candidates who normally would have themselves acquired moral stature by foiling the folk devil of the 'job-taking, crime-causing, illegal immigrant' (Cohen 2002: xxii–vi; also Chavez and Provine 2009). Trump foreclosed the possibility of them drawing on this moral resource, however, by outflanking them, making them look comparatively 'weak on illegal immigration' (Trump, at the GOP debate, 13 February 2016) or 'soft on terror' (speech 19 September 2016; see also Trump, GOP debate, 15 December 2015).[14] From the first moments of his campaign, Trump struck an infamously 'strong' tone on these issues:

> When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best…. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems to us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (Campaign announcement speech, 16 June 2015)

With respect to fears of terrorism, Trump affected similarly extreme concerns, announcing his plans at a campaign rally in Mount Pleasant, S.C. on 6 December 2015:

> [speaking in the third person] Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what the hell is going on. We have no choice … we have no choice.

[14]At times, GOP leaders found themselves in the awkward position of decrying Trump's comments while defending his targets. This was the case when Trump cited the Mexican heritage of United States District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel in order to question his ability to preside over a class action case against the defunct Trump University. GOP House leader Paul Ryan was compelled to take the unusual step of criticizing his own party's nominee, saying that Trump's comments were 'sort of like the textbook definition of a racist comment [that] I think that should be absolutely disavowed'.

Statements like these—so recognizable as the stock in trade of moral panic discourse—went far beyond the parameters of whatever dynamic of one-upmanship may have existed among the other candidates with respect to the core Republican value of being 'tough' on these issues, and many commentators suggested that these remarks would doom his campaign. Such reasoning was partly predicated on a belief in the widespread acceptance of the moral norms that were being upheld by every other candidate in the GOP field, but this 'red line' was not merely a normative barrier. It was also a prohibition borne out of the rational calculation of the 'autopsy' that the GOP had undertaken in the wake of their 2012 electoral loss, which produced a consensus among GOP leaders that in order to win, the Republican party needed to broaden its base by appealing to non-traditional constituencies, chief among which were Hispanics and other racial minorities, youth, and women (Barbour *et al.* 2012).

Trump's statements thus went against the 'party line', even if they stood to resonate with the GOP's traditional constituency. This route was open to Trump in particular because, as an outsider, he was not constrained in the manner that a conventional GOP candidate would have been. His sensitivity to the *possibility* of this route, however, indicates another, wholly charismatic mode of relation to the body politic. That is, charismatic leaders are distinguished by an uncanny ability to sense emotional discontent within an audience (Wasielewski 1985) and their ability to 'formulate and express the inchoate sentiments deeply held by people around them' (Dawson 2011: 122). In the case of Trump, his 'feelers'—reputedly honed while consuming thousands of hours of conservative talk radio (Sherman 2016)—seemed to be sensitively attuned to a subterranean region of the body politic where phobic sentiments about 'outsiders' were widely shared. Trump's continual aspersion of Muslims and Mexican immigrants, which would have not sounded out of place in the colloquial discourses of the 'flyover states', nevertheless sounded refreshingly new when issuing from the mouth of someone who stood a real chance of winning the GOP nomination (Hochschild 2016*b*).

What are the conditions under which such outflanking becomes possible? Scott's (1990) concept of the 'hidden transcript' helps to describe the manner in which divergences between official and popular but unexpressed discourses can imbue political bodies with a charge of discontent that is propitious for charismatic eruption. Scott describes hidden transcripts as speeches, gestures and practices that contradict the *status quo*, 'public transcripts' promulgated by elite, powerful, opinion leaders. They are the product of marginalized sectors of society—those who most naturally have grievances against the governing order—and they are 'hidden' precisely because they 'characterize discourse that takes place 'offstage,' beyond direct observation by powerholders … produced for a different audience and under different constraints of power than the public transcript' (Scott 1990: 4–5). Incipient leaders who confront official discourses through public declarations of the hidden transcript can acquire mystique and charisma within the constituency out of which they arise (Scott 1990: 221, 218). This charismatic affectation is partly a function of awe at the reckless temerity of the one who 'speaks truth to power', and partly a result of the fact that such persons open up a new *avenue of identification* in which they are seen to be speaking on behalf of a larger community as a paradigmatic, living emblem of unexpressed discontents (Scott 1990: 222). As Scott writes, '[t]he powerful emotional valence of the charismatic speech or act for subordinate groups—their sense of elation, joy, release—depends, I think, on it finding this resonance within the hidden transcript' (Scott 1990: 222).

The 'directness' that charismatic devotees experience in the communications they receive from their leaders (Trump was consistently described by admirers as a 'straight talker') thus can be counter-posed against the constrained and (one is made to feel) 'compromised' mode of communication exhibited by traditional leaders. If GOP leaders would want to gain traction through the implication of folk devils that would appeal to the more racist or xenophobic elements of their constituencies, they would have needed to rely on coded, 'dog-whistle' forms of communication (López 2015). Not so for Trump. As Heer (2016), a senior editor at *The New Republic* insightfully noted, 'Trump's genius is to turn subtext into text'.

Thus, the interactional context for Trump's statements about Mexican immigrants and Muslims, which is easily ascertainable from within a moral panic theoretical frame, can at the same time be described in classically Weberian terms. On the side of rational-legalism were those establishment members who were fundamentally motivated by the principle of 'calculability' (1922: 956–1003): they heeded the recommendations of the 'autopsy', they raised reasonable objections about the feasibility of Trump's stated plans for mass-deportation and the erection of a border wall, and they accepted the 'rules' of political discourse. On the side of traditional mores were the members of the Republican base, who were motivated by a long-standing tradition of conservative moralism that drew energy from phobic sentiments about 'outsiders' (Hofstadter 1964). This conflict between rational and traditional forms of legitimacy, in turn, led to a legitimacy crisis that opened up new opportunities for Trump's charismatically extreme reaffirmations of the value, along the pathway indicated in Figure 1. In typically charismatic fashion, Trump appropriated the value monopolistically, as a means of enhancing a wholly personal form of authority:

> If it weren't for me, you wouldn't even be talking about illegal immigration, Chris [Wallace, the moderator]…. You wouldn't even be talking about it. This wasn't a subject that was on anybody's [i.e. any other candidate's] mind until I brought it up at my announcement [loud cheering]. (First GOP debate, 6 August 2015, Cleveland, Ohio)[15]

That Trump's statements are consistently of a kind with moral panic discourse is immediately apparent. Accompanying this in an equally consistent fashion, however, is a critique of traditional moral leaders themselves, who alternately lack 'toughness', moral commitment, or even (as quoted above) the ability to 'figure out what the hell is going on.' In the midst of the GOP debate on 15 December 2015, Trump combined fears of immigration and terrorism into a dual-pronged attack on establishment candidate Jeb Bush:

> Look, look, look. We need a toughness. We need strength…. And if we don't get it back fast, we're just going to go weaker, weaker and just disintegrate…. Jeb comes out and he talks about the [US's southern] border, and I saw it and I was witness to it, and so was everyone else, and I was standing there, [quoting Bush] 'they come across as an act of love'—he's saying the same thing right now with radical Islam. And we can't have that in our country. It just won't work. We need strength.

[15]On the topic of Islam Trump also took credit for being a 'conversation starter.' Two weeks after the San Bernardino attacks which killed fourteen people, he remarked, 'Radical Islamic terrorism came into effect even more so than it has been in the past. People like what I say. People respect what I say. And we've opened up a very big discussion that needed to be opened up' (GOP debate, 15 December 2015, in Las Vegas).

In previous cycles, it would have been difficult to criticize the GOP establishment for a lack of toughness on these issues. It is clear, however, that moral panic discourse also affords an 'outflanking' opportunity that, in the hands of a charismatic outsider, can inflict damage to erstwhile representatives of the moral barricade.

Dialectic Two—'Bedevilling' the Traditionalist Leader

As much as the first dialectic above highlights Trump's radical affirmation of certain moral values, at the same time, his campaign has also been marked by a dramatic willingness to engage with moral experimentation and novelty. From his initial entry into the political field through the promotion of 'birtherism', to his expressions of admiration for Vladimir Putin as a 'strong leader' (e.g. GOP debate, 10 March 2016), to his questioning the validity of the reverence accorded to Republican Senator John McCain for his Vietnam-era military service,[16] to his statement that, although he is a professed Christian, he has never felt the need to ask God for forgiveness (Luntz 2015); Trump has been an insouciant heretic with respect to American conservatism specifically and American political practice generally.

Trump's ascendance thus hints at a route to power that is less circuitous than the 'outflanking' pathway described above. Highlighting the innovative aspects of moral entrepreneurship, this second dialectic involves the instantiation of new folk devils directly, without reference to the middling role of traditional moral actors. By invoking processes of demonization that have no precedent in the practices of traditional leaders, this route draws on the 'virtuosic' creativity indicated in Weber's description of charismatic leadership (see 1922: 542, 565, 599). As Trump's example will show, such creativity can even involve 'bedevilling' the ruling class—refashioning conventional moral authorities themselves as folk devils for new dialectics of moral panic.

The theoretical reference for such radical departures can be found in the account of moral origination that Friedrich Nietzsche explored, first over a series of aphorisms in *Human, All-Too-Human* (1878[1992]: sections 45, 96, 136), and then much more fully in *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887[1992], especially book one). While Cohen was primarily concerned with the preservationist aspects of moral culture—that is how the existing social order produces agents who shore up traditional value distinctions through the principle of moral contrast—Nietzsche's interests lay instead with the *creative* processes of moral production; in his words, 'the conditions and circumstances in which [morals] grew, under which they evolved and changed' (1887[1992]: 456). The contrast between Nietzsche and Cohen helps to clarify why Cohen's right-thinkers are not 'entrepreneurs' in the freest and most radical sense (Becker 1963[2008]: 147–53), since the traditionalist actors he describes tend to follow established and recognizable patterns as they promulgate traditional moral narratives. As such, they draw upon a prevailing 'common understanding' that binds a ruling class, making possible their programmatic coordination.

By contrast, charismatic figures can at times lead *singularly* innovative interventions in the moral order—innovations that defy pre-established repertoires of cultural

[16]'He's a war hero because he was captured—I like people that weren't captured'.

authority and upset those who rely on them. If daring innovation is one mode of charismatic affect (Weber 1922: 243, 978, 1115–7), then the most striking innovations will be those which engage in defiant reversals of established value tables.[17] A philologist by training, Nietzsche used etymology to uncover the history of such value-transformations (1887[1992]: 463–7; 473–5), and he considered the *power to name* (and rename) to be the most salient feature of this creative agency.[18] Such considerations prefigured later theoretical work within the American pragmatist tradition that introduced concepts like 'tagging' (Tannenbaum 1938), 'labelling' (Mead 1934; Lemert 1951; Becker 1963[2008]), and the transformative power of what philosopher John Searle called 'illocutionary speech acts': 'declarations [that] bring about some alteration in the status or condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed' (1975: 358–61).[19] Reed (2013: 262) recently applied this notion of 'constative naming' to his theorization of charismatic acclamation, noting that the charismatic leader is 'capable of performing into existence new social kinds, categorizations and relationships' (for a full discussion see p. 261–7; see also Craciun 2016: 377–8; Joosse 2017*a*).[20] This insight, when paired with an awareness the performative antinomy between the charismatic hero and the folk devil, allows for an understanding of how the establishment of the leader's heroic persona can implicate new Manichean bifurcations of the moral order, producing, through a symmetrical process of moral spill-off, concomitant, opposing, performative foils to the leader in the form of new folk devils (as per Smith 2000: 104) (Figure 2).

The power to name—or in the present case, the power of 'name-calling'—was clearly a central feature of Trump's efforts to bolster his public image while radically redefining the moral status of the traditional political class. *New York Times* writer Mark Leibovich interviewed Trump about the topic of nicknaming, and his response is telling of the importance he attached to the strategy:

> 'It matters…. It matters as to the look and feel and touch…. I feel it, it's an instinct', Trump told me over the phone. He envisions 'Crooked Hillary' as the latest triumph in a series, after 'Lyin' Ted', 'Liddle Marco' and 'Low Energy Jeb', the nicknames that he affixed to his vanquished Republican rivals…. Trump has a knack for coining just the right moniker, the perfectly dismissive and catchy thing. 'It works, it flows', Trump said, admiring his latest work….

[17]For Nietzsche, this involved a 'slave revolt in morality', in which the aristocratic 'good' of Greco-Roman morality was recast, via the alchemical psychology of *ressentiment*, as the 'evil' of Judeo-Christianity. Leaving aside controversies attendant to this particular case, his broader contribution—which was to reveal the plasticity of moral substance when it is subjected to creative 'inversion[s] of the value-positing eye' (472)—has been profoundly consequential for sociological and criminological theory (e.g. Scheler 1961; Ranulf *et al.* 1938; Merton 1968; Meltzer and Musolf 2002; Young 2009).

[18]'The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say, 'this *is* this and this,' they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it' (1887: 462).

[19]For debates and alternative formulations of this idea, see Austin (1955[1975]), Butler (1997) and Derrida (1977).

[20]As I have pointed out elsewhere (2014: 276), the German phrasing that Weber used to describe charismatic acclamation—'*soll…heißen*'—which Parsons' translation is rendered in rather passive terms as 'is considered', contains a variety of other no-less valid (but more agentic) connotations such as 'is named', 'is called', or even 'is hoisted'—as in, 'to hoist a flag'. In this sense, we can see that Weber's thinking was, like Nietzsche's, also consonant, *avant la lettre*, with speech act theory (see also Smith 2013: 28–9).



FIG. 2 'Bedevilling' the traditional leader

After settling on a name, Trump was characteristically didactic about its implementation, as when he literally spelled out his nickname for attendees a campaign rally in Bethpage New York on 6 April 2016:

> He's Lyin' Ted. You know I came up with the idea—but you have to spell it right! It's 'L-Y-I-N APOSTROPHE' Lyin' Ted! [mimicking Cruz] the Bible held high—he puts it down and then he lies.

Several factors have contributed to the efficacy of Trump's use of name-calling as a political strategy. For one, the 'adjective-noun' formula that Trump used when constructing nicknames (i.e. 'Crooked Hillary', 'Lyin' Ted', 'Low-Energy Jeb Bush'), constituted a form of moral simplicity that spoke to elemental moral categories, advancing, in what psychologist Sherman referred to in an earlier (2011) analysis of Trump's combative style, a 'taxonomy, identifying what subspecies of winner and loser people are'. Second, the strategy of nicknaming also seems to have been comported well for the new realities of non-traditional media (e.g. Bennett 2012; Kushin *et al.* 2010) and 'infotaiment' (e.g. Moy *et al.* 2005; Thussu 2008). That is, while other candidates produced traditional political statements, Trump used nicknames as punchy motifs which created a moral resonance that spanned across the 'Twitterified' or 'Facebookified' assemblages of contemporary civil discourse. As *Business insider* writer Mark Abadi (2016) observed:

> [A]ttaching that 'Crooked' label to every single issue [pertaining to Hillary Clinton], and hammering it again and again and again, is so extremely important for the messaging for Trump…. He wants me or you to go into that voting booth, and basically when we go through our memory and try to retrieve the things we're thinking about Hillary, that 'crooked' label needs to one of those things.

Third and most importantly, however, was the *scope* of the moral terrain that Trump's nicknames effected. When gathering together the nicknames Trump produced, one is struck by how they refuse categorization in terms that could in any way be recognizable as conservative—or even political—values in the traditional sense. Indeed, it has often

been said that Trump is in some respects 'not ideological'.[21] It would be more accurate instead to say that Trump's moralism in these instances proceeds without reference to the customary bounds of what Bourdieu (1991) called the 'political field,' and that for this reason it is simply incommensurate with the left/right distinctions that govern political thought.

Rather than comporting to the internecine struggles between Republicans and Democrats, Trump's rhetorical interventions here effect a more expansive moral terrain that extends in two opposing but complementary directions. At its most elephantine, Trump's moral project extends out, toward the macro/civilizational-level project of 'Making America Great Again.'[22] At the same time, however, he managed to personalize every issue, such that all outward political disagreements were presented as manifestations of an underlying (maleficent) character trait within his opponents, whether this be psychological instability ('Crazy Bernie Sanders,' 'Goofy Elizabeth Warren'), lethargy and incompetence ('Low Energy Jeb Bush' and 'Little Marco' [Rubio]), or personal unscrupulousness ('Crooked Hillary' [Clinton],'Lyin' Ted' [Cruz]). In this sense, Trump's moral interventions were simultaneously 'above' and 'beneath' common practices for political interaction.

By expanding the politico-moral spectrum to include these macro and micro outposts, Trump consigned 'politics' (as it is conventionally defined) to a veritable blind spot in his moral discourse, allowing him to mount a campaign that has consisted primarily of leapfrogging between messages about his promised 'greatness' for America and the personal failings of whomever he happened to be sparring. Trump had thus found his place—creatively—within the politico-moral culture of the American civil sphere. Furthermore, in this arena of his own making we can see elements of an emergent moral panic. Trump's political foes are not just failing by traditional moral standards (as is the case in the 'outflanking' dialectic described above). Rather, they are moral miscreants who actively threaten America's core essence, and who must be stopped. In Trump's moral language, politicians were folk devils in their own right, every bit as culpable as Muslims and immigrants for America's moral decline. The theory of deliverance was thus made clear—as was Trump's heroic role in it—as someone who would 'drain the swamp' (Trump 2016).

Conclusion

This article has described how, because moral panics and charismatic enthusiasm implicate alternately distinct, complementary, and unitary processes within socially constituted moral systems, the models of Weber and Cohen, when taken together, offer a more robust and theoretically profitable vision of moral denaturation and reformulation than would be on offer by either of them, taken in isolation. Most basically, the theoretical commensurability of Weber and Cohen derives from the fact that each

[21]In an interview with CNBC's Scott Wapner, for example, former House Speaker John Boehner remarked that, 'Donald Trump is not an ideologue. I've said yesterday he's barely a Republican. He could be barely a Democrat as well. So nobody really knows where he's going'. Immediately after Trump's win, President Obama used this idea as a means of reassuring worried Americans, saying that he found Trump to be 'pragmatic' and 'not an ideologue'.

[22]This is typical of the grandiosity of charismatic 'missions' (Weber 1922: 439, 1115–7).

describes a similar social process (what we might refer to as 'the social construction of extraordinary moral characters'). This they do, however, with respect to opposite ends of the moral spectrum. While there have been discussions in the past about the co-presence of folk heroes and folk devils (Eliade 1958[1996]; Smith 2000); or descriptions of interpretive processes of transition between heroic and devilish statuses (Katz 1975; Warren 1980; Joosse 2012*b*: 81–5; Joosse *et al*. 2015: 824–6), the agency of 'heroes' themselves has not been adequately accounted for in moral panic theory. With its focus on processes *co-instantiation*, this article has sought to provide a more detailed interactional account of how charismatic agency holds causal significance within processes of moral panic.

What might account for the lack of such synthetic attempts in the past? No doubt the balkanization between sociology and criminology bears some responsibility. Just as surely, the disconnect is a product of generational and normative factors. *Economy and Society* (1922) and *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (1972) appeared 50 years apart, and it is well known that Cohen's work appeared as a part of the New Deviancy Theory wave that was cresting, in part, at the expense of the prestige of 'cannonical,' sociologies (Cohen 2011; Young 2009). By the late 1960s, Weber's pretentions towards value-neutrality (Roth and Schluchter 1979: 65–116) had moved past sounding quaint and were being viewed with increased suspicion by a generation of criminologists who were advocating, along with Cohen, for a 'sceptical revolution in criminology and the sociology of deviance', that was 'part of a broader reaction in the social sciences as a whole against the dominant models, images and methodology of positivism' (1972: 5, 252, nt. 8). Notwithstanding the fact that Weber himself was positively anti-positivist, such framing of 'dominant models' doubtless made his conceptual uptake increasingly unfashionable for younger criminologists who wished above all to look *forward* during the critical turn of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The irony that emerges in light of the present pairing with Weber attends to the revelation that the Cohenian dialectics described here are, by comparison with Weber's, the more 'Durkheimian' of the two, in so far as Cohen's 'right-thinking' agents work within a system that functions to preserve an existing moral order. In their now classic discussion, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994; 2009: 249) reiterate what has become recognized as the main interaction at the heart of moral panic theory, namely, 'the contrast between the condition or behavior that is denounced and the correctness of the righteous folk engaged in the denunciation.' This article critically interrogates this notion of 'correctness,' refusing to accord traditional mores with such ontological priority (and 'folk devils' with a corresponding epiphenomenonal status [cf. McRobbie 1994; Walsh 2016]). It recognizes that traditional values cannot be taken for granted as the cultural centre of gravity to which all moral manifestations will eventually be drawn. While these Durkheimian aspects of moral panic theory have been discussed by others (Garland 2008; Reed 2015), and while others have pointed to the increasingly contradictory and complex nature of the field of power in which moral panics operate (Hier 2008; McRobbie and Thornton 1995), it is really the comparison with Weber that shows the route toward drawing more fully on the promise—first made with the emergence of New Deviancy Theory—of decoupling the sociology of morality from some out-dated reference points within structural-functionalism (Abend 2008). The force and impact of charismatic challenges within moral systems, displayed in the 'outflanking' and 'bedevilling' modes of interaction, reveal 'anti-preservationist' processes

through which proto-orthodoxies can rise to become traditional cultures of the future. Indeed, an acknowledgement of this charismatic agency helps to account even for the appearance of morally defiant and otherwise inscrutable figures like Donald Trump.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Editor Sandra Walkate and anonymous reviewers at the *British Journal of Criminology* for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Thanks are also due to Maggy Lee, Karen Joe Laidler, Xiaoli Tian, Liping Wang, and Iris Hoiting, for comments and support along the way.

References

Abadi, Mark. (2016), 'There's an interesting reason why Donal Trump's nicknames for his enemies are so effective', *Business Insider*, available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/why-donald-trump-gives-nicknames-to-his-political-enemies-2016-11 (accessed 2 November 2016).

Abend, G. (2008), 'Two Main Problems in the Sociology of Morality', *Theory and Society*, 37: 87–125.

Abrutyn, S. and Van Ness, J. (2015), 'The Role of Agency in Sociocultural Evolution: Institutional Entrepreneurship as a Force of Structural and Cultural Change', *Thesis Eleven*, 127: 52–77.

Alexander, J. (2010), *The Performance of Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Austin, J. L. (1955[1975]), *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford University Press.

Barbour, H., Bradshaw, S., Fleischer, A., Fonalledas, Z. and McCall, G. (2012), *Growth and Opportunity Project*. RNC.

Becker, H. S. (1963[2008]), *Outsiders*. Simon and Schuster.

Bennett, W. L. (2012), 'The Personalization of Politics Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of Participation', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 644: 20–39.

Bourdieu, P. (1991), 'Political Representation: Elements for a Theory of the Political Field', *Language and Symbolic Power*, 171–202.

Butler, J. (1997), *Excitable Speech*. Routledge.

Cisin, I. and Clark, W. (1962), 'The Methodological Challenge of Disaster Research,' in G. W. Baker and D. W. Chapman, eds, *Man and Society in Disaster*, 200–16. Basic Books.

Cohen, S. (1972[2002]), *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. Routledge.

——. (2002), 'Moral Panics as Cultural Politics: Introduction to the Third Edition', in S. Cohen, ed., *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, vi–xliv. Routledge.

——. (2011), 'Whose Side Were We on?: The Undeclared Politics of Moral Panic Theory', *Crime Media Culture*, 7: 237–43.

Chavez, J. and Provine, D. M. (2009), 'Race and the Response of State Legislatures to Unauthorized Immigrants', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 623: 78–92.

Craciun, M. (2016), 'The Cultural Work of Office Charisma: Maintaining Professional Power in Psychotherapy', *Theory and Society*, 45: 361–83.

Critcher, C. (2008), 'Moral Panic Analysis: Past, Present and Future', *Sociology Compass*, 2: 1127–44.
——. (2009), 'Widening the Focus: Moral Panics as Moral Regulation', *British Journal of Criminology*, 49: 17–34.
Dawson, L. L. (2011),'Charismatic Leadership in Millennial Movements,' in C. Wessinger, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism*, 113–32. Oxford University Press.
Derrida, J. (1977), *Limited Inc*. Northwestern University Press.
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1968), 'Introduction,' in *Charisma and Institution Building: Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, xi–lvi. University of Chicago Press.
Eliade, M. (1958[1996]), *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. University of Nebraska Press.
Garland, D. (2008), 'On the Concept of Moral Panic', *Crime, Media, Culture*, 4: 9–30.
Geertz, C. (1977), 'Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power', in Joseph Ben-David, Terry Nicholas Clark, ed., *Culture and Its Creators: Essays in Honor of Edward Shils*, 150–71. University of Chicago Press.
Goode, E. and Ben-Yehuda, N. (1994), 'Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 20: 149–71.
——. (2009), *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*. John Wiley & Sons.
Greenfeld, L. (1985), 'Reflections on Two Charismas', *British Journal of Sociology*, 36:117–32.
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978), *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order*. Palgrave Macmillan.
Heer, J. (2016), *'Trump's Genius Is to Turn Subtext into Text'*, available online at https://twitter.com/heerjeet/status/705774998787477505 (accessed 19 April 2016).
Hier, S. P. (2002), 'Conceptualizing Moral Panic through a Moral Economy of Harm', *Critical Sociology*, 28: 311–34.
——. (2008), 'Thinking Beyond Moral Panic: Risk, Responsibility, and the Politics of Moralization', *Theoretical Criminology*, 12: 173–90.
——. (2011), 'Tightening the Focus: Moral Panic, Moral Regulation and Liberal Government', *British Journal of Sociology*, 62: 523–41.
——. (2016), 'Good Moral Panics? Normative Ambivalence, Social Reaction, and Coexisting Responsibilities in Everyday Life', *Current Sociology*, 1–19.
Hochschild, A. R. (2016*a*), *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. The New Press.
——. (2016*b*), 'The Ecstatic Edge of Politics: Sociology and Donald Trump', *Contemporary Sociology*, 45: 683–9.
Hofstadter, R. (1964), 'The Paranoid Style in American Politics'. *Harpers Magazine*, 77–86.
Jenkins, P. (1992), *Intimate Enemies: Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain*. Transaction Publishers.
Jewkes, Y. (2015), *Media and Crime*. Sage.
Joosse, P. (2012*a*), 'The Presentation of the Charismatic Self in Everyday Life: Reflections on a Canadian New Religious Movement', *Sociology of Religion*, 73: 174–99.
——. (2012*b*), 'Elves, Environmentalism, and 'Eco-Terror': Leaderless Resistance and Media Coverage of the Earth Liberation Front', *Crime Media Culture*, 81: 75–93.
——. (2014), 'Becoming a God: Max Weber and the Social Construction of Charisma', *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 14: 266–83.
——. (2017*a*), 'Weber's Disciples: Theorizing the Charismatic Aristocracy', *Sociological Theory*, 35.

——. (2017*b*), 'Leaderless Resistance and the Loneliness of Lone Wolves: Exploring the Rhetorical Dynamics of Lone Actor Violence', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29: 52–78.

Joosse, P., Bucerius, S. M. and Thompson, S. K. (2015), 'Narratives and Counternarratives: Somali-Canadians on Recruitment as Foreign Fighters to Al-Shabaab', *British Journal of Criminology*, 55: 811–32.

Katz, J. (1975), 'Essences as Moral Identities: Verifiability and Responsibility in Imputations of Deviance and Charisma', *American Journal of Sociology*, 80: 1369–90.

Kushin, M. J. and Yamamoto, M. (2010), 'Did Social Media Really Matter?' *Mass Communication and Society*, 13: 608–30.

Lemert, E. M. (1951), *Social Pathology*. McGraw-Hill.

López, I. H. (2015), *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class*. Oxford University Press.

Luntz, F. (2015), *Interview with Donald Trump at the Family Leadership Summit*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eI_Y8l3U8mo (accessed 18 July 2015).

McDermott, V. (2013), 'Adding Legitimacy to the Moral Panic Toolkit', *The Critical Criminologist Newsletter*, 21: 8–16.

——. (2015), *The War on Drugs in Sport: Moral Panics and Organizational Legitimacy*. Routledge.

McRobbie, A. (1994), 'Folk Devils Fight Back', *New Left Review*, 203: 107–16.

McRobbie, A. and Thornton, S. L. (1995), 'Rethinking 'Moral Panic' for Multi-mediated Social Worlds', *British Journal of Sociology*, 46:559–74.

Mead, G. H. (1934), *Mind, Self, and Society*. University of Chicago Press.

Meltzer, B. and Musolf, G. (2002), 'Resentment and Ressentiment', *Sociological Inquiry*, 72: 240–55.

Merton, R. K. (1968), *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Simon and Schuster.

Moy, P., Xenos, M. A. and Hess, V. K. (2005), 'Communication and Citizenship: Mapping the Political Effects of Infotainment', *Mass Communication & Society*, 8: 111–31.

Nietzsche, F. (1878[1992]), 'Human, All-Too-Human [Selections]', in F. Nietzsche, ed., *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 147–54. Trans. W. Kaufmann. The Modern Library.

——. (1887[1992]), 'On the Genealogy of Morals', in F. Nietzsche, ed., *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 437–599. Trans. W. Kaufmann. The Modern Library.

Ranulf, S., Briefs, G., Taylor, H. and Whitehead, T. N. (1938), *Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology: A Sociological Study*, 49: 107–9.

Reed, I. A. (2013), 'Charismatic Performance: A Study of Bacon's Rebellion', *American Journal of Cultural Sociology*, 1: 254–87.

——. (2015), 'Deep Culture in Action: Resignification, Synecdoche, and Metanarrative in the Moral Panic of the Salem Witch Trials', *Theory and Society*, 44: 65–94.

Roth, G., and Schluchter, W. (1979), *Max Weber's Vision of History*. University of California Press.

Scheler, M. (1961), *Ressentiment*. Ed. with an Introd. by Lewis A. Coser. Trans. William W. Holdheim. Free Press of Glencoe.

Scott, J. C. (1990), *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. Yale University Press.

Searle, J. R. (1975), 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts,' in K. Günderson, ed., *Language, Mind, and Knowledge*. Minneapolis.

Sherman, G. (2016), 'Operation Trump: Inside the Most Unorthodox Campaign in Political History', *New York Magazine*, April 3.

Sherman, J. (2011), 'Trump's Name-Calling a Symptom of Nounism', *Psychology Today*. May 2.
Shils, E. (1965), 'Charisma, Order, Status', *American Sociological Review*, 30: 199–213.
——. (1975), *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*. University of Chicago Press.
Smith, D. N. (2013), 'Charisma Disenchanted: Max Weber and His Critics', *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, 31: 3–74.
Smith, P. (2000), 'Culture and Charisma: Outline of a Theory', *Acta Sociologica*, 43: 101–11.
Tannenbaum, F. (1938), *Crime and the Community*. Ginn.
Thussu, D. (2008), *News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment*. Sage.
Trump, D. (2016), 'Donald Trump's Five-Point Plan for Ethics Reform'. Speech in Colorado Springs. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vd3fnEAUuio (accessed 17 October 2016).
Turner, B. S. (2011), *'The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays,'* in Simon Susen, Bryan S. Turner, ed., 223–245, Anthem Press, 2011.
Young, J. (1971), 'The Role of the Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy, Negotiators of Reality and Translators of Fantasy', in Stanley Cohen, ed., *Images of Deviance*, 37. Penguin.
——. (2009), 'Moral Panic its Origins in Resistance, Ressentiment and the Translation of Fantasy into Reality', *British Journal of Criminology*, 49: 4–16.
Walsh, J. P. (2016), 'Moral Panics by Design: The Case of Terrorism', *Current Sociology*, 1–20.
Warren, C. (1980), 'Destigmatization of Identity: From Deviant to Charismatic', *Qualitative Sociology*, 3: 59–72.
Wasielewski, P. L. (1985) 'The Emotional Basis of Charisma,' *Symbolic Interaction*, 8: 207–22.
Weber, M. (1905[1920]), *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. 1930 by T. Parsons. 1958 reprint. 1904–1905, second edition. Scribner.
——. (1922[1978]), *Economy and Society*, vol. 2. G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. University of California Press.
——. (1922[1956]), *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Wright, S. (2015), 'Moral Panics as Enacted Melodramas', *British Journal of Criminology*, 55: 1245–62.