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Success under tokenism: Co-option of the newcomer and the prevention of collective protest

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A laboratory analogue of North American intergroup context was used to investigate the responses of individuals who succeed in individual upward social mobility under conditions of highly restricted boundary permeability (i.e. tokenism). These successful tokens were compared with participants who either (a) succeeded in an open/meritocratic intergroup context, or (b) were forced to remain in the disadvantaged group because of the tokenism restriction. Although successful tokens recognized the collective injustice of tokenism, their behaviour did not differ from participants who succeeded in the open/meritocratic condition. Those forced to remain in their disadvantaged position preferred non-normative action (relatively drastic actions known to be inconsistent with the rules of the broader social system), while successful tokens supported only disadvantaged group members who accepted their disadvantaged position or took individual normative action. Experiment 2 suggests that successful tokens' lack of support for collective or non-normative actions does not result from (a) a failure to identify with the disadvantaged in-group; (b) compliance with perceived advantaged group norms; or (c) individualistic concerns for personal benefits. The present results provide some evidence that tokens shift their identification from the disadvantaged to the advantaged group. Thus, the consistent lack of support for socially disruptive action by members of the disadvantaged group may represent an attempt to support their new in-group—the high-status advantaged group.

Increasing the representation of traditionally under-represented minorities in advantaged positions has become a major theme in North American society. Integration programmes have had some measurable success in domains such as education, housing, social and recreational services and employment, and a growing number of disadvantaged group members are gaining access to more advantaged positions. However, there has also been considerable resistance (Farley, 1985; Jacobson, 1985; Schuman, Steeh & Bobo, 1985). This resistance and the general slow pace of social change have often resulted in situations where only a few

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members of these disadvantaged groups gain access to advantaged positions, while the vast majority of the group remain in a disadvantaged position. This highly restricted intergroup context has been labelled 'tokenism' (Kanter, 1977; Moreland, 1965).

Most of the existing social psychological analysis has focused on the perceptions and actions of the members of the dominant/advantaged group who interact with token minorities (Garland & Price, 1977; Sackett, DuBois & Noe, 1991; Taylor, 1981; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978) and the experiences of the tokens themselves (Alexander & Thoits, 1985; Brown & Ford, 1977; Floge & Merrill, 1986; Hoffman, 1985; Kanter, 1977; Laws, 1975; Lord & Saenz, 1985; Spangler, Gordon & Pipkin, 1978; Yoder, 1991). The dominant conclusions from this literature are: (a) tokens from traditionally disadvantaged groups seldom receive treatment and status equal to their non-token colleagues; (b) tokens often find their position difficult and dissatisfying; and (c) token status can result in deficits in performance.

Far less research has examined the impact of tokenism on intergroup relations. The research evidence that is available suggests that an intergroup structure of tokenism may create additional barriers to efforts at increasing intergroup equality. Prior token support by an advantaged group member can reduce the likelihood that he or she will provide more substantive subsequent support for the disadvantaged group (Dutton, 1976; Dutton & Lennox, 1974). Awareness of the difficulties faced by previously successful tokens may lower the aspirations of other disadvantaged group members (Pettigrew & Martin, 1987). Also, even token representation of their group in advantaged positions can reduce disadvantaged group members' interest in collective action directed at decreasing intergroup disparities (Martin, Price, Bies & Powers, 1989; Wright, 1997; Wright & Taylor, 1998; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990*a*).

The gist of these studies is that the intergroup context of tokenism is unlikely to produce actions by advantaged or disadvantaged group members that will result in more general decreases in intergroup disparity. However, there is one perspective from which tokenism offers some potential for optimism among disadvantaged group members. Tokenism provides several members of the disadvantaged group with access to the privileges and resources of the advantaged group. From this position tokens could serve as agents of social change. They might lead collective attempts to remove the barriers preventing full and equal advancement of their group. From this perspective, tokens are expected to use their newly acquired advantaged position to improve the collective status of the disadvantaged group.

Indirect theoretical support for this perspective can be found in social psychological work on the relationship between fraternal relative deprivation and collective action (Abeles, 1976; Dibble, 1981; Guimond & Dube'-Simard, 1983; Martin & Murray, 1983; Pettigrew, 1978; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; Walker & Mann, 1987). Fraternal (group) deprivation refers to feelings of discontent and injustice about the treatment of one's group, and is contrasted with egoistical (personal) deprivation, which involves feelings about the justice of one's personal treatment (Runciman, 1966). The dominant research finding is that fraternal deprivation, rather than egoistical deprivation, determines support for collective

responses (see Walker & Pettigrew, 1984, for a review). If this is the case, the personal success experienced by tokens need not diminish their feelings of fraternal deprivation, or their support for collective action. This view is clearly expressed by Abeles (1976) in his conclusion to an investigation of relative deprivation and militancy among urban blacks: 'Perhaps, then, the economic success of individual blacks will not weaken their support for social change so long as they feel that blacks (or a subgroup of blacks) continue to do poorly as a group' (p. 135).

More direct evidence that tokens may serve as agents of social change is provided by sociological work investigating the activities of 'women's caucuses' (Briscoe, 1978) and 'black caucuses' (Childs, 1992). John Brown Childs describes black caucuses as 'self-initiated advocacy groups formed within predominantly white, previously racially exclusionary organizations'. These caucuses propose solutions to problems of inequity and prejudice, while attempts to increase the representation of their disadvantaged group. Caucus groups appear to provide evidence of tokens who are working to improve the opportunities for other members of their disadvantaged group.

Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) provides the basis for an alternative hypothesis about the likely response of tokens. A central assumption of SIT is that membership in an advantaged group is desirable because it provides a positive social identity, which in turn contributes positively to one's self-esteem. Membership in a low-status group, on the other hand, is associated with a negative social identity and there is some evidence that members of low-status groups evaluate their groups less positively (Brown & Wade, 1987; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985). Further, SIT describes permeability of intergroup boundaries as an important determinant of disadvantaged group behaviour. When the boundaries appear permeable, individuals in the low-status group will attempt to move into a higher status group (social mobility). Only when group boundaries are impermeable will collective attempts to change the status of the disadvantaged group ensue (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1990; Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 1993; Wright & Taylor, 1998; Wright *et al.*, 1990*a*).

Unfortunately to date, discussions based on SIT have tended to conceptualize boundary permeability as dichotomous—either open or closed. Tokenism, with the intergroup boundaries highly restricted but not entirely closed, represents an intergroup context positioned between these two extremes. However, SIT can provide a framework for considering this context. Two points seem particularly relevant.

First, SIT predicts that successful social mobility will have a very positive impact on the individual's social identity. This results in strong identification with the new high-status group and rejection of the low-status group membership that had contributed negatively to one's social identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Secondly, several discussions of SIT describe the important role played by the dominant Western social belief in meritocracy (Billig, 1976; Hogg & Abrams, 1988, Tajfel, 1981). Successful tokens have, at least to some degree, endorsed this ideology of personal freedom, in that most of them have achieved their improved personal position through individual normative actions. The pervasive ideology of

meritocracy and strong identification with their high-status group membership may allow tokens to ignore or reinterpret the discrimination against the rest of their previous in-group.

Taylor & McKirnan (1984), in their five-stage model of intergroup relations, provide a more explicit statement of this position. They propose that successful tokens will be easily co-opted by the advantaged group, and will become staunch supporters of the existing social structure. Tokens will serve as an additional barrier to collective actions by the disadvantaged group, because they will serve to reinforce the dominant social belief that individual merit is the criterion for success and will be used as 'proof' of the nonexistence of discrimination.

Thus, there are competing hypotheses about the likely effect of tokens on the interests of the disadvantaged group. The fraternal deprivation perspective and research on caucus groups predict that tokens may serve as an important source of support in attempts to reduce intergroup inequality. Alternatively, SIT and the five-stage model predict that tokens will reinforce the existing social structure and its discrimination against the disadvantaged group.

EXPERIMENT 1

The first experiment addresses the primary questions concerning the responses of successful tokens to the restrictions faced by members of their former in-group. How will they evaluate these restrictions? Will they be seen as just or unjust? More importantly, what types of behaviour by members of the disadvantaged group will be supported by these tokens?

To address this last question one must first consider what types of actions are available to the members of the disadvantaged group. Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam (1990*a*, 1990*b*) propose a framework for considering these numerous alternative actions based on three distinctions: (a) action vs. inaction (acceptance); (b) individual vs. collective action; and (c) normative vs. non-normative action. Individual action is defined as behaviours designed to improve one's own treatment, position or status, while collective actions are directed at improving the conditions of one's in-group. Normative actions are those which conform to the norms of the existing social structure, while non-normative actions are those deemed unacceptable or inappropriate.[1] These three distinctions result in five discrete categories of behaviour: (a) inaction and apparent acceptance of one's disadvantaged position; (b) individual actions consistent with established norms of behaviour (i.e. hard work, education); (c) individual actions that violate established norms (i.e. crime, cheating); (d) collective actions consistent with established norms (i.e. voting, lobbying); and (e) collective actions that violate the norms of the existing system (i.e. civil disobedience, violent protest). These five forms of behaviour have dramatically different implications for subsequent intergroup relations and for the likelihood of change in the social structure. Inaction and individual normative action represent little threat

[1] These definitions of normative and non-normative are somewhat different from others which have focused on intragroup processes, where norms are defined as behaviours consistent with the values and perspectives of in-group members. This study considers rules of behaviour that apply across groups within a given social system or society. In this case, the specific in-group need not endorse the norms, they need only be aware of their existence and authority within the broader society.

to the advantaged group and the existing social structure. Individual non-normative and collective normative actions usually present a mild but manageable threat to the position of the advantaged group. Collective non-normative action is clearly the most socially disruptive strategy. This five-category framework encompasses a broad array of potential behaviours and provides a basis for specific predictions about the forms of action that will be supported or opposed by those who have successfully moved out of a disadvantaged group.

The current experiments utilized a paradigm designed by Wright *et al*. (1990*a*). This paradigm differs from other laboratory procedures used to study disadvantaged groups and token status (e.g. Ellemers *et al*., 1998, 1990, 1993; Lord & Saenz, 1985) in that it provides a laboratory analogue of the North American intergroup context. Both SIT and the five-stage model describe the meritocratic ideology as an important determinant of tokens' responses. Thus, to adequately test these models, this ideology must be represented in the research paradigm. In addition, true tokens are not simply solo members of a group. Their solo status is the direct result of both their own efforts to move into an advantaged position and the restrictive intergroup boundaries imposed by the advantaged group. Thus, in the present paradigm, members of a clearly disadvantaged group were first encouraged to attempt individual social mobility into an advantaged, high-status group. Then, within this ostensibly meritocratic context, the actual permeability of the intergroup boundary was manipulated.

The condition of primary interest is one in which participants were successful in their attempt at social mobility under conditions of tokenism. Here, the advantaged group imposed a discriminatory restriction severely limiting the number of disadvantaged group members they accept. Participants were led to believe that they were one of a very small percentage of the qualified members of the disadvantaged group given membership in the advantaged group.

In order to understand the responses of successful tokens, they were compared to participants in two other conditions: (a) those who were rejected by the advantaged group because of the tokenism policy; and (b) those who were successful in an open/meritocratic condition, in which the advantaged group was open to all with the required ability. Wright and colleagues (Wright, 1997; Wright & Taylor, 1998; Wright *et al*., 1990*a*) have examined the responses of those who are unfairly rejected under conditions of tokenism. These participants experience first-hand the discriminatory nature of restrictions associated with tokenism, and the consistent finding is that they recognize the injustice of their treatment and prefer individual non-normative action. A fraternal relative deprivation approach predicts that successful tokens should react similarly, recognizing the collective injustice against their past in-group and feeling fraternal deprivation. They should, therefore, support non-normative and collective actions by the disadvantaged group and should show little interest in inaction and individual normative strategies.

In the open/meritocratic condition, group membership is not used as a criterion in determining success. Relative deprivation, SIT and the five-stage model all predict that successful candidates in this open merit-based condition should evaluate the situation as just and satisfying. They should, therefore, support only inaction and individual normative actions, while opposing collective and non-normative

behaviours by unsuccessful members of the disadvantaged group. SIT and the five-stage model predict that successful tokens will react in a similar manner. They should reject or ignore the injustices against the disadvantaged group and support only inaction and benign individual normative responses, opposing the more disruptive non-normative and collective actions.

Method

Participants

The participants were 24 male and 30 female undergraduates. All were volunteers and participated for the chance to win $200 in a lottery. All participants indicated that they had never participated in a social psychological experiment.

Procedures and materials

Participants participated in groups of five to seven. They were told that they would be working in groups later, but must work independently and not interact with one another during the first part of the study. They were seated at individual desks, separated by dividers.

Instructions to participants. An experimenter provided initial instructions that were reinforced and supplemented by a 3.5 min tape-recorded message. Participants were told that the experiment was designed to test their ability to make effective decisions about people. This ability was characterized as an essential skill, one strongly related to the attainment of positions of responsibility and leadership in many occupational and social contexts. They were also told that research has shown large differences in this decision-making skill. To take advantage of these differences, participants would be divided into two groups on the basis of their ability as decision-makers. The instructions indicated that, although they would start as a member of the low-ability group, they would have an opportunity to advance into a high-ability group. Participants were led to believe that their performance on an initial decision-making test would determine whether they would complete the experiment as a member of the high-status or the low-status group.

It was necessary that participants be motivated to gain access to the high-ability group, and that the disadvantaged status of the low-ability group (their in-group) be obvious. Therefore, the description of the two groups given on the taped instructions clearly delineates the benefits of membership in the high-ability group. Participants were told that if accepted into the high-ability group, they would associate with high-status others, who had already been recognized as superior decision-makers. Also, entry into the high-status group resulted in greater rewards and responsibilities. Ostensibly, high-ability group members received more exciting and challenging tasks in the latter part of the experiment. High-ability group members participated in a $200 lottery, whereas low-ability group members participated in a $20 lottery. Most importantly, it was the members of the high-ability group who evaluated the performance of new participants (like themselves), and determined who would be allowed into their high-status group. Participants were told that a panel of three high-ability group members would be acting as judges in the evaluation of their work. In reality, there was no high-ability group, and the fate of all participants was predetermined by the experimental manipulation.

Experimental procedures. Following the tape-recorded instructions, participants were given 15 min to read the evidence from a criminal case and to answer two short essay-style questions. This constituted the initial decision-making test, designed to determine their membership in the high-ability or the low-ability group. Their answers were then collected and ostensibly taken to the panel of judges working in an adjoining room. A 12 min delay followed, during which time the three judges presumably graded the participants' work. During this delay period, the experimenter distributed a sample mark sheet and described in detail the procedure used by the judges to arrive at a mark. It was also explained that a mark of 8.5 out of 10 (85%) had been set as the score required for entry into the high-ability group.

In order to fill the remainder of the delay, the experimenter gave participants a second case to read. It was described as part of the group task used in the second part of the experiment. Actually, this case served only to reinforce the notion that they would be participating in a second part of the experiment as a member of either the high-status or low-status group.

Following the delay, the completed mark sheets were returned and distributed. Information provided on these mark sheets put into effect the experimental manipulation. As the experimental manipulation was contained in written feedback, it was possible for the participants to be randomly assigned to condition by the assistant who returned the mark sheets.

Experimental manipulation. All mark sheets provided general feedback about the participant's work and all participants received a mark of 8.8—above the required 8.5 out of 10. The three conditions were created by altering the content of the judges' written comments. In the successful open (meritocratic) condition, entry into the high-status group was based solely on performance (i.e. success in reaching the required mark). Participants in this condition were led to believe that, like themselves, all those who achieved the required score were accepted into the high-ability group.

In the two tokenism conditions, participants were told that the high-ability group had decided to ignore the 8.5 required score and instead had imposed a strict quota on entry into their group. The participant was informed that only 2% of the low-ability group members who scored above 8.5 were being accepted. In the rejection tokenism condition, participants were told that they were not among the 2% who were selected and that they must remain in the low-ability group. In the successful tokenism condition, it was made clear that, although they personally had been selected, others in the low-ability group who had achieved a score above 8.5 were being forced to remain in the low-ability group. It was also clear that they would be one of a very few members of the low-ability group allowed into the high-status group. The tokenism manipulation was intended only to create a condition in which a very few members of the low-status group would gain access to the high-status group, not to provide justification for the new restrictions. Therefore, no reasons were given for the judges' decision to change the criterion. Nevertheless, the judges' comments stated explicitly that the restrictive quota was directed at members of the low-ability group.

Dependent measures. Participants were given a few minutes to read the mark sheet and digest their feedback. The experimenter then informed them that, before beginning work with their groups, all participants were to complete a response form. The experimenter approached each participant individually to determine their group membership. For those who were to remain in the low-ability group the instruction on the form explained that before beginning the group portion of the experiment as a member of the low-ability group, they would be given an opportunity to respond to the negative decision of the judges. They were asked to rate the extent to which they would like to endorse each of five alternative behaviours and were told that they would actually undertake the action they rated highest (i.e. rated nearest to 10 on the Likert scale).

The response alternatives were presented as five statements: (a) Inaction—'I accept the decision of the high-ability group and wish to complete the experiment as a member of the low-ability group'; (b) Individual Normative Action—'In the past, the high-ability group has allowed some individuals to take a retest. I would personally like to request a retest to try again to get into the high-ability group'; (c) Individual Non-normative Action—'I would like to go against the rules set by the high-ability group and make a personal protest. I refuse to do any tasks assigned by the high-ability group until I feel satisfied with the treatment I receive'; (d) Collective Normative—'In the past, the high-ability group has allowed some groups of unsuccessful candidates to take a retest. I wish to urge all members of the low-ability group to join me in requesting a retest so we all may try again to get into the high-ability group'; and (e) Collective Non-normative Action—'I would like to urge all members of the low-ability group to join me in going against the rules set by the high-ability group and make a collective protest. Our group will refuse to do any tasks assigned by the high-ability group until we feel satisfied with the treatment we all receive'. Below each option was the question 'How much would you like to take this action?' and an 11-point Likert scale, anchored by 0 = not at all and 10 = very much. After making the five ratings, participants signed an Official Response Card indicating their single action of choice.

Those who had been accepted into the high-ability group (both successful tokens and those accepted in the open/meritocratic condition) received a form that welcomed them to their new group and informed them that those who had been rejected by the judges were now receiving an opportunity to

respond to this negative decision. It was explained that their first task as new members of the high-ability group was to decide what kinds of action, taken by unsuccessful low-ability group members, should be supported by the high-ability group. They were to rate the degree of support they would give to a low-ability group member attempting each of the five behavioural options and to select the one action they were most willing to support (i.e. rated nearest to 10 on the Likert scale). The five statements were identical to those presented to the participants in the rejection tokenism condition, except that the clause 'A low-ability group member' replaced the word 'I' at the beginning of each statement and the statement was worded in the third person (i.e. he/she). Below each option was the question 'How willing are you to support a low-ability group member taking this action?' and an 11-point Likert scale, anchored by 0 = not at all and 10 = very much. After making the five ratings they signed an Official Response Card indicating their most supported action. They were told that they would take this card with them to their first meeting with the high-ability group, where they would lobby other high-ability group members to support low-ability group members taking the type of action they recommended.

Finally, participants provided ratings of their perceptions and emotional reactions. Three questions involved participants' feelings of anger, perception of justice and satisfaction concerning their personal treatment. The remaining three questions were equivalent measures of the participants' feelings of anger, perceptions of justice and satisfaction concerning the collective treatment of the low-ability group. The exact wording of the questions was: (a) 'How just was the treatment you personally (the low-ability group as a whole) received from the high-ability group?'; (b) 'How satisfied are you with the way the high-ability group has treated you personally (the low-ability group as a whole)?'; and (c) 'How angry are you about the way you personally (the low-ability group as a whole) were treated by the high-ability group?'

Following completion of this second set of questions, participants were thoroughly debriefed and informed that all participants were entered in the $200 lottery.

Results

Preliminary analysis

Preliminary analysis showed no significant main or interaction effects involving gender ($p > .05$). Gender was not included in subsequent analyses.

Perceptions and emotional responses

An overall MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. successful open, successful tokenism and rejection tokenism) on perceptions and emotional reactions to personal treatment and the collective treatment of the low-ability in-group yielded a significant effect of condition ($F(12,92) = 11.17$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .60$). Subsequent univariate analyses indicated a significant effects of condition on each of the six measures. The means, F statistics and effect sizes are presented in Table 1.

The primary intention of this research is to examine the responses of successful tokens. Thus, of primary interest are the results of the pairwise Newman–Keuls comparisons between participants in the successful tokenism condition and those in each of the other two conditions ($\alpha < .05$, for all comparisons). Comparisons between participants in the successful tokenism condition and those in the successful open condition revealed no significant differences in responses to personal treatment. Participants in both these successful conditions rated their personal treatment positively. However, when compared to participants in the successful open condition, successful tokens rated the treatment of the low-ability group as significantly less just and satisfying, and indicated significantly greater anger about this treatment.

Comparisons between participants in the successful tokenism condition and

Table 1. Mean rating of emotions and perceptions of personal and collective treatment and *F* statistics for comparisons between participants in the successful open, successful tokenism and rejection tokenism conditions

	Experimental conditions					
Perceptions and emotions	Successful open	Successful tokenism	Rejection tokenism	*F* test (effect size)	*p*	η^2
Personal treatment						
Justice	7.65^a	7.41^a	2.30^b	$(2,51) = 53.55$	$< .001$	.68
Satisfaction	8.24^a	7.64^a	2.00^b	$(2,51) = 88.49$	$< .001$	.78
Anger*	9.00^a	8.47^a	3.65^b	$(2,51) = 35.33$	$< .001$	.58
Collective treatment						
Justice	6.00^a	4.24^b	3.90^b	$(2,51) = 6.59$	$< .01$	.20
Satisfaction	6.64^a	4.14^b	2.95^c	$(2,51) = 17.01$	$< .001$	.40
Anger*	7.82^a	5.35^b	5.10^b	$(2,49) = 5.43$	$< .01$	.18

*Anger scores are reverse to match scores for justice and satisfaction (i.e. 0 = very angry; 10 = not at all angry).

Note. Means in the same rows with different superscripts differ significantly ($\alpha < .05$).

participants in the rejection tokenism condition revealed that successful tokens were significantly more positive in their evaluation and emotional response to their personal treatment. However, although participants who were rejected in the tokenism condition were somewhat less satisfied with the treatment of the low-ability group than were successful tokens, these two conditions produced equivalent ratings of injustice and expressions of anger about the treatment of the low-ability group.

Behavioural options ratings

An overall MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. successful open, successful tokenism and rejection tokenism) on ratings of endorsement of each of the five behaviours (i.e. inaction, individual normative, individual non-normative, collective normative, collective non-normative) yielded a significant effect of condition ($F(10,94) = 5.09$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .38$). Subsequent univariate analyses indicated a significant effect of condition for inaction, individual normative action, individual non-normative action and collective normative action. The means, *F* statistics and effect sizes are presented in Table 2.

Again, of primary interest are the results of the pairwise Newman–Keuls ($\alpha < .05$) comparisons between participants in the successful tokenism and those in each of the other two conditions. Comparisons between participants in the successful tokenism condition and those in the successful open condition revealed no significant differences in support for any of the five responses. Within-subject pairwise comparisons indicated that participants in both these successful conditions gave significantly greater support to inaction and individual normative action than to either the individual or collective non-normative response. The only difference in the

Table 2. Mean rating of support for each of the five behavioural responses and F statistics for comparisons between participants in the successful open, successful tokenism and rejection tokenism conditions

	Experimental conditions					
Behavioural responses	Successful open	Successful tokenism	Rejection tokenism	F test (effect size)	p	η^2
Inaction	7.35^a	7.00^a	2.80^b	$(2,51) = 12.63$	$< .001$	.33
Individual normative	6.24^a	7.59^a	3.40^b	$(2,51) = 8.71$	$< .001$	.25
Individual non-normative	3.92^a	4.59^a	6.70^b	$(2,51) = 4.91$	$< .05$	.16
Collective normative	5.53^a	4.12^{ab}	2.85^b	$(2,51) = 3.69$	$< .05$	.13
Collective non-normative	3.06	2.59	3.95	$(2,51) = 0.98$	n.s.	.04

Note. Means in the same rows with different superscripts differ significantly ($\alpha < .05$).

pattern of responses for participants in these two successful conditions was that participants in the successful open condition gave significantly greater support to collective normative action than to the two non-normative responses, while participants in the successful tokenism condition did not.

Comparisons between participants in the successful tokenism condition and participants in the rejection tokenism condition revealed that successful tokens indicated significantly greater support for inaction and individual normative action and significantly less support for individual non-normative action than those who were rejected. Within-subject pairwise comparisons indicated that participants in the rejection tokenism condition gave significantly greater support to individual non-normative action than to the other four response options.

Behavioural choice

The single action selected by each participant yielded the frequency data presented in Table 3. A hierarchical log-linear modelling approach was used to test the effect of condition on selected behavioural response. The manipulation of condition (C) was an independent variable, and the frequency in these cells was determined by the design of the experiment. Thus, the initial model (hypothesizing independence of behavioural response (B) and experimental condition (C)) included the main effects behavioural response and the main effect of group openness (B)(C). This model has a poor fit, differing significantly from the saturated model ($L^2(8) = 27.09, p < .001$). Thus, the optimal model is the saturated model—the model including the behavioural response by condition interaction (BC).

Table 3 illustrates that the dependence relationship between experimental condition and the chosen behavioural response results from the preference for inaction and individual normative action in the successful open and successful token conditions, and the preference for individual non-normative action in the rejection tokenism condition. As with the rating scale data, the pattern of results for the successful tokenism and the successful open conditions are very similar.

Table 3. Frequency and percentage of participants in successful open, successful tokenism and rejection tokenism conditions selecting each of the five behavioural responses

Behavioural responses	Experimental conditions		
	Successful open *N* (%)	Successful tokenism *N* (%)	Rejection tokenism *N* (%)
Inaction	5 (29)	6 (35)	3 (15)
Individual normative	8 (47)	7 (41)	2 (10)
Individual non-normative	0 (0)	1 (6)	10 (50)
Collective normative	4 (24)	3 (18)	3 (15)
Collective non-normative	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (10)

Discussion

The responses of successful tokens in Expt 1 were consistent with the predictions of SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the five-stage model (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). Success under tokenism resulted in a pattern of behavioural responding virtually identical to that found in the open condition. Successful tokens were no more willing to support non-normative or collective actions initiated by a member of the disadvantaged group than were those who succeed in an open (meritocratic) context (see Table 2).

The differences between successful and unsuccessful tokens must be interpreted with some care. Unsuccessful tokens are rating interest in options for *their own* actions, while successful tokens are rating their support for the actions *of others*. This presents a possible alternative explanation for differences in ratings between these two groups—especially for non-normative actions (see Mummendey, Linneweber & Loschper, 1984). However, comparisons between ratings of interest in each of the five response within conditions (i.e. the within-subjects comparisons) clearly demonstrate a different pattern of behaviour for successful tokens and those who were unsuccessful. Participants in the unsuccessful tokenism condition show a clear preference for individual non-normative action over the normative and acceptance options (see Tables 2 and 3). However, this type of non-normative action is unlikely to receive the support of successful tokens.

The measures of participants' perceptions and emotional reactions showed clearly that successful tokens' failure to support non-normative and collective action did not result from a failure to recognize the injustice associated with the policy of tokenism. Although successful tokens recognized that they personally had been treated well and appropriately reported high levels of personal justice and satisfaction and little anger about their personal treatment, they also clearly recognized the collective injustice of tokenism. When considering the collective treatment of the low-ability in-group, successful tokens reported feelings of injustice and anger that did not differ significantly from the ratings of those who were rejected because of the tokenism

policy, and their ratings of satisfaction were significantly lower than those in the open condition (see Table 1).

These findings do not support the fraternal deprivation position, which predicted that if successful tokens recognized the collective injustice of the tokenism context, they would support collective and non-normative actions on behalf of the disadvantaged group. Despite recognizing the collective injustice, successful tokens were unwilling to support actions by disadvantaged group members that might serve to rectify this collective injustice. In fact, more than one third of the successful tokens expect members of the disadvantaged group to take no action at all in response to their unjust treatment (see Table 3). In short, successful tokens see the collective injustice of tokenism, but act as though they do not.

In addition to describing the action of successful tokens, these findings point to an important limitation in much of the research on the responses of disadvantaged groups, which has measured only the individual's perceptions of justice and emotions such as anger and resentment (see Wright *et al*., 1990*b*, for a discussion of this issue). Often it is suggested that behaviour should follow directly from these evaluations and emotional responses. Had this assumption been made here and the measures of behavioural responding not been included, the present conclusions would have been entirely different. After considering only the perceptions and emotional reactions to the collective treatment of the disadvantaged group, one might have concluded that successful tokens react more like those who were rejected than like those who were successful in an open condition. One might be tempted to assume that this pattern of attitude and affect would lead to a similar pattern of behaviour among those rejected and those who were successful. However, the inclusion of the behavioural measure leads to very different conclusions. It appears that, although collective action is associated with feelings of anger, dissatisfaction and injustice concerning the collective treatment of one's group (Guimond & Dube'-Simard, 1983; Walker & Mann, 1987; Wright *et al*., 1990*b*), these feelings are not *sufficient* to produce support for collective or disruptive action. This finding is consistent with research and theory in resource mobilization (McCarthy & Zald, 1979) and other social movement theories (Klandermans, 1989; Pinard & Hamilton, 1986). These perspectives point out the limits of perceptions of injustice and feelings of anger as determinants of collective protest, pointing instead to the perceived availability of necessary resources and collective efficacy as necessary preconditions (see also Kelly, 1993; Martin, Brickman & Murray, 1984).

EXPERIMENT 2

The challenge raised by these initial findings is to uncover the psychological mechanisms responsible for successful tokens failure to support the interests of the disadvantaged group. Expt 2 tests the strength of these initial findings, while investigating four potential explanations for the tokens' failure to support disruptive action. The first three of these explanations were investigated by comparing three separate manipulations with a standard successful tokenism control condition (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3). The final explanation was tested by comparing participants' identification with the low-ability and high-ability groups across all four conditions.

Explanation 1: identification with the disadvantaged in-group

Recent research arising out of SIT indicates that collective action is associated with relatively strong identification with the in-group (Ellemers *et al*., 1990; Kelly, 1993; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Perhaps participants in Expt 1 easily abandoned the disadvantaged group because they felt little or no identification with this low-status in-group. A lack of initial identification might result in little motivation to engage in collective action in support of others even if they have been unjustly treated. This view is also presented by Walker & Pettigrew (1984) and Martin & Murray (1983) in their discussions of fraternal deprivation and collective responding. Walker & Pettigrew refer specifically to temporary or emotionally neutral groups as collectives that are unlikely to secure the commitment necessary to generate feelings of fraternal deprivation. The laboratory-created in-group (the low-ability group) used in Expt 1 clearly qualifies as a temporary and emotionally neutral in-group, and it may not have engendered the identification necessary to produce support for collective and non-normative actions. In fact, it is possible that participants in Expt 1 never accepted their membership in the low-ability group at all. Thus, successful tokens might have interpreted their situation as joining their rightful in-group, rather than leaving the disadvantaged in-group to join the out-group.

To test this explanation, it was necessary to increase the tokens' identification with the disadvantaged group. One strategy to achieve greater identification would be to use a meaningful real-world in-group with which the participants would feel considerable affiliation prior to the laboratory manipulation. The use of a real-world in-group also broadens the generality of the finding beyond the situation constructed in Expt 1. In the procedures used in Expt 1, successful attempts at individual mobility resulted in the individual actually leaving the in-group (the low-ability group) and joining the out-group (the high-ability group). This is the situation in some real-world intergroup contexts such as social class, workers/management or religious conversion. In these cases, a successful effort to improve one's status results in actually leaving the previous in-group (e.g. 'the poor') to join a more advantaged out-group (e.g. 'the middle class'). However, in many other prominent intergroup relations (e.g. race or gender) individual mobility does not mean actually leaving the in-group (e.g. women) and joining the outgroup (e.g. men). Instead, in these cases there are two dimensions of categorization, and although the two are correlated such that the in-group is highly under-represented or not represented at all in the advantaged group (e.g. women in senior management), joining the advantaged group does not mean leaving the in-group (e.g. the woman who becomes a senior manager does not have to become a man). Using a real-world in-group as the target of tokenism allows extension of this investigation of the behaviour of successful tokens into these types of intergroup contexts which involve multiple category dimensions.[2]

All participants in the second experiment were students at a junior college (Marianopolis). Marianopolis college is recognized as an elite school with high

[2] This point was made apparent by the comments provided by two of the journal reviewers.

entrance standards, making the category 'Marianopolis students' one that should garner considerable in-group identification. In-group identification can also be enhanced by the presence of a clearly defined out-group (Kelly, 1993)—in the present case, students from a neighbouring college (Dawson College) that is not recognized as having the elite status of Marianopolis. Hypothesis 1 predicted that the increased identification associated with a relevant disadvantaged in-group would result in successful tokens offering greater support for more disruptive collective and non-normative actions.

Explanation 2: compliance with advantaged group norms

The power of a group to gain compliance from the individual is a much studied phenomenon in social psychology (Brown, 1988; Turner, 1991). Compliance can arise from fear of rejection or retaliation that could result if one chooses to deviate from the expected behaviours of the group. Because socially disruptive behaviour by the disadvantaged group is unlikely to be popular among members of the advantaged group, tokens may perceive strong social pressure not to support these types of action. In addition, the precarious position of the token as a new member of the established advantaged group may make them particularly susceptible to such influences (Moreland, 1985). Thus, it is possible that tokens would prefer to support more disruptive actions by disadvantaged group members, but instead comply with what they perceive to be the behavioural norms of the advantaged group (see Pettigrew, 1991*a*, for discussions of this type of compliance).

Research has shown that compliance-based conformity to group norms can be reduced when the individual makes his or her decision anonymously, rather than in the presence of other group members (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Raven, 1959). Thus, Hypothesis 2 predicted that indicating their support for disadvantaged group members anonymously would free tokens of the need to comply with advantaged group norms, resulting in greater support for collective and non-normative responding.

Explanation 3: individualistic self-interest

The first explanation implies that tokens would choose to support the disruptive actions of disadvantaged group members if they felt an identification with the disadvantaged in-group. The second implies that tokens would support more disruptive responses but are prevented by perceived social pressure from the advantaged group. Alternatively, it could be that groups and group memberships play no role in the actions of tokens. They may choose to support only inaction and individual normative action for purely individualistic, self-protective reasons (Wright *et al.*, 1990*a*). The token has just received access to an elite high-status position entitling her or him to special recognition and financial advantages. If members of the disadvantaged group are allowed to engage in disruptive non-normative or collective actions, the token's own high status and privileges may be threatened. Thus, exclusive support of inaction and individual action is consistent with a truly

individual action designed to protect one's personal resources. Hypothesis 3 predicted that a reduction in the personal benefits gained as a result of entry into the advantaged group would reduce self-interest motives and increase the tokens' support for more disruptive collective and non-normative actions.

Explanation 4: identification with advantaged group

Both the five-stage model and SIT make clear the psychological benefits of membership in a high-status group. In fact, Ellemers and colleagues (Ellemers *et al*., 1990) have found that even anticipated mobility from a low-status to a high-status group can lead low-status group members to identify with the high-status group. Thus, the improved identity provided by the high-status group could lead successful tokens to quickly shift their identification to this advantaged group. This new identification with the high-status group results in efforts to maintain or enhance the status of the new in-group (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985). From this perspective, the consistent avoidance of any support for socially disruptive collective or non-normative action may not be a betrayal of the disadvantaged in-group or a self-centred individualistic act. Instead, it may represent a collective action in support of the new in-group—the high-ability group.[3] This view would lead to the prediction that none of the three manipulations presented in Expt 2 should influence the pattern of support for the low-ability group. Instead, Hypothesis 4 predicted that successful tokens in all conditions will show stronger identification with the high-status advantaged group than with the low-status disadvantaged group.

Method

Participants

Participants were 31 male and 45 female junior college students, aged range 17 to 21, with a mean of 18.7 years. All were volunteers and participated for the chance to win $300 in a lottery. All indicated that they had never participated in a social psychological experiment.

Procedures and materials

Control condition. Except for a small addition to the final perceptions and emotional reactions questionnaire, the control condition was an exact replication of the successful tokenism condition in Expt 1. As in Expt 1, participants participated in small groups, but worked independently. The initial instructions and most of the procedures and materials were identical to those used in the successful tokenism condition in Expt 1. All participants in Expt 2 were successful under conditions of tokenism; all received a mark sheet that indicated they were one of only 2% of the qualified members of their group to be given access to the high-status group. They then rated the extent to which they would support an unsuccessful member of the disadvantaged group who attempted each of five behaviours (inaction,

[3] An alternative explanation for tokens' psychological identification with the high-status group is provided by Brewer's Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991). This theory holds that individuals seek in-groups that simultaneously meet the need for assimilation and differentiation. Groups with small and exclusive memberships will draw stronger identification than will larger, less selective categories. The advantaged group in the present experiment is a high-status minority group. It simultaneously provides the potential for optimal distinctiveness and the benefits of high status.

individual normative, individual non-normative, collective normative, collective non-normative), and chose the behaviour they were most willing to support. Again, participants rated their perceptions and emotional reactions to their personal treatment and the collective treatment of the low-ability group. In Expt 2, questions measuring feelings of frustration were added to those concerning justice, satisfaction and anger used in Expt 1.

Explanation 1: identification with disadvantaged in-group: relevant college in-group condition. The first manipulation was designed to increase the participants' identification with the disadvantaged in-group by replacing the minimal groups used in Expt 1 with a meaningful, real-world categorization. Participants were told that testing was just beginning at their college (Marianopolis), but had been running at a neighbouring college (Dawson) for several weeks. For this reason, all of the present members of the high-ability group were from Dawson College. Confederates were used to reinforce this information. Two confederates, recruited from outside Marianopolis, entered the room with the rest of the participants. When the names of these two strangers did not appear on the experimenter's attendance list, they informed the experimenter, in a voice audible to all participants, that they were high-ability group members from Dawson College, and that they had been asked to come to Marianopolis to participate as judges. The experimenter explained to the confederates that the high-ability group was meeting in a room down the hall. The confederates left, ostensibly to join the rest of the high-ability group.

When the participants received their mark sheets indicating that they had succeeded, they were told that the advantaged group had imposed a strict quota on Marianopolis students. They were informed that only 2% of the Marianopolis students who achieved the previously established criterion score of 8.5 or better would be accepted into the high-ability group. Thus, in this condition the restrictions of tokenism were imposed on a real-world in-group.

Explanation 2: compliance with advantaged group norms: anonymity/vote condition. The second experimental condition was designed to remove any perceived social pressure to comply with advantaged group norms. Participants made their ratings and reported the action they most supported on a 'secret ballot'. It was explained that the experimenter would collect and tabulate the ballots of all high-ability group members (old and new). The experimenter would indicate nothing about individual votes or the level of support given each option, reporting only which form of action had received the most votes. This option would then receive the general support of the high-ability group. Unlike the control condition, in which participants were expected to lobby for support of their most preferred action, participants in the anonymity/vote condition were assured that their decision to support a given action would be completely confidential.

Explanation 3: individualistic self-interest: reduced personal benefits condition. In this third experimental condition, participants' individualistic self-serving motives were reduced by cutting the personal benefits received for gaining access to the advantaged group. Along with the standard tokenism information, participants in this condition were told that a lack of funds made it impossible to have any more $300 lotteries. Therefore, although they were accepted into the high-ability group, they would have to participate in the $30 lottery with the low-ability group members. Thus, in this condition, one of the major extrinsic personal benefits of access to the advantaged group was removed. However, because there remained a number of other actual and symbolic benefits to membership in the high-ability group (e.g. association with high-status others, recognition as a superior decision-makers, participation in more exciting and challenging tasks, and holding the power to determine who would be allowed into their high status group in the future), the status hierarchy is maintained and this manipulation is best described as *reducing* personal benefits.

Explanation 4: identification with advantaged groups. Along with the questions concerning justice, satisfaction, frustration and anger, all participants in Expt 2 answered two questions about their level of identification with the low-ability and high-ability groups. These questions asked participants to rate (on an 11-point Likert scale) how much they believed they would get along with members of each group, and how much they respected the members of each group.

Results and discussion

Each of the first three hypotheses were tested using planned comparisons between the appropriate experimental condition and the control.

Hypothesis 1: identification with disadvantaged in-group

These analyses involved comparisons between participants in the college in-group condition and participants in the control condition.

Manipulation check: identification with low-status group. The two questions concerning identification with the low-status in-group were averaged to form a single measure of identification (standardized alpha .72). A two-tailed t test indicated that participants in the college in-group condition ($M = 6.55$) reported significantly greater identification with the low-status group than did participants in the control condition ($M = 4.73$, $t(35) = 3.13$, $p < .01$).

Perceptions and emotions. The mean ratings of personal and collective injustice, satisfaction, anger and frustration for participants in the control and college in-group conditions are presented in the first two columns of Table 4. An overall MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. control and college in-group) on perceptions and emotional reaction to personal treatment and the collective treatment of the low-ability in-group yielded a significant effect of condition ($F(8,27) = 3.10$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .48$). Subsequent univariate analysis indicated no significant differences between the college in-group and control conditions on the four measures

Table 4. Mean ratings of emotions and perceptions of personal and collective treatment in control and three experimental conditions

		Experimental conditions		
Behavioural responses	Control	College in-group	Anonymous/ vote	Reduced self-interest
Personal treatment				
Justice	6.17	7.55*	6.90	4.81
Satisfaction	7.17	7.90	7.26	5.56*
Anger	8.25	8.70	8.89	6.68**
Frustration	8.11	8.61	7.94	6.12**
Collective treatment				
Justice	5.35	2.90***	5.23	6.25
Satisfaction	5.69	4.15*	5.58	6.56
Anger	6.75	4.35**	7.00	8.06
Frustration	6.69	4.05***	6.90	7.43

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$.

Note. Scores for anger and frustration are reverse to match scores for justice and satisfaction (i.e. 0 = very angry, 10 = not at all angry; and 0 = very frustrated, 10 = not at all frustrated). Means marked with asterisk differ significantly from the control condition.

of personal treatment. However, compared to participants in the control condition, participants in the college in-group condition rated the collective treatment of the low-ability group to be significantly less just ($F(1,34) = 9.29$, $p < .01$) and indicated significantly greater anger ($F(1,34) = 6.61$, $p < .05$) and frustration ($F(1,34) = 9.68$, $p < .01$) about this collective treatment. The effect for satisfaction about the treatment of the low-ability in-group approached significance ($F(1,34) = 2.93$, $p = .09$).

Behavioural options ratings. The mean ratings of support for each of the five behaviours by participants in the control and college in-group conditions are presented in the first two columns of Table 5. A MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. control and college in-group) on support for the five behavioural responses results in no significant overall effect ($F(5,33) = 0.67$, $p = .65$). In addition, none of the subsequent univariate comparisons were significant (F values ranged from 0.02 to 1.22).

Table 5. Mean ratings of support for five behavioural responses in control and three experimental conditions

		Experimental conditions		
Behavioural responses	Control	College in-group	Anonymous/ vote	Reduced self-interest
Inaction	7.36	7.16	7.35	8.37
Individual normative	5.36	5.82	4.65	4.44
Individual non-normative	3.42	4.02	1.85**	3.43
Collective normative	4.95	4.20	5.05	4.18
Collective non-normative	3.05	3.55	2.05	2.87

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$.
Note. Means marked with asterisk differ significantly from the control condition.

Behavioural choice. The frequency of selection of each of the five responses by participants in the control and college in-group conditions are presented in the first two columns of Table 6. The number of cells with expected frequencies below five makes analysis of this data problematic. However, it is clearly apparent from a visual inspection of the frequencies that the two patterns are very similar.

Hypothesis 1 was based on the notion that the temporary and emotionally neutral group used in Expt 1 was unable to garner the necessary in-group identification to produce support for collective action (Ellemers *et al*., 1990; Kelly, 1993; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). It was predicted that when the relevant in-group of 'Marianopolis students', especially when presented in contrast to the out-group 'Dawson students', was the target of the tokenism policy this would inspire greater support for collective and non-normative strategies.

As anticipated, participants indicated greater identification with the low-ability

Table 6. Frequency (freq.) of selection and percentage of participants in each cell selecting each of the behavioural responses

		Experimental conditions		
	Control	College in-group	Anonymous/ vote	Reduced self-interest
Behavioural responses	Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)
Inaction	10 (52)	9 (45)	13 (65)	10 (59)
Individual normative	6 (32)	7 (35)	3 (15)	2 (12)
Individual non-normative	0 (0)	2 (10)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Collective normative	2 (11)	2 (10)	3 (15)	3 (18)
Collective non-normative	1 (5)	0 (0)	1 (5)	2 (12)

group when it was associated with the college in-group. In addition, they reported more negative perceptions and emotions in response to the collective treatment of the disadvantaged group when it was confounded with their Marianopolis in-group. However, the pattern of support for disadvantaged group actions does not support the predicted importance of this increased identification. The disadvantaged group received no more support for collective and non-normative action when associated with the real-world college in-group than did the minimally defined low-ability group in the control condition. These data do not support the conclusion that a lack of initial identification with the disadvantaged in-group accounts for tokens' consistent avoidance of collective and non-normative actions.

In addition, these results also demonstrate the robustness of the tokenism findings in cases involving multiple category dimensions. Like a number of societally relevant intergroup contexts (e.g. race and gender), in this condition gaining membership in the advantaged group did not necessarily mean leaving the college in-group. It appears that in this situation as well, successful tokens are relatively unlikely to support collective and non-normative actions in support of the disadvantaged group, despite the obvious confound between membership in the disadvantaged group and membership in their college in-group.

Hypothesis 2: compliance with advantaged group norms

These analyses involved comparisons between participants in the anonymous/vote condition and participants in the control condition.

Perceptions and emotions. The mean ratings for each of the eight measures for participants in the anonymous/vote condition are presented in column three of Table 4. The overall MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. control and anonymous/vote) on perceptions and emotional reaction to personal treatment and the collective treatment of the low-ability in-group yielded no significant effect of

condition ($F(8,26) = 0.49, p = .85$). The subsequent univariate comparisons indicated no significant differences between the anonymous/vote condition and control conditions on any of these eight ratings (F values ranged from 0.008 to 1.41).

Behavioural options ratings. The mean ratings of support for each of the five behaviours by participants in the anonymous/vote condition is presented in the third column of Table 5. A MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. control and anonymous/vote) on support for the five behavioural responses results in no significant overall effect of condition ($F(5,33) = 1.46$, $p = .23$). Subsequent univariate comparisons yielded only one significant difference. Participants in the anonymous/vote condition gave less support to the individual non-normative response than did participants in the control condition ($F(1,37) = 4.42, p < .05$). The remaining four F values ranged from 0.0005 to 1.21.

Behavioural choice. The frequency of selection of each of the five responses by participants in the anonymous/vote condition are presented in column three of Table 6. Again, the number of cells with expected frequencies less than five makes formal statistical comparison with the control condition problematic. However, the sole difference between the two conditions was that participants in the anonymous/vote condition were somewhat more likely than controls to select inaction, and were somewhat less likely than controls to prefer individual normative action.

This second manipulation tested the hypothesis that the tokens' actions were affected by compliance with the perceived norms of the advantaged group. Hypothesis 2 predicted that anonymity would increase endorsement of collective and non-normative actions. The present findings provide no support for this second hypothesis. Successful tokens showed no greater interest in supporting disruptive disadvantaged group behaviour when their decisions were made anonymously than when they believed they would have to lobby publicly.

If there was any effect at all, it was that participants in the anonymous/vote condition were less supportive of non-normative actions (see Table 5), and were more likely to select inaction as their preferred response (see Table 6). It may be that the vote resulted in feelings of anonymity not only from the advantaged group, but from the disadvantaged group as well. This anonymity may lessen compliance with normative pressure to support the low-status in-group, thus reducing support for actions designed to change the discriminatory policies.

Hypothesis 3: individualistic self-interest

These analyses involved comparisons between participants in the reduced personal benefit condition and participants in the control condition.

Perceptions and emotions. The mean ratings of personal and collective injustice, satisfaction, anger and frustration by participants in the reduced personal benefit condition are presented in column four of Table 4. The MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. control and reduced personal benefit) on perceptions and emotional reaction to personal treatment and the collective treatment of the low-

ability in-group failed to reach statistical significance ($F(8,23) = 1.25$, $p = .30$, $\eta^2 = .30$). Univariate comparisons indicated no significant differences between the reduced personal benefit and control conditions on the four measures of collective treatment (F values ranged from 0.49 to 1.61). However, compared to participants in the control condition, participants in the reduced personal benefit condition indicated significantly greater anger ($F(1,30) = 6.23$, $p < .05$) and frustration ($F(1,30) = 5.90$, $p < .05$) about their personal treatment. The effect for satisfaction about their personal treatment approached significance ($F(1,30) = 2.94$, $p = .09$).

Behavioural options ratings. The mean ratings of support for each of the five actions by participants in the reduced personal interest condition are presented in column four of Table 5. A MANOVA testing the general effect of condition (i.e. control and reduced personal interest) on support for the five behavioural responses results in no significant overall effect ($F(5,29) = 0.44$, $p = .82$). In addition, none of the subsequent univariate comparisons were significant (F values ranged from 0.001 to 1.17).

Behavioural choice. The frequency of selection of each of the five behaviours by participants in the reduced personal interest condition are presented in column four of Table 6. Again, the number of cells with expected frequencies less than five precluded statistical analysis. However, inspection of the frequencies clearly shows that the patterns of selected actions are very similar across these two conditions.

This final manipulation investigated the potential role of personal self-interest as the motivation for successful tokens' failure to support collective and non-normative actions. Tokens' perceptions and emotional reactions to their personal treatment showed that they recognized and were angry and frustrated when they did not receive the expected financial benefits of their success. However, this negative response to their personal treatment did not lead to increased support for collective or non-normative actions by members of the disadvantaged group. Thus, the present data provides no support for the hypothesis that it is concern for one's personal benefits that motivates tokens' preference for benign actions on the part of the low-status in-group.

Hypothesis 4: identification with advantaged group

Including participants from all four conditions, the two questions used to measure group identification were combined to produce a general measure of identification with the low-status group (standardized alpha .71) and the high-status group (standardized alpha .65). A paired two-tailed t test resulted in a marginally significant difference ($t(72) = 1.80$, $p = .07$ (associated with a moderate effect size, $\eta^2 = .054$)) between the means for identification with the low-status group ($M = 5.25$) and identification with the high-status group ($M = 5.83$).

In addition, analysis of the relationship between identification with the high-status group and the five behavioural options yielded a significant positive correlation between identification with the high-status group and support for the acceptance option ($r = .43$, $p < .01$), no significant correlation between identification with the high-status group and support for individual normative action ($r = -.14$, n.s.), and

significant negative correlations between identification with the high-status group and support for individual non-normative action ($r = -.38$, $p < .01$), collective normative action ($r = -.40$, $p < .01$), and collective non-normative action ($r = -.53$, $p < .01$).

The greater identification with the high-status group than with the low-status group is consistent with predictions based on SIT and the five-stage model. In addition, this prediction is supported by the finding that higher identification with the high-ability group is associated with greater support for acceptance (the least disruptive behaviour) and with lower support for non-normative and collective actions (those likely to threaten the present order). In fact, it is interesting to note that the more potentially disruptive the action, the stronger the negative correlation with identification with the high-status group. Although correlational, these findings provide support for the role of shifting in-group identification as a determinant of tokens' actions.

From this perspective, the tokens' failure to support disruptive action by the disadvantaged group may be more accurately described as a collective action in support of their new high-status in-group rather than as a betrayal of the disadvantaged in-group. The high-status group provides a more positive social identity for successful tokens. Thus, even the injustices of tokenism may not prevent tokens from shifting their identification to the high-status group and engaging in actions that will maintain the position of this new in-group.

If this 'shifting in-group identification' explanation is accurate, it is possible that the strength of initial identification with the disadvantaged in-group will mediate the degree and pace of this shift of identification to the advantaged group and, thus, will mediate successful tokens' support for non-normative and collective action by the disadvantaged group. However, because membership in an advantaged group has both psychological (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and material benefits, it may be only the most strongly identified disadvantaged group members who would not experience the shift in in-group identification. It seems that most successful tokens will demonstrate the shift in identification relatively quickly when any or all of the following are present: (a) membership in the advantaged group brings significant advantages for the individual (i.e. enhances personal identity and/or provides material benefits); (b) there is some consensual agreement that the higher status of the advantaged group is deserved (i.e. the hierarchy has some legitimacy) ; and/or (c) the broader societal norms promote upward social mobility. Additional research is needed to investigate the importance of initial identification with the disadvantaged in-group and these other social factors as potential determinants of the identification patterns of successful tokens and ultimately of their support for the disadvantaged group.

This focus on identification and social identity also raises an alternative explanation for the actions of successful tokens, based not on a shift in identification from one group to another but on a tendency to focus on one's personal identity rather than one's collective identity. Smith, Spears & Oyen (1994) found that when an individual member of a disadvantaged group received rewards that lead to personal gratification, a manipulation that made group membership salient served to *decrease* feelings of deprivation. These authors hypothesize that personal gratification in the face of

group deprivation may lead to a focus on intragroup comparisons (i.e. interpersonal comparisons with other members of their disadvantaged in-group). The result is a reduction of attention given to intergroup inequalities and enhanced concerns for maintenance of one's personal position. In the present research, the tokenism manipulation may lead successful tokens to focus on their personal success and personal advantage relative to others in the disadvantaged group, and undermine a focus on the intergroup injustices. It should be recalled that, in the present research, successful tokens rated their support for the five forms of action available to the disadvantaged group prior to answering any questions about perceptions of injustice or feelings of anger. Thus, it is possible that although tokens can recognize the collective injustices when specifically asked to reflect upon the experience of the disadvantaged group, until such a direct request is made their personal identity may remain the dominant focus of attention. Future research should attempt to consider this possibility—that the actions of successful tokens may be guided by an individual rather than a collective self-categorization.

This hypothesized focusing of attention on individual identity resulting from the policy of tokenism also provides a potential explanation for the preference for *individual* non-normative action by participants in the *rejected* tokenism condition in Expt 1 (see Wright, 1997). Perhaps the success of even a few members of their disadvantaged in-group focuses disadvantaged group members' attention on *intra*group comparisons with the successful tokens rather than *inter*group comparisons with the high-status group (Ellemers *et al*., 1993). This focuses attention on the participants' personal standing within the in-group rather than on the standing of the in-group relative to the out-group, resulting in greater attention to their own rejection, strong negative perceptions associated with personal treatment, and individual rather than collective action.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The first intention of Expt 2 was to examine the strength of the pattern of responses shown by successful tokens. These results provide a strong replication of the basic findings of Expt 1 and demonstrate the robustness of the basic pattern. Expt 2 used a younger sample, a different laboratory setting, two different experimenters (one male and one female), and three new experimental manipulations. As in Expt 1, successful tokens consistently gave little support to collective and non-normative actions by unsuccessful disadvantaged group members. Of course, interpreting 'no differences' between experimental conditions can be problematic.[4] However, measures of participants' perceptions and emotional response indicated appropriate interpretation of the conditions. Participants in the college in-group condition indicated greater identification with the disadvantaged in-group and lower perceived justice, less satisfaction, more anger and greater frustration at the treatment of the

[4] At the level of the philosophy of science, there exists some debate concerning the traditional positivist approach to theory testing. The approach described by Popper (1959) and espoused by others (Bartley, 1982; Pettigrew, 1991*b*) emphasizes the value of deductive falsification over inductive verification. The present research is consistent with this Popperian approach, in that it serves to rule out (falsify) alternative hypotheses.

disadvantaged group. Tokenism applied against this real-world in-group produced much stronger negative reactions, but this impact on perceptions and emotions did not translate into changes in behaviour. Similarly, the reduced personal benefit condition resulted in more negative reactions to personal treatment. Again, these changes in perceptions and emotions did not lead to changes in actions. It appears that participants both understood and were engaged in the procedures and, thus, it is unlikely that the failure of participants to show differences in behavioural responding can be attributed to the ineffectiveness of the manipulations.

Finally, it is necessary to comment on the specifics of the present design. The paradigm presented participants with a very individualistic work environment. Despite the numerous references to future group work, participants were clearly encouraged to work independently in an attempt at individual social mobility. Clearly, this individualistic setting placed constraints on the actions of successful tokens. However, this setting was created intentionally in an effort to mirror the meritocratic ideology and highly individualistic orientation of North American society (Hofstede, 1980; Hsu, 1983; Spence, 1985). It also properly represents the actual experiences of most real-world tokens, where their solo status is the result of their own efforts at individual mobility combined with the discriminatory restrictive intergroup boundaries faced by members of their group.

Nonetheless, a potential critique of the procedure is that the individualistic orientation is overdone, making disruptive non-normative and collective actions impossible. However, participants in Expt 1 who were rejected under conditions of tokenism, although faced with the same situational constraints as successful tokens, were clearly less constrained in their actions. These participants showed a clear preference for non-normative action. In addition, other research using this same paradigm has examined the responses of disadvantaged group members facing an advantaged group that is completely closed to members of their group (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright *et al.*, 1990*a*; Wright & Taylor, 1998). Here, participants showed a clear preference for collective non-normative action. The behaviour of rejected participants in Expt 1, and the actions of participants in previous studies (see also Wright, 1997) appear to demonstrate that support for collective and non-normative actions is possible in the present paradigm, despite the individualistic nature of setting.

This critique, however, does raise questions for further consideration. Although individual mobility and the meritocratic ideal are a pervasive part of Western societies, there may be situations where an individual's mobility into a high-status group results, in part, from the efforts and support of other members of their disadvantaged in-group (i.e. community supported scholarships, in-group mentors, in-group voting for elected officials, etc.). In these cases, individual success is in part the result of collective effort or sacrifice. Under these circumstances successful tokens may acknowledge the assistance of the disadvantaged in-group and be much more likely to support actions directed at social change.

CONCLUSIONS

Disadvantaged group members who become token members of an advantaged group have the potential to play an important role in ongoing intergroup relations. If they were to use their newly acquired status and privileges to aid the members of their disadvantaged group, these tokens could be important contributors to social change. However, the present research findings consistently suggest that tokens are unlikely to support collective and non-normative behaviours by members of the disadvantaged group. Thus, instead of paving the way for increased representation of the disadvantaged group, successful tokens may be easily co-opted into the advantaged group and, thus, may at times serve as impediments to larger social change.

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