

SUDAN POLICY BRIEF



Resistance Committees and Sudan's Political Future

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Key Findings

- ▶ Resistance committees in Sudan have an extensive history of organising, dating back to 2010. Since then, resistance committees have increased their capacities and have worked to streamline their activities. Following the coup of October 2021, resistance committees across the country have come to the forefront of non-violent resistance movements. They engage in a variety of activities including organising protests, supporting victims of abuse and injustice, working to coordinate resistance and advocacy efforts with local governments, and human rights campaigns. While these activities display their inclination to support Sudanese society, many resistance committees remained excluded from Sudanese political processes.
- ▶ Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, resistance committees have played a central role in providing social protection and humanitarian relief provisions to citizens on the ground impacted by fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
- ▶ While resistance committees continue to support citizens across Sudan, they would benefit greatly from financial and capacity building support. Specifically, resistance committees have cited the need for donations to support their advocacy and humanitarian relief efforts as they remain largely self-funded and constrained financially. In addition, there is a need to increase technological capacities across states, through supporting equitable access to internet, digital devices and telecommunications services, in order to allow committees across the country to better coordinate with one another. Finally, there is a desire to improve team-building, diplomacy, advocacy, and writing skills. This support would allow them to carry out their activities effectively and make meaningful contributions to nation-building activities and political processes.
- ▶ Given Sudan's current conflict, the committees are in need of support from relevant stakeholders. International organisations in Sudan currently conducting humanitarian relief can coordinate with resistance committees to ensure that support is provided across the country. Stakeholders working on safe-passage routes for refugees and internally-displaced persons could also lend their capacities to resistance committees, who have extensive knowledge of Sudan's neighbourhoods and areas.

- ▶ Resistance committees have a variety of visions for Sudan's future. These perspectives are shaped by the various understandings and possibilities of the revolution, which are influenced by class, race, gender, religion, and social, economic and political identities. Overall, the committees continue to prioritise and emphasize the need for long-term, meaningful, sustainable change across the country that promotes inclusion, economic prosperity, adequate social service provision, and peace.

Introduction

Resistance movements in Sudan are not a new phenomenon. Throughout Sudan's post-colonial history, resistance and protest movements have attempted to enact political, social and economic change. Sudan's post-independence period has been shaped by the political influence of political groups who controlled the country's socio-economic structure.¹ Within this context, the country has experienced several dictatorships, including from 1958-1964, 1969-1985, and 1989-2019. Each of these dictatorships were faced with revolutionary calls for peace and democracy by the Sudanese people. The most recent example of Sudanese resistance movements leading to political change was the 2018-19 revolution. Although Sudan's most recent revolution borrowed strategies from the previous uprisings of 1964 and 1985, its calls for political change were distinctive in several ways. The uprisings of 1964 and 1985, which lasted five and eleven days respectively, were led by the leftists and liberals of Sudan's urban riverain areas. However, these activists were unable to transcend the divide between themselves and marginalised regions before the regimes were toppled.² Distinctively, Sudan's most recent revolution began outside of the capital, on 19 December 2019, in Atbara, a town with a rich history of protests and labour movements. The revolution quickly spread, as activists across the country called for the dismantling of Omar al-Bashir's regime.

The fall of Omar al-Bashir's regime on 11 April 2019, after three decades in power, was a result of several months of large-scale street demonstrations against Sudan's deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the political, social and economic domination of the regime. However, the demonstrations that led to al-Bashir's removal were the first in a wave of protests that would continue until the present day.

Following the removal of al-Bashir, protestors began advocating for the removal of his remaining military loyalists. In response, the military infamously launched a violent dispersal of the sit-in in Khartoum on June 3 2019. This tragic display of the security sectors power and entrenchment raised questions about the direction of democratic rule in Sudan. By August 2019, the civilian opposition forces, under the umbrella of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), signed a deal with the military, or Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The signing of this deal with Sudan's military, a body that has historically been the leader of Sudan's three successful and thirteen failed coups,³ as well as the appointment of Abdel Fatah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan 'Hemedti' Dagalo, as heads of Sudan's transitional government, both of whom were historically loyalists to Bashir, led to a wave of discontent amongst a large section of Sudan's revolutionaries. Regardless, this deal led to a transitional period of power sharing between the military and civilian opposition. However, in October 2021, the military seized power again, declaring a state of emergency. This led to a second wave of protests, this time led by the neighbourhood resistance committees.

The emergence of the resistance committees to the forefront of Sudanese civilian oppositional politics is a distinctive phenomenon, particularly due to the formation and national reach of each of these groups. These grassroots neighbourhood networks exist nation-wide and consist of people from various backgrounds. In particular, these resistance committees are popular amongst young Sudanese, who were at the forefront of the 2018 revolution and previous mobilisations like it. More than anything, resistance committees are a pronouncement of the specific desires and struggles of young Sudanese people and marginalised groups. To further the understanding of the viewpoints, aims and objectives of these committees, this paper provides a brief background and history to these groups. In addition, this paper will map out the activities, challenges, objectives, and hopes of resistance committees within the context of the current conflict in Sudan, which began on 15 April 2023.

Background and History of Resistance Committees

An understanding of the history of resistance committees can help shed light on how these groups came to the forefront of Sudanese civilian opposition movements. When resistance committees began to develop, they engaged in a variety of political activities. In 2010, they engaged in voter registration and awareness raising around the 2010 elections, with the intention to promote democratic nation-building and a future without Omar al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP).⁴ At this point, these groups took the form of loose neighbourhood groups. In 2013, they also engaged in protests in response to the government's decision to reduce wheat and fuel subsidies, which was a direct consequence of Sudan's post-secession financial crisis,⁵ a more modern pronouncement of Sudan's power and class imbalances, that have been shaped by successive governments' failures to undertake any radical reformation of the country's socio-economic structures. However, these groups were about more than class imbalances, and grew to advocate for inclusion and empowerment of marginalised groups in all facets of Sudanese society.

At the time, these groups were mainly made-up of students and young graduate political party cadres from the Communist and Congress Parties,⁶ which have a history in engaging in opposition politics, particularly in the 1960s. In addition to their anti-government sentiments, these young people shared an experience of campus politics and some were from similar areas and neighbourhoods. Although they were united in their backgrounds and politics, they lacked formal internal structure, cohesion, and communication. As a result of this, their work on the ground was slow.⁷ However, over the next three years, these groups would join together to form a loose coalition called resistance committees, whose focus remained on engaging small-scale resistance within their neighbourhoods.⁸

By the end of 2016, Sudan was experiencing another wave of anti-government resistance. This time, resistance committee activists supported and carried out a three-day civil disobedience campaign.⁹ At this point, the resistance committees had developed the skills and coordination necessary to execute anti-government protests and strikes at a larger scale. In the run up to December 2018, the resistance committees began to engage and organise via social media with large sectors of society across the country. Drawing on inspiration from the Arab Spring, resources from the internet supported activists in developing strong networks and knowledge on effective protest tactics.¹⁰

Central to these tactics was the approach of non-violent protests, similar to those witnessed in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010 and 2011. It has been noted that the successes of the Arab Spring inspired political activism among resistance committee members, who, along with other protest groups, were able to reflect and strategize on methods of non-violent resistance, mobilisation, and community support.¹¹

Activities of Resistance Committees in 2018-19

Similar to 2013, the resistance committees in 2018-19 were mainly composed of younger people from a variety of social and economic backgrounds. Members of these committees are proudly independent, and were not controlled by any political party in the country. Resistance committee members were motivated to mobilise according to their own social, economic and political grievances with the government. While Sudan's deteriorating economic situation during the final years of al-Bashir's rule has been cited as a main cause for the protests,¹² the discontent of activists can be more acutely understood as a response to the regime's continuous pattern of marginalisation of its citizens across regional, gendered, religious, social, political, and economic lines. For instance, for resistance committees in conflict-affected regions, contributing to the protest movement was seen as an advocacy for their desire to restore peace in their areas.¹³ However, regardless of varying priorities, several intersectional issues were driving resistance committees to organise against the regime. Some of these issues included the country's deteriorating economic and security situation, the lack of inclusion of youth voices into politics and the three decade long domination of the NCP, and historical inequality and discrimination, amongst other issues.¹⁴

With these issues as motivating factors, resistance committees began to play an important role in mobilising people on-the-ground against al-Bashir's regime. During the revolution and until today, resistance committees have been organised via formally demarcated areas.¹⁵ This has allowed neighbourhood residents to have direct access to their committee members and to allow committee members to mobilise and organise more easily. Political pressures and grievances felt within neighbourhoods could be discussed during committee meetings and potentially be brought forward to larger-scale political discussions.

The importance of the localised nature of resistance committees cannot be understated, particularly because the resistance committees have come to fill the gap of several government public services. The NCP has long been criticized for its lack of governmental budget allocation towards its citizens. The government, alongside the Sudanese army, has controlled a large share of Sudan's budget and resources.¹⁶ This large allocation can be seen as a result of the government's desire and prioritisation to exercise control and influence on political and security spheres of life, particularly through the national security sector and militias. Central to the protest movement were calls for reallocation of the state's budget to public services and necessities that the majority of the Sudanese population have been deprived from. Resistance committees have provided spaces for communities to discuss and devise solutions to issues that impact their neighbourhoods on a day-to-day basis, such as water shortages, and larger political issues, such as organising for protests.

In addition to their neighbourhood coordination and support efforts, resistance committees came to use distinctive mobilisation tactics throughout the revolution. For instance, neighbourhoods would coordinate protests with one another to make it more difficult for security forces to identify the protestors. Protestors would frequently agree to protest in each other's neighbourhoods, and this type of mobilisation contributed to the strategy of exhausting security forces.¹⁷ Another example of early resistance committee mobilisation during the revolution was door-to-door callouts, which involved coordinating and mobilising protests by knocking on each other's doors to spread the news. This was particularly useful in mobilising during the several periods of internet blackouts, in which people could not organise via social media.¹⁸ These tactics would become commonplace in neighbourhoods in Sudan, and their consistency proved to be a distinctive illustration of the political and mobilising power these groups possessed.¹⁹ This inclusivity can also be understood through the geographical spread of resistance committees in Sudan. Unlike the revolutions of 1964 and 1985, where protest movements were concentrated in the urban capitals, the spread of resistance committees today is nation-wide, and through social media, committees have been able to connect and coordinate with one another. This is illustrative of the interconnectivity that has emerged between Khartoum and the country's peripheries.

Although the resistance committees operated independently, they were also part of wider coordinating efforts during the revolution. Specifically, they joined the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), some political parties and other civilian organisations. Together with the SPA and other groups, the resistance committees signed the Freedom and Change Coalition Declaration on January 1st 2019, which would become the political manifesto of the coalition.²⁰ However, following the fall of al-Bashir and the beginning of the transitional period, the FFC umbrella, which grew out of the need for more coordinated resistance efforts, began to grow more fragmented. There were disagreements about making deals with the military, working with Umma Party,²¹ and general divergences on the future direction of the FFC. As a result, the resistance committees, the Communist Party and the Professionals Association distanced themselves from the FFC.²² The fragmentation of the civic uprising can be regarded as a facet of both its initial and localised success. In particular, the FFC's decision to partake in a power-sharing plan with the Transitional Military Council, made-up of Sudan's military junta who were responsible for the June 3rd 2019 massacre and hundreds of other casualties since the start of the revolution, set them apart from the resistance committees, many of whom believed that this agreement with the military did not represent the revolutionary fervour of Sudan's youth.²³ Nevertheless, following the signing of a political agreement and constitutional declaration, Sudan entered a political transitional period, which was governed by a Sovereign Council and transitional state bodies.

Activities of Resistance Committees in 2021-2022

While the resistance committees played an important mobilising role throughout the course of the revolution, it was their actions in 2021 that brought them to the spotlight. In October 2021, Sudan's military, under the command of General Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, staged a coup that deposed of the country's transitional government and resulted in the consolidation of power in the hands of the country's military and security forces. The transfer of power to the hands of security forces by means of a military coup is very familiar to Sudan. The country has experienced several military-led coup attempts including in 1958, 1969, 1985, and 1989. As such, this most recent coup is demonstrative of a successive historical pattern of the entrenchment of the military in Sudanese politics. However, what is distinctive about the October 2021 military coup, was the shift in nature of civilian-led protest movements. Further splits between civilian parties emerged, as groups disagreed on whether to trust the military's promise of an eventual civilian-led government or to adopt a non-negotiation stance towards the coup. While some factions of the FFC entered negotiations with the military in the hopes to devise a path towards a civilian-led government in Sudan, resistance committees throughout the country began to protest against the October 2021 coup. Distinctively, resistance committees have displayed commitments reflective of their two loudest slogans: 'going back is impossible' and 'no negotiation, no partnership, and no legitimization.' Unlike the SPA and the FFC, who effectively mobilised against the regime during the revolution but eventually negotiated with the military, the resistance committees have spent the last few years playing a central role in a more radical politics that goes against the status quo promoted by elite political actors in Sudan.

In addition to protesting against the regime, some committees, most notably those from Sinnar State, Jazira State, and Khartoum State, led the issuance of political charters, which served as a roadmap for their resistance operations.²⁴ These charters were formed based off of consultations between neighbourhoods, regions and other revolutionary civilian bodies.²⁵ They focused on important themes including social and economic inequality, war and political repression, the legacy of colonialism, and the future of participatory democracy in Sudan. By April 2022, the charters were discussed and brought together for the signing of a unified revolutionary charter, titled: The Revolutionary Charter for the Establishment of the People's Authority.²⁶

Signed by 55 groups across the country, this charter can be viewed as a pronouncement of the resistance committees', and partners', visions for the future of Sudan. While the issuance of the Charter is an example of the strong coordination effort amongst resistance committees, there remained discrepancies and disagreements both amongst and within resistance committees. In many ways, these disagreements have been shaped by the various understandings and possibilities of the revolution, which are influenced by class, race, gender, religion, and social, economic and political identities. While the protests against Bashir were predicated on the belief that Sudan can and should be shaped by Sudanese society, the ways in which this society should be shaped, as well as the path to it's shaping, have arisen as points of contention. These rifts have particularly come to light in the current political moment, and are accentuated by various internal and external challenges. Regardless, the overarching belief amongst resistance committees is that the status quo built by Bashir's regime is not reflective of the visions and hopes they have for Sudan's future.

Challenges and Objectives of Resistance Committees before April 2023

Since the October 2021 coup, political discussions continued between the mainstream FFC-Central Council, some opposition parties, and the transitional military council. These discussions led to a draft transitional constitutional document and a political framework agreement.²⁷ In addition, it had been announced that a civilian-led cabinet would be appointed in the first-half of April 2023, allowing the country return to its journey towards democracy.²⁸ Opinions regarding these political developments have been mixed, with members of resistance committees split on whether to accept or reject the political declaration. These splits not only existed across resistance committees, but within them as well.²⁹ For some members of resistance committees, accepting these political developments and arrangements is the only viable way to gain legitimacy and have their concerns realised.³⁰ Other resistance committee members believed that full trust cannot be given to the transitional military council.³¹ They argued that if the political agreement brings about productive dialogue, there can be change.³² Finally, there are some members that denounced the agreement completely and continued to advocate for a non-negotiation stance.³³ Their opposition to the political settlement is rooted in the belief that the negotiations have the potential to be co-opted by the military,³⁴ just as it had been in the run up to the October 2021 coup. This fear was grounded on the belief that the civilian opposition is repeating the same mistakes as in 2019, and that these negotiations had the potential to lead to further military control during Sudan's forthcoming transitional period. Regardless, across the three view-points, there was an underlying worry that the proposed two-year transitional period will not be enough to address the root causes of instability in Sudan. There is a strong recognition that it will take significantly longer to uproot remnants of the previous regime and address people's economic, political, social, and conflict-related concerns throughout the entire country.³⁵ Ultimately, across interviewees, it was evident that the resistance committees are concerned with long-term sustainable progress, across all facets of Sudan's economic, political and social life, as opposed to short-term political gains or progress.³⁶ Along with uprooting remnants of the previous regime, the resistance committees are concerned with the country's lack of public services, economic opportunities, and the cycles of marginalisation and violence, that in particular have impacted the lives of millions living in Sudan's peripheries.

Regardless of these disagreements, resistance committees continued to mobilise, negotiate and found synergies with one another. Where internet services are available and accessible, resistance committees discussed political issues and Sudan's future on Facebook Live and via Twitter. In addition, they utilised social media to organise meetings with one another. It was emphasized that social media has played an important role in making organising more accessible, given the country's current period of economic turmoil. Many people's salaries have been impacted, and social media provides a way for people to connect without having to bare the financial cost of travelling across the country.³⁷ The specific activities that the resistance committees had been focusing on since the October 2021 coup include supporting victims of abuse and injustice, working to coordinate resistance and advocacy efforts with local governments, human rights advocacy campaigns, women's empowerment, and advocating for transitional justice.³⁸ In addition, some resistance committees continued to mobilise people for protests against the transitional military government.³⁹ There is a desire amongst the committees to also work on supporting democratic elections in the future, through educational programmes and advocacy.

The ambitions and objectives of resistance committees have been frequently impacted by a variety of logistical, geographic, and economic challenges. Firstly, it was emphasized that the country's current economic situation continued to impact the work that resistance committees are able to do.⁴⁰ Resistance committees are largely self-funded and depend on donations from their neighbourhoods and members to function. Given that people's incomes have been impacted by the economic situation, resistance committees are frequently unable to fulfil their initiatives, travel for meetings and protests, or provide support to their communities. This situation grew increasingly worse following the October 2021 coup, due to the deterioration of the country's security situation, which has made it difficult for many members, and particularly women, to travel far distances.⁴¹

Secondly, given that Khartoum is the political capital and the wealthiest part of the country, resistance committees based in Greater Khartoum are more likely to have easier access to political opportunities and platforms than those in the peripheries, who may be limited by finances, the consequences of conflict, or weak public infrastructure.⁴² As a result, resistance committees outside of Khartoum often feel that their priorities and visions for Sudan's future are excluded from the political dialogue.⁴³

To solve this, it has been suggested that resistance committees outside of Khartoum can elect individuals based in Khartoum to represent them.⁴⁴ Lastly, resistance committees have pointed to their own internal knowledge gaps and capacity building deficiencies that have impacted their ability to contribute meaningfully to political negotiations. In particular, there is a desire to improve team building, diplomacy, advocacy, and writing skills of committee members across the country.⁴⁵ Although these challenges persist, resistance committees remain committed to enacting and supporting long-term change in Sudan.

Finally, on an external level, before April 2023, resistance committees argued that they would be able to organise and participate in political change in a more effective manner if there was more transparency from political elites and international stakeholders. Since the October 2021 coup, it was noted by the committees that international and national actors have become less transparent in their dealings with the military junta.⁴⁶ As a result, this has left the resistance committees feeling excluded from the political dialogue. Resistance committees believe that transparency from political actors is important because it will provide reassurances that non-democratic forces, specifically those from the former NCP regime, will not be involved in the new democratic government.⁴⁷ Lack of transparency is also responsible for the increase of suspicion between the resistance committees and other political and civilian forces. There is a strong belief that transparent approaches to political dealings, such as through public speeches or TV broadcasts, will not only lead to more inclusive politics, but will also help political forces gain more support and political buy-in.⁴⁸ Importantly, the young people part of resistance committees are keen to speak and negotiate with political actors but are in need of platforms and technical and logistical support to ensure that their voices are heard.

Resistance Committees and the Current Conflict

In the run up to 15 April 2023, resistance committees continued to support victims of abuse and injustice, coordinate resistance and advocacy efforts with local governments, engage human rights advocacy campaigns and women's empowerment initiatives, and advocate for transitional justice. However, on the morning of 15 April 2023, fighting broke out in the country's capital between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under the direction of Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under the command of Mohamed Hamdan 'Hemedti' Dagalo. The causes of the conflict can be traced to disagreements and rifts concerning Sudan's security sector, the role of the RSF versus the role of the SAF in Sudan's future, and the economic and political power struggles Sudan has grown accustomed to. Although Sudan has experienced long history of armed conflict and war, across the last 65 years of independence, Khartoum has remained a safe haven for its residents and for those fleeing conflict in the peripheries. Urban warfare in the capital is not commonplace, and it did not take long before the conflict in Khartoum spread to Western Sudan, impacting conflict-affected regions such as Darfur.

The roots of this power struggle can be traced back to the Islamist coup of 1989, which brought al-Bashir to power and transformed and empowered Sudan's military and security landscape. When al-Bashir seized power in 1989, his movement experienced political splits and ideological power struggles. To counter this, he purged the military and security sector to solidify his power, ensure loyalty and opulently rule by the gun. As the Sudan's military continued to grow in budget and arms, so did the RSF. The RSF emerged from the Janjaweed, the militia group responsible for many of the atrocities that occurred in Darfur since 2003. Al-Bashir's government formalised the Janjaweed into the RSF in 2013, and its commander Hemedti, gained more political power and wealth.⁴⁹ The RSF worked side-by-side with the army under Bashir's command to counter the protests during 2018-19, and Hemedti secured himself a seat at the table alongside Burhan during the transitional government and as a co-orchestrator of the October 2021 coup. Therefore, the power struggles between the RSF and SAF that have led to this current moment can be regarded as the result of decades-long state-sanctioned enormous military and militia spending, the Sudanese army's historic, albeit consistent, seat and influence over Sudanese politics, and the RSF's rapid monetary, military, and political growth, which occurred under the empowerment and legitimisation of the previous regime. In the views of many resistance committees, the causes of this conflict can also be linked to the international and national partners who engaged in political dealings with both the RSF and SAF during the transitional period and after the coup.

For many members of resistance committees, the current conflict is the worst-case-scenario they had feared. On the second day of the fighting, Khartoum's resistance committees released a joint statement on their position – emphasising that they are not impartial and that they are 'engaged in peaceful struggle against the militarisation' of the country.⁵⁰ The committees have urged civilians not to side with either the RSF or the army, in order to ensure that neither side can utilise political or ethnic rhetoric to mobilise more fighting or establish more political legitimacy in the country.⁵¹ Alongside these statements, they have also channelled their resources and networks to provide much needed social protection and humanitarian relief provisions to citizens on the ground impacted by the fighting between the two sides. The coordination mechanisms established by the resistance committees in the months and years prior to this conflict have come to the forefront, as the committees continue to cooperate and exchange information with each other nation-wide. This has proven useful in helping citizens evacuate Khartoum via resistance committee monitored safe-routes and in delivering much needed service provision. Specifically, the resistance committees have provided water, medical, electricity and financial support where possible to their neighbours.⁵² Not only have these humanitarian and social protection efforts helped address the already existing lack of social and public service provision available to the Sudanese people, but they emphasize the legitimacy of the committees as a network capable of providing the social, health, security, and monetary relief when the government fails to do so.

Conclusion

Sudan's resistance committees have developed a strong culture of organising and advocacy. The various political events that occurred since 2010 have helped resistance committees solidify their position as radical revolutionary spokespeople for Sudan's future. Early pronouncements of resistance committee initiatives and actions have included raising awareness around elections, engaging in protests in response to government financial crises and mobilising against al-Bashir's regime in 2018-2019. Following rifts with the FFC and the coup of October 2021, resistance committees demonstrated their strength, perseverance and capabilities. Their protests and relief efforts were all grounded on their mantra of the three 'no's': no partnership, no negotiation, and no legitimacy of the military government that came to control the country after the coup.

The history of conflict, protest movements, dictatorships, and coups in Sudan have fed into cycles of exploitation and marginalisation, economic turmoil, lack of service provision, and more conflict. In this context, resistance committees have served as an example of what Sudanese society that prioritize the needs and concerns of its citizens could look like. These networks have highlighted their vision for a Sudan that is shaped by the diverse wishes of its people. To reflect and achieve this, resistance committees have provided support for marginalised communities, humanitarian and social service provision during the current conflict, organised and coordinated nation-wide, and have engaged in advocacy and human rights initiatives.

However, the actions and initiatives of resistance committees are not without their challenges. Before the conflict, resistance committees across the country cited a need for monetary and capacity building support to ensure that they can effectively engage in their activities. In addition, many committees also underlined their frustration with being sidelined from Sudan's political processes in the run up to April 2023. Today, many members risk their lives providing support to citizens in their areas impacted by conflict.

While the conflict in Sudan rages on, resistance committees continue to deliver life-saving support nation-wide. Within this context, the scale at which they are mobilising their resources is unprecedented, particularly because the current situation presents much uncertainty with regards to the country's political, social, and economic future. Nevertheless, the committees continue to work in the face of this adversity and uncertainty. They continue to serve as an example of the revolutionary power of community, and the revolutionary power of the Sudanese people.

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